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Note on province names
Since 1975, the names of provinces in southern Vietnam have changed 
a number of times. In particular, between 1976 and the 1980s, many 
provinces were amalgamated to form larger ones. From 1990, the 
reverse process occurred, and some large provinces were divided up. 
The following list gives the names of the provinces in the Central Coast 
region and in the Mekong Delta in the period 1976–90 and the names 
used since 2005.
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Provinces in the Central Coast region
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1. Bình Trị Thiên
2. Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng
3. Nghĩa Bình
















The measurement of land areas and paddy yields varies across regions 
of Vietnam in terms of the unit used and its value. Villagers in Quảng 
Nam use sào (equal to 500 square metres), thước (one-fifteenth of 
1 sào), mẫu (equal to 10 sào or 0.5 hectare) and hectares (equal to 20 sào) 
to measure their land area. They often use ang (equal to 4.5 kilograms 
of paddy) to measure their paddy yield. Meanwhile, more productive 
villages in An Giang use công (1,000 sq m), mẫu (10 công or 1 ha) and 
hectares to measure their land area. Villagers often use gịa (equal to 





Vietnam has long been primarily an agrarian country. Land has always 
been an essential source of livelihoods, security and social status for 
the peasantry. Land is not only an important means of production, but 
also an important means of wealth, and has historically provided the 
strongest base for social and political power.1 In other words, land is 
the major concern not only for peasants, but also for political leaders 
competing for power and people’s allegiance and support. As in many 
other agrarian countries, in Vietnam, agrarian reforms have been 
carried out intermittently throughout its history, aimed at either 
stabilising existing power structures or consolidating new ones. 
Soon after Vietnam was reunified, leaders of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP) in the central government launched full-
scale social, economic and political reforms in the south to bring it 
into line with conditions in the socialist north and reunify the country 
politically, socially and economically. VCP leaders called this reform 
scheme the ‘socialist revolution’, and its aim was to transform Vietnam 
into a socialist country similar to other socialist states. The socialist 
revolution included socialist transformation and building. Socialist 
transformation was aimed at converting non-socialist elements into 
socialist ones, replacing private ownership of the main means of 
production with public ownership (collective and state) and eliminating 
institutions perceived to be ‘old’ and ‘backward’ and responsible for 
1  Christodoulou, D. (1990), The Unpromised Land: Agrarian Reform and Conflict Worldwide, 
London: Zed Books, p. 22. 
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class exploitation in order to build ‘new and advanced’ ones. Socialist 
building meant establishing and reinforcing new (socialist) production 
relations, new productive forces and institutions and a new culture. 
The VCP’s leaders reasoned that, through socialist tools of planning 
and ‘proletariat dictatorship’, they could successfully build up large-
scale socialist production and a ‘rationally’ structured agro-industrial 
economy, the two equally balanced legs of which (agriculture and heavy 
industry) would help move the economy rapidly forward. The  party 
leaders also believed that, under socialist production relations and 
systems of ownership, Vietnam would be able to end poverty and class 
exploitation and become an advanced country with a socialist system 
of large-scale production.2 
Having won the war and achieved the political reunification of Vietnam, 
the VCP strongly believed it could succeed in carrying forward the 
socialist revolution by building a centrally planned economy with 
large-scale production—a task it had not accomplished in the north. 
As Vietnam was an agricultural country, the VCP leaders considered 
agrarian reform a key component of the socialist revolution. Their 
reform or ‘socialist transformation of agriculture and agricultural 
collectivisation’ in the south had two main components: land 
redistribution and collectivisation. Redistribution was considered an 
important initial step of socialist agrarian reform. Socialist large-scale 
production or collective farming was the end goal of the transformation 
project. With high expectations of their capacity, the VCP leaders 
believed they could complete these projects within a few years.
This book shows that the results of land redistribution and agricultural 
collectivisation in the south varied from region to region. It also shows 
that, overall, socialist agrarian reform fell short of leaders’ visions and 
expectations. There are two main reasons for this: regional differences 
and local politics. In the Central Coast region, the initial conditions 
seemed to be favourable for collective farming. Prolonged and 
destructive war had rendered most peasant households poor, and the 
social and economic structures of rural communities were flattened 
and relatively homogeneous. The region’s new local authorities were 
2  Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam [hereinafter ĐCSVN] (2004), Nghị quyết lần thứ 24 của Ban chấp 
hành Trung ương Đảng khóa III [Resolution No. 24 of the Third Party Central Committee], in 
ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 36, 1975 [Party Document: Volume 36, 1975], Hà Nội: NXB 
Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 383.
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quickly consolidated thanks to a considerable number of returned 
southerners and ex-revolutionaries who were able to fill government 
positions. They were familiar with and loyal to VCP policies and were 
able to mobilise people to implement these.
In contrast, in the Mekong Delta, conditions even initially were 
unfavourable for collective farming. Living in more favourable 
environmental and socioeconomic conditions and with less devastation 
from the war, peasant households in the Mekong Delta were better off 
than their Central Coast counterparts. Their social structure was also 
highly stratified and diverse: land reforms before reunification had 
led to the development of a middle strata of peasants and, by 1975, 
this group accounted for a majority of the peasantry and was largely 
engaged in commercial agriculture. They preferred individual to 
collective farming. In addition, the new local authorities in the Mekong 
Delta and elsewhere in the Southern Region (Nam Bộ) found it difficult 
to exert social control and carry out the VCP’s postwar policies. Due to 
a shortage of cadres to fill new positions, local authorities had to recruit 
new cadres, a majority of whom were not former revolutionaries or 
southerners returning from the north. They were not familiar with the 
VCP leaders’ post-1975 land redistribution and collectivisation policies 
and showed little enthusiasm for them.
Thus, implementing land redistribution and collectivisation was 
completed faster and more easily in the Central Coast than in 
the Mekong Delta region. By 1980, the Central Coast had largely 
completed its socialist agricultural transformation. Meanwhile, the 
Mekong Delta failed to meet its target and, by the end of 1980, only 
8 per cent of peasant households and 6 per cent of agricultural land had 
been brought under collective farming. The slower transformation in 
the Mekong Delta was a result not only of stronger peasant resistance, 
but also of local cadres’ lack of commitment to the socialist project. 
Opposition to collectivisation and land redistribution came from both 
landowners and the intended beneficiaries of these reforms, some of 
whom even engaged in open and confrontational resistance and other 
kinds of politics. Meanwhile, local cadres were unenthusiastic about 
and lax in implementing the socialist transformation policy; they took 
steps to implement it only when higher-level authorities pressed them 
to do so.
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However, being resolute and persistent in their efforts to build socialist 
large-scale production, VCP leaders launched numerous directives 
and campaigns to urge local authorities in the south to complete the 
process. Only in the mid-1980s, after a decade of great effort, struggle 
and several policy modifications to ease local resistance, did authorities 
in the Mekong Delta and elsewhere in the Southern Region announce 
the completion of agrarian reform and collectivisation. Despite their 
efforts to establish collectives and bring peasants into these structures, 
VCP leaders were unable to direct peasants and local cadres to behave 
in line with their expectations. Thus, collective farming in Vietnam’s 
southernmost region performed poorly and failed substantially to 
achieve its stated goals.
Although villagers in the Central Coast appeared to comply with 
the policy of collectivisation, they tried their best to maximise their 
individual earnings regardless of the outcomes of collective work. They 
undertook collective work carelessly and deceitfully, and often stole 
collective inputs and equipment and encroached on collective land, while 
they devoted time and material investments to their own household’s 
economic activities, often at the expense of collective farming. In the 
Mekong Delta, many tried to evade collective farming as much as 
possible. Some joined collectives but did not actually participate in 
collective work; some participated in the work but just went through 
the motions; most did not take care of collective property. Many spent 
most of their time and effort on making a living somewhere else. 
Local cadres in both places also manifested various forms of 
misbehaviour. They were caught between their orders from the top and 
the reality of the peasants they governed. With a lack of pressure from 
higher authorities, cadres, especially in the Mekong Delta, were reluctant 
to enforce the socialist transformation policy; often they modified 
policies to accommodate villagers’ concerns and to protect local 
interests. However, when under pressure from the central government, 
local cadres carried out policies hastily and modified them to make them 
easier to implement, with little regard for either the overall purpose 
of the state’s policies or villagers’ interests. In  addition, several local 
cadres increasingly abused their positions and became self-serving. 
They managed collectives poorly, embezzled a considerable amount 
of agricultural inputs and produce and misappropriated peasant land. 
5
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Despite numerous campaigns by the central and provincial authorities 
to crack down on and correct such ‘bad behaviour’, these problems did 
not disappear but seemed to increase over time.
As in the north, in both the Central Coast and the Mekong Delta, 
due to evasion and noncompliance by peasants and local cadres, 
collective farming performed poorly. Although collectivisation helped 
improve irrigation systems, increased the number of crops per year 
and succeeded in introducing new seeds and technology, it performed 
poorly compared with the family-based farming that it tried to eliminate 
and replace. In fact, collective farming could not produce sufficient 
food for the society. By the mid-1980s, Vietnam faced a serious fall in 
food production and was on the brink of an economic crisis. In this 
context, the Sixth National Congress (in December 1986) released 
a ‘renovation policy’ (chính sách đổi mới) that abandoned the centrally 
planned economy and adopted a market-based one.
The economic component of đổi mới opened the way to new forms of 
ownership and management, and the resurgence of the private sector 
and the market. In this context, collective farming faced even more 
difficulties. Local cadres became even more lax about management and 
abused their positions to make use of market opportunities for personal 
benefit at the expense of collective farming. Meanwhile, many villagers 
refused or were not able to pay their debts or fulfil their obligations to 
the collectives. Some even returned land or abandoned it when they 
saw that their contracted land was unprofitable. 
The ultimate consequences of such deviant practices were a gradual 
demise in the efficiency of collective farming and consistent falls 
in food production and peasants’ living standards. Faced with local 
food shortages, villagers and local cadres had to initiate new farming 
arrangements. The aim of these experiments was to encourage villagers 
to work on collective land and keep collectives alive; however, this 
gradually derailed collective farming from its original intention and 
amounted to an informal return to individual farming. In other words, 
the failure of socialist agrarian reforms and collectivisation in the 
postwar era resulted significantly from the widespread involvement 
by peasants and local officials in everyday practices that deviated from 
official guidelines and the VCP leaders’ expectations.
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A few studies have addressed the agrarian reforms in southern 
Vietnam from 1975 to the late 1980s. Most are short articles, but they 
also include a few books and dissertations in Vietnamese.3 Recent 
books by Đặng Phong and Huy Đức reveal some secrets about how 
political and economic decisions were negotiated and formulated at 
the top leadership level.4 However, the existing literature provides scant 
detail and insufficient analysis of VCP leaders’ approach to post-1975 
agrarian reform and how such policies were carried out at the local 
level. In addition, the existing literature is largely silent on explanations 
of variations in villagers’ behaviour and policy outcomes across regions 
within southern Vietnam, and on the key factors contributing to the 
failure of socialist large-scale production and the shift in state agrarian 
policies. 
Writing on northern Vietnam’s agrarian reform, Ben Kerkvliet gives 
a rich account of everyday politics and convincingly explains how 
it significantly contributed to the demise of collective farming and 
modifications to Vietnam’s national policies. According to Kerkvliet, 
everyday politics includes ‘quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and 
acts that indirectly and for [the] most part privately endorse, modify, 
or resist prevailing procedures, rules, regulations, or order’.5 It involves 
3  Đào Duy Huấn (1988), Củng cố và hoàn thiện quan hệ sản xuất xã hội chủ nghĩa trong nông 
nghiệp tập thể hiện nay ở vùng Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long [Solidifying and perfecting socialist 
production relations in the agriculture of the Mekong Delta], PhD thesis, Học Viện Nguyễn Ái 
Quốc, Hà Nội; Ngo Vinh Long (1988), Some aspects of cooperativization in the Mekong Delta, 
in D. Marr and C. White (eds), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press; Huỳnh Thị Gấm (1998), Những biến đổi kinh tế xã hội ở nông thôn 
Đồng bằng sông Cửu Long 1975–1995 [Socioeconomic changes in the Mekong Delta from 1975–
1995], PhD thesis, Đại Học Khoa Học Xã Hội Nhân Văn, Hồ Chí Minh; Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991), 
Thực Trạng Nông Nghiệp, Nông Thôn và Nông Dân Việt Nam 1976–1990 [Agricultural and Rural 
Development in Vietnam 1976–1990], Hà Nội: NXB Thống Kê; Trần Hữu Đính (1994), Quá trình 
biến đổi về chế độ sở hữu và cơ cấu giai cấp nông thôn Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long (1969–1975) [The 
Process of Ownership and Class Structure Change in Rural Mekong Delta, 1969–1975], Hà Nội: 
NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội; Lê Thị Lộc Mai (2001), Quá trình giải quyết vấn đề ruộng đất và phát triển 
nông thôn ở Vĩnh Long giai đoạn Đổi mới 1986–1996 [Dealing with land problems to facilitate 
rural development in Vĩnh Long in the period 1986–1996], Masters thesis, Đại học Khoa học Xã 
hội & Nhân văn, Hồ Chí Minh; Nguyễn Minh Nhị (2004), An Giang: Lich sử tháo gỡ đột phá và 
chủ động hội nhập kinh tế thế giới [An Giang: The History of Breakthroughs and Active Integration 
into the World Economy], 15 August, Long Xuyên: Sở Nông Nghiệp và Phát Triển Nông Thôn 
An Giang; Hicks, N. (2005), Organizational adventures in district government, PhD thesis, The 
Australian National University, Canberra.
4  Đặng Phong (2009), Tư duy kinh tế Việt Nam 1975–1989 [The Economics of Vietnam 1975–
1989], Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất Bản Trí Thức; Huy Đức (2012), Bên Thắng Cuộc [The Winning Side], 
2 vols, Giai Phong: OsinBook.
5  Kerkvliet, B. J. (2005), The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed 
National Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 22.
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little or no organisation. Due to their discontent with collective farming, 
peasants relied on their own strategies for survival—aimed at making 
a living, raising their families and wrestling with daily problems. 
For example, they tried their best to ‘minimize the cooperative’s claim 
on their labour and to maximize their household-based production’.6 
They tried to minimise their effort, time and costs while maximising 
work-points. They took advantage of any opportunity to steal collective 
inputs, produce, time and equipment, while devoting time, materials 
and effort to their own household plots. According to Kerkvliet, 
although these tactics were low-key, dispersed, largely unorganised 
and nonconfrontational, and were often carried out individually, they 
occurred in many places at the same time and the cumulative effects 
of thousands of such actions therefore had a huge impact on the 
performance of collective farming in Vietnam. 
James Scott also claims the outcome of state policies almost always 
‘depends on the response and co-operation of real human subjects’. 
In  innumerable instances, ordinary people have played significant 
political roles. In particular, they have proven capable of undermining, 
resisting or even transforming state policies, even in authoritarian 
settings. For example, collectivisation of Soviet agriculture and 
‘villagisation’ in Tanzania failed badly, largely because they encountered 
strong resistance from peasants, ‘including flight, unofficial production, 
and trade, smuggling, and foot dragging’.7 The goal of such resistance 
is to thwart material extraction by states or dominant classes rather 
than to directly overthrow or transform them. Scott has shown that, 
in socialist states, foot-dragging and evasion in response to unpopular 
forms of collective agriculture can short-circuit grandiose policies 
dreamed up by national leaders.
In this book, I adopt and expand on James Scott’s notion of everyday 
forms of resistance and Ben Kerkvliet’s concept of everyday politics to 
examine how everyday politics played out under and affected post-1975 
national agrarian policies in different regions of southern Vietnam. 
By  focusing on two case studies—Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (QN-ĐN) 
province (now two separate provinces, Quảng Nam and Đà Nẵng) in 
the Central Coast region and An Giang province in the Mekong Delta—
6  Ibid., p. 2.
7  Scott, J. C. (1998), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 247.
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the book traces the rationale for and content of post-1975 agrarian 
reforms and socialist building in these two places. It examines how 
national agrarian policies were carried out and shows how everyday 
politics at the local level was able to divert the direction of policies 
issued by top-level VCP leaders. In particular, it examines similarities 
and differences in peasants’ and local cadres’ behaviours and politics in 
these two places, and the effects of local conditions and local politics 
on the ability of local authorities to implement the post-1975 agrarian 
reforms. As such, it provides regionally specific insights into postwar 
experiences of socialist agrarian reform and the local factors that led to 
the failure of and a shift in such policies nationwide.
This book argues that peasants’ everyday politics and local cadres’ 
malpractices and corruption played an important role in derailing 
the VCP’s post-1975 agrarian reforms in both the Central Coast and the 
Mekong Delta. Significant variation in the outcome of land reform and 
collectivisation policies arose from regional differences with regards 
to socioeconomic conditions and political capacity, and the forms and 
magnitude of peasant politics and local cadres’ noncompliance. Despite 
the variation, as in the north, in the Central Coast and the Mekong 
Delta, collective farming performed poorly; it was inferior to the private 
farming that it tried to replace and could not produce sufficient food for 
the society. Thus, collective farming failed to fulfil the VCP’s objectives 
of increased productivity, improved living standards for peasants and 
ending class exploitation in the countryside. To cope with production 
problems, local cadres and their fellow villagers had to modify or 
initiate new farming arrangements. Despite VCP leaders’ persistent 
efforts to strengthen and consolidate collective farming and crack down 
on local evasion, resistance and malpractice, these problems could not 
be rooted out, but rather persistently increased over time. Faced with 
food shortages and many other problems related to collective farming, 
VCP leaders gradually modified their policies, and eventually accepted 
and officially endorsed local initiatives. The  accumulated effects of 
piecemeal policy modifications led to collective farming gradually 
departing from the VCP’s original intentions for it. Finally, national 
leaders shifted their policies back to household-based farming in the 
late 1980s and, from then, collectives lost their purpose and were 




For my research, I selected the Mekong Delta in the south and the 
Central Coast in the north of what I call southern Vietnam, the territory 
formerly under the governance of the Republic of Vietnam (1955–75). 
In both regions, food crops, especially rice, have long been the primary 
farm produce. This sets the two regions apart from the South-East 
Region and the Central Highlands, in which industrial crops, rather 
than food crops, have been prominent—rubber and fruit trees in the 
former and coffee and rubber in the latter. While the Mekong Delta and 
the Central Coast have similarities, there are also notable differences. 
Population density on arable land in the Mekong Delta is lower than in 
the Central Coast. Village settlements in the Mekong Delta follow rivers 
and channels whereas most villages in the Central Coast are relatively 
isolated and surrounded by hedges and rice fields. Pre-1975 agrarian 
reforms seem to have had a greater impact in the Mekong Delta than 
in the Central Coast. This led to more commercial farming of food 
(including rice) and greater complexity in rural social structures in the 
Mekong Delta compared with the Central Coast, which had greater 
levels of subsistence agriculture and relatively homogeneous rural 
communities before 1975.
Within the two selected regions, I focused on two provinces: Quảng 
Nam province (previously part of Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng) in the Central 
Coast and An Giang province in the Mekong Delta. Within each 
province, I focused on one district: Thăng Bình in Quảng Nam and Chợ 
Mới in An Giang. In both districts, agrarian reform and collectivisation 
campaigns after 1975 were rather intense, perhaps more than in some 
other parts of the two provinces. In Thăng Bình district, I examined two 
communes (xã): Bình Lãnh, where provincial and district authorities 
established a pilot collective on 30 October 1977, and Bình Định, which 
underwent normal collectivisation. Most of my interviews were in Bình 
Lãnh’s Hiền Lộc village and Bình Định’s Thanh Yên village. In Chợ Mới, 
An Giang, I focused on Long Điền B commune in which provincial and 
district authorities built pilot production units (tập đoàn sản xuất) in the 
summer–autumn crop season of 1979 (after failing to experiment with 
collectives in the province). In Long Điền B commune, I interviewed 
villagers across its eight different hamlets.
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Interviews were one main source of data. I conducted two rounds of 
fieldwork: from September to October 2004 and from June to December 
2005. I spent most of my fieldwork time interviewing ordinary villagers 
and current and former officials at different levels who had experienced 
the socialist transformation of agriculture and collective farming 
from 1975 to the late 1980s. Most of these people were more than 
50 years old. The interviews were open-ended, rather than structured 
questionnaires. I asked people about their experiences, observations 
and their assessments of post-1975 agrarian issues related to my broad 
research questions. The specific questions asked of each informant 
varied depending on the person’s background and involvement, their 
comments and the information they provided, and what I had learned 
during the course of my research. When I found it convenient, I asked 
permission to tape-record interviews.
In Hồ Chí Minh City, I was able to interview two officials who had 
previously been staff members of the Committee for Southern 
Agricultural Transformation (Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Miền Nam, or 
BCTNNMN). In An Giang, I was able to interview three former staff 
members of the An Giang Committee for Agricultural Transformation 
(Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp An Giang, or BCTNNAG). In Chợ Mới, 
I interviewed three district officials and more than 15 commune, hamlet 
and production unit cadres who were directly engaged in carrying out 
agrarian policies from 1975 to the late 1980s. In Quảng Nam, I was able 
to interview three provincial officials, one local journalist, two district 
officials and more than 15 commune, collective and brigade cadres.
In terms of ordinary villagers, I was able to stay in selected villages for 
a total of four months in each province, so I had many opportunities 
to chat with and interview individuals and groups. In particular, I was 
able to interview more than 100 male and female villagers in each 
province. The interviews were carried out mostly in their homes, 
varying in length from 20 minutes to two hours. Some individuals 
were interviewed more than once. In my first round of fieldwork, I took 
notes to record my interviews. However, in the final round of fieldwork, 
thanks to the rapport established, I was able to tape-record more than 
60 interviews in each province. For the safety of informants, I generally 
use pseudonyms when referring to them.
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Documents are another primary source. In Hồ Chí Minh City, I was 
able to access and photocopy some relevant books, dissertations 
and national newspapers such as Nhân Dân (The People), Đại Đoàn 
Kết (Great Unity) and Sài Gòn Giải Phóng (Saigon Liberation) in the 
General Sciences Library (Thư viện Khoa Học Tổng Hợp) and Social 
Sciences Library (Thư viện Khoa Học Xã Hội). When interviewing staff 
members of the BCTNNMN, I was given some valuable committee 
reports. In An Giang and Quảng Nam, I acquired relevant materials—
published and unpublished—from numerous government agencies at 
different levels, such as people’s committees, departments of agriculture 
and rural development, departments of statistics and libraries. These 
documents include reports, surveys, statistics, historical records and 
studies done by commune, district, provincial and national agencies. 
Importantly, I was able to access and copy local newspapers, magazines 
and reports, ranging from 1974 to the early 1990s in the general library 
(Thư Viện Tổng Hợp) in Đà Nẵng City for Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng 
(QN-ĐN) province and from 1978 to the early 1990s in the An Giang 
Library in Long Xuyên City, An Giang province. (Unfortunately, 
An  Giang newspapers from before 1979 were unavailable because 
they were destroyed in a flood in 1978.) Although newspapers were 
organs of the VCP with a political propaganda purpose, I found them 
to be a valuable source of information if read carefully and selectively. 
The newspapers covered a wide range of information on national and 
provincial policies, statistics, policy implementation and results and 
daily struggles at the village level across different places in each province. 
It was common for articles to reveal or criticise policy shortcomings 
and problematic activities that had occurred a few years earlier as well 
as providing more accurate statistics some years after the event than 
had been available at the time. The newspapers often carried debates 
over agrarian issues, and local papers also frequently published readers’ 
letters or petitions regarding their land, property and other agrarian 
issues or their complaints about the corrupt practices of local cadres.
Organisation
Following this introduction to the book’s themes and approach, 
Chapter  2 examines VCP leaders’ objectives for the post-1975 
agrarian reforms. It also reviews the pre-1975 agrarian reforms and 
points out how these resulted in regional differences within southern 
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Vietnam. I found there were numerous political, social and economic 
objectives for the post-1975 agrarian reforms. The primary objective 
was consolidating power and building socialism, but VCP leaders also 
hoped reforms would solve their postwar economic problems and 
modernise the south’s agriculture.
Chapter 3 looks at post-1975 land reform and other preparations for 
collectivisation in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast and An Giang province 
in the Mekong Delta. I found that, in QN-ĐN, the local authorities 
quickly consolidated their power and successfully carried out 
preparatory policies such as land restoration and reform. Meanwhile, 
authorities in An Giang and many other provinces in the Mekong Delta 
faced difficulties consolidating power and had problems implementing 
preparatory policies such as land reform and crop conversion.
Chapter 4 examines the building of pilot collective organisations and 
the acceleration of collectivisation. I found that collectivisation in QN-
ĐN was achieved rapidly, but it faced major difficulties in An Giang. 
The reason was that collectivisation faced weaker peasant resistance 
in QN-ĐN than in An Giang. Moreover, local cadres in QN-ĐN were 
more loyal to the socialist transformation policy than their counterparts 
in An Giang. 
Chapter 5 examines the performance of collective organisations under 
the work-points system (1978–81). I found peasants’ everyday politics 
and local cadres’ malpractices contributed significantly to the poor 
performance of collective farming. As the process of collectivisation 
continued, peasants in QN-ĐN chased work-points at the expense of 
collective farming. Meanwhile, many of their counterparts in An Giang 
were not even undertaking collective work; they tried their best to evade 
or abandoned collective work as much as possible. And cadres in both 
places managed collectives poorly. Despite many cadres in QN-ĐN 
being loyal to the VCP’s agrarian policies, several abused their power at 
the expense of peasants’ and collectives’ interests. Meanwhile, cadres in 
An Giang were unenthusiastic about collective farming and exercised 
slack management of labour, finance, production and distribution of 
produce. Several also abused their positions and became self-serving. 
Despite numerous campaigns by the authorities to strengthen collective 
farming in both places, the malpractice among local peasants and local 
cadres could not be reduced. 
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Chapter 6 examines the modifications of the VCP’s agrarian policies 
and the adoption of the product contract system in An Giang and 
QN-ĐN. It also examines the second wave of land reform and 
collectivisation and the strengthening of collective farming from 1981 
to the late 1980s in An Giang and elsewhere in the Southern Region. 
The chapter shows that, in the first few years after the adoption of 
product contracts, the performance of collective farming improved 
significantly, in both QN-ĐN and An Giang provinces. In An Giang, 
product contracts saved some production units from collapse and 
facilitated the completion of the second wave of land redistribution and 
collectivisation because peasants seemed to accept the product contract 
system more than the work-points system. However, from 1985 to the 
late 1980s, collective farming in both An Giang and QN-ĐN was in 
crisis and similar problems arose in both places, owing to the effects of 
local politics. Performance again declined, peasants’ living standards 
dropped alarmingly and a new class of exploiters started to emerge.
Chapter 7 examines in depth the relationship between local politics, 
the  performance of collective farming under product contracts 
(1981  to  the late 1980s) and decollectivisation initiated at the local 
level. I found that collective farming under the product contract 
system continued to face major shortcomings and the impact of local 
politics. Despite differences in magnitude, peasants and local cadres 
in both places manifested similar forms of politics and noncompliant 
behaviour. Villagers in the Central Coast tried their best to enlarge 
their household economies by capturing collective resources, land and 
labour at the expense of the collective economy. Meanwhile, An Giang 
villagers tried their best to ensure their livelihoods by undertaking wage 
work elsewhere and using collective resources for their daily needs 
rather than investing in their collective fields. In the late 1980s, villagers 
in both places increasingly tried to avoid repaying debts and fulfilling 
their obligations to the collective; they wanted to return collective land 
or abandoned it when they saw that collective farming was unprofitable. 
Local cadres in both places increasingly abused their power and 
became self-serving. QN-ĐN cadres shifted most collective work 
tasks to peasants and did not perform their own services well. They 
stole collective property and irrationally increased the quotas and 
agricultural input prices for peasants. Meanwhile, An Giang cadres 
assigned almost all farming tasks to peasants and increasingly 
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embezzled resources, misappropriated peasant land, mismanaged 
collective funds, monopolised agricultural services and—in the words 
of my interviewees and official reports alike—oppressed the masses. 
It was common for local cadres to misappropriate land anywhere they 
could and they had more land than ordinary people. 
As discussed in Chapter 7 and the book’s conclusion, these kinds of 
local politics had a huge adverse effect on the survival of collective 
organisations and led to the failure of collective farming. In the late 
1980s, local authorities, especially in An Giang, started to rethink the 
direction and purpose of collective farming and created policies to 
correct previous shortcomings. New individual farming arrangements 
beyond the official orthodoxy were adopted and became widespread, not 
only in the Mekong Delta, but also in the Central Coast and elsewhere 
in Vietnam. At first, VCP leaders put great effort into cracking down 
on such practices, but they were unable to control them and gradually 
recognised their benefits and accepted them. Finally, they endorsed 




Map 1.1 Southern Vietnam, 2005
Source: Nhà xuất bản Bản Đồ (2005), Vietnam’s Administrative Atlas, Hà Nội: NXB Bản 
Đồ, p. 8.
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Map 1.2 Quảng Nam administrative map, 2005




Map 1.3 Thăng Bình district map, 2005
Source: Nhà xuất bản Bản Đồ (2005), Vietnam’s Administrative Atlas, Hà Nội: NXB Bản 
Đồ, p. 48.
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Map 1.4 An Giang administrative map, 2005




Map 1.5 Chợ Mới district map, 2005





Vietnamese Communist Party 
leaders’ reasons and objectives 
for post-1975 agrarian reform
Introduction
After the military victory of April 1975, southern Vietnam was under 
the control of Hanoi’s government in general and the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP) leaders in particular. The VCP very quickly 
decided to remake the south in line with the socialist north. They called 
for a ‘socialist revolution’ or ‘socialist transformation and building’ in 
the south, a key component of which was the socialist transformation 
of agriculture.
According to Đặng Phong, the Secretary-General of the VCP, Lê Duẩn 
was the principal architect of North Vietnam’s economic model during 
1960–75 and unified Vietnam’s economic model from 1975 until his 
death in 1986. Therefore, Vietnam’s post-1975 economic model in 
the south was heavily influenced by Lê Duẩn’s thoughts and North 
Vietnam’s model.1 Postwar ‘economic problems and the reunification of 
Vietnam after so many years of war’, Christine White contends, created 
‘an unfavourable context for an open, innovative, and creative approach 
to experimentation with alternative routes to socialism’.2 
1  Đặng Phong, The Economics of Vietnam 1975–1989, pp. 72–3.
2  White, C. P. (1988), Alternative approaches to the socialist transformation of agriculture 
in postwar Vietnam, in D. Marr and C. White (eds), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist 
Development, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 134–43.
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This chapter will not focus on internal debates and decision-making 
processes at the top level. Instead, it examines the main reasons the 
VCP decided to carry out this process in the south. It also explores the 
development model the VCP pursued and its rationale. In particular, 
it examines the original objectives, content and steps of the post-1975 
socialist agricultural transformation and socialist building. Before 
examining these, however, it is essential to provide an overview of 
pre-1975 land and agrarian reforms and their legacy.
Overview of southern Vietnam’s pre-1975 
land tenure and agrarian reforms
In precolonial times, Vietnam had three intertwined and competing 
forms of landownership: state, village and individual.3 Large portions 
of  village land were communally owned, inalienable by law and 
periodically distributed among the male inhabitants. Those who 
were outsiders or not born in the village were excluded from a share 
of communal land.4 From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, 
Vietnamese territory gradually expanded to the south and reached the 
vast plains of the Mekong Delta. To encourage this southward land 
reclamation, the state allowed peasants to claim and own as much 
land as they wanted. This led to a land tenure system in the Southern 
Region that was different to that in the rest of Vietnam. Private land 
became dominant while levels of communal land were insignificant.5 
French colonial rule brought about a major upheaval in Vietnam’s land 
tenure system. French policies favoured large landowners at the expense 
of traditional small landowners. The French government granted large 
tracts of land—whether free, at cheap prices or at auction—to French 
colonists and their Vietnamese collaborators.6 By the 1930s, all regions 
3  Vũ Huy Thúc (1979), Tìm hiểu chế độ ruộng đất Việt Nam nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX [Examining 
Vietnam’s Land Tenure System in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century], Hà Nội: NXB Khoa Học 
Xã Hội, p. 11.
4  White, C. (1981), Agrarian reform and national liberation in the Vietnamese revolution 
1920–1957, PhD thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, p. 28.
5  Nguyễn Đình Đầu (1992), Chế Độ Công Điền Công Thổ Trong Lịch Sử Khẩn Hoang Lập Ấp 
ở Nam Kỳ Lục Tỉnh [Land Tenure System in the Southern Region of Vietnam in the History of Land 
Reclamation], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Trẻ, pp. 61, 82; Vũ Huy Thúc, Examining Vietnam’s Land Tenure 
System, pp. 215–16.
6  White, Agrarian reform and national liberation, pp. 31–2.
23
2 . VIETNAMESE CoMMuNIST PARTy LEAdERS’ REASoNS ANd oBjECTIVES
of Vietnam faced a severely unequal pattern of landholding distribution. 
In the Mekong Delta, a small group of landlords owned much of the land 
and tenants farmed 80 per cent of cultivated land.7 In 1953, near the end 
of colonial rule, the Bảo Đại government put forth an agrarian policy 
to compete with the Việt Minh’s agrarian reforms. The land reform 
decrees (cải cách điền địa) that were issued advocated rent reduction, 
security of land tenure and modest restrictions on the maximum size of 
holdings.8 This reform was unsuccessful, however, because the Bảo Đại 
government made no serious effort at implementation.9 
After the collapse of French colonialism in 1954, Vietnam was divided 
until its reunification in 1975. In the north, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam pursued land redistribution and agricultural collectivisation. 
Land reform was carried out vigorously and violently between 1953 and 
1957, with fields redistributed more or less equally between all farming 
households.10 Land reform was considered a necessary and immediate 
step towards collectivisation.11 By 1960, North Vietnam had completed 
collectivisation.12 In the south, Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm also 
considered land reform a top national policy when he came to power. 
His Ordinance No. 57 (22 October 1956) called for land redistribution 
by limiting maximum holdings to 100 hectares plus 15 hectares of 
ancestral (patrimonial) land (ruộng hương hỏa). Any holding in excess 
of that limit was subject to expropriation (truất hữu).13 Ordinance No. 
57 was supposed to affect 2,035 Vietnamese landlords (including 12 in 
7  Callison, C. S. (1983), Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social, and Political 
Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam, New York: University Press of America, 
p. 39.
8  Trần Phương (1968), Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Việt Nam [Land Revolution in Vietnam], Hà Nội: 
NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội, pp. 247–8.
9  Prosterman, R. L. and Riedinger, J. M. (1987), Land Reform and Democratic Development, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 120.
10  Wiegersma, N. (1988), Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution—Patriarchy and 
Collectivity in the Rural Economy, New York: St Martin’s Press, p. 139.
11  Moise, E. E. (1976), Land reform and land reform errors in North Vietnam, Pacific Affairs 
49(1), pp. 70–92.
12  Kerkvliet, B. (1999), Accelerating cooperatives in rural Vietnam, 1955–1961, in B. Dahm, 
V. J. H. Houben, M. Grossheim, K. W. Endres and A. Spitzenpfeil (eds), Vietnamese Villages in 
Transition: Background and Consequences of Reform Policies in Rural Vietnam, Passau, Germany: 
Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Passau, pp. 53–88.
13  Quang Truong (1987), Agricultural collectivization and rural development in Vietnam: 
A  north/south study (1955–1985), PhD thesis, Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 
pp.  141–2; Trần Phương, Land Revolution in Vietnam, pp. 252–3; Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller 
in the Mekong Delta, p. 43.
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the Central Coast) with holdings of more than 100 hectares, and 200 
French landlords. In other words, 650,000 hectares of land were to be 
expropriated.14 However, by the end of 1967, only 275,000 hectares had 
been redistributed, to 130,000 families, accounting for less than one-
eighth of South Vietnam’s cultivated land and one-tenth of its tenant 
farmers.15
Following the fall of the Ngô Đình Diệm government in November 
1963 and amid growing insecurity and political instability, successive 
governments in the south made no further efforts towards land reform 
until Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s tenure in 1967. On 26 March 1970, backed by 
the United States, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s government launched its Land 
to the Tiller (LTTT) program, in the hope of gaining peasant support 
against the growing National Liberation Front (NLF). The LTTT 
program was similar to distribution programs carried out years earlier 
in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.16 By February 1975, some 1,136,705 
hectares—nearly half of the rice-growing land in the south—had been 
redistributed. Under the LTTT program, 77 per cent of tenants became 
landowners.17 In addition to the Saigon government’s land reforms, 
the NLF carried out rent reduction and land redistribution in areas 
under its control, which were known as ‘liberated areas’ (vùng giải 
phóng). NLF reforms also contributed significantly to the rise of middle 
landowners. By 1969, middle peasants made up about 51–87 per cent 
of the rural population in NLF-controlled areas.18 
14  Trần Phương, Land Revolution in Vietnam, pp. 265–72.
15  Prosterman and Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development, p. 126.
16  Wiegersma, Vietnam, p. 191.
17  Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta, pp. 327–32.
18  Elliott, D. W. (2003), The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong 
Delta 1930–1975, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 1, 451. According to David Elliott, to analyse 
the  politics of land, the VCP developed several class categories for rural society, including 
landlords (địa chủ), petty bourgeoisie (tiểu tư sản), capitalists (tư sản), rich peasants (phú nông), 
middle peasants (trung nông), poor peasants (bần nông) and landless peasants (cố nông). Middle 
peasants were those who owned sufficient land, farm animals and tools to support their families 
(p. 459).
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In summary, between 1945 and 1975, land tenure patterns in 
the south gradually changed as a result of reforms carried out by 
the Việt Minh, governments in Saigon and the NLF, and also as a result 
of the transformation of rural society during the war.19 By  1975 in 
the  Mekong Delta, 70 per cent of the rural population were middle 
peasants who owned 80 per cent of the cultivated land, 60 per cent 
of the total farm equipment and 90 per cent of draught animals.20 
Unlike the agrarian sector in North Vietnam, which, at the beginning 
of the land reforms was dominated by landlords, the agrarian sector 
in the Southern Region was dominated by middle peasants who 
engaged largely in commercial agriculture. This large cohort of middle 
peasants wanted to continue to farm their own land and sell their own 
crops. They proved resistant to the post-1975 land redistribution and 
collectivisation in the south.21 
Meanwhile, in the Central Coast region, the significant factor 
transforming the land tenure system was war rather than any pre-1975 
reforms. The war had disrupted or destroyed any positive effect of 
land reforms carried out by governments in Saigon or the NLF. It had 
caused a large proportion of rural people to live in enclosed camps and 
much of their land had been abandoned. After the war, many peasants 
returned home without capital, draught animals or farm tools. Thus, 
soon after reunification, the agricultural sector in the Mekong Delta 
had reached a higher level of economic development than that in the 
Central Coast. The social structure and rural economy in the Mekong 
Delta were more diverse than in the Central Coast. These regional 
disparities contributed to differences in peasants’ behaviour and the 
results of post-1975 agrarian policies.
19  Grossheim, M. (1999), The impact of reforms on the agricultural sector in Vietnam: 
The  land issue, in B. Dahm, V. J. H. Houben, M. Grossheim, K. W. Endres and A. Spitzenpfeil 
(eds), Vietnamese Villages in Transition: Background and Consequences of Reform Policies in Rural 
Vietnam, Passau, Germany: Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Passau, p. 97.
20  Ngo Vinh Long (1988), Some aspects of cooperativization in the Mekong Delta, in D. Marr 
and C. White (eds), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, p. 169.
21  Elliott, The Vietnamese War, p. 4.
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Post-1975 agrarian reform in the south
Soon after the war, at the 24th plenum of the Third Party Congress, 
in September 1975, the VCP began planning how to bring the south 
into line with the north politically, socially and economically and 
make the whole nation socialist.22 At this meeting, the party released 
a resolution that outlined the ‘ongoing tasks of Vietnam’s revolution in 
the new age’, one of which was to ‘accomplish national reunification and 
take the whole nation fast, vigorously and firmly to socialism’.23
On 25 April 1976, the official political reunification of the country 
came about through a national election to establish a unified National 
Assembly.24 At the first session of this new assembly, in June 1976, 
General Secretary Lê Duẩn clarified the tasks of economic reunification 
for both the north and the south of Vietnam: 
[T]he north must continue speeding up the task of building socialism 
and improving socialist production relations; the south must proceed 
simultaneously on the task of socialist transformation and the task of 
socialist building.25 
The aim, according to party leaders, was to transform non-socialist 
elements into socialist ones, replace private ownership of the main 
means of production with public ownership (collective and state) and 
eliminate perceived ‘old’ and ‘backward’ institutions and build ‘new 
and advanced’ ones. Socialist building meant establishing new, socialist 
production relations, new productive forces, new super-infrastructure 
and a new culture. 
22  The Third Central Committee was the committee formally chosen at the time of the third 
party congress in 1960.
23  ĐCSVN (2004), Nghị quyết hội nghị lần thứ 24 của Ban Chấp Hành Trung Ương ĐCSVN, số 
247/NQ-TW (ngày 29 tháng 9 năm 1975) [Resolution No. 247/NQ-TW (29 September 1975)], in 
ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 36, 1975 [Party Document: Volume 36, 1975], Hà Nội: NXB 
Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 369. I used the electronic versions of the VCP’s documents (Văn Kiện Đảng 
Toàn Tập) downloaded from the party’s website: www.vcp.org.vn (accessed 13 February 2006).
24  Phạm Văn Chiến (2003), Lịch Sử Kinh Tế Việt Nam [History of the Vietnamese Economy], 
Hà Nội: NXB Đại Học Quốc Gia, p. 152.
25  Lê Duẩn (2004), Toàn dân đoàn kết xây dựng tổ quốc Việt Nam thống nhất, xã hội chủ nghĩa 
[Calling for the whole country’s solidarity to build a socialist and unified country], in ĐCSVN, 
Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 37, 1976 [Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính 
Trị Quốc Gia, p. 140.
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To build socialism in the rural south, as in the north, the post-1975 
government called for socialist transformation to establish large-
scale production in agriculture. This transformation had two main 
components: land redistribution and collectivisation. The former was 
considered a temporary measure while the latter was the end goal 
of socialist revolution in the countryside.
Post-1975 land reform in the south
Despite inheriting a land tenure system that was more or less equitable 
and dominated largely by middle peasants, the VCP decided to carry 
out land reform in the south. It gave several reasons for this reform. 
First, it was aimed at eliminating the social base of potential opponents 
such as landlords, rural capitalists and rich peasants. Resolution 
numbers 247/NQ-TW (29 September 1975) and 254/NQ-TW (15 July 
1976) and Directive No. 235/CT-TW (20 September 1976) stressed 
the ‘elimination of the vestiges of colonist and feudal exploitation of 
land’, ‘nationalisation of farms and the land of foreign capitalists’, and 
the ‘expropriation of farms, the lands of comprador capitalists, 
and treacherous landlords’ and of landlords who had fled abroad. 
Second, it was aimed at fulfilling the promise of the LTTT program, 
which the party used to attract peasants’ support during the war. The 
party called this ‘completing the remaining task of land revolution in 
the south’ (hoàn thành nhiệm vụ cách mạng ruộng đất ở Miền Nam).26
Third, the party also wanted land reform to resolve postwar economic 
problems, especially food shortages. After Vietnam’s reunification, 
both China and the United States cut their food aid to the country, so 
the party had to make food security and self-sufficiency top priorities. 
Land reform therefore aimed to increase food production and facilitate 
solidarity among peasants. The party’s Directive No. 235 (dated 20 July 
1976) stated: 
26  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 247/NQ-TW, pp. 368–406; ĐCSVN (2004), Nghị quyết của Bộ chính 
trị số 254/NQ-TW (ngày 15 tháng 7 năm 1976) về những công tác trước mắt ở Miền Nam [Politburo 
Resolution No. 254/NQ-TW (15 July 1976) on ongoing work in the south], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện 
Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 37, 1976 [Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc 
Gia, pp. 200–25; Ban Bí Thư (BBT) (1976), Chỉ thị 235/CT-TW của Ban bí thư Trung ương Đảng 
Cộng Sản Việt Nam (ngày 20 tháng 9 năm 1976) về việc thực hiện nghị quyết của Bộ chính trị về vấn đề 
ruộng đất ở Miền Nam [Directive No. 235 of the Secretariat of the Central Committee Communist Party 
of Vietnam on the Implementation of the Politburo’s Land Resolution in the South], 20 September, 
Hà Nội: Ban bí thư Trung ương Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam, p. 2 (provided by a former staffer of the 
Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation in the south).
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Resolving the land problem in the south is aimed at not only eliminating 
the vestiges of feudal and colonist exploitation and making the landless 
and the land-short have means of production to make a living but also 
facilitating peasant solidarity and production … [Therefore,] in areas 
where the land problem is basically resolved, [we] can just carry out 
land reform in some necessary cases, not undo and do it again. In areas 
with vestiges of feudal and colonist exploitation, [we] will attempt to 
address that fast, definitely by 1976. Note that when sharing land 
to peasants, [we] must avoid dividing land into small parcels that are 
unfavourable for production.27
Finally, as in other socialist countries, Vietnam’s post-1975 land reforms 
were temporary and preparatory measures towards collectivisation. 
However, instead of taking a more radical approach, as in the north 
in 1953–57 (and as occurred in China in the 1950s), the government 
of reunified Vietnam took a more moderate and gradual approach in 
the south, although the content and emphasis of these reforms varied 
over time.28 There are at least three main reasons the VCP chose this 
approach.
First, according to VCP accounts, party leaders recognised the positive 
legacy of previous agrarian reforms and admitted that ‘the landlord 
class had already been largely eliminated’ and ‘the majority of land now 
belonged to peasants’.29 One party scholar also noted that, by 1975–76, 
thanks to land reforms between the 1950s and the early 1970s, middle 
peasants (trung nông) made up the majority of farming households.30 
So, although party leaders knew that land and machinery were not 
distributed equally, especially in the Mekong Delta, the tenancy 
problem had already been largely eliminated in the south and certainly 
was not as serious as it had been in the north during the 1950s.31 
A government report said tenancy remained a problem in only a few 
27  BBT, Directive No. 235.
28  Nolan, P. (1976), Collectivization in China: Some comparisons with the USSR, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 3(2): 192–220, at p. 203. From 1975 to 1978, the authorities emphasised eliminating 
exploitation ahead of land redistribution. However, when collectivisation in the Mekong Delta 
failed to achieve its expected goal, the party attributed the failure to the incompleteness of land 
reform. Land redistribution (điều chỉnh ruộng đất) was therefore given prominence in the early 
1980s, touching not only upper–middle peasants, but also middle peasants.
29  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 247/NQ-TW, p. 382.
30  Lâm Quang Huyên (1985), Cách Mạng Ruộng Đất ở Miền Nam Việt Nam [The Land 
Revolution in South Vietnam], Hà Nội: NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội, p. 189.
31  Lê Duẩn (1980), Cải Tạo Xã Hội Chủ Nghĩa ở Miền Nam [Socialist Transformation in the 
South], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 74.
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rural areas that had previously been under the prolonged control of 
Saigon’s government; the tenanted land accounted for only about 
1 per cent of total agricultural land, and the land rent was about 20 gịa 
(400 kg) of paddy per hectare.32 
Second, as well as fulfilling its political objectives, the party tried to 
minimise any negative economic effects of reform. A radical reform 
program could cause chaos and a significant fall in food production. 
This is why VCP leaders often emphasised land reform be carried out 
by ‘negotiating with each other’, ‘helping and unifying each other’, 
‘being affectionate and rational’ (có tình có lý) and ‘allowing cultivators 
to continue to farm on parts of their current land’ (giữ nguyên canh là 
chính). Party leaders argued that this approach could avoid disrupting 
agricultural production, strengthen peasants’ solidarity and make 
collectivisation easier.33 
Finally, although I found little evidence in official documents, it seems 
the party had learned a costly lesson from the radical land reforms in 
the north and did not want to repeat it in the south.34 Party leaders still 
classified rural capitalists, rich peasants and upper–middle peasants 
as the ‘exploiting’ class and considered wage labour a capitalist form 
of exploitation.35 Party leaders retained their objective to eliminate 
the enemies of socialism in the south, as they had in the north in the 
1950s, but this was to be achieved in a quieter and more gradual way. 
The method was similar to that of re-education camps from which 
thousands of ex-government officials and supporters were quietly and 
discreetly sent to prison.36 
32  Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Miền Nam [hereinafter BCTNNMN] (1984), Báo cáo tình hình 
ruộng đất và quá trình điều chỉnh ruộng đất trong nông thôn Nam Bộ [Report on Land Redistribution 
in the Southern Region], January, Hồ Chí Minh: Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Miền Nam, p. 3. Gịa 
is often used to measure paddy weights in the Southern Region (Nam Bộ). It is equal to 20 kg; 
therefore, 20 giạ is equal to 400 kg (ĐCSVN, Politburo Resolution No. 254/NQ-TW, pp. 214–16).
33  BBT (2004), Directive No. 235, pp. 279–80.
34  I found little evidence of this in official documents. In interviews, however, many local 
cadres, including former cadres of the Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation in the 
south, said these things to me (Fieldwork in Vietnam, May–December 2005).
35  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 247/NQ-TW.
36  Thompson, L. C. (2010), Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975–1982, Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Co.
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Socialist transformation of agriculture 
for collectivisation
Because the post-1975 agrarian reform was a key component of the 
socialist revolution, it is difficult to separate it from other economic and 
social reforms. To understand the rationale for or original objectives of 
this transformation in the south, it is necessary to examine them in the 
context of the overall socialist revolution. 
According to party accounts—such as the second plenum’s resolution 
of the fourth Communist Party Congress, the Secretariat’s Directive 
No. 15/CT-TW (4 August 1977) and the Politburo’s Directive No. 43/
CT-TW (14 April 1978)—the objectives of socialist transformation in 
agriculture, or agricultural collectivisation, included ‘taking agriculture 
into socialist large-scale production’; ‘eliminating exploitation and the 
causes of exploitation, backwardness and poverty’; ‘facilitating the 
collective mastery of the labouring people and developing agricultural 
production’; ‘building up technical bases and bringing advanced science 
and techniques into production to increase productivity’; ‘improving 
step by step the living standards of the peasants and constructing 
a new way of life in rural areas’; ‘contributing to the reorganisation of 
productive forces at the national level’; and ‘contributing to meeting 
the essential requirements for food and food stuff, industrial inputs 
and exports, and making agriculture a favourable base for socialist 
industrialisation’. The following sections will pinpoint in detail each 
of these objectives.37 
37  ĐCSVN (2004), Nghị quyết Hội nghị lần thứ hai của Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng 
khóa IV, số 03/NQ-TW (ngày 19 tháng 8 năm 1977) [Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party IV (19 August 1977)], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng 
Toàn Tập: Tập 38, 1977 [Party Document: Volume 38, 1977], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, 
p. 298; ĐCSVN (2005), Chỉ thị của Ban bí thư số 15/CT-TW (ngày 4 tháng 8 năm 1977) về việc 
thí điểm cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa ở Miền Nam [Secretariat’s Directive No. 15/CT-TW (4 August 
1977) on experimenting with socialist agricultural transformation in the south], in ĐCSVN, Văn 
Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 38, 1977 [Party Document: Volume 38, 1977], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị 
Quốc Gia, pp. 741–7; ĐCSVN (2004), Chỉ thị của Bộ chính trị, số 43/CT-TW (ngày 14 tháng 
4 năm 1978) về việc nắm vững và đẩy mạnh công tác cải tạo nông nghiệpở Miền Nam [Politburo’s 
Directive No. 43 on intensifying agricultural transformation in the south], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện 
Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 39, 1978 [Party Document: Volume 39, 1978], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc 
Gia, pp. 183–91.
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From small and spontaneous to large-scale and 
planned production
The resolution of the fourth Communist Party Congress highlighted 
the role of agriculture in Vietnam’s new era: 1) producing sufficient food 
for the consumption needs of the whole society and for food reserves; 
2) supplying raw materials for industrialisation; and 3) producing for 
export.38 The party believed collectivisation and collective ownership 
would make it easy to plan production at regional and national levels. 
It would also be easy to construct large areas of concentrated and 
specialised agricultural production. Through large-scale production, it 
would be possible for agriculture to adopt new and modern techniques 
and use science to push intensive farming (thâm canh), increase the 
number of crops per year (tăng vụ), expand cultivated areas (mở rộng 
diện tích), expand irrigation (thuỷ lợi hoá), increase mechanisation 
(cơ giới hoá) and adopt new seeds (giống mới).39 The combination of all 
these factors could give Vietnam a modern and productive agricultural 
sector that guaranteed sufficient food production for the whole society 
plus surplus for industrialisation. 
According to party leaders, the south would play an important role 
in fulfilling these new tasks because it possessed an abundance of 
fertile land, farm equipment and skilled labour, especially in the 
Southern Region (Nam Bộ).40 The south, according to one study, had 
about 3.2 million hectares of cultivated land compared with 2 million 
hectares in the north. Moreover, the south had the potential to expand 
its agricultural land to 10 million hectares, compared with 4 million 
hectares in the north. Of this, the Mekong Delta would be able to 
extend agricultural production to 1,032,000 additional hectares of land; 
the South-Eastern Region to 779,000 hectares; the Central Highlands, 
1,366,000 hectares; and Zone V of the Central Coast, 652,000 hectares.41 
38  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second Plenum.
39  ĐCSVN (2004), Nghị Quyết của Đại hội Đảng lần thứ IV của Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam 
(ngày 20 tháng 12 năm 1976) [Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam (20 December 1976)], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 37, 1976 
[Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, pp. 930–2.
40  Phan Văn Đáng (1978), Tập dượt đi lên hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Experiment with agricultural 
collectives], in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Con đường làm ăn tập thể của nông dân [The Collective 
Farmer’s Way], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tổng Hợp Thành Phõ, (TP) Hồ Chí Minh, p. 110.
41  Nguyễn Trần Trọng (1980), Những vấn đề công tác cải tạo và xây dựng nông nghiệp ở các tỉnh 
phía Nam [Ongoing Tasks for Transforming and Building the South’s Agriculture], Hà Nội: NXB 
Nông Nghiệp, p. 182.
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Despite placing a high value on the south’s agricultural potential, 
party leaders strongly criticised it for ‘individual farming’, ‘fragmented 
landholding’, ‘unequal development’ and the influence of capitalism.42 
They argued ‘the fragmentation of agricultural production results from 
small-scale production, individualised farming aimed at fulfilling 
subsistence and narrow demands of local markets’.43 Individual farming 
was ‘spontaneous, unplanned’ (tự phát, tuỳ tiện) and ‘fragmented’ 
(manh mún). It had ‘a low level of specialisation and cooperation’ and 
was ‘technically backward’.44 Moreover, the individual farming system, 
party leaders believed, had ‘backward’ production relations that 
hindered adoption of modern techniques and better use of land.45 
In general, according to the party, the south had high agricultural 
potential that had not been fully exploited. The task was therefore to 
transform the old system of agriculture into a new one of ‘planned, 
concentrated and large-scale production’, ‘specialisation’ (chuyên môn 
hoá), ‘cooperativisation’ (hợp tác hoá), ‘linkagisation’ (liên hiệp hoá) 
and collectivisation.46 
Eliminating exploitation and its causes, poverty 
and backwardness 
In the view of party leaders, land redistribution would provisionally 
eliminate exploitation in farming but would not eliminate the causes of 
exploitation.47 A party scientist even argued that ‘eliminating the feudal 
land tenure system and implementing the slogan “land to the tillers” 
42  Ibid.
43  Hồng Giao (1984), Đưa Nông nghiệp lên một bước lớn Xã hội chủ nghĩa [Taking Agriculture 
One Step Towards Socialist Large-Scale Production], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 23.
44  Trần Văn Doãn (1986), Như thế nào là nông nghiệp một bước lên sản xuất lớn xã hội chủ nghĩa 
[What is One Step of Agriculture Towards Socialist Large-Scale Production], Hà Nội: NXB Nông 
Nghiệp, p. 5.
45  Võ Văn Kiệt (1985), Thực hiện đồng bộ ba cuộc cách mạng ở nông thôn [Simultaneous 
Execution of Three Revolutions in Rural Areas], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tổng Hợp TP Hồ Chí Minh, 
pp. 47, 128; Nguyễn Trần Trọng, Ongoing Tasks, p. 9.
46  Nguyễn Trần Trọng, Ongoing Tasks, p. 9; Tố Hữu (1979), Phát động phong trào quần chúng 
thực hiện thắng lợi công cuộc cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa đối với nông nghiệp Miền Nam [Campaign 
to succeed in socialist agricultural transformation in the south], in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Khẩn 
trương và tích cực đẩy mạnh phong trào hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp Miền Nam [Urgently and Positively 
Promote the Acceleration of Collectivisation in the South], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 42.
47  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 10. The party believed without collectivisation 
a few successful farming households would end up owning much of the land, undermining the 
ideal of social and economic equality.
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were in fact beneficial to the development of capitalism in rural areas’.48 
Rural households would soon become unequal. Replacing private 
ownership with collective ownership would guarantee the elimination 
of exploitation and its causes as well as poverty and backwardness.49 
At the second plenum of the fourth party congress (6–16 December 
1977), in assessing the achievements and the shortcomings of the 
past 20 years of collectivisation in the north, Lê Duẩn minimised the 
failure of the north to increase productivity and the living standards 
of peasants. Instead, he emphasised the achievements. Collectivisation 
in the north, he said, had eliminated the cause of class conflicts in 
rural areas, facilitated solidarity among different rural groups (such as 
religious and non-religious people, Kinh people and ethnic minorities) 
and protected the livelihoods of people, especially the elderly, infants, 
invalids and the families of war martyrs (gia đình thương binh liệt sĩ). 
Second, it had improved irrigation, facilitated new farming techniques 
and increased the number of crops harvested per year. All these factors 
led to ‘an increase in productivity and food production in the north 
despite still facing stressful food shortage in the time of calamity’. Third, 
it changed the face of rural society; thanks to collectivisation, cultural, 
education, healthcare and material conditions in rural areas had 
gradually improved. Finally, it played an essential role in contributing 
to  the defeat of the American invasion and saving the country. 
He believed collectivisation in the south could achieve similar results.50 
Backing socialist industrialisation and ensuring food security
The leaders of some socialist countries, such as Russia and China, 
considered agriculture to be a source of financial surpluses for carrying 
out industrialisation and collectivisation as the keys to state-centred 
accumulation and the primacy of the growth of heavy industry.51 
Post-1975 agrarian reform in Vietnam was also aimed at supporting 
industrialisation as well as ensuring food security for the whole society.
48  Nguyễn Huy (1985), Mấy vấn đề lý luận và thực tiễn của cách mạng quan hệ trong nông 
nghiệp nước ta [Theories and Practices of Revolution in the Production Relations of Our Country’s 
Agriculture], Hà Nội: NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội, p. 121.
49  Đại Đoàn Kết (1977), Nghị quyết lần thứ II: Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa IV ra 
nghị quyết [Resolution II of the Central Committee of the Party IV], Đại Đoàn Kết, 3 September 
1977, p. 11.
50  ĐCSVN (2004), Đề Cương kết luận của đồng chí Lê Duẩn tại Hội nghị lần thứ II [Lê Duẩn’s 
final statements at second plenum], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 38, 1977 [Party 
Document: Volume 38, 1977], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, pp. 254–5.
51  Selden, M. (1994), Pathways from collectivization: Socialist and post-socialist agrarian 
alternatives in Russia and China, Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 17(4), pp. 423–49, at p. 425; 
ĐCSVN, Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress, p. 917.
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During the war, both the north and the south had relied heavily on 
foreign aid, including food.52 However, soon after the war, this aid 
was gradually cut off or significantly reduced, and some imported 
foods were no longer available.53 Ensuring food for the whole society 
therefore became a top concern of the VCP. With collectivisation, party 
leaders believed, Vietnam could deal with its food shortage. Moreover, 
collectivisation would create conditions in which ‘every labourer has 
a job, every field is properly used and every industry can develop’.54 
Controlling rural society and consolidating power
Party leaders attached great importance to controlling rural areas in 
times of war and post war. In wartime, within a competitive environment 
and focused on winning the war, the party had adopted policies 
favouring peasants’ interests, which Brantly Womack calls ‘mass-
regarding in policy’.55 However, reunification changed the context in 
terms of not only power relations between the party and the peasants, 
but also the main concerns of the party. Although the party still paid 
attention to peasants’ interests, its ideology favoured other matters, 
too—such as controlling society, land, labour, production and grains to 
strengthen its socialist building projects.
In other words, the primary concern of the leaders of reunified Vietnam 
was to control the south politically, economically and socially, to 
consolidate their power and reorganise production according to their 
socialist blueprint. Party leaders often called for a strategy of ‘holding 
firmly to the proletariat dictatorship’ to control and manage all aspects 
of society and the economy, monitoring people’s political, economic, 
cultural and social activities.56 Socialist transformation included 
eliminating the political, social and economic bases of all perceived 
opposition classes. Revolutionary leader Võ Văn Kiệt pointed out: 
52  Vo Nhan Tri (1990), Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, p. 58.
53  ĐCSVN (2005), Chỉ thị của Ban bí thư số 02/CT-TW (ngày 21 tháng 1 năm 1977) về những 
việc trước mắt để giải quyết lương thực [Directive of the Secretariat No. 02/CT-TW (21 January 
1977) on immediate matters for food processing], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 38, 
1977 [Party Document: Volume 38, 1977], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia], p. 2.
54  Hồng Giao, Taking Agriculture One Step, pp. 26–7.
55  Womack, B. (1987), The party and the people: Revolutionary and postrevolutionary politics 
in China and Vietnam, World Politics 39(4), pp. 479–507.
56  ĐCSVN (2004), Báo cáo tổng kết công tác xây dựng Đảng, và sửa đổi điều lệ Đảng (ngày 
17 tháng 12 năm 1976) [Report on building party organisation and changing party regulations 
(17  December 1976)], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 37, 1976 [Party Document: 
Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, pp. 749, 789.
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[T]hrough economic transformation the state consolidates and 
strengthens the proletariat dictatorship and collective mastery of 
labouring people, roots out completely counter-revolutionary forces, 
completes the economic unification of the country and facilitates the 
entire strength of the socialist state.57 
One of the objectives of socialist agricultural transformation was to bind 
peasants with the party-state to isolate perceived opposition groups 
and gain social control of the countryside. Moreover, party leaders 
believed that controlling peasants, their production and their produce 
would help them also control non-staple food producing groups and 
their goods in the cities. Lê Duẩn argued: 
[I]f the state controls staple food, it can control industrial goods … 
controlling staple food means controlling everyone’s essential goods 
which enables control of the products of large industries, small 
industries and handicraft producers.58 
During my interviews, some of my respondents told me the communists 
controlled people by controlling their stomachs. Therefore, controlling 
the countryside and food production became important to the party in 
the post-reunification period. At the fourth party congress in December 
1976, Premier Phạm Văn Đồng stressed: 
[I]n agriculture, be quick to cut off the relationship between the 
capitalists and the peasants, organise immediately the relationship 
between the state and the peasants, using this relationship to help 
peasants develop production and request them to sell food to the state.59 
Another objective of socialist agricultural transformation was to select 
and purify local cadres to consolidate the power of the party-state in 
the rural south. During the war, many southern party cells had been 
destroyed. Others, especially in the ‘religious areas’ of the Mekong 
Delta, barely functioned and were considered ‘thin’ (cơ sở đảng mỏng) or 
‘blank’ (cơ sở đảng trắng). Thus, party leaders called for a consolidation 
of the party’s base and recruitment of new members in the south, 
57  Võ Văn Kiệt, Simultaneous Execution of Three Revolutions, p. 40.
58  Lê Duẩn, Socialist Transformation in the South, p. 14.
59  ĐCSVN (2004), Phương hướng nhiệm vụ và mục tiêu chủ yếu của kế hoạch 5 năm 1976–
1980 [Key tasks and objectives of the five-year plan, 1976–1980], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn 
Tập: Tập 37, 1976 [Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 655.
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as well as the building and consolidation of political organisations, the 
testing of cadres and purification of ‘bad elements’ within state and 
party organisations.60 
The content and steps of socialist transformation 
of agriculture 
According to VCP leaders, the purpose of the socialist transformation 
of agriculture was to carry out three intertwined revolutions in the 
countryside: a revolution in production relations, a revolution in science 
and technology and a revolution in thought and culture. At the fourth 
congress in December 1976, Lê Duẩn emphasised that the socialist 
transformation was to ‘combine a revolution in production relations 
with a revolution in technology and science and in thoughts and 
culture, as well as reorganising national production and circulation’.61 
The overall aim of the ‘three revolutions’ in the rural south was to 
create ‘a regime of socialist collective ownership, socialist large-scale 
production, adoption of new technology and socialist men with 
socialist values and culture’.62 
The following sections describe these three revolutions and the steps 
towards socialist agricultural production. 
Revolution in production relations
Post-1975 land reform was considered part of the process of establishing 
collective farming. Therefore, its beneficiaries would have the right to use 
but not to own the land. ‘The state’, according to one party resolution, 
‘does not provide a certificate of land ownership to the beneficiaries’.63 
60  ĐCSVN (2004), Chỉ thị của Ban bí thư, số 273/CT-TW (ngày 24 tháng 9 năm 1976) về việc 
củng cố tổ chức cở sở Đảng và kết nạp Đảng viên mới ở Miền Nam [Secretariat’s Directive No. 273 
on consolidating party organisation in the south], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 37, 
1976 [Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 285.
61  Đại Đoàn Kết (1977), Nhiệm vụ cải tạo quan hệ sản xuất Miền Nam [Ongoing task for 
socialist transformation in the south], Đại Đoàn Kết, 17 September 1977, p. 14.
62  ĐCSVN (2004), Báo cáo chính trị của Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng tại Đại hôi đại 
biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IV, do đồng chí Lê Duẩn trình bày [Political report of the Party Executive 
Committee at the fourth national representative meeting], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: 
Tập 37, 1976 [Party Document: Volume 37, 1976], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, pp. 454–608.
63  Hội Đồng Chính Phủ [hereinafter HĐCP] (1976), Quyết định số 188/CP của Hội Đồng Chính 
Phủ (ngày 25 tháng 9 năm 1976) về chính sách xóa bỏ tàn tích chiếm hữu ruộng đất và các hình 
thức bóc lột thực dân, phong kiến ở Miền Nam Việt Nam [Ministerial Council’s Decision No. 188/
CP (25 September 1976) on the Policy of Eliminating Land Tenure and Other Forms of Colonial and 
Feudal Exploitation in the South], Hà Nội: Hội Đồng Chính Phủ, p. 7.
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Party leaders envisioned collectivisation requiring a prolonged political 
campaign and class struggle between capitalism and socialism.64 To ensure 
its success, the party called for a ‘step-by-step’ approach to move from 
low to high and from simple to complicated forms of collective farming 
that were suitable for each region.65 The change meant moving from 
‘simple interim forms of collective organisation’—production solidarity 
teams (tổ đoàn kết sản xuất) or labour exchange teams (tổ đổi công vần 
công)—to a medium form of collective (production units: tập đoàn sản 
xuất) and then to full collectives (hợp tác xã). This process is quite similar 
to that of collectivisation in the north, which shifted from ‘mutual aid 
teams’ (tổ đổi công) to low-level collectives (hợp tác xã bậc thấp) and then 
to high-level collectives (hợp tác xã bậc cao).66 
The resolution of the fourth party congress in 1976 was to set 1980 
as the target date for the completion of agricultural transformation in 
the south, bringing most peasant households and their land into the 
collectives. In addition, VCP leaders planned to establish state farms 
that would occupy about one-third of cultivated areas and become 
dominant in production and distribution. Party leaders envisioned 
state farms (nông trường quốc doanh)—so-called agro-industrial 
corporations (tổ hợp công nông nghiệp)—being the largest production 
organisation in the socialist agricultural sector. They would operate 
like an industrial factory, relying on mechanisation, specialisation and 
the use of intensive farming techniques. The state farms, according to 
party leaders, would be expected to set a good example for agricultural 
collectives in the use of scientific methods of management and farming. 
Individual farming would be eliminated or become insignificant.
64  Phạm Văn Kiết (1978), Nông dân đang sôi nổi đi lên làm ăn tập thể [Peasants are eager 
for collective farming], in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Con đường làm ăn tập thể của nông dân 
[The Collective Farmer’s Way], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB TP Hồ Chí Minh, p. 20.
65  ĐCSVN, Politburo’s Directive No. 43, p. 188.
66  Quang Truong, Agricultural collectivization, p. 56; Nguyễn Huy, Theories and Practices of 
Revolution, pp. 95–6. Another interim form was the farming machine team (tổ hợp máy nông 
nghiệp) established in the Mekong Delta and South-Eastern Region. Each team had five to seven 
peasants who possessed farm machines. Depending on the classification of the machines (large, 
medium or small), these teams were organised under the direct leadership of the agricultural 
department of the district, the commune or the hamlet’s production department (Ban sản xuất 
ấp xã), respectively. These organisations were supposed to be ‘interim’ or ‘transitional’ (qúa độ) 
steps in establishing collective machine units (tập đoàn máy) under the control of the district’s 
authorities or specialised machine teams (đội chuyên máy) under the control of collectives or 
production units.
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Revolution in science and technology
While the revolution in production relations was to see the creation 
of socialist large-scale production organisations (collectives and state 
farms), the revolution in science and technology would modernise 
agriculture, which was considered essential to making collective 
farming superior to individual farming. Party leaders therefore 
stressed, as well as carrying out collectivisation in the south, ‘the need 
to combine collectivisation with extending irrigation [thuỷ lợi hoá] and 
mechanisation [cơ giới hoá] and using modern and advanced science 
and techniques for cultivation and animal husbandry’.67 
Irrigation
In assessing the irrigation systems of the south, the party concluded 
they were too few, too small and often individually owned. War had 
also destroyed some. Party leaders planned to double the amount of 
irrigation by 1980.68 
In the Mekong Delta, the party’s irrigation program emphasised 
improving the canal systems by dredging existing channels and making 
new ones, and building new irrigation systems to treat acid sulphate 
soil (rửa phèn) and retarding floods and salinity intrusion (chống lũ, 
chống mặn).69 For the Central Coast, which had only 460,000 hectares 
of agricultural land in mid-1970 and where farmers relied heavily 
on rainfall because irrigation systems were poor, the party called for 
the repair of existing canals and the establishment of more dykes and 
water-pumping stations.70 By 1980, the Central Coast was expected to 
irrigate 180,000 to 200,000 hectares of double-cropped rice fields.71
67  ĐCSVN, Key tasks and objectives of the five-year plan, p. 626.
68  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second Plenum, p. 315.
69  There were four provinces in the Central Coast Region: Quảng Nam-Đà Nẳng, Nghĩa Bình, 
Phú Khánh and Thuận Hải (Nguyễn Dương Đáng. (1983). Kinh tế nông nghiệp Xã hội chủ nghĩa 
[Economics of Socialist Agriculture]. Hà Nội: NXB Nông Nghiệp, p. 105).
70  ĐCSVN (2004), Báo cáo của Bộ chính trị tại hội nghị lần thứ hai Ban chấp hành Trung ương 
khóa IV [Report of the Politburo at the Second Conference of the Central Committee, Session IV], 
in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 38, 1977 [Party Document: Volume 38, 1977], Hà Nội: 
NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 180.
71  Nguyễn Dương Đáng, Economics of Socialist Agriculture, p. 42; Nguyễn Trần Trọng, Ongoing 
Tasks, p. 328.
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Mechanisation
For party leaders, mechanisation meant substituting machinery 
for animal and human power so as to increase productivity and 
efficiency.72 The authorities also believed mechanisation would help to 
attract peasants, especially middle ones, to collective farming because 
many farming households in the Southern Region were already using 
some machinery.73 One party scientist argued that, without ‘combining 
collectivisation with mechanisation, attracting peasants into collectives 
will be difficult’ because it would not be able to demonstrate 
‘its superiority over individual farming’.74 
To utilise existing agricultural machinery in the south, party leaders 
urged each district to organise privately owned machines into 
machinery teams (tổ hợp máy), machinery units (tập đoàn máy), 
specialised machinery teams (đội máy chuyên doanh) and collective 
machinery teams (đội máy tập thể). Each district was also supposed 
to build state machinery stations (trạm máy quốc doanh) equipped 
with ‘large’ machines (máy lớn) supplied by the state or bought from 
individuals.75 At the second plenum of the fourth party congress, 
VCP leaders planned to import 18,700 large tractors, 30,000 small 
ones and other machinery to increase the mechanisation rate in land 
preparation to 50 per cent for the whole country and 74 per cent for the 
Mekong Delta.76 
Chemical inputs and new seeds
Before reunification, southern peasants, especially in the Mekong 
Delta, had used chemical fertilisers. The importation of such fertilisers 
in the south had increased dramatically after 1960 and reached 372,183 
tonnes in 1973. The average amount of chemical fertiliser used per 
hectare of agricultural land reached about 120 kilograms. The greater 
use of fertilisers was associated with an increased adoption of new 
rice seeds (lúa thần nông) in the south, which were planted on 41,000 
hectares in 1968 (accounting for 1.4 per cent of rice-growing land) and 
on 890,400 hectares in 1973 (31 per cent). However, the adoption of 
new seeds in the south was low compared with a rate of 60 per cent in 
the north at the same time—which party leaders used to indicate the 
72  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second Plenum, p. 232.
73  Nguyễn Trần Trọng, Ongoing Tasks, p. 246.
74  Nguyễn Huy, Theories and Practices of Revolution, p. 96.
75  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second Plenum, p. 210.
76  Ibid., p. 178.
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superiority of socialist agriculture. As well as the low rate of new seed 
adoption, party leaders criticised southern farming for using too little 
fertiliser, especially compared with the north of the country. They also 
urged rural southerners (families, collectives and state farms) to make 
‘green manure’ (làm phân xanh) and ‘dung manure’ (phân chuồng).77 
The party believed that, by implementing irrigation and mechanisation 
and the adoption of new seeds and fertilisers, the state could gradually 
control peasants’ production and shift them into collective organisations.
Revolution in thought and culture
Taking the south into socialism, carrying out socialist industrialisation 
and establishing large-scale socialist production of agriculture were 
decisions made by the top party leaders. To see their policies carried 
out, they needed people’s participation, conformity and endorsement. 
The party realised that southerners had long engaged in capitalist 
production, had a private ownership mindset (đầu óc tư hữu) and had 
capitalist tendencies (có khuynh hướng tư bản chủ nghĩa). Leaders also 
believed the harmful legacies of two decades of US neo-colonialism 
posed great obstacles to the construction of socialism in the south.78 
For  example, they believed colonialism and bourgeois thoughts 
(tư tưởng tư sản) were entrenched in the south and ‘anti-revolutionary’ 
groups (bọn phản cách mạng) were still active. 
Therefore, the socialist revolution to determine ‘who would triumph 
over whom’, to transform private into public ownership and to replace 
individual with socialist large-scale production would encounter 
strong resistance. 
To tackle this situation, party leaders set out to transform people’s 
thoughts and culture to fit their policies. They called this effort the 
‘revolution in thought and culture’. A prevalent guiding slogan was 
a statement by President Ho Chi Minh: ‘The first and essential condition 
for constructing socialism is to have socialist people’ (muốn xây dựng 
chủ nghĩa xã hội, trước hết cần có những con người xã hội chủ nghĩa).79 
77  Taylor, P. (2001), Fragments of the Present: Searching for Modernity in Vietnam’s South, 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, p. 31.
78  Hồ Chí Minh’s statement on new socialists was cited in Lê Duẩn’s report at the first meeting 
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Socialist people were supposed to have the following characteristics: 
1) correct thoughts and affection, adequate knowledge and the ability to 
undertake collective mastery over society, the natural world and oneself 
(làm chủ xã hội, thiên nhiên và bản thân); 2) high levels of volunteerism 
and a determination to overcome every difficulty to complete assigned 
tasks; 3) be honest, disciplined, skilful and productive, love working 
and detest living off others (ăn bám), and have respect for and protect 
public property; and 4) love socialism and have the pure spirit of the 
‘international proletariat’ (quốc tế vô sản).80 
To produce these kinds of ‘new socialists’, party leaders called for 
multiple measures involving education, administration, political and 
cultural activities, coercion and economic incentives.81 Socialist people 
were created not only in the Communist Party, but also in ‘every mass, 
economic, cultural and social organisation, in every industry and at 
every level of administration, in every town and village and family’.82 
Central government and local newspapers, socialist literature and the 
arts were also required to serve the construction of new socialist people 
by ‘praising good people and good merits’ (ca ngợi người tốt việc tốt) 
and criticising ‘negative phenomena’ (hiện tượng tiêu cực) in society 
and ‘the legacy of feudalism and colonialism’.83 
Party leaders considered local-level cadres the most important 
agents for the success of socialist transformation. They reasoned that 
agricultural collectivisation would transform the nature of production 
organisations and the way of life in the countryside. The requirements 
for managing socialist large-scale production were completely different 
to those of the small individual economy; therefore, cadres (including 
political, managerial and technical cadres) would be determining 
factors for success.84 
In addition to the general characteristics of new socialists, cadres 
were supposed to be ‘frugal’ (cần kiệm), ‘moral’ (liêm chính), ‘live 
simple, clean and sound lives’, ‘fight against privilege, embezzlement, 
collusion and trespassing on state property’ and ‘repel the influence 
80  Ibid.
81  Ibid., pp. 500–1.
82  ĐCSVN, Resolution of the Fourth Party Congress, p. 935.
83  Nguyễn Trần Trọng, Ongoing Tasks, p. 277.
84  ĐCSVN, Report on building party organisation, pp. 743, 849.
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of the bourgeois lifestyle’.85 Through mass campaigns of agricultural 
transformation and collectivisation, local party cells (đảng bộ cơ sở) 
would be able to identify the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cadres. The former 
would include those who were committed to large-scale production 
(quyết tâm theo con đường sản xuất lớn). The latter would be those 
who still harboured the ‘thoughts of peasants’ (tư tưởng nông dân) and 
‘thoughts of self-satisfaction and longing for individual farming’ (luyến 
tiếc làm ăn riêng lẻ).86 
Party leaders also realised that, in addition to the influence of local 
cadres, peasants’ attitudes, motivations and actions would significantly 
affect the results of socialist transformation in general and the 
performance of collective farming in particular. The results would be 
excellent if people ‘absolutely trusted’ the party’s policies. Therefore, 
soon after reunification, the party tried to attract peasants in the south 
to join ‘peasant associations’ (nông hội) to educate them to ‘enhance 
a  patriotic spirit’ (nâng cao tinh thần yêu nước) and ‘love socialism’ 
(yêu  chủ nghĩa xã hội).87 It would be important to instil in peasants 
‘socialist thought’, to educate them about the party-state’s policies, to 
give them a ‘consciousness of building socialism’ (có ý thức xây dựng 
chủ nghĩa xã hội) and to encourage them to perform their obligations 
to the state well (thực hiện tốt nghĩa vụ với nhà nước).88 
Conclusion
Soon after reunification, the government in Hanoi decided to carry 
out a socialist revolution in the south to reunify the country politically, 
socially and economically. VCP leaders considered socialist agrarian 
reform a key component of the socialist revolution. 
85  Ibid. A former district cadre in Chợ Mới said he learnt a lesson about cadres during the 
campaign of collectivisation: good cadres were those who ‘took care of the people but did not 
follow the ideas of the masses’ (lo cho dân nhưng không chạy theo quần chúng) (Author’s interview, 
17 June 2005, Chợ Mới).
86  ĐCSVN, Lê Duẩn’s final statements at second plenum, p. 289.
87  ĐCSVN, Political report of the Party Executive Committee, p. 564.
88  ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 03/NQ-TW of the Second Plenum, p. 290; Phan Văn Đáng, 
Experiment with agricultural collectives, pp. 30–1.
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Driven by Marxist–Leninist doctrine and high expectations of their 
capacity and the south’s economic potential, the VCP leaders believed 
they could succeed in building a centrally planned economy, socialist 
industrialisation and large-scale production even though this had 
not been fully accomplished in the north. In the agricultural sector, 
this vision included two main components: land redistribution and 
collectivisation. 
To ensure the success of collectivisation, VCP leaders paid great 
attention to its preparatory steps: redistributing land, bringing peasants 
into interim collective organisations, training cadres and building the 
capability of the local authorities. They called for the simultaneous 
execution of three revolutions—in production relations, in science 




Postwar restoration and 
preparations for collectivisation
Introduction
Vietnam is one of the most bombed countries in world history. After 
three decades of war (1945–75), Vietnam inherited a devastated 
economy, society and ecology. Rural destruction in the southern half of 
Vietnam was especially severe, and thousands of villages were heavily 
affected by war. Millions of hectares of agricultural land were bombed 
repeatedly and, by 1975, according to a Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) report, 560,000 hectares of cultivated land had been left 
untended.1 One and a half million buffaloes and oxen were killed.2
The south faced another postwar problem: massive urban 
unemployment.  During the conflict, large numbers of rural refugees 
were moved or fled to cities and towns, where they often worked in 
military-related sectors of the economy. At war’s end, a majority 
of these refugees and soldiers and civil officials discharged by the 
government in Saigon were unemployed. According to VCP reports, 
the total urban population in 1975 was 7 million, of whom about 
3  million (30 per  cent) were unemployed.3 So, after the war, central 
1  ĐCSVN (2004), Báo cáo của Bộ chính trị tại Hội nghị Trung Ương Đảng lần thứ 24 [Report of 
the Politburo at the 24th Party Central Committee Conference], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn 
Tập: Tập 36, 1975 [Party Document: Volume 36, 1975], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 318.
2  Quang Truong, Agricultural collectivization, p. 155.
3  Ibid.
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and local authorities emphasised the consolidation of political power 
and economic restoration. Inherent in these policies, however, was 
preparation for collectivisation. In other words, after the war, the 
VCP focused simultaneously on establishing its authority, restoring 
production, implementing land reform and solving other postwar 
problems.4
This chapter examines the implementation of these policies in the first 
few years after the war ended and prior to intense collectivisation of 
farming. In particular, the chapter focuses on the consequences of war 
and how local governments in parts of the Central Coast province 
of Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (QN-ĐN) and the Mekong Delta province of 
An Giang struggled to consolidate their political power and implement 
these policies and how local officials (who were policy implementers) 
and peasants reacted to them. 
By comparing these two regions, the chapter reveals differences and 
similarities in their postwar conditions, which led to differences in the 
form and magnitude of peasants’ and local cadres’ politics and attitude 
to  state policies. It shows variations in policy implementation 
and  explains how local conditions affected the implementation and 
performance of national policies.
Postwar policies in the Central Coast
Rebuilding the war-torn economy
The Central Coast was the worst affected region in southern Vietnam 
in terms of lives lost and social, economic and ecological destruction. 
One province in that region was QN-ĐN (which was divided into two 
separate provinces in 1996). According to Quảng Nam’s Department 
of Statistics, more than two-thirds of QN-ĐN’s agricultural land was 
abandoned and uncultivated in 1975, thousands of people had been 
killed or injured and unexploded mines littered the countryside. More 
than three-quarters of all villages had been destroyed, forcing peasants 
to flee and live together in a few refugee areas, bringing economic activity 
to a standstill. Therefore, after the war, the province ‘faced a severe food 
4  See ĐCSVN, Resolution No. 247/NQ-TW.
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shortage and acute unemployment’.5 A large proportion of arable land 
was uncultivated. An article in the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper in 
December 1975 summarised the situation in verse: ‘fields in rural areas 
lack draught animals; gardens were abandoned, houses were empty, 
and the people were prostrate and hungry’ (đồng quê vắng bóng trâu 
cày, vườn hoang nhà vắng dân gầy xác xơ).6
Despite heavy destruction, the authorities in QN-ĐN rapidly 
consolidated their power in all parts of the province. By September 
1976, according to the former provincial chairman of QN-ĐN: 
[A] complete system of revolutionary authority was quickly built from 
province to district, commune, ward, subcommune and subward. The 
revolutionary authorities swiftly controlled and managed all urban 
areas and large rural areas.7
At least three factors helped the new authorities in QN-ĐN consolidate 
their power. First, large rural parts of the province and the wider Central 
Coast region were under the influence of the Việt Minh during the war 
with France (1945–54) and then under the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) during the war against the US-backed government in Saigon 
(1954–75). Despite the ‘liberated areas’ (vùng giải phóng) being reduced 
significantly in the late 1960s, the NLF still controlled many remote and 
mountainous rural areas economically and politically. In the liberated 
areas, the NLF was able to carry out its policies and campaigns.8 This 
familiarity and strong relationship with farmers enabled the new 
authorities to control and successfully deal with postwar society.
Second, QN-ĐN and other parts of the Central Coast region did not 
face huge problems filling government and party positions thanks to 
the large number of local revolutionaries who survived the war and 
others who returned there from northern Vietnam. During the war, 
5  Cục Thông Kế tỉnh Quảng Nam [hereinafter CTKQN] (2005), Quảng Nam 30 Năm Xây 
Dựng và Phát triển [Quảng Nam’s Socioeconomic Development over the Past 30 Years], Tam Kỳ: Cục 
Thông Kế tỉnh Quảng Nam, p. 22.
6  Đồng quế vắng bóng trâu cày, vườn hoang nhà trống dân gầy xác xơ [Fields in rural areas lack 
draught animals; gardens were abandoned, houses were empty, and the people were prostrate and 
hungry], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 December 1975, p. 1.
7  Hoàn thành thắng lợi vẻ vang nhiệm vụ xây dựng đất nước, xây dựng chế độ mới, con người 
mới Xã hội chủ nghĩa [Completing the task of building the country, the new regime and new 
socialist men], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 8 September 1976, p. 1.
8  Quyết thắng trên mặt trận nông nghiệp [Be determined to win on the agricultural front], 
Quảng Đà, 30 April 1974, p. 1; Lời kêu gọi ra sức gia tăng sản xuất, thực hành tiết kiệm [Do the 
best to increase food production and be thrifty], Quảng Đà, 30 April 1974, p. 2.
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the NLF in QN-ĐN had recruited a large number of revolutionaries 
who operated locally or were sent to the north for training. Despite the 
surrender or killing of many revolutionaries from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s, their numbers were still considerable. Quảng Nam’s records 
show that, during the war, Bình Lãnh (a mountainous commune) 
suffered severe destruction. However, at least 25 revolutionary soldiers 
and 20 other revolution-supporting families still lived in the Bình Lãnh 
commune.9 Likewise, Thăng Phước commune in Thăng Bình district 
was reportedly ‘wiped clean’ (bị xoá trắng) of its revolutionary base, but 
after the war, the number of surviving revolutionaries was sufficient 
to fill key positions in the communal and subcommunal authorities 
(chính quyền thôn).10 
Finally, the flattened, war-torn society and economy made it somewhat 
easy for the new authorities to exert their power without confronting 
strong resistance from opposition groups.
Along with consolidating their power bases, the new authorities in 
QN-ĐN focused on solving the problems of refugees, unemployment 
and production. According to the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper, 
after the war, the province sent 400,000 refugees back to their home 
provinces (Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên Huế). QN-ĐN also sent 700,000 
refugees in urban areas back to their rural homes. In dealing with 
unemployment, the new authorities decided to move large numbers of 
unemployed people in urban areas either to the new economic zones in 
the Central Highlands or to rural areas.11
In rural areas, the new authorities focused on restoring agricultural 
production and preparing for collectivisation and socialist large-
scale agriculture. This work included restoration of abandoned land 
and reclamation of new land (khai hoang, phục hoá), redistribution 
of  landholdings (điều chỉnh ruộng đất), improvement of irrigation 
(làm  thuỷ lợi), extension of cultivated areas (mở rộng diện tích canh 
tác), field transformation (cải tạo đồng ruộng) and intensive farming.
9  Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam (2003), Quảng Nam Anh Hùng, thời đại Hồ Chí Minh, Kỷ Yếu 6/2003 
[Quảng Nam is a Hero in the Age of Ho Chi Minh], Tam Kỳ: Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam, pp. 319–21.
10  Toàn xã Thăng Phước làm ăn trong các tổ đổi công thường xuyên [The whole population of 
Thăng Phước commune is organised into regular labour exchange teams], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
23 May 1977, p. 4.
11  Nhân dân tỉnh ta chẳng những đánh giặc giỏi mà còn giàu nghị lực và tài năng sáng tạo trong 
xây dựng lại quê hương giàu đẹp [Our province’s people fought the enemy and are building the 
country well], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 29 March 1976, p. 3.
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Land restoration and redistribution
Land restoration
Soon after reunification, the new authorities in QN-ĐN launched 
a  campaign to ‘attack weeds in fields’ (chiến dịch tấn công đồng cỏ) 
and ‘remove unexploded landmines’ (tháo gở bom mìn). The Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper in March 1976 reported that authorities had 
mobilised thousands of urban youths to work in rural areas. In addition, 
they mobilised thousands of army engineers (công binh) and former 
guerillas to remove the mines littering the fields. Within a year, the 
province had restored more than 26,000 hectares of land, accounting 
for about half of all abandoned land and one-third of the province’s 
agricultural land.12 Within two years, the province reportedly restored 
to productive use 50,000 hectares of previously abandoned land.13
Because the authorities were able to mobilise large numbers of rural 
and urban people, good progress with land restoration was made in 
many areas. An example is Điện Bàn district. It had 114 subcommunes 
(villages), 93 of which were completely destroyed during the war. 
Many  people faced hunger, and weeds had taken over their land. 
The district’s new authorities mobilised everyone to turn 4,600 hectares 
of abandoned land into cultivated land. Former guerillas and local 
militia removed 20,794 landmines, during which 19 people were killed 
and 34 were injured.14
People from Hiền Lộc village in Bình Lãnh commune, Thăng Bình 
district, recalled that they returned after the war with ‘two empty 
hands’ (với hai bàn tay trắng). During the war, many working-age men 
had died, so many families returning to their villages were in a situation 
where ‘a son had lost his father and a wife had lost her husband’ 
(cảnh con mất cha, vợ mất chồng). Moreover, many families lacked the 
tools necessary for making a living and wild metre-high weeds had 
taken over their fields. Bombs and rockets had destroyed some of their 
land, and landmines remained in some rice fields. A widow with three 
children remembered:
12  Ibid.
13  Hội nghị tổ đổi công toàn tỉnh thành công tốt đẹp [The conference on labour exchange teams 
achieved good results], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 June 1977, p. 3.
14  Điện Bàn: Cả huyện là một công trường [Điện Bàn: The whole district is a working field], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 August 1976, p. 1.
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After the war, I took my three children home with two empty hands, 
no rice [không lúa gạo], no buffaloes. It was so miserable [cực khổ lắm]! 
This village was full of wild weeds and trees. We had to restore the 
abandoned fields by exchanging labour with others [làm vần công với 
người khác]. At that time we were afraid of mines exploding in the fields 
but we still tried to do [land restoration]. I was not afraid of death but 
worried that if I died, who would take care of the children? My sister-
in-law died of a mine exploding when she was hoeing an abandoned 
field at that time.15
Villagers in Hiền Lộc recalled that the land tenure system had 
totally changed because farms had been abandoned for many years. 
The  previous landlords had fled. Large areas of land now seemed to 
have a kind of common ownership. People restored any plot they liked 
as if it were their own. Some restored as much land as their families 
could manage. Those who came home first could select land close to 
their houses. Those who came later had to cultivate land further away.
While people restored some of the land on their own, the new 
authorities mobilised villagers to rehabilitate the remaining abandoned 
land. The  new Thăng Bình district authorities mobilised villagers 
from less war-torn communes to help residents in heavily damaged 
communes. A former Bình Lãnh commune official recalled that people 
in Bình Nguyên, Bình Tú and Bình Trung communes who lived in or 
near the district centre came to help restore the fields in Bình Lãnh. 
After land restoration, the commune authority, through the local 
farmers’ associations (ban nông hội thôn), reallocated land among 
households according to the number of people in their immediate 
family (theo nhân khẩu).16
The situation in Thanh Yên village in Bình Định commune 
(Thăng  Bình district) was similar. After the war, returning residents 
found the place devastated, and weeds and bomb craters riddled their 
land. Local authorities mobilised people to restore abandoned land. 
Youth  associations and former soldiers in the Saigon regime were 
mobilised to lead the campaign by restoring ‘difficult’ fields littered 
15  Mr Đồ in Hiền Lộc village recalled that he returned home from Đà Nẵng city later than 
other people so he was forced to cultivate land far from home that other people disliked (Author’s 
interview, 14 October 2005, Bình Lãnh).
16  Ibid.
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with landmines. Commune authorities and local farmers’ associations 
reallocated all restored unclaimed land to households according to 
their needs.17
Land redistribution
After land restoration in QN-ĐN came land redistribution, for 
which—unlike in the Mekong Delta (see next sections)—there was 
no strong resistance from a landed class. At a conference to sum up 
the implementation of land policy and the LTTT (Land to the Tille) 
program in QN-ĐN on 30 July 1976, authorities announced that the 
province had ‘successfully completed land redistribution to peasants’: 
[O]ne year after starting to implement a new land policy, the fields 
in our province actually returned to peasants [ruộng đất về tay nông 
dân]. Basically, there is no more exploited class or landlords. Feudal 
exploitation has permanently been eliminated.18
According to authorities, the province had redistributed 19,547 
hectares of arable land to 47,000 landless people. About 1,710 hectares 
had come from ‘land donations’ (hiến điền) and expropriations of land 
from landlords and ‘lackeys of the imperialists’ (tay sai của Đế quốc).
According to party researcher Lâm Quang Huyên, ‘by May 1976, the 
former zone V [khu V cũ; in the Central Coast] had solved [its] land 
distribution problem’. Huyên reported that, according to the data from 
61 communes and seven wards of nine districts in the Central Coast, 
the local authorities had appropriated 18,027 hectares, accounting 
for 31 per cent of the total arable land. This land was then allocated 
equitably to 34,875 land-poor and landless peasant households 
(containing 192,107 people).19 The composition of appropriated land 
is displayed in Table 3.1.
17  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Thanh Yên.
18  Ibid. At that time, the total agricultural land in the province was about 90,000 hectares.
19  Lâm Quang Huyên (The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, p. 180) also mentioned that 
Bình Trị Thiên province had retrieved 12,737 hectares of land and granted it to 40,609 peasant 
households.
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Table 3.1 The composition of appropriated land in 61 communes 
and seven wards in the Central Coast region
Type of land Area (hectares) Proportion (%)
Communal land (công điền công thổ) 4,515 25.05
Landlords’ and rural capitalists’ land 4,330 24.02
Rich peasants’ land 1,717 9 .52
Religious land 1,541 8 .55
other 5,924 32 .86
Total 18,027 100.00
Source: Lâm Quang Huyên (1985), Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Miền Nam Việt Nam [The 
Land Revolution in South Vietnam], Hà Nội: NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội, p. 180.
In areas that were heavily war-damaged and where local authorities 
played a major role in restoring abandoned land, land redistribution 
was more extensive than in areas less affected by the war. For example, 
in Bình Lãnh and Bình Đình communes in Thăng Bình district and 
Duy Phước commune in Duy Xuyên district, authorities redistributed 
equitably a large proportion of restored and communal land (công điền) 
to landless and land-poor households.20 In addition, land redistribution 
happened gradually as families with more land lent some to their 
relatives and neighbours.21 Meanwhile, in Hòa Tiến commune of Hòa 
Vang district, where levels of abandoned land and land restoration 
were more modest, local authorities granted only ‘communal land’ to 
peasants. They did not touch private land until collectivisation started, 
so inequitable land distribution remained.22 
Other postwar economic restoration
With only 90,000 hectares of agricultural land—accounting for less 
than 10 per cent of natural areas—and a population of 1.5 million 
in 1976, QN-ĐN province had a low level of agricultural land per 
capita. In addition, most agricultural land was sandy and poor and 
20  Xã Duy Phước trước bước ngoặc lịch sử [Duy Phước commune and its historic turning-
point], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 24 September 1977, p. 1. One sào is equal to 500 square metres and 
1 thước is equal to one-fifteenth of 1 sào.
21  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Bình Định.
22  Hòa Tiến: 1,057 hộ tự nguyện đưa 379 ha ruộng đất vào làm ăn tập thể [Hòa Tiến: 1,057 
households voluntarily put 379 hectares into collective farming], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 October 
1977, p. 1.
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had inadequate irrigation.23 During the war, QN-ĐN’s economy had 
depended heavily on imported commodities and food and foreign aid. 
The province produced only about 95,000–100,000 tonnes of food, 
falling short of its annual consumption of 450,000–500,000 tonnes.24 
After the war, food security was the provincial leaders’ main concern. 
To ensure self-sufficiency in food production, provincial leaders urged 
‘party members, cadres, and people to facilitate food production and 
economise to the maximum [thực hành tiết kiệm tối đa]’.25 
In late 1976, the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper launched a column 
called ‘The People’s Forum’ to discuss whether or not QN-ĐN province 
could resolve its own food problems. Several articles in this column 
came from state offices at provincial, district and commune levels. Most 
agreed that the province could feed itself. The methods for this included 
‘irrigation’ (thuỷ lợi), ‘intensive farming’ (thâm canh), ‘adopting new 
seeds’ (áp dụng giống mới), ‘developing subsidiary crops’ (phát triển cây 
màu), ‘increasing the number of crops per year’ (tăng vụ), ‘expanding 
agricultural land’ (mở rộng diện tích) and ‘transforming and designing 
fields’ (cải tạo đồng ruộng).26 Provincial leaders eventually asserted that 
the province could ensure its own food supply and they set a target 
to produce 500,000 tonnes of staple food in 1980. The plan called for 
an expansion of agricultural land, from 50,000 hectares to 140,000 
hectares, extending irrigated areas from 21,000 hectares in 1976 to 
60,000 in 1980, moving 160,000 people from lowland areas to new 
23  Phấn đấu mở rộng nhanh diện tích canh tác [Strive to extend cultivated area], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 26 June 1976, p. 4.
24  CTKQN, Quảng Nam’s Socioeconomic Development, p. 22.
25  Đẩy mạnh sản xuất và thực hành tiết kiệm giải quyết vấn đề lương thực cấp bách trước mắt 
[Increase production and be thrifty to immediately deal with urgent food shortage], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 16 February 1976, p. 1; Nêu cao tinh thân tự lực tự cường trong sản xuất và xây dựng quê 
hương [Be self-reliant in ensuring food production and building the country], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 29 September 1976, p. 1.
26  Tỉnh ta có khả năng tự giải quyết lương thực hay không? [Is our province able to solve our 
own food problem?], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 22 November 1976, p. 1; Nhìn lại diện tích đất đai 
để thấy rõ khả năng tự giải quyết lương thực [Re-examining agricultural areas to evaluate our 
capacity for dealing with food problems], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26, November 1976, p. 1; Nước 
và sản xuất lương thực ở tỉnh ta [Irrigation and food production in our province], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 18 December 1976, p. 1; Vì sao tỉnh ta đặt vấn đề giải quyết lương? [Why do we pay 
great attention to solving the food production problem?], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 22 December 
1976, p. 1.
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economic zones in mountainous areas, increasing subsidiary crops to 
30 per cent of total food production and expanding the area of new 
spring–summer rice crops to 15,000 hectares.27
QN-ĐN’s leaders considered irrigation an important first measure 
(biện pháp hàng đầu). In November 1975, they launched a widespread 
campaign to expand irrigation, mobilising people to dig ponds, build 
dams and canals and use manual pumps to water fields.28 Within the 
first three months of 1976, QN-ĐN had mobilised the equivalent of 
111,850 days of labour to repair 363 dams and 132 canals totalling 
131,905 metres. In addition, the province started five large-scale 
irrigation projects, including the ‘Phú Ninh great irrigation dam’ 
(Đại công trình thuỷ lợi Phú Ninh) in Tam Kỳ district and Trường Giang 
and Cao Ngạn dams in Thăng Bình district.29
Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên villages recalled that, soon after 
reunification, each family contributed months of labour to build Cao 
Ngạn dam in Bình Lãnh commune and Phước Hà dam in Bình Phú 
commune. Later, authorities mobilised village youth to build another 
great irrigation dam, Phú Ninh, in Tam Kỳ district. One woman in Hiền 
Lộc village told me she had to contribute three months of labour to 
the construction of Cao Ngạn dam and many days for the other dams. 
When undertaking this work, she had to carry her own food.30 Some 
peasants in Hiền Lộc said governments in the French and American 
times had attempted to build these dams but were unable to pay for 
labour and the use of private land. Under the revolutionary authorities, 
however, land belonged to everyone (của chung) so it was easier to build 
dams, roads and other infrastructure that required vast tracts of land.31
27  Hồ Nghinh: Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng vượt bậc phát triển sản xuất nông nghiệp [Hồ Nghinh: 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng has made great progress in agriculture], Nhân Dân, 8 March 1977, p. 5; 
Nghị quyết hội nghị Ban chấp hành Đảng bộ tỉnh khóa 11 [Resolution of 11th Provincial Party 
Executive Committee], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 12 March 1977, p. 1.
28  Đẩy mạnh công tác thủy lợi nhỏ để phục vụ sản xuất xuân hè và hè thu [Extending irrigation 
for the spring–summer and summer–autumn crops], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 8 March 1976, p. 1. 
Bình Dương commune in Thăng Bình district was considered an exemplary case because it had 
dug 2,200 ponds (giếng) from which to water its crops. On average, each labourer had dug one 
pond.
29  Toàn tỉnh sôi nổi ra quân làm thủy lợi lợi [People in the province are extending irrigation], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 12 May 1976, p. 1.
30  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Bình Lãnh.
31  An elderly man in Hiền Lộc village referred to Phú Ninh dam as Ba kỳ dam (‘the three periods 
dam’) because it was initiated by the French, continued by Saigon’s government and completed by 
the new government (Author’s interview, 17 October 2005, Hiền Lộc).
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Dams took over large amounts of peasants’ land, but I found no 
evidence of strong resistance, although some peasants did express 
dissatisfaction with the policy. An article in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng 
newspaper (on  29  September 1976) told how the party cell of Hòa 
Nhơn commune in Hòa Vang district overcame peasants’ ‘backward 
thoughts and superstitions’ when it decided to open a canal through 
hills and villages to divert water from the river to rice fields. Many 
peasants refused to participate in the project. Some elderly people 
were afraid the dam would ‘break down the heart of their village land’ 
(đứt con đất của làng) and upset ‘the spirits of the land’ (Thổ địa quở 
phạt). Some worried about the loss of their land and their family’s 
tombs. Other residents doubted the success of the project. To overcome 
these objections, the party cell organised meetings to ‘fight and criticise 
feudal thoughts such as selfishness and superstitions’.32
As well as more irrigation, local authorities wanted new rice seeds 
used and more crops per year. To solve food shortages in the interval 
between the winter–spring and summer–autumn crops (chống đói giáp 
hạt), the province launched a campaign to adopt a new spring–summer 
rice crop (vụ xuân hè).33 Such a crop was new to many peasants in 
QN-ĐN who had previously cultivated at most only two rice crops per 
year. However, adopting the spring–summer crop achieved good initial 
results.34 Some years later, many of the irrigated areas of QN-ĐN also 
cultivated a third rice crop each year.
Peasants who had been under the influence of the Saigon government’s 
rural development program were familiar with the adoption of new rice 
seeds. For example, QN-ĐN peasants in Điện Quang commune in Đại 
Lộc district, Điện Minh and Điện Phương in Điện Bàn district and Hòa 
Nam and Hòa Xuân communes in Hoà Vang district had used chemical 
fertilisers, new rice seeds and farm machinery even before 1975.35 
However, the majority of peasants in the province still grew traditional 
rice varieties and had rarely used chemical fertilisers or human manure 
(phân bắc: literally, ‘northern manure’).
32  Be self-reliant in ensuring food production, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 29 September 1976, p. 4.
33  Tăng vụ sản xuất xuân hè [New additional spring–summer crops], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
16 February 1976, p. 4.
34  Vụ sản xuất xuân hè thắng lợi [The spring–summer crops have a good result], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 7 August 1976, p. 1.
35  Những mùa lúa đầu tiên [The first rice crops], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 19 April 1976, p. 2.
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As an additional step towards increasing rice production, authorities 
in QN-ĐN called for the removal of tombs from agricultural land.36 
Although this policy touched a sensitive aspect of peasant culture—
which considered ancestral tombs immovable—it encountered only 
modest resistance. For example, people in Điện Bàn district ‘spent 
100,000 working days to remove 90,000 scattered tombs, extending 80 
additional hectares of agricultural land’.37 Despite dissatisfaction with 
the policy, few Điện Bàn peasants openly objected. Many, though, 
criticised it in private. Similarly, in Duy An commune, Duy Xuyên 
district, peasants mockingly said ‘even the dead aren’t allowed to rest’ 
(người chết cũng không được nằm yên). However, authorities were finally 
able to ‘convince’ these peasants to accept the policy.38
According to the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper, postwar economic 
restoration policies achieved good results. From mid-1975 to the end 
of 1977, the province expanded its cultivated areas (diện tích gieo trồng) 
from 96,000 to 183,337 hectares, equal to the figure in 1965. Production 
of staple food also increased, from 149,062 tonnes in 1975 to 300,000 
tonnes by the end of 1977, showing the province would be able to 
overcome food shortages and produce its target of 500,000 tonnes 
by 1980.39
Building the foundation for collective farming
While carrying out postwar economic restoration policies, authorities 
also created labour exchange teams (tổ đổi công vần công). This policy 
seemed to fit well with local practices in which reciprocity and mutual 
assistance were still popular among villagers. Also, before 1975, and 
especially during the Việt Minh period, revolutionary authorities in 
many areas of QN-ĐN had organised peasants into labour exchange 
teams and even some collectives.40
36  Ủy ban nhân dân ra chỉ thị về công tác quy hoạch mồ mả và nhà của của nhân dân [The 
Provincial People’s Committee issued a directive to reallocate tombs and houses], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 28 August 1976, p. 1.
37  Điện Bàn: The whole district is a working field, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 August 1976, p. 1.
38  Duy An lập khu nghĩa địa mới [Duy An has established new graveyards], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 5 April 1976, p. 2.
39  Gióng đường cày thắng lợi [Be victorious in agriculture], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26 April 
1977, p. 1.
40  Ngành nông nghiệp tỉnh Quảng Đà tích cực chăm lo vụ mùa tháng 8 [Agricultural sector in 
Quảng Đà is positive about caring for August crops], Quảng Đà, 20 June 1974, p. 1.
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Soon after the war, Điện Bàn district, for example, formed 598 labour 
exchange teams to help with land restoration.41 Likewise, peasants in 
Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên villages, Thăng Bình district, recalled that, 
to undertake land restoration, subcommune farmers’ associations 
organised them into labour exchange teams, each comprising 15–20 
neighbouring households.42 Most of these labour exchange teams 
operated in an irregular and seasonal manner (tổ đổi công không thường 
xuyên, thời vụ) and for specific tasks such as preparing fields and 
harvesting. They were dismantled when the specific task was completed.
Local authorities successfully organised peasants into ‘regular labour 
exchange teams’ (tổ đổi công thường xuyên) in some parts of QN-ĐN. 
For example, Sông Bình subcommune (Đại Quang commune, Đại Lộc 
district) formed regular labour exchange teams for land restoration, 
production and irrigation. Some 160 households in the subcommune 
were organised into such teams, each comprising 12–14 households 
and one or two buffaloes. Members of these organisations exchanged 
labour among themselves in their everyday production activities. Men 
were often in charge of hoeing and ploughing, while women did lighter 
work such as transplanting and harvesting. Those who did not have 
draught animals could use the team’s buffaloes.43 Another example is 
Thăng Phước commune in Thăng Bình district, whose land had been 
abandoned for 10 years. Most of its men died in the war, and women 
and the elderly made up its workforce. To cope with such difficulties, 
local authorities quickly organised peasant households into 39 regular 
labour exchange teams.44
At a conference of labour exchange teams in June 1977, QN-ĐN leaders 
(hội nghị tổ đổi công) praised the role of labour exchange in ‘training 
peasants to work collectively’ and solving their postwar problems. 
Leaders criticised these organisations, however, for ‘developing 
unevenly and unsoundly’ and operating according to simple, unfair 
and irrational methods (chưa công bằng, hợp lý). Therefore, they called 
for the upgrading of simple labour exchange teams into a higher-level 
organisation called a ‘production team working according to norms 
41  Điện Bàn: The whole district is a working field, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 August 1976, p. 1.
42  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc.
43  Tổ đổi công vần công ở Sông Bình [Labour exchange teams in Sông Bình], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 8 May 1975, p. 2.
44  The whole population of Thăng Phước commune, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 May 1977, p. 2.
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and contracts’ (PTWCNC) (tổ sản xuất có định mức, khoán việc).45 
According to the guidelines, a PTWCNC was based on individual 
ownership of land and other means of production, but management was 
similar to that in a collective organisation. For example, officials kept 
track of labour exchanges through work-points, norms and contracts, 
and they distributed state agricultural inputs to each team.46
Establishing the PTWCNCs was the ‘first step of collectivisation’, 
and the aim was to ‘facilitate peasants’ solidarity’, ‘improve collective 
work’, ‘establish state and peasant relations’, ‘make peasants familiar 
with collective work’ and ‘select and train cadres’ for ongoing 
collectivisation.47 However, unlike with a simple labour exchange team, 
building a PTWCNC required training cadres and peasants. 
By October 1977, QN-ĐN had trained nearly 9,000 cadres; some districts 
had completed the training of all cadres and were preparing to establish 
PTWCNCs before the winter–spring crop of 1977–78.48 However, there 
were also some difficulties in building PTWCNCs. For example, Đại 
Lộc district selected Đức Phú subcommune in Đại Hiệp commune in 
which to build pilot PTWCNCs. To ensure success, the authorities had 
to do a lot of preparation, such as organising policy, studying training 
(học tập chính sách) for cadres and peasants and preventing peasants 
from selling draught buffaloes and farm tools. Authorities were able 
to mobilise 97 per cent of households into 33 PTWCNCs, but these 
organisations did not function well. Cadres were confused about 
management (lúng túng về quản lý) and unsure how to make norms and 
contracts and calculate and determine workdays among households.49 
Similarly, An Bình subcommune (in Tiên Kỳ commune, Tiên Phước 
district) faced difficulties managing its PTWCNCs. Peasants were 
45  The conference on labour exchange teams, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 June 1977, p. 1.
46  Xây dựng các tổ sản xuất có định mức khoán việc [Establishing production teams working 
according to norms and contracts], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 22 October 1977, p. 3.
47  Bản hướng dẫn nội dung xây dựng tổ đổi công có định mức, khoán việc [Guidelines for 
establishing production teams working according to norms and contracts], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
29 June 1977, p. 1.
48  Establishing production teams working according to norms and contracts, Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 22 October 1977, p. 3.
49  Đại Lộc xây dựng các tổ sản xuất có định mức khoán việc [Đại Lộc is establishing production 
teams working according to norms and contracts], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26 October 1977, 
p. 2. In June 1977, the provincial authorities released a directive forbidding merchants from 
purchasing and slaughtering draught animals (Nghiêm cấm thương nhân mua trâu bò để giết 
thịt [Prohibiting private merchants from purchasing and slaughtering livestock], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 24 September 1977, p. 1).
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confused about how to work according to norms and contracts. 
Some  complained that the procedures ‘coerced, humiliated and 
restricted’ people and ‘did not raise their enthusiasm’. One peasant 
complained that, ‘without norms and contracts, I can work with all my 
heart. Now under the norms and contracts, I do enough to just achieve 
satisfactory results according to the contract!’50
By the end of 1977, when collectivisation began, QN-ĐN had built 4,524 
simple interim collective organisations, of which nearly 80 per cent of 
peasant households were members. Of these, 2,625 were PTWCNCs, 
although 42 per cent of them were below standard.51 Among the places 
in QN-ĐN without any PTWCNCs were Hiền Lộc village (Bình Lãnh 
commune) and Thanh Yên village (Bình Định commune).52
Generally speaking, by late 1977, authorities in QN-ĐN, particularly 
in Thăng Bình district, were able to accomplish most of the intended 
preparatory measures for collectivised farming. The story is different in 
the Mekong Delta’s An Giang province.
Preparing for collectivisation in the 
Mekong Delta
Consolidating local authorities
After the war, An Giang province and other parts of the Mekong Delta 
were under the control of the new military administration (thời kỳ quân 
quản). It took a year for the new authorities to consolidate a civilian 
government in An Giang and other provinces.
According to the documents relating to Chợ Mới district’s party 
committee, after the war, the new district authorities faced many 
difficulties in controlling society and consolidating their power.53 
50  Bình An xây dựng tổ sản xuất có định mức khoán việc [Bình An is establishing production 
teams working according to norms and contracts], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 24 April 1978, p. 3.
51  Tỉnh ủy mở hội nghị bàn về cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa đối với nông nghiệp [Provincial Party 
Committee opens conference on socialist agricultural transformation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
22 February 1978, p. 1.
52  Author’s interviews, August–November 2005, Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên villages.
53  Đảng Bộ Chợ Mới (2000), Trên mặt trận bảo vệ an ninh tổ quốc [On the national security 
front], in Chợ Mới 25 năm xây dựng và phát triển [Chợ Mới’s Socioeconomic Development over the 
Past 25 Years], Chợ Mới: Đảng Bộ huyện Chợ Mới, p. 44.
VIETNAM’S PoST-1975 AgRARIAN REFoRMS
60
According to a former official of Long Điền B commune, after 30 April 
1975, Bảo An soldiers (of the Hòa Hảo religion) and soldiers and 
officers from Saigon gathered in Chợ Mới district and fought against 
the revolutionary force for a week.54 Assessing the difficulties of Chợ 
Mới district in the first few years after reunification, a former party 
secretary there reported that 
eighty per cent of the population was religious; most of them were the 
Hòa Hảo. Twenty thousand Saigon soldiers gathered here … forty per 
cent of the population were landless and land-poor.55 
The authorities considered the large number of former Saigon and Bảo 
An soldiers in Chợ Mới a political and military threat.
Another difficulty authorities faced was a lack of local party cadres to 
fill new positions. This was the situation in Chợ Mới district and many 
other parts of the Mekong Delta.56 During the war, local networks of 
southern cadres had been destroyed and many revolutionaries killed, 
especially through the American and Government of South Vietnam 
Phoenix program.57 After the war, party organisations in An Giang 
were weak, and 17 communes had no party cells. Most surviving ex-
revolutionaries came from remote districts such as Tịnh Biên, Tri 
Tôn and Phú Châu.58 Villagers in Chợ Mới called their area a ‘white 
area’ (vùng trắng), which meant no Communist Party cells operated 
there until reunification. By mid-1975, Chợ Mới district had only 58 
Communist Party cadres—insufficient for establishing a new local 
authority. Therefore, 40 party cadres were sent from nearby Sa Dec 
province.59 In assessing the situation of the party organisation in Chợ 
Mới district in the first few years after reunification, the secretary 
54  Author’s interview, 16 June 2005, Chợ Mới.
55  Qua hội nghị công báo hoàn thành cơ bản hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp ở Chợ Mới: Bài học gì 
được rút ra [Report from a conference announcing the completion of collectivisation in Chợ Mới: 
Lessons learned], An Giang, 15 April 1985, p. 1.
56  Phạm Văn Kiết, Peasants are eager for collective farming, p. 28.
57  Beresford, M. (1988), Issues in economic unification: Overcoming the legacy of separation, 
in D. Marr and C. White (eds), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, p. 107; Hicks, Organizational adventures in district government, p. 120.
58  Ủy Ban Nhân Dân Tỉnh An Giang [hereinafter UBNDTAG] (2003), Địa Chí An Giang 
[An Giang Province], An Giang: Ủy Ban Nhân Dân Tỉnh An Giang, p. 349.
59  Ban Chấp Hành Đảng Bộ Huyện Chợ Mới [hereinafter BCHDBHCM] (1995), Lịch sử Đảng 
bộ huyện Chợ Mới [The History of Chợ Mới Party Cell, 1927–1995], Chợ Mới: Ban Chấp Hành 
Đảng Bộ Huyện Chợ Mới, p. 169.
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of An Giang commented that ‘the party bases [cơ sở đảng] were small 
and thin [mỏng]. Mass organisations and communal and hamlet 
authorities were inadequate and weak.’60
In the first few years after reunification, many communes in Chợ Mới 
district had no party cells or only weak ones. For example, in 1977, Long 
Điền B commune had a new party cell with only three members—one 
was the secretary of the cell, one was the commune’s chairman (chủ tịch 
xã) and the other was the commune’s chief police officer (trưởng công 
an xã), who had just become a party member. At the hamlet level, new 
authorities selected some trusted local people to work as chiefs (trưởng 
ấp) and members of managerial boards and peasant associations.
A majority of local cadres in Long Điền B commune were not ex-
revolutionaries. They were selected thanks mostly to the revolutionary 
merit of their parents, brothers or even distant relatives. Long Điền B 
residents remembered after reunification new local cadres often 
called themselves ‘ex-undercover revolutionaries’ (cán bộ nằm vùng) 
or ‘meritorious for having hidden Vietnamese communist cadres’ 
(có công nuôi cán bộ). In many cases, the new cadres were exaggerating. 
One elderly man, a former chief of the Saigon government’s local militia 
group (dân quân tự vệ) in a hamlet in Long Điền B, commented that 
the local chief had been a member of his staff during the war. After 
reunification, the man was made hamlet chief thanks to the revolutionary 
merit of his brother-in-law, who lived in Đồng Tháp. The man often 
claimed that he had previously been an undercover revolutionary, but 
many people did not believe him.61 Some local people added that, due 
to lack of revolutionary merit, many of these cadres tended to work to 
gain political merit (lập công). Some said that, while these cadres tried 
to comply with official policies, they also pursued their own interests.
Building the foundation for collective farming
While establishing a new government, leaders in the Mekong Delta 
also began to build the foundations for collectivisation. In the Central 
Coast region, the first stage had been to create labour exchange teams. 
In the Mekong Delta, however, the first step was to create ‘production 
60  Huyện Chợ Mới hoàn thành hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [Chợ Mới district has completed 
collectivisation], An Giang. 4 April 1985, p. 1.
61  Author’s interview, 29 June 2005, Long Điền B, Chợ Mới.
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solidarity teams’ (tổ đoàn kết sản xuất). The different names reflect social 
and economic differences between the two regions. In the Mekong 
Delta, labour exchange among peasants had not been as common 
in previous decades as in the Central Coast. Instead, in the Mekong 
Delta, land-rich peasants had often hired the land-poor and landless 
to work for them. The term ‘solidarity’ reflected the Communist Party 
government’s desire to unite these two classes of villagers.
According to official guidelines, each production solidarity team should 
farm 30–50 hectares. The authorities expected that, in so doing, cadres 
and peasants would learn to exchange labour (vần đổi công) and work 
together collectively. In practice, many production solidarity teams 
did not operate this way. Villagers in Long Điền B said the production 
solidarity teams in Chợ Mới district often had 200 to 300 hectares—
virtually the size of a hamlet. Moreover, many production solidarity 
teams did not exchange labour. A former production solidarity team 
leader said peasants refused to farm that way, wanting to hire labour 
as they had previously, rather than exchanging it, because the latter 
method was unknown and considered inferior.62 Therefore, although 
production solidarity teams existed, people farmed no differently to 
before—as individuals, not as teams. One local cadre described this 
as ‘each person cultivated his own land and paid his own fees’ (đất ai 
nấy làm phí ai nấy trả). The production solidarity teams played only an 
intermediary role between the state and peasants. The teams were in 
charge of delivering agricultural inputs and other necessary goods from 
the state to peasants and collected taxes from peasants for the state.63
In 1976, Chợ Mới district established 105 production solidarity teams 
in 101 hamlets, but their quality was low. Chợ Mới’s party cell reported:
In 1977, the district party committee realised that in reality peasants 
in these organisations still farmed individually. In other words, 
these organisations were in fact just fuel-delivering teams [tổ xăng 
dầu]. Therefore, the district’s party committee decided to establish 
a committee for agricultural transformation [ban cải tạo nông nghiệp 
huyện] and immediately selected several cadres to go to the provincial 
capital for training.64
62  Author’s interview, 25 June 2005, Long Điền B.
63  Author’s interview, 15 June 2005, Long Điền B.
64  Report from a conference, An Giang, 15 April 1985, p. 1.
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By 1978 An Giang province had established about 300 production 
solidarity teams, 528 by 1979 and 1,528 by 1980. Most of these 
organisations, according to assessment reports, were ‘inadequate in 
quality and scale’ (không đúng tính chất và quy mô).65 Hoping to improve 
their quality, the vice-chief of An Giang’s committee for agricultural 
transformation in June 1981 ordered the teams to be made smaller.66 
However, the situation did not improve much because local leaders 
were preoccupied with land redistribution and other issues.
Prohibiting non-resident cultivators (cắt xâm canh)
Compared with other regions of the south, the Mekong Delta (especially 
the western part, Miền Tây, where An Giang is) was among the least 
affected by the war. Thanks to a relatively peaceful life, abundant natural 
resources and previous agrarian reforms, food production in many 
parts of the region had exceeded consumption needs. Previous reforms, 
especially the LTTT program, had almost eliminated big landlords, 
establishing a solid institutional foundation of small and family-owned 
farms;67 and the rural population had diverse occupations, including 
growing commodity crops, working as labourers, engaging in petty 
trade and other non-farming work. This made the social structure 
and economic activities of the Mekong Delta more diverse than in the 
Central Coast and other regions of the south.
Another feature of difference in the region was that peasants’ farming 
and production activities extended beyond their villages. Many peasants 
had land in their own hamlet as well as in distant communes, districts 
and even other provinces. In Chợ Mới district (An Giang), more than 
half the peasants also had fields elsewhere. Most of their ‘outside’ land 
was in Long Xuyên quadrangle (Tứ Giác Long Xuyên) and the Plain 
of Reeds (Đồng Tháp Mười), which local peasants called ‘big fields’ 
(đồng lớn). A former district official mentioned that the combined 
area of agricultural land Chợ Mới’s peasants had outside the district 
exceeded the district’s total agricultural land. Most peasants who had 
65  Sở Thông Tin Văn Hóa An Giang [hereinafter STTVHAG] (1978), Thông tin phổ thông 
[General Information], Vol. 9, Long Xuyên: NXB Sở Thông Tin Văn Hóa An Giang, p. 9; Phong 
trào hợp tác hóa tiếp tục đi vào chiều hướng ổn định và phát triển theo hướng phương châm tích 
cực và vững chắc [Collectivisation continues to progress positively and firmly], An Giang, 7 June 
1981, p. 2.
66  Collectivisation continues to progress positively and firmly, An Giang, 7 June 1981, p. 2.
67  Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta, p. 328.
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land in ‘big fields’ possessed more than 100 công (10 hectares) of land; 
despite growing one ‘floating rice’ crop (lúa nổi) a year, these peasants 
annually carried home thousands of gịa of paddy.68 Many peasants in 
Long Điền B recalled that, before 1975, farming was a profitable job 
and they enjoyed a high standard of living. Even agricultural labourers 
who did not have land earned a ‘sufficient’ livelihood (sống thoải mái) 
working for the land-rich or in fishing and non-farming occupations.69
As in many other authoritarian states, Vietnam’s new government 
attempted to remake the complex rural south so it would be easy to 
manage the population and production system in line with its existing 
socialist model of administration.70 To deal with the complexity of the 
rural south and restrict landed peasants from cultivating beyond their 
own villages, officials in Hanoi issued Directive No. 235/CT-TW in 
September 1976:
For land of non-commune residents [đối với ruộng đất xã này xâm canh 
xã khác], if it belongs to labouring peasants [such as poor and middle 
peasants], let them continue to cultivate it; if the land has been classified as 
land under confiscation [such as the land of rich peasants and landlords], 
then grant it first to current cultivators of the land who have farmed the 
land for a long time and now do not have enough land.71 
The Politburo’s Directive No. 57 (15 November 1978) clarified that land 
confiscation would apply to the land of non-resident rich peasants, rural 
capitalists and upper–middle peasants. For the land of non-resident 
labouring people, local authorities should either mobilise landowners 
to the site of their land or give them other land (in their village) in 
exchange.72 In light of these directives, the authorities in An Giang and 
elsewhere in the Mekong Delta implemented a policy of prohibiting 
‘land occupying’ or ‘non-resident cultivators’ (cắt xâm canh), which 
meant many peasants in the region, including middle peasants, had to 
give up much of their ‘outside’ land.73
68  Author’s interview, 3 August 2005, Long Điền B. One công is equal to one-tenth of 1 hectare. 
One giạ is equal to 20 kilograms.
69  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B.
70  Scott, Seeing Like a State.
71  ĐCSVN, Secretariat’s Directive No. 273, pp. 280–1.
72  ĐCSVN (2004), Chỉ thị 57/CT-TW về việc xóa bỏ các hình thức bóc lột của phú nông, tư 
sản nông thôn và tàn dư bóc lột phong kiến [Directive No. 57 on eliminating exploitation in the 
south], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập, Tập 38, 1977 [Party Document: Volume 38, 1977], 
Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 474.
73  Huỳnh Thị Gấm, Socioeconomic changes in the Mekong Delta, p. 88.
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Villagers in Long Điền B commune, Chợ Mới district, recalled that 
this was one of the most controversial postwar policies they faced. 
It encouraged ‘cultivation close to the residential area’ (liền canh liền 
cư) and people were not allowed to farm outside their residential 
communes or districts.74 According to some former local officials in 
Chợ Mới district, this policy enabled the new authority to control rural 
society and food production and procurement. They also argued that, 
if people were allowed to move freely, the local authorities would not be 
able to mobilise people into collective organisations. Moreover, these 
policies were a first step towards land redistribution and collectivisation. 
Prohibiting non-resident cultivators helped authorities appropriate the 
land of non-resident land-rich households and give it to land-poor and 
landless households in each commune.75 In addition, the policy also 
helped to identify land for state farms (nông trường), district farms 
(nông trang) and other state organisations.
Under the non-resident cultivator prohibition, many peasants in Chợ 
Mới claimed to have lost land, in Tứ Giác Long Xuyên and Đồng Tháp 
Mười, to newly established state farms, collectives or production units. 
Many expressed their dissatisfaction. Some peasants resisted quietly by 
abandoning land and refusing any other land in exchange.
Mr Ph, a farmer in Long Điền B commune, Chợ Mới district, recalled 
that he had owned 7 hectares of land in another district of An Giang, 
Châu Thành, since 1952. After 1975, he continued to till the land for two 
years until a state farm was established and he was expelled. He said he 
felt sad to lose the land, but could not do anything about it. He returned 
home to borrow 5 công (0.5 hectares) of land from his relatives from 
which to make a living.76
Mr H, who lived in the same hamlet as Mr Ph, had possessed 20 hectares 
of land in Thoại Sơn district of An Giang since 1954. He said a state 
farm appropriated his land and offered him other land in exchange, but 
he was very upset and refused the offered land. Eventually, he decided 
to abandon the land and returned home to ‘raise ducks and chickens 
and work on a few công of land around the house’.77 
74  Author’s interviews, August–October 2005, Long Điền B.
75  Author’s interviews, 20–29 June 2005, Long Điền B.
76  Author’s interview, 3 August 2005, Long Điền B.
77  Author’s interview, 4 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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In general, peasants were submissive and kept their true feelings private. 
Most claimed they feared the new authorities because they did not yet 
know the laws properly and, even if they tried their best, those in power 
would control the situation.
Some peasants, however, reacted strongly and openly confronted 
officials. For example, Mr Ba G in Long Điền B, who lost more than 
10 hectares of land in Thanh Bình district of Đồng Tháp province one 
year after reunification, complained to the commune chairman:
In my opinion, what you did was unconscionable. In the past, we 
endured the war with you to cultivate on the land, as you know. We used 
to have meals and drink with you. We lived with you for many years, 
suffering a lot from wars. Many people had died in this place during 
that time. Now you say we usurped the land and you expel us. Pity us!78
He cried for hours before the chairman, but the chairman remained 
silent, doing nothing to help him. Finally, knowing that it was not 
possible to change the situation, Mr Ba G decided to abandon his land 
and offered a mocking goodbye to the official: 
[Y]ou often said that you liberated us from the yoke of slavery, but now 
you put us with another yoke, the yoke of no land with which to make 
a living!79
A woman in Long Điền B who lost 13 hectares of land in another 
An Giang district shared her story:
After reunification, the authorities planned to establish a state farm 
on the peasant land. We complained to the commune authorities. 
In  response to our objection, the commune secretary organised 
a meeting with us. She, the commune secretary, suggested exchanging 
our land. I got angry and said, ‘Whose land? Peasants’ land or your 
land? If it is your land, we will take it but other people’s land we refuse.’ 
I turned back and said to the crowd: ‘Those who do not want to 
exchange land, raise your hands.’ They all raised their hands … a man 
from the crowd stood up and said, ‘I come from communist areas 
but I haven’t seen anyone like you. Now we do not have any land to 
till.’ The  commune secretary could not do anything but withdrew in 
silence … Then, our small group, about 20 people, went to the district 
authorities to complain. They said they would consider our petition 
78  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
79  Ibid.
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and would resolve it gradually. But nothing had been resolved until 
Mr Nguyễn Văn Linh ascended to power. As a result, I had to go around 
and work as a wage-earner for seven to eight years.80
This ‘prohibition’ was controversial not only among peasants in Long 
Điền B, but also with many other peasants in the Mekong Delta. They 
argued that peasants in the delta had always enjoyed ‘freedom’ over 
where they resided, in selecting their occupations and in seeking new 
economic opportunities. Many peasants in Long Điền B commune 
recalled that people became sick and died due to depression after losing 
their land. A former cadre of a production unit in Long Điền B said:
Southern people valued their land highly: ‘First are children, second 
is land [nhất hậu hôn nhì điền thổ].’ Because many suffered a lot to 
accumulate the land during the wars, when losing their land, they were 
so sad that a few of them suffered mental sickness, even died of mental 
depression.81
Villagers considered the prohibition an ‘odd’ policy (chính sách kỳ cục) 
imposed from the north. Land occupation meant occupying the land of 
others (xâm lấn), but in reality people put great effort into reclaiming 
and improving their land rather than taking land belonging to others.82 
Mr H. H. in Long Điền B recalled losing 2 hectares of land in Long Điền 
A, a nearby commune, and a commune official began working on his 
land. Mr H. H. said:
They [local officials] told me that I was not allowed to cultivate the land 
because I was not a commune resident. One had to cultivate where one 
lived. I argued that now the north, the centre and the south were united 
into one country, people had the right to cultivate anywhere. I did not 
steal anybody else’s land!
He failed to convince the officials, although he was later granted a few 
công of redistributed land when he joined a production unit in Long 
Điền B.83 
80  Author’s interview, 10 August 2005, Long Điền B. Nguyễn Văn Linh was the VCP’s general 
secretary from 1987 until 1992. Local people often divided the period 1975–90 into two phases: 
Lê Duẩn’s phase (trào Lê Duẩn) and Nguyễn Văn Linh’s phase (trào Nguyễn Văn Linh).
81  Author’s interview, 20 September 2004, Long Điền B.
82  Author’s interview, 4 August 2005, Long Điền B.
83  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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A report of the Communist Party’s Central Committee for Agricultural 
Transformation in 1984 recognised the shortcomings of, and variation 
from one area to another in the implementation of, the prohibition 
policy. Some local authorities implemented the policy correctly by 
encouraging peasants who had land in two different areas (hai nơi) 
to choose only one. But in general, many local authorities were often 
confused about how to resolve the problem. Some considered non-
residents’ land ‘invaded’ (coi xâm canh là xâm lấn). They implemented 
the policy incorrectly, and non-resident peasants were often coerced 
into abandoning their land, even though they had not been given land 
in exchange in their residential area.84
First land redistribution
The VCP’s Resolution No. 24, Directive No. 253/NQ-TW 
(20  September  1976) and Directive No. 28/CT-TW (26 December 
1977) called for land redistribution with the aim of ‘eliminating vestiges 
of feudalism’ and the ‘exploitation of land’. In response, An Giang and 
other provinces in the Mekong Delta implemented these policies 
but often interpreted them to mean ‘mobilising land donations’ (vận 
động hiến điền) and redistributing land among peasants in the spirit 
of ‘sharing one’s rice and clothes’ (nhường cơm sẻ áo).85 A former 
member of the Provincial Committee for Agricultural Transformation 
remembered emphasising the ‘sharing of one’s rice and clothes’ rather 
than ‘eliminating exploitation’ during reform in An Giang from 1976 
to 1980. The provincial authorities also paid great attention to the 
economic objectives of the reform.86 
According to a Chợ Mới party cell report, during the period of military 
control (May 1975 to February 1976), the district ‘confiscated 2,214 
hectares of land abandoned by reactionaries who had left Vietnam87 and 
temporarily granted land to 3,760 landless and land-poor households’.88 
84  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, p. 17.
85  These terms can be found in Tài liệu hỏi về hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Inquiry about collective 
farming] in STTVHAG, General Information, p. 9. Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp An Giang (1978), 
Báo cáo tình hình cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa [Report on Socialist Agricultural Transformation], 
13 December, Long Xuyên: Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp An Giang; Công tác điều chỉnh ruộng đất ở 
quê nhà [Land redistribution in rural areas], An Giang, 6 September 1982, p. 1; Trích diễn văn của 
đồng chí Lê Văn Nhung [An extract from Lê Văn Nhung’s speech], An Giang, 10 May 1985, p. 1.
86  Author’s interview, 31 May 2005, Long Xuyên.
87  Many of them were ‘boat people’ who fled Vietnam by sea after the war.
88  BCHDBHCM, The History of Chợ Mới Party Cell, p. 173.
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Afterwards district authorities emphasised ‘land redistribution’ 
(chia cấp ruộng đất) in the spirit of ‘sharing one’s clothes and rice’ among 
the peasants. However, the authorities persistently pressed land-rich 
households to share any land in excess of their farming capacity with 
landless and land-poor households.89
People in Long Điền B remembered the land policy as being one of 
‘sharing one’s rice and clothes’ (chia cơm sẻ áo) or ‘land sharing’ 
(trang  trải ruộng đất). A former commune official who had been in 
charge of Long Điền B’s agricultural transformation said the first post-
1975 land policy he carried out in his commune was ‘land redistribution’ 
(điều chỉnh ruộng đất). In his opinion, the land reform was aimed at 
‘lifting the poor up and taking the rich down so that the two classes 
became equal to each other’.90
Although local authorities carried out land redistribution by ‘mobilising’ 
(vận động) the land-rich households to share some of their land with 
land-poor and landless households, they faced strong resistance from 
land-rich peasants and even from some of the intended beneficiaries. 
A former vice-chairman of Long Điền B commune recalled:
Land-rich people were dissatisfied with the policy. Even now they still 
curse us; a few carried long swords to the field to resist sharing their 
land. But because people at that time feared the new authorities, they 
did not dare fight us violently. Meanwhile, [poor] peasants were so 
heavily influenced by capitalist and feudalist thoughts that they refused 
to receive redistributed land. People said it was weird to take others’ 
land. It was a difficult time for us. Some cadres did not want to share 
their own land but we did not dare discipline them because our staff 
members were few. We also did not dare touch land of higher officials 
for fear of their revenge [sợ bị trù dập].91
To overcome peasants’ resistance, Long Điền B commune authorities 
decided to carry out land redistribution in a way that tackled the 
‘easiest first, hardest later’. They focused on redistributing communal 
and religious land first and then mobilised individuals who had more 
land (such as more than 10 hectares). At the same time, commune 
authorities implemented other policies such as adopting high-yielding 
rice, increasing the number of crops per year (chuyển vụ), building 
89  Ibid, p.173.
90  Author’s interview, 29 July 2005, Long Điền B.
91  Ibid.
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production solidarity teams and monopolising the supply of fertilisers 
and fuel to peasants. These policies also facilitated land sharing among 
peasants.92 A former commune official recalled:
Due to a shortage of fuel for using water pumps, people had to water 
their fields by scooping. It was impossible for those who had more than 
50–100 công [5–10 hectares] of land to manage all their land. Therefore, 
we mobilised those who had more than 50 công of land to share their 
land with others. If they were able to manage all their land, they would 
not need to share it. But if not, the land would be shared with the land-
poor and landless households. No land was allowed to be uncultivated.93
As mentioned, however, land redistribution was not well received even 
by some land-poor peasants. Some beneficiaries refused to accept 
redistributed land because they felt ‘weird’ (kỳ cục) about taking others’ 
land or were afraid of hurting others’ feelings. Some did take the 
redistributed land but did not dare accept a large amount because they 
were afraid of being unable to grow high-yielding rice. Some others said 
they took redistributed land because they did not want to be moved to 
the new economic zones. An elderly man in Long Quới II hamlet, Long 
Điền B commune, described his discontent:
The policy of sharing ‘one’s rice and clothes’ was not suitable for people 
here. A majority of peasants did not want it. Those who had more land 
did not want to share some of their land because they had accumulated 
it with sweat and tears [bằng mồi hôi nước mắt]. Those who did not 
have land did not want to take the land of others. They feared that, 
when receiving land, they would have to adopt new rice seeds and 
two rice crops per year with which they were unfamiliar and would be 
unable to make it profitable.94
Meanwhile, some land-rich peasants managed to avoid land 
redistribution by dividing their fields among their children 
and relatives. Local officials also encouraged them to do this.95
92  Ibid.
93  Ibid.
94  Author’s interview, 16 June 2005, Long Điền B.
95  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B. Local peasants said that, after reunification, 
they were informed that the state would take the landless and land-poor to new economic zones. 
Therefore, to avoid going to these zones, they had to accept redistributed land.
71
3 . PoSTwAR RESToRATIoN ANd PREPARATIoNS FoR CoLLECTIVISATIoN
A former production unit cadre in Long Điền B remembered that land 
redistribution was primarily implemented on the basis that ‘the land-
rich lent some of their fields [cho mượn đất] to land-poor households to 
make a living’.96 Other people confirmed that, during land redistribution, 
land-rich peasants ‘lent’ them a few công of land. When lending the 
fields, the land-rich peasants often said: 
Now I lend you the area for high-yielding rice cultivation. But if you fail 
to grow or the state gives up the requirement of growing high-yielding 
rice and returns to traditional rice [lúa mùa], then please return the 
field to me.97 
This later had unintended consequences when land disputes developed 
between new and previous landowners when collective farming was 
dismantled (discussed in Chapter 6). 
Despite the land redistribution in Long Điền B from 1975 to 1978 
reducing land inequality among peasants, many landless peasants did 
not receive any land at all. A landless resident in the commune recalled 
that he did not receive any land until 1982; he argued that the ‘share one’s 
rice and clothes’ policy benefited only a small proportion of landless 
households because most of the land-rich had distributed their land 
to their children and relatives before the state could touch it.98 In other 
words, the main beneficiaries of land reallocations in Long Điền B from 
1975 to 1978 were relatives of the land-rich households rather than the 
land-poor and landless households targeted by VCP policy.
According to a Chợ Mới party cell report, by the end of 1978, district 
authorities had redistributed about 3,026 hectares of land (about 
10 per  cent of the cultivated area) to 5,474 landless and land-poor 
households.99 In general, the results of land redistribution from 1975 to 
1978 in An Giang province were modest. By the end of 1978, the province 
had taken 20,000 hectares of land from ‘landlords and feudalists’ 
to redistribute among the land-poor and landless households.100
96  Author’s interview, 24 June 2005, Long Điền B.
97  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Bien B.
98  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B.
99  BCHDBHCM, The History of Chợ Mới Party Cell, p. 173.
100  STTVHAG, General Information, p. 9.
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According to a report from the Committee for Southern Agricultural 
Transformation (BCTNNMN), Vietnam’s Southern Region, which 
included the Mekong Delta and the South-East Region, had confiscated 
and redistributed 191,931 hectares of ‘exploited’ land to landless and 
land-poor households between 1976 and 1978. Of that amount, ‘Tiền 
Giang province had confiscated 12,000 hectares of land from 174 
landlords, 468 rich peasants, rural capitalists, and reactionaries’; Long 
An province confiscated 15,543 hectares of land, Bến Tre province 
confiscated 55,600 hectares, Đồng Tháp took 13,321 hectares, An Giang 
28,800 hectares and Minh Hải 19,814 hectares.101 The report said:
Land reform during 1976–1978 focused largely on nationalising the 
land of foreign farms and confiscating land of landlords, capitalist-
compradors and reactionaries … A large proportion of this land was 
abandoned and occupied illegally.102
Moreover, the report revealed that, in many locations, local authorities 
did not know how to use the confiscated land. Some used it to establish 
state farms, collectives or production units or lent it to military, state or 
mass organisations to produce food. Only small amounts of land were 
used for redistribution among land-poor and landless households, 
despite the fact these still made up a large proportion of the rural 
population.103
According to a survey carried out by the BCTNNMN, landless and 
land-poor households still accounted for 18–31 per cent of the rural 
population and occupied just 10 per cent of the land in July 1978 
(see Table 3.2).
In response to this situation, in November 1978, VCP leaders issued 
Directive No. 57/CT-TW, which called for the continued elimination of 
the exploitative practices of rich peasants, rural capitalists and vestiges 
of feudal exploitation. The directive reported:
In many areas of the south, eliminating the vestiges of feudal and 
landlord exploitation has not been carried out fully. In many areas 
[local authorities] do not understand clearly the need to eliminate 
101  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, p. 9. It is worth noting that this report gave 
a higher figure for land redistribution in An Giang (28,800 hectares) than An Giang’s report 
of 20,000 hectares.
102  Ibid.
103  Ibid., pp. 8–9.
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rich peasants’, rural capitalists’ and some upper–middle peasants’ 
exploitation … in many areas, party members who have come from the 
exploiting class still hold key leadership positions in the commune and 
hamlet authorities; they have not been enlightened [giác ngộ] about 
the party, nor yet understand clearly the policy of the party-state; even 
some try to protect the interests of the exploiting class.104
It therefore urged local authorities to ‘continue to be resolute in 
eliminating the exploitation of the exploiting class and to share some 
of their fields with others’. These households were allowed to retain 
a limited amount of land, equal to the average land per capita in the 
commune.105
Under Directive No. 57, the speed of land redistribution and 
collectivisation increased in many provinces of the Mekong Delta. 
However, land redistribution had not been carried out seriously, and 
local authorities did not follow official regulations nor were they under 
regular and close leadership.106
Table 3.2 Social structure in seven typical hamlets in seven provinces 
of the Mekong Delta in July 1978



















3 .32 1 .42 1 .43 2 .73 1 .42 8 .14 2 .67
Percentage 
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25.50 31 .31 20.43 24.20 21.09 18.30 19.30
Percentage 
of land





47.00 45 .54 56 .46 59 .79 50.47 63.70 71 .88
Percentage 
of land






17.10 16 .64 15 .23 11 .79 20.06 13.00 5 .74
Percentage 
of land
29 .48 28.20 27.30 20.29 33.70 20.40 14.10
104  ĐCSVN, Directive No. 57, p. 468.
105  Ibid, pp. 469, 472.
106  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution.
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7.10 4.09 6 .45 1 .47 2 .96 1 .86 0.41
Percentage 
of land
29.70 11.50 20.00 5 .21 4 .98 4.60 0.55
1 Type I: non-farming households; Type II: poor households, including land-poor and 
landless households who were engaged in wage labour; Type III: middle households 
who had enough land for their farming needs; Type IV: upper–middle households who 
had sufficient land, and some of which hired wage labour; Type V: rich households who had 
much land and many machines and engaged in capitalist business .
Source: Trần Hữu Đính (1994), Quá trình biến đổi về chế độ sở hữu và cơ cấu giai cấp 
nông thôn Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long (1969–1975) [The Process of Ownership and Class 
Structure Change in Rural Mekong Delta, 1969–1975], Hà Nội: NXB Khoa Học Xã Hội, p. 103.
Table 3.3 Landholdings in and social composition of a typical hamlet 



















15 3 .3 3.00 0.31 657
II: Poor 
households
115 25 .5 73 .24 7.70 1,151
III: Middle 
households




77 17 .1 280.00 29 .48 2,774
V: Rich 
households
32 7 .1 280.00 29 .47 14,563
Source: Nguyễn Thành Nam (2000), Việc giải quyết vấn đề ruộng đất trong quá trình đi 
lên sản xuất lớn ở Đồng bằng Sông Cửu Long 1975–1993 [Resolving land issues in the 
process of large-scale production in the Mekong Delta, 1975–1993], PhD thesis, Đại Học 
Khoa Học Xã Hội and Nhân Văn, Hồ Chí Minh, p. 47.
Therefore, during the period 1979–81, the 13 provinces in the Southern 
Region redistributed only 71,292 hectares of land, which accounted 
for only one-third of land redistribution during the period 1976–78. 
From 1979 to 1981, An Giang redistributed 6,000 hectares of land 
(additional to the 20,000 hectares previously redistributed), Hậu Giang 
redistributed 13,588 hectares and Kiên Giang 4,890 hectares.107
107  Ibid, p. 11.
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In summary, the land reforms in An Giang and other provinces in the 
Mekong Delta from 1975 to 1980 did not meet the target of eliminating 
exploitation and redistributing land to land-poor households. Indeed, 
land redistribution in An Giang from 1975 to 1980 redistributed only 
26,000 hectares of land, which was just 43 per cent of the target (60,225 
hectares).108 Despite this, land reform had significantly weakened the 
landed class, undermined their capacity to produce commodity rice 
and transformed the existing land tenure system.
Adopting high-yielding rice and two rice crops 
per year (chuyển vụ)
VCP leaders viewed the Mekong Delta as the ‘rice granary’ (vựa 
lúa) of the country and considered the region undercultivated and 
underexploited. After reunification, central authorities sent a group 
of researchers to the region and their study showed it had great 
agricultural potential because ‘floating rice’ and the traditional single 
rice crop per year were still the main crops there. Two rice crops per 
year would use only about 250,000 hectares of the delta’s 2 million 
hectares of agricultural land. Therefore, the central government urged 
farmers in the Mekong Delta to adopt two rice crops per year as early 
as the winter–spring of 1975–76.109 
From 1976 to 1980, provincial authorities in An Giang pushed the 
adoption of high-yielding rice to replace the traditional ‘floating rice’. 
They considered crop transformation essential to facilitate agricultural 
development, land reform and collectivisation.110 However, the adoption 
of high-yielding rice and two crops per year in An Giang province and 
elsewhere in the Mekong Delta encountered strong peasant resistance. 
Peasants in the Mekong Delta had a long history of cultivating floating 
rice (lúa nổi), which had adapted well to the annual flooding and other 
108  In mid-1980, An Giang’s leaders announced that the province had essentially completed its land 
redistribution—of 60,225 hectares (see An Giang hoàn thành cơ bản công tác cải tạo nông nghiệp 
[An Giang has completed agricultural transformation], An Giang, 22 November 1985, p. 1).
109  Phan Quang (1981), Đông Bằng Sông Cửu Long [The Mekong Delta], Hà Nội: NXB Văn Hóa, 
pp. 77–8.
110  According to Võ Tòng Xuân, the area of land used for floating rice in An Giang before 1975 
was about 180,000 hectares, accounting for the largest proportion of rice-growing land. Võ Tòng 
Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý (1994), Đề Tài KX 08-11: Tổng kết khoa học phát triển tổng hợp kinh tế 
xã hội nông thôn qua 7 năm xây dựng và phát triển An Giang [KX Account 08-11: Summing Up An 
Giang’s Socioeconomic Construction and Development over the Past 7 Years], Long Xuyên: Chương 
Trình Phát Triển Nông Thôn An Giang, p. 31.
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local ecological and cultural conditions. The productivity of floating 
rice was lower than the high-yield variety, but more stable—around 
10–15 giạ (200–300 kg) of rice paddy per công. Moreover, floating rice 
cultivation did not demand a large investment in fertilisers, pesticides, 
labour and land preparation. With floating rice, a peasant could 
cultivate a large tract of land with little effort. Local peasants referred 
to floating rice cultivation as ‘caring little but getting a real harvest’ 
(làm chơi ăn thật). In March (of the lunar calendar), they sowed rice 
and then went home until it was time to harvest. They cultivated one 
rice crop a year and enjoyed a lot of spare time during which they could 
fish and conduct other economic and cultural activities.111
Some peasants in Long Điền B remembered trying before 1975 to 
adopt high-yielding rice on parts of their land; however, they had 
little understanding of it. The high-yielding rice required inputs such 
as fertiliser and pesticides, intensive maintenance and levelling of 
the land, but they were unable to afford such extras. Even land-rich 
peasants feared not being able to manage all their fields if they were 
planted with high-yielding rice. A secondary schoolteacher in Long 
Điền B who adopted high-yielding rice in 1972 recalled:
In the past, my family had adopted high-yielding rice no. 8 [lúa thần 
nông 8] on a trial basis. At that time, the land had not been levelled 
[chưa bằng phẳng] and I was busy teaching and did not have much time 
to care [for it] so I grew only a small amount. Because high-yielding 
rice had not been adopted extensively in the field, mice and all insects 
attacked my crops. So, the rice productivity was poor. The highest 
productivity I gained was about 20 gịa per công [equal to 4 tonnes per 
hectare], but it cost me a lot [chi phí quá nhiều].112 
Villagers in Long Điền B commented that, in 1977, soon after people had 
harvested their traditional rice crop, the local authorities announced the 
adoption of high-yielding rice and two rice crops per year. Many people 
refused and continued to cultivate subsidiary crops (vụ màu)—mostly 
watermelon—instead of a second rice crop. In response to peasants’ 
resistance, local authorities set fire to a field to clear the land for crop 
conversion. An elderly man whose 3 công of watermelon was burnt at 
that time recalled:
111  Author’s interviews, June–October 2005, Long Điền B.
112  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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The authorities did things forcibly [làm mạnh]. My watermelon field 
was growing well and nearly ready for harvest. The morning of that day, 
my son and I went to water the field as usual. Then in the afternoon the 
authorities [‘mấy ổng’] suddenly set the field on fire without informing 
me. The whole field [cả cánh đồng] burned. Many people who lost their 
watermelon crops shouted and cried [la chửi và khóc]. Some had lost 
7 to 10 công of watermelon. The authorities did an odd thing [làm kỳ 
cục]. They said that they did so in order to plough the field for second 
rice crop transformation. However, it took three months from firing to 
ploughing the field. Therefore, people grew more upset.113
A former tractor driver who was in charge of ploughing the field for the 
second rice crop recollected:
At that time, I was a tractor team member [đội máy kéo]. Nobody dared 
to plough the field but I did. Some of my relatives criticised me and 
considered me a person without ancestors [người không có ông bà]. 
But  I knew that we could not refuse to comply with the policy [chủ 
trương]. Adopting two rice crops per year and planting high-yielding 
rice were compulsory so we had to follow. When I was ploughing the 
fields, there were some guys who carried long swords [dao mác] to 
block the tractor’s path. Frankly speaking, I did not dare plough the 
field without the support of authorities. At that time, officials from 
the commune’s agricultural department, commune police and even 
the commune chairman himself came to support us. Without them, 
nobody dared plough … those who disagreed with the policy tried to 
intimidate us rather than openly confront us because they too were 
afraid of the authorities. Everyone was afraid to upset the Vietnamese 
communist cadres [nói đến ba ông Việt Cộng ai cũng sợ].114
Despite strong peasant resistance, the authorities used various measures 
to force the adoption of high-yielding rice, such as prohibiting peasants 
from farming outside their residential area, land redistribution and 
controlling the supply of rural goods and inputs. As a result, the 
adoption of two crops per year in An Giang increased the area under 
rice cultivation from 31,509 hectares in 1976 to 79,066 hectares in 
1980.115 In Chợ Mới district, it increased from 3,120 hectares in the 
winter–spring of 1976–77 to 16,430 hectares in the winter–spring of 
1978–79, which accounted for nearly half of the total rice land in the 
district. Some communes in Chợ Mới district, such as Hòa Bình, Nhơn 
113  Author’s interview, 29 June 2005, Long Điền B.
114  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
115  Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 31.
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Mỹ and Hội An, had by this time completed their adoption of high-
yielding rice and the two-crop requirement.116 Phú Tân district, in 
which the local authorities were weak and 90 per cent of the population 
was Hòa Hảo, implemented crop transformation extensively, too. 
The area of high-yielding rice there increased from 6,600 hectares in 
1975 to 17,500 hectares in 1980.117
Conclusion
After the war, in response to the VCP’s agrarian policies, local 
authorities in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast and An Giang in the 
Mekong Delta focused on resolving postwar problems and preparing 
for collectivisation. Despite Thăng Bình district being heavily damaged 
by the war, the new authorities there and in many other districts of 
QN-ĐN swiftly consolidated their power and were able to implement 
the main contents of the VCP’s post-1975 reforms. The new authorities 
in Chợ Mới and other districts of An Giang still faced difficulties in 
building government and implementing the VCP’s policies.
There are at least two main reasons for the ‘better’ results in 
implementation in QN-ĐN than in An Giang. First, after the war, QN-
ĐN had a larger number of ex-revolutionaries and southerners returned 
from the north than did An Giang. QN-ĐN cadres at the district, 
commune and village level had more experience with the VCP’s policies 
and northern collectivisation and were more loyal to the party’s socialist 
transformation of agriculture than their counterparts in An Giang. For 
instance, authorities in QN-ĐN carried out preparatory measures for 
collectivisation forcefully and simultaneously. Meanwhile, An Giang 
authorities implemented these policies more cautiously. Peter Nolan 
also shows that the relative strength and quality of the Communist Party 
apparatus at the village level is one reason for more socioeconomically 
successful collectivisation in China than in the former Soviet Union.118
116  BCHDBHCM, The History of Chợ Mới Party Cell, p. 171; STTVHAG, General Information, 
p. 14.
117  Phú Tân đẩy mạnh phong trào hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [Phú Tân intensifies collectivisation], 
An Giang, 27 November 1980, p. 1.
118  Nolan, Collectivization in China, pp. 195–7.
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Second, the consequences of war in QN-ĐN were more severe than 
in An Giang. After the war, most peasant households in QN-ĐN 
were extremely poor and the social and economic structure of rural 
communities was flattened and relatively homogeneous. Most peasants 
were engaged in subsistence production and struggled to make a living. 
Given the extremely difficult conditions in QN-ĐN, most poor and 
powerless villagers tended to comply with the new agrarian policies 
to avoid any political, social or economic disadvantages imposed by 
those in power. In addition, some of the new policies, such as labour 
exchange teams and land sharing, seemed to fit well with local culture 
and practices. Because of the absence of market relations, cultural 
patterns of behaviour such as reciprocity and labour exchange were 
popular in QN-ĐN.
Meanwhile, because the consequences of war in Chợ Mới, in An Giang, 
were less severe than those in QN-ĐN, peasant households were better 
off and lived in more open, highly stratified and occupation-diverse 
rural communities. An Giang villagers therefore had greater capacity to 
evade and resist state policies that were unattractive to them. Moreover, 
some of the new agrarian policies—such as production solidarity teams, 
land redistribution and prohibition of non-resident cultivators—did 
not fit with local practices and conditions in which market relations 
and private land tenure were well established. These policies therefore 
encountered strong peasant resistance in An Giang and elsewhere in 







After the war, along with restoring the country’s war-torn economy, 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leaders put great effort into 
preparing the south for collectivisation. They urged local authorities to 
carry out collectivisation step by step, moving from a low to a high level 
and from simple to complicated forms of collective organisations. The 
party urged local authorities to experiment with pilot collectives before 
expanding collectives extensively in the south. In 1977, VCP leaders 
instructed each province in the south to select one district in which to 
build a pilot collective in the winter–spring season of 1977–78. They 
were determined to carry out collectivisation and planned to complete 
it by 1980.1 
The pilot collectives failed, especially in the Southern Region, and 
their form and character had to be changed to fit regional conditions. 
Despite these failures, party leaders praised the success of the pilot 
collectives in terms of mobilising peasants, collectivising their means 
of production and increasing productivity and collective members’ 
1  Ban Chấp Hành Trung Ương [hereinafter BCHTU] (1977), Chỉ thị 29-CT/TW về chính sách 
được áp dụng ở các hợp tác xã thí điểm ở Miền Nam [Directive No. 29-CT/TW on Policy for Pilot 
Collectives in the South], 26 December, Hà Nội: NXB Nông Nghiệp.
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incomes compared with individual farming.2 After the conference 
to consolidate agricultural collectives in the south in August 1978, 
VCP leaders persistently pushed collectivisation to achieve its goals.3 
Moreover, the border war with Cambodia and China helped increase 
the VCP’s determination to accomplish collectivisation.
Results varied, however, from region to region, and major problems 
were encountered, especially in the Mekong Delta. By the end of 1979, 
collectivisation was essentially complete in the Central Coast region, 
while it had been achieved for only a modest proportion of land and 
peasant households in the Mekong Delta.
This chapter examines the process and performance of pilot collectives 
in the Central Coast and the Mekong Delta and how and why VCP 
leaders decided to accelerate collectivisation; why collectivisation 
occurred rapidly in the Central Coast but faced many difficulties in the 
Mekong Delta; and how local authorities, cadres and peasants in both 
regions reacted to and influenced the collectivisation process. 
Experiments with collectives in Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng (QN-ĐN), Central Coast region
Two years after resolving their postwar problems, QN-ĐN’s provincial 
leaders seemed to trust their ability to meet not only the food subsistence 
requirements of the province, but also to bring the province’s agriculture 
towards socialist large-scale production.4 In September 1977, the QN-
ĐN party cell released its resolution ‘on development and agricultural 
transformation’ (Nghị quyết về phát triển và cải tạo nông nghiệp), which 
scheduled the building of pilot collectives in 1977, their extension 
in 1978 and accelerating and completing collectivisation by 1980.5 
Provincial leaders argued that establishing collectives in rural areas 
2  Nguyễn Thành Thơ (1978), Ra sức tiến hành hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [Do our best to 
implement collectivisation], in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Con đường làm ăn tập thế của nông dân 
[The Collective Farmer’s Way], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tp. Hồ Chí Minh, p. 13.
3  Ibid., p. 13. According to Nguyễn Thành Thơ, by August 1978, 132 pilot collectives had been 
established in the south. However, the majority of these (108) were in the Central Coast region; the 
Mekong Delta had only two, the South-Eastern region had 12 and the Central Highlands had 18.
4  This statement can be found in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (Be victorious in agriculture, 26 April 
1977, p. 1).
5  Nghị Quyết hội nghị Ban chấp hành đảng bộ tỉnh (khóa 11) về vấn đề phát triển và cải tạo 
nông nghiệp [Resolution of the Eleventh Provincial Party Congress on agricultural transformation 
and improvement], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 September 1977, p. 1.
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would not only fulfil the aims and ideals of the Communist Party, but 
would also be the peasants’ reward for enduring great losses during the 
country’s wars.6
As an initial step, provincial leaders decided to build three pilot 
collectives in three different districts: a commune-sized pilot collective 
(Duy Phước collective) in Duy Phước commune, Duy Xuyên district; 
a half-commune–sized collective (Hòa Tiến 1 collective) in Hòa Tiến 
commune, Hòa Vang district; and a commune-sized pilot collective 
(Bình Lãnh collective) in Bình Lãnh commune, Thăng Bình district. 
While the first two collectives were in lowland areas where land was 
more fertile and peasants were more prosperous, the third was in an 
area of undulating, less fertile land.
The main criteria provincial leaders used were that the place had to be 
an ex-revolutionary base (cơ sở cách mạng) and its party cell had to be 
‘strong’ and decisive. For example, Bình Lãnh commune was selected 
because the area had been a strong revolutionary base and its party cell 
was loyal to the party’s agricultural transformation policy, which would 
enable it to build a successful pilot collective.7
To establish these pilot collectives successfully at the outset, QN-ĐN 
authorities undertook considerable preparations. They set up 
a  provincial committee responsible for agricultural transformation 
(Ban cải tạo nông nghiệp)8 and launched a series of campaigns urging 
local cadres and peasants to study the provincial party committee’s 
resolution.9 In addition, the authorities opened a collectivisation 
school (trường hợp tác hoá) to train collective cadres. It trained 
37 cadres and eight accountants for Duy Phước collective, 17 cadres 
and six accountants for Bình Lãnh collective and 15 cadres and five 
accountants for Hòa Tiến collective.10 A former vice-chairman of Bình 
6  This was cited from the speech by Hồ Nghinh, the Communist Party secretary for the province, 
at the meetings to establish Hòa Tiến 1 pilot collective and Bình Lãnh pilot collective (Mở đại hội xã 
viên thành lập hợp tác xã nông nghiệp Bình Lãnh và Hòa Tiến [Members’ congress held to establish 
Bình Lãnh and Hòa Tiến collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 5 November 1977, p. 1).
7  Author’s interview, 20 October 2004, Bình Lãnh commune.
8  Thành lập Ban cải tạo nông nghiệp [Establishing a committee for agricultural transformation], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 October 1977, p. 1.
9  Phấn khởi nghiên cứu học tập Nghị quyết Tỉnh ủy về phát triển và cải tạo nông nghiệp 
[Studying the Provincial Party Committee’s resolution on agricultural transformation], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 10 September 1977, p. 1.
10  Tổng kết xây dựng thí điểm hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Summing up establishing pilot 
collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 May 1978, p. 1.
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Lãnh collective remembered that, before establishing pilot collectives, 
he and other cadres in Bình Lãnh were sent for four months of training 
in Đà Nẵng city.11
Furthermore, to prevent peasants from slaughtering and selling draught 
animals before the collectives were established, the provincial people’s 
committee released a directive forbidding people from buying draught 
animals. The directive stipulated that 
buying draught animals within the commune requires the permission 
of the local People’s Committee [Uỷ ban Nhân dân xã]; exchange of 
stocks between two communes requires permission from the district 
People’s Committee; and buying and selling animals between two 
districts requires permission from the provincial People’s Committee.12
It also forbade peasants from intentionally injuring, poisoning or 
slaughtering their draught animals. Each commune also established 
a committee for mobilising peasants into collectives (Ban vận động 
thành lập hợp tác xã), which were in charge of convincing peasants to 
join collectives through study meetings or visiting ‘difficult’ peasant 
households who were reluctant or refused to join collectives.13
Villagers in Bình Lãnh collective recalled that, to establish the pilot 
collectives there, central, provincial and district authorities provided 
considerable assistance and resources to the commune. Seven northern 
cadres, including the chairs of the ‘advanced’ collectives in Thanh 
Hóa province, came to stay in the commune for seven months to 
provide help. They even directly managed the collectives. The district’s 
authorities sent a vice-chairperson of its economic department to work 
as a chairperson of the Bình Lãnh collective. The central and provincial 
governments had also invested a great deal in Bình Lãnh collective 
by providing hundreds of tonnes of cement, lime, fertiliser and other 
resources.14
After a few months of preparation, provincial authorities started to 
establish the pilot collectives. An October 1977 article in the Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported that 100 per cent of peasant 
11  Author’s interview, 14 October 2005, Bình Lãnh.
12  Prohibiting private merchants from purchasing and slaughtering livestock, Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 24 September 1977, p. 1.
13  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Bình Lãnh and Bình Định communes.
14  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Bình Lãnh.
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households in Duy Phước commune, 96 per cent in Bình Lãnh 
and 95  per cent in Hòa Tiến 1 had ‘voluntarily signed the form to 
participate in collectives’.  The  article urged ‘peasants in the province 
to follow the path of collective farming of Duy Phước, Bình Lãnh 
and Hòa Tiến’.15 In late October 1977, local authorities announced 
the completion of the three pilot collectives and the establishment 
of collective members’ congresses (đại  hội xã viên) to select their 
managerial boards (ban quản trị hợp tác xã). The percentage of peasant 
households joining collectives increased—to 98.3 per cent in Bình Lãnh 
collective and 99  per cent in Hòa  Tiến 1.16 Almost all land, draught 
animals and other means of production were collectivised: ‘One 
hundred per cent of agricultural land  in Duy Phước [704 hectares], 
97.7 per cent in Bình Lãnh [562  hectares] and 100 per  cent in Hòa 
Tiến [373 hectares].’ Approximately 87 per cent of draught animals in 
Duy Phước, 90.1 per cent in Bình Lãnh and 100 per cent in Hòa Tiến 
1 were collectivised, as were ‘production tools, machinery and other 
implements necessary for collectives’.17
Although the official documents claimed that most peasants joined 
pilot collectives voluntarily, few residents recalled being enthusiastic 
participants. Many peasants in Bình Lãnh claimed they did not like 
joining the collective but had to do so. They were ‘coerced’ (bị bắt buộc) 
or ‘pressured’ (bị bắt bí) and fearful of being isolated (sợ cô lập) if they 
did not join. Some were indifferent and just followed what others did. 
Some—especially land-poor but labour-rich families—seemed to be 
more eager than others to join. Some decided to join because they 
believed the state would take care of them and not let them die of hunger 
regardless of the collectives’ performance.18 The provincial newspaper 
reported that some peasants did not believe in collective farming and, 
in the first few months, the pilot collectives found it difficult to mobilise 
members to work in the fields. Moreover, some peasants engaged in 
obstructive practices such as selling their draught animals before 
collectivisation, renting land in uncollectivised communes or seeking 
15  Bà con nông dân trong tỉnh hãy theo con đường làm ăn tập thể của Duy Phước, Bình Lãnh, 
Hòa Tiến [Peasants in the province should follow the collective farming paths of Duy Phước, Bình 
Lãnh and Hòa Tiến people], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 October 1977, p. 1.
16  Mở đại hội xã viên thành lập hợp tác xã nông nghiệp Duy Phước [Members’ congress held to 
establish Duy Phước collective], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 29 October 1977, p. 1; Members’ congress 
held to establish Bình Lãnh and Hòa Tiến collectives, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 5 November 1977, p. 1.
17  Summing up establishing pilot collectives, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 May 1978, p. 1.
18  A woman in Bình Lãnh argued: ‘entering [a] collective means hunger, but the party could not 
let people die of it’ (Author’s interview, 20 October 2005).
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outside jobs to make a living.19 While the collective transplanted 
seedlings, many people focused only on growing their subsidiary crops 
(màu) on their ‘5 per cent land’ (the portion of their land they were 
allowed to retain) or on land the collective had not yet used.20
Despite many peasants not liking collective work, the establishment 
of the three pilot collectives in QN-ĐN did not face difficulties. Local 
authorities were able to take control of peasants’ land and other 
means of production and mobilise peasants into collective work. As in 
QN-ĐN, other parts of the Central Coast confronted few difficulties 
in building their pilot collectives. For example, Nghĩa Bình province, 
neighbouring QN-ĐN, also succeeded in building pilot collectives, 
among them one in Nghĩa Lâm commune that 99.9 per cent of peasant 
households joined.21
In May 1978, when the pilot collectives had their first harvest, the 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported ‘a victory in the first step’ 
(thắng lợi bước đầu). Staple food production and productivity in the 
three pilot collectives, it said, reached the highest figure ever, and the 
income of the collectives’ members was higher than that of individual 
farmers.22
At a conference to provide a summary of the state of the pilot collectives 
in May 1978, Hồ Nghinh, the Communist Party Secretary for QN-ĐN, 
praised the collectives’ achievements:
[T]hat victory confirmed the correct … policies of our party, reflected 
the superiority of the mode of socialist collective production … that 
victory defeated the propaganda and distorted statement of the enemy 
as well as solved doubts [hồ nghi] and anxiety [băn khoăn] of some 
cadres and peasants.23
19  Summing up establishing pilot collectives, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 May 27, p. 1.
20  Thắng lợi bước đầu của phong trào Hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [The first victory steps of 
collectivisation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 May 1978, p. 1.
21  HTX Nghĩa Lâm (1978), Kinh nghiệm xây dựng hợp tâc xã Nghĩa Lâm, tỉnh Nghĩa Bình 
[Experiences from establishing Nghia Lam collective in Nghĩa Bình province], in Võ Chí Công 
et al. (eds), Con đường làm ăn tập thể của nông dân [The Collective Farmer’s Way], Hồ Chí Minh: 
NXB Tp. Hồ Chí Minh, p. 147. Nghĩa Bình was the result of the amalgamation of Quảng Ngãi and 
Bình Định provinces.
22  The first victory steps of collectivisation, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 May 1978, p. 1.
23  Hồ Nghinh: Thắng lợi của việc xây dựng thí điểm hợp tác là thắng lợi có ý nghĩa của toàn 
đảng bộ và nhân dân toàn tỉnh [Hồ Nghinh: The success of pilot collectives is a significant victory 
for the province’s party and people], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 May 1978, p. 1.
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Peasants in Bình Lãnh collective confirmed that, in the first season, 
the collective had a bumper harvest. Collective members received 
3 kilograms of paddy per workday—a level never repeated in later 
years of collective farming. Many villagers attributed the bumper crop 
to favourable weather, the huge investment in the pilots and ‘good 
soil’ because the land had been uncultivated for a long time.24 Some 
peasants and former staff of collectives revealed that the high payment 
per workday the peasants received for the first season was an inflated 
figure that the authorities used to attract peasants in other places to join 
collectives. To increase the payment per workday for peasants, leaders 
of the pilot collectives had transferred some of the peasants’ current 
work-points to the next season. A former cadre of Bình Lãnh collective 
confirmed this deception:
The payment per workday was actually about 2 kilograms at that time. 
However, by trickily transferring part of the amount of work-points [ghế 
điểm] to the next season, payment per workday reached 3 kilograms. 
That’s why we never achieved that figure.25
In short, although peasants in QN-ĐN and other parts of the Central 
Coast were not eager to join collectives, the pilot collectives there faced 
weaker resistance than in other regions in the south. Local authorities 
were able to collectivise peasants’ land and their other main means 
of production and mobilise them to undertake collective work.
Building pilot collectives in the Mekong Delta
Communist Party leaders anticipated strong peasant resistance to 
collectivisation in the Southern Region, so they undertook cautious 
experiments with pilot collectives. Instead of requesting each province 
to build its own pilot collectives, as in the Central Coast, in the Mekong 
Delta, party leaders built only one pilot collective for the whole 
region—in Tân Hội commune, Cai Lậy district, Tiền Giang province—
in February 1977. Tân Hội commune was selected because it had been 
a revolutionary base of the National Liberation Front (NLF).
24  Villagers said the soil was in good condition because it had been left uncultivated for a long 
time. The collective also used huge volumes of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, lime and 
manure.
25  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Bình Lãnh.
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This pilot was a commune-sized collective called Tân Hội collective 
(Hợp Tác Xã Tân Hội), which contained 904 households and 525 
hectares of land. To make Tân Hội collective a shining example for 
the whole region, authorities had to invest considerable resources. 
For example, the central government sent more than 100 cadres from 
‘advanced collectives’ (hợp tác xã tiên tiến) in the north to help. Despite 
this, the collective faced significant difficulties and many members 
dropped out. By 1978 only 234 peasant households remained in the 
collective. To try to save the collective, authorities decided to divide it 
into two; however, neither collective was able to hold out and both were 
dismantled (tan rã).26
With the failure of this large-scale (qui mô lớn) collective, party leaders 
decided to try a smaller-scale pilot. They chose Phú Quới hamlet, 
Yên  Bình commune, in Gò Công district of Tiền Giang province, in 
which to build a hamlet-sized pilot, called Phú Quới collective. The main 
criteria for selecting Phú Quới were: 1) the natural conditions were 
favourable for the adoption of intensive farming (high-yielding rice) 
and increasing the number of crops per year; 2) peasants in the hamlet 
had been trained in production solidarity teamwork; and 3) its cadres 
and mass organisations were strong and capable of building a successful 
collective.27
After one month of preparation, Phú Quới pilot collective was officially 
established on 17 May 1978. It had 257 households (98.4 per cent of 
total households), 309.84 hectares of land (97.4 per cent of the total) 
and nearly 100 per cent of the machinery and draught animals in the 
hamlet. Unlike the previous experiments, the Phú Quới collective was 
able to survive beyond a few months of operation and was considered 
an exemplary example for other provinces.28 Learning from this 
experience, some other provinces in the Mekong Delta shifted to 
experimenting with small-scale pilot collectives and production units 
(Tập đoàn sản xuất).29
26  Huỳnh Thị Gấm, Socioeconomic changes in the Mekong Delta, p. 80.
27  Đảng bộ huyện Gò Công (1978), Vận động thành lập hợp tác xã thí điểm ở Gò Công 
[Mobilising and establishing pilot collectives in Gò Công], in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Con đường 
làm ăn tập thể của nông dân [The Collective Farmer’s Way], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tp. Hồ Chí Minh, 
pp. 129–30.
28  Ibid., pp. 133–4.
29  Huỳnh Thị Gấm, Socioeconomic changes in the Mekong Delta, p. 80.
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Experimenting with collectives in An Giang
In October 1978, An Giang province began to build pilot collectives. 
Among them were the Hòa Bình Thạnh commune-sized collective in 
Châu Thành district, and the Tây Huề hamlet-sized collective in Long 
Xuyên town. Despite direct assistance from the provincial government, 
the building of the Hòa Bình Thạnh collective failed in terms of 
peasants’ participation and performance. A recent official document 
revealed that 
in order to mobilise peasants into joining the collective, policemen had 
to stand at the edges of the rice fields and request peasants to destroy 
their vegetable crops in order to give the land to the collective.30 
Authorities also faced great difficulties convincing peasants to hand 
over their machinery and tools to collective organisations. The collective 
had to force peasants to hand over this equipment (tập thể hoá bằng 
mọi giá). Some owners strenuously objected, and ‘intentionally 
removed some machine accessories; some broke the machines’ chains 
or axles before handing them to the collective’. After collectivisation, 
the machines’ new managers lacked the skill and motivation necessary 
to look after them, so that, 
after one season, 100 per cent of machines were broken and had to be 
put into storage; hundreds of hectares of land were not ploughed in 
time and left uncultivated.31 
As a result, the collective’s performance was very poor. Peasants received 
a low income, equal to just one-quarter of their previous income from 
individual farming.32 Thus, Hòa Bình Thạnh collapsed.
Meanwhile, the Tây Huề hamlet-size collective was able to continue 
despite its poor performance in terms of the quality of peasant work 
and paddy productivity. When the collective was established, 211 out 
of 244 households joined, but the collective faced a high dropout rate.33 
30  Xuân Thu and Quang Thiện (2005), Đêm trước đổi mới: Công phá ‘lũy tre’ [On the eve of 
the renovation: Breaking through the ‘bamboo hedges’], Tuổi trẻ Online, 14 December, available 
from: tuoitre.vn/tin/chinh-tri-xa-hoi/phong-su-ky-su/20051204/dem-truoc-doi-moi-cong-pha-
luy-tre/111625.html (accessed 4 October 2017).
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid.
33  Hợp tác xã Tây Huề qua 6 năm làm ăn tập thể [Tây Huề collective over the past 6 years], 
An Giang, 30 December 1983, p. 2.
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In general, pilot collectives were not successful in An Giang and other 
Mekong Delta provinces. Central and provincial leaders in the delta 
therefore shifted full collectivisation from collectives to production 
units, which they now considered a basic form of collectivisation.34
Experimenting with production units
Realising the failure of pilot collectives, many districts in An Giang 
built the more modest production units instead. The size of these units 
ranged from 40 to 50 hectares of land and from 50 to 100 households.
In late 1979, Chợ Mới district chose Long Điền B commune in which 
to build pilot production units.35 According to a former official of 
Long Điền B commune, with the direct assistance of some local and 
northern cadres from the province of Thanh Hóa, they decided to build 
pilot production unit no. 1 (tập đoàn sản xuất số 1) in Long Phú 1 
hamlet. Long Phú 1 hamlet was considered to have strong leadership 
(chính quyền ấp mạnh) thanks to the hamlet chief, who was ‘powerful’ 
and ‘enthusiastic’ (nhiệt tình) about agricultural transformation. 
In addition, a large proportion of the population in Long Phú 1 was 
Catholic, and most of the land in the hamlet had been owned by the 
local church (đất ông cha, đất nhà chung) but rented to peasants, 
meaning the land there was already considered more like communal 
than individual land. Authorities believed that when the church leaders 
agreed to hand the land over to them, such collectivisation would be 
acceptable to the peasants. Finally, the proportion of landless and land-
poor households in Long Phú 1 was relatively high compared with 
other hamlets, so authorities expected such households would be more 
eager to farm collectively than better-off households.36
Local villagers recalled that the district committee for agricultural 
transformation undertook a lot of preparation before establishing 
production unit no. 1, such as selecting good cadres to fill the unit’s 
management board, rezoning land boundaries and mobilising peasants 
to join. Peasants in the hamlet whose land was within the boundaries 
34  Quang Truong, Agricultural collectivization, p. 191.
35  BCHDBHCM, The History of Chợ Mới Party Cell, p. 175.
36  Author’s interview, 29 July 2005, Long Điền B.
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of  the production unit were preferred members, while landless 
households in the hamlet or neighbouring hamlets were also invited 
to join.37
Marshalling peasants to join the production unit was not easy. Villagers 
recalled that, of the 10 households invited, only five or six participated; 
more poor than better-off households joined; and ‘some better-off 
households who had more than 30 công of land detested [chê] collective 
farming in the production unit, so they ran off to hire land in other 
places to make a living’. They also recalled that some residents who lost 
land were so upset they refused to join.38
When asked why they joined, many former members of the production 
unit said it was ‘for fear of the new authorities’ (sợ chính quyền mới), 
‘fear of being taken to the new economic zones’ (sợ đưa đi vùng kinh tế 
mới), because they were being coerced (bị ép buộc) or ‘in order to keep 
the land’ (vào để giữ đất). One man in Long Phú commented: 
[O]ut of 100 people, only five who were landless and loved farming 
were happy to join. The remainder were coerced into joining; if we 
didn’t participate how could we make a living and keep our land?39 
Despite such difficulties, 83 households were reported to have joined 
production unit no. 1, and it began to operate with 55 hectares of land 
in the summer–autumn of 1979.40 Unlike a collective, the production 
unit collectivised land but not machinery, draught animals or other 
peasant-owned resources. A machinery unit (tập đoàn máy) was in 
charge of the peasants’ farm machinery. Villagers referred to the main 
unit as the ‘land unit’ (tập đoàn đất) to distinguish it from the machinery 
unit, and both were to become teams or brigades in a future collective. 
The production unit operated according to a work-points system in 
which peasants farmed collectively and were rewarded with a number 
of points. Although official policy encouraged payment for land (trả hoa 
lợi ruộng đất), the leaders of production unit no. 1 did not apply this.
37  Ibid. The production unit’s management board consisted of five staff who were considered to 
have come from ‘revolutionary tradition–related families’ (gia đình có truyền thống cách mạng): 
the chairperson, one vice-chairperson in charge of labour management, another vice-chairperson 
in charge of planning, one accountant and one storekeeper.
38  Author’s interviews, 2–30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
39  Author’s interview, 25 September 2004, Long Điền B.
40  The total number of households within the boundaries of the production unit was about 150 
(Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B).
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Despite considerable assistance from district and northern cadres and 
significant investment in the pilot production unit, its performance was 
not good. Many people were reported to have ‘joined the production 
unit but did not go to work in the fields’ (vào tập đoàn nhưng không ra 
đồng); some sent their children and other ‘subsidiary labour’ (lao động 
phụ) to work while ‘the main labour’ (lao động chính) in households 
made a living in other ways. Villagers also mentioned that peasants 
did their production unit work unenthusiastically and carelessly, and 
‘no-one took care of common property’ (cha chung không ai khóc). 
Moreover, the production unit was unable to mobilise peasants to 
complete their work on time (làm không kịp việc). For example, weeding 
of the production unit’s rice fields went so slowly that ‘the weeds grew 
faster than the speed of weeding’.41 One man outside production unit 
no. 1 recalled:
I went to see how people in the production unit worked collectively. 
When I saw the weeds were overgrown, I lost my interest [thấy mà 
mất ham] in collective farming. Meanwhile, in individuals’ rice fields, 
I could not see any weeds [không thấy một cọng cỏ]. At that time I was 
afraid that collective farming would expand into my hamlet.42 
(See Chapter 5 for more about peasants’ everyday politics.)
According to a former cadre of production unit no. 1, for the first season 
(summer–autumn 1979), paddy productivity was about 60 per cent of 
individual farming rates. Because few peasants were working in the 
fields, the total of peasants’ work-points was small. As a result, payment 
per workday for peasants was relatively high (about 10 kilograms per 
workday). Therefore, production unit no. 1 was known as an exemplary 
case in the Chợ Mới district. Party leaders presented it as a typical case 
(đi báo cáo điển hình) at provincial and central government conferences 
on pilot collectives in 1979.43
In the winter–spring of 1979–80, authorities in Long Điền B commune 
decided to create another production unit, unit no. 2, in Long Phú 2, at 
the nearby hamlet of Long Phú 1. Production unit no. 2 faced similar 
difficulties in mobilising and managing peasants and its performance 
41  Author’s interviews, 27–30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
42  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B.
43  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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was poor from the outset. Although the performance of these two pilot 
collectives steadily deteriorated, local cadres tried their best to keep 
them from collapsing.
Accelerating collectivisation
In April 1978, VCP leaders released Directive No. 43/CT-TW 
(14 April 1978), which stressed ‘firmly grasping the task of agricultural 
transformation and speeding it up in the south’.44 It advocated for 
local officials in the south to make agricultural transformation their 
‘central and regular task’ (nhiệm vụ trọng tâm và thường xuyên), which 
they should carry out in a ‘positive, unhesitant and not overhasty and 
careless manner’.45 
At the conference on the consolidation of agricultural collectives in 
the south in August 1978, party leaders also revealed that the country 
now faced a ‘new situation’ relating to China ‘inciting’ Cambodia into 
a  border war against Vietnam. The party leaders stressed ‘this new 
situation requires us to speed up agricultural transformation and try 
our best to implement it in the south’.46 They planned to implement 
a great wave of collectivisation in the south in 1979 to complete 
the establishment of collectives and production units by 1980.47 
The following sections examine how collectivisation was accelerated in 
QN-ĐN in the Central Coast and in An Giang in the Mekong Delta. 
QN-ĐN in the Central Coast
Following the three initial pilot collectives, QN-ĐN established 
four more (hợp tác xã nông nghiệp), in the spring–summer of 1978. 
According to Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper accounts, by June 
1978, the province had established seven pilot collectives, which were 
reportedly operating well. The provincial leaders attributed the ‘good’ 
performance of these pilots largely to ‘the correctness of agricultural 
transformation policy’ and ‘the superiority of new production 
44  ĐCSVN, Politburo’s Directive No. 43, pp. 183–91.
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid, p. 9. 
47  Võ Chí Công (1978), Con đường làm ăn tập thể của nông dân [The collective farmer’s way], 
in Võ Chí Công et al. (eds), Con đường làm ăn tập thế của nông dân [The Collective Farmer’s Way], 
Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tp. Hồ Chí Minh, p. 71.
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relations’.48 Excited with the performance of pilot collectives and in 
response to the VCP’s Directive No. 43 (14 April 1978), QN-ĐN’s 
leaders called for a rapid and extensive increase in collectivisation for 
the winter–spring of 1978–79.49 
By October 1978, QN-ĐN had established 113 collectives involving 46 
per cent of the province’s peasant households and 35 per cent of its 
agricultural land.50 By that time, officials in Duy Xuyên, a key district 
that had established the first pilot collective in QN-ĐN, announced that 
collectivisation there was largely complete, making it the first district 
in QN-ĐN, and the first in the south, to achieve completion.51 Duy 
Xuyên had established 19 collectives, which almost all of the peasant 
households in the district had joined.52 Inspired by the high speed of 
collectivisation, provincial leaders decided in October 1978 to shorten 
by one year the schedule for fulfilling the main targets of their five-year 
agricultural plan for 1976–80. This meant completing collectivisation 
and reaching the production target of 500,000 tonnes of staple food by 
1979 instead of 1980.53 
By April 1979, one year after the VCP issued Directive No. 43, QN-ĐN 
had established 164 collectives, involving 70 per cent of total peasant 
households. Collectivisation in other Central Coast provinces was also 
48  Xã Luận: Xây dựng quan hệ sản xuất mới trong nông nghiệp [The editorial: Building new 
production relations in agriculture], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 June 1978, p. 1. The four new pilot 
collectives were Hòa Tiến no. 2 collective in Hòa Vang district, Quyết Tiến collective and Tiền 
Phong collective in Điện Bàn district, and Tam Thành collective in Tam Kỳ district.
49  Tích cực chuẩn bị mở rộng phong trào tổ chức hợp tác xã sản xuất nông nghiệp [Be positive 
towards the extension of collectivisation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 10 June 1978, p. 1.
50  Thành lập xong 98 hợp tác xã sản xuất nông nghiệp [98 agricultural collectives have been 
established], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 October 1978, p. 3. 
51  Đoàn cán bộ Ban cải tạo nông nghiệp Trung ương, các tỉnh Miền Trung và Hội liên hiệp 
phụ nữ Việt Nam thăm huyện Duy Xuyên [Cadres of the Central Agricultural Transformation 
Committee, the Central Coast provinces and Vietnam Women’s Union visited Duy Xuyên 
district], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 October 1978, p. 1. 
52  Duy Xuyên had 28,000 hectares of uncultivated land, 11 communes and 19,462 households. 
It had 7,000 hectares of agricultural land, including 3,400 hectares of rice-growing land, and the 
level of land per capita was 1 sào and 11 thước (equal to 867 sq m). Farming households accounted 
for 81.4 per cent of the population; fishing, 3.4 per cent; handicrafts, 9.4 per cent; traders, 1.4 per 
cent; and other professions, 4.1 per cent (Duy Xuyên khân trương xây dựng huyện để chỉ đạo và 
quản lý các hợp tác xã [Duy Xuyên district’s rush to build capacity to lead collectives], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 October 1978, p. 1). 
53  Xã luận: Phấn đấu hoàn thành những mục tiêu về sản xuất và cải tạo nông nghiệp đểa trong 
năm 1976–1980 của tỉnh vào năm 1979 [The editorial: Do our best to meet 1976–1980 targets of 
production and agricultural transformation by 1979], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 21 October 1978, 
p. 1. 
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rapid. By April 1979, the Central Coast region had largely completed 
collectivisation in two forms, collectives and production units 
(see Table 4.1).54 
Table 4.1 The number of collectives and the percentage of peasant 
households joining collectives in five Central Coast provinces by 
April 1979
Province Number of 
collectives
Percentage of total 
peasant households 
Bình Trị Thiên 231 85 .5
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng 164 70.0
Nghĩa Bình 246 57 .8
Khánh Hòa 180 80.0
Thuận Hải 183 55 .4
Central Coast region 1,004 70.3
Source: Cùng với cả Miền Nam tỉnh ta khẩn trương hoàn thành hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp 
[our province, together with southern provinces, hurries to complete collectivisation], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 june 1979, p . 1 .
Nhân Dân newspaper reported on 29 April 1980 that, by the end of 
1979,  the Central Coast had established 1,114 collectives and 1,500 
production units, which accounted for 83 per cent of peasant households 
and 76  per cent of agricultural land. The article praised collective 
farming for achieving better levels of paddy productivity, staple food 
production and food contribution to the state than individual farming.55 
By the end of 1979, QN-ĐN authorities announced the completion of 
collectivisation in the lowland and midland areas. The province had 
established 235 collectives involving 18,400 peasant households (nearly 
93 per cent of the province’s peasant households) and 106,000 hectares 
of agricultural land (84 per cent of the total land). The remaining 
peasant households and land were in mountainous areas where ethnic 
54  Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng. (1979). Cùng với cả Miền Nam tỉnh ta khẩn trương hoàn thành 
hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [Our province, together with southern provinces, hurries to complete 
collectivisation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 June, p. 1. 
55  Năm năm cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa đối với nông nghiệp ở Miền Nam [Five years of socialist 
reform for agriculture in the south], Nhân Dân, 29 April 1980, p. 1. Similar praise for collective 
farming was found in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (Our province, together with southern provinces, 
27 June 1979, p. 1); and in Thế Đạt (1981), Nền nông nghiệp Việt Nam từ sau cách mạng tháng Tám 
năm 1945 [Vietnamese Agriculture Since the August Revolution 1945], Hà Nội: NXB Nông Nghiệp, 
pp. 215–16. 
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minorities lived.56 The size of collectives ranged from 200 to 700 
hectares and among these were 48 collectives the size of a commune 
(xã). On average, each collective had 421 hectares of agricultural land, 
1,542 workers and 762 households.57 The acceleration of collectivisation 
in QN-ĐN is illustrated in Table 4.2.





















No . of 
collectives 




n/a n/a n/a 50 57 .8 70 92 .9
n/a = not available
Sources: Thắng lợi bước đầu của phong trào Hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [The first victory 
steps of collectivisation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 May 1978, p. 1; Thành lập xong 98 
hợp tác xã sản xuất nông nghiệp [98 agricultural collectives have been established], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 11 October 1978, p. 3; Năm 1979 tỉnh ta căn bản hoàn thành hợp tác 
hóa nông nghiệp ở các huyện đồng bằng [The midlands of our province have completed 
collectivisation in 1979], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 17 October 1979, p. 1; Hôi nghị Ban cải 
tạo nông nghiệp tỉnh: Ra sức củng cố HTX để làm tốt vụ sản xuất Đông–Xuân [Provincial 
Committee for Agricultural Transformation: Strengthening cooperatives to make good in 
winter–spring production], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26 december 1979, p . 1 .
In Thăng Bình district, as in many other districts in QN-ĐN, 
collectivisation was rapid and faced no strong peasant resistance. After 
‘successfully’ establishing the experimental collective of Bình Lãnh, in 
mid-1978 the district’s leaders called for the setting up of collectives 
in other communes. By September 1978, Thăng Bình district had 
established 10 collectives in five of its 20 communes.58 By June 1979, 
Thăng Bình had established 17 collectives in 13 communes, involving 54 
per cent of peasant households and 44 per cent of agricultural land; and, 
56  The midlands of our province, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 17 October 1979, p. 1. 
57  Phong trào hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp: Sự kiện và con số [Overview of collectivisation: Events 
and figures], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 June 1983, p. 2. 
58  Thăng Bình chuẩn bị xây dựng 10 hợp tác xã [Thăng Bình is about to establish 10 collectives], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 9 September 1978, p. 1.
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among these, 10 communes had largely completed collectivisation.59 
By the end of 1979, Thăng Bình’s authorities announced the completion 
of collectivisation, with 36 collectives across its 20 communes. 
Bình Định commune in Thăng Bình district completed collectivisation 
by October 1979, and had two collectives: Bình Định collective no. 1 
and Bình Định collective no. 2 (where I did fieldwork and interviews in 
2004 and 2005). A former cadre of Bình Định collective no. 2 recalled 
that, after one month of mobilising peasants, almost all households in 
the area had joined the collective. Only 20 peasant households declined, 
most of whose occupants were too old to work.60 
Thus, by 1979–80, collectives (hợp tác xã) were the main farming 
organisations in QN-ĐN and other provinces of the Central Coast 
region. A typical collective in QN-ĐN encompassed most or all of 
a  commune and had from 200 to 700 hectares of agricultural land. 
On average, collectives in QN-ĐN were as large as, or even larger than, 
typical collectives in the north.61 For example, the Bình Lãnh commune-
sized collective in Thăng Bình district had 1,900 hectares of uncultivated 
land, 564 hectares of agricultural land and 1,050 households.62 
QN-ĐN leaders defined collectives as ‘socialist agricultural production 
economic organisations established voluntarily by peasants and under 
the leadership of the party with the guidance and help of the state’.63 
Peasants over 16 years of age were supposed to do collective work. 
When participating in the collective, each member had to contribute 
a share (cổ phần) to the collective’s assets. Households were allowed 
to retain part of their land—known as ‘5 per cent land’—mostly from 
their garden, for the family economy (kinh tế gia đình). All other land 
and livestock were supposed to be in the collective.64 
59  Thăng Bình sơ kết hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp, phát động thi đua với HTX Duy Phước, Định 
Công và Vũ Thắng [A preliminary summing up of collectivisation in Thăng Bình], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 2 June 1979, p. 1. 
60  Author’s interview, 20 April 2004, Bình Định.
61  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 138. The enlarged collectives in the north in 1974 
averaged about 200 hectares of land and 350 households. 
62  HTX Bình Lãnh từ yếu kém vươn lên tiên tiến [Bình Lãnh collective is moving away from 
a position of weakness], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 9 June 1979, p. 2.
63  Một số quy định về xây dựng hợp tác xã [Some regulations on establishing collectives], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26 August 1978, p. 1. 
64  Ibid.
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QN-ĐN had met the agricultural transformation target set by the VCP’s 
leaders. Collectivisation was completed within one year—even faster 
than in the north, where collectivisation took two years to complete.65 
In explaining the rapid collectivisation in QN-ĐN, one provincial party 
leader attributed it to the ‘correctness’ of the central party’s policy, 
‘the loyalty of local authorities’, ‘the close relationship between peasants 
and the party’ and the extensive preparations for collectivisation such 
as organising peasants into labour exchange teams and training a large 
number of cadres.66
My interviews also revealed that local cadres from the provincial to the 
commune level in QN-ĐN were devoted to the policy. After reunification, 
provincial cadres were local ex-revolutionaries or returnees from 
the north. They were familiar with the north’s collectivisation model 
and could apply it to QN-ĐN. People in QN-ĐN had a long history 
of complying with state policies (phục tùng nhà nước); therefore, after 
reunification, local cadres and residents tended to comply with the 
VCP’s agricultural transformation policy.67 Moreover, local cadres were 
considered more ‘bolshevist’ and ‘fascist’ than their counterparts in the 
Southern Region and were willing to use coercive measures to force 
peasants to join collectives.68 
A former vice-chairman of Bình Định collective no. 2 admitted that, at 
that time, he was loyal to the VCP’s agricultural transformation policy 
because he had been taught that socialism was ideal, and the main task 
of the new authorities was to transform the old economy and build 
a new one. He believed collectivisation was the only way to prosperity, 
justice and the elimination of exploitation. He acknowledged that he 
had at first trusted the VCP’s policy. He reasoned: 
In the war with America, the north carried out collectivisation and 
supported the south to win the war. As far as I knew, most of the 
chairpersons of agricultural collectives in the north were women. So, 
we men could do it. 
65  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 69. 
66  Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng. (1979). Cuối năm 1978: Ra đời 107 hợp tác xã bao gồm 96,704 nông 
dân, chiêm 50% số hộ trong tỉnh [By late 1978: 107 cooperatives were established, including 
96,704 farmers, accounting for 50 per cent of households in the province], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
2 December, p. 1.
67  Author’s interview, 10 October 2004, Tam Kỳ. 
68  Author’s interviews, 26 December 2005, Thành Phố, Hồ Chí Minh; 6 October 2004, Bình Định. 
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… [N]orthern cadres kept us in the dark, too. They did not tell us the 
shortcomings of collectivisation in the north. Even so, some southern 
returnees did.69
With high expectations for collectivisation and loyalty to the VCP, 
local cadres were keen to bring peasants into collectives. Some 
former cadres admitted they had to use various tactics, even ‘tricky 
measures’ (thủ đoạn) and harsh sanctions, to force peasants to comply. 
For  example, some threatened peasant households who declined to 
join. Villagers who refused to join faced obstacles in their individual 
farming efforts and encountered problems with official paperwork, 
especially that relating to children’s schooling and access to health care 
and state goods.70 These measures were quite similar to those used in 
the north during 1959–61.71
In theory, each collective was built on three principles: voluntary 
membership, mutual benefit and democratic governance. In reality, 
peasants were coerced into joining the collective. A former chairman of 
Bình Lãnh collective recalled: 
The first principle of collectivisation was coercion. Livestock [trâu bò] 
and land were all collectivised. Right before establishing the collective, 
application forms were sent to ask peasants to sign. If someone declined 
to join, his land was replaced with barren land far away so that peasants 
joined out of fear.72 
In contrast to previous research suggesting the rapid collectivisation 
in the Central Coast region was due to peasants living in unfavourable 
conditions and ‘hoping for a better life’, my interviews show that many 
peasants joined collectives out of fear.73 Many villagers who joined 
recalled ‘being coerced’ (bị bắt buộc), ‘fearing isolation’ (sợ bị cô lập) 
and ‘fearing disadvantage’ (sợ bị thua thiệt). Some also said they joined 
out of ‘ignorance’ (không biết), because they were ‘just following others’ 
(họ  vào thì mình vào) and because ‘being poor together was okay’ 
(nghèo thì nghèo chung).74 Asked whether he volunteered to participate, 
one 60-year-old man in Thanh Yên village of Bình Định commune, 
Thăng Bình district, recalled: 
69  Author’s interview, 20 April 2004, Bình Định.
70  Author’s interview, 21 October 2004, Bình Lãnh.
71  See Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 71.
72  Author’s interview, 21 October 2004, Bình Lãnh. 
73  Quang Truong, Agricultural collectivization, p. 207. 
74  Author’s interviews, October 2004, Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc.
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If we did not participate, we had to endure a lot of disadvantages; we 
could not keep our land but were given bad land far away. During the 
collectivisation campaign, local cadres warned that if we did not join, 
our cows and buffaloes would not be allowed to graze on, even go 
through, collective fields. Moreover, if we did not join, we would be 
isolated from other people; we could not buy goods from the state; our 
children would not have access to education and other things.75 
A recent unpublished essay by a well-known journalist in QN-ĐN 
reported that, when the Bình Lãnh, Duy Xuyên and Hòa Tiến 1 pilot 
collectives were established, peasants in other areas of QN-ĐN worried 
(lo lắng), doubted (nghi ngờ) and feared (sợ hãi) that collectivisation 
would reach them. 
Many explanations and discrediting of rumours that collectivisation 
in the north had produced bad consequences failed to stop peasants 
in many areas of QN-ĐN slaughtering or selling their animals before 
collectivisation, destroying plants and selling their agricultural 
machinery.76 
Villagers in Thanh Yên village, Bình Định commune, admitted that 
many people slaughtered or sold their draught animals to avoid 
collectivising them.77 However, although many peasants doubted the 
benefits of collective farming, most joined.
The Mekong Delta
As previously mentioned, in 1977, authorities in the Mekong 
Delta had  great trouble establishing experimental commune-sized 
collectives.  Hence, in 1978, they scaled back their expectations and 
concentrated on setting up hamlet-sized ones and then production units 
(tập đoàn sản xuất) with between 30 and 50 hectares of land. At  the 
conference on agricultural transformation in the south held in Cửu 
Long province in April 1979, national leaders claimed that production 
75  Author’s interview, 17 October 2005, Thanh Yên. It was said that peasants who joined collectives 
received purchasing books (sổ mua bán) that enabled them to buy fuel, soap, salt, clothes and other 
goods in state shops. Non-collective members could not access these goods (Author’s interview, 
7 October 2005, Thanh Yên).
76  L. K. (1990), Từ quá khứ đến hiện tại: Mười lăm năm ấy [From past to present: Over the 
past 10 years], Unpublished essay. I was given this article when I interviewed the author, a former 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng journalist, on 20 October 2005.
77  Author’s interviews, 1–30 October 2005, Bình Định.
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units were the most suitable collective organisation for the Southern 
Region as a whole and for the Mekong Delta in particular. Therefore, 
they called for the region to accelerate collectivisation in the form of 
production units instead of through collectives. However, the national 
leaders still wanted to experiment with collectives and hoped that 
many more could eventually be set up by consolidating well-established 
production units.78 
In 1979, in response to the VCP leaders’ policy, An Giang and other 
provinces in the Southern Region (and in the Mekong Delta and 
South-Eastern Region) accelerated the formation of production 
units. According to a report of the Central Committee for Southern 
Agricultural Transformation (BCTNNMN), by November 1979, the 
Southern Region had established 13,178 production units and 272 pilot 
collectives, accounting for 33.5 per cent of peasant households and 
26.9 per cent of agricultural land.79 However, according to the Nhân 
Dân newspaper in April 1980, few of these collectives operated well; 
many failed to show ‘the superiority of new production relations’ and 
failed as ‘an appropriate form of collective’.80 Moreover, only 7,000 
production units in the Southern Region actually farmed collectively 
(làm ăn chung), and even these faced many difficulties. The remaining 
production units had not yet started to farm or had started but failed. 
Production unit members ‘still did not feel secure’ (vẫn chưa an tâm), 
even in some of the well-performing units. Some units deviated from 
their production schedule (tiêu cực trong sản xuất), illegally giving 
‘blank contracts’ to households (khoán trắng cho hộ), and were verging 
on collapse (sắp tan rã).81 
78  BCTNNMN (1978), Thông báo về cuộc họp từ ngày 22–24 tháng 10 năm 1979 của Ban cải tạo 
nông nghiệp Miền Nam [Report of Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation in the South 
on 22–24 October 1979 Meeting], 5 November, Hồ Chí Minh: Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Miền 
Nam, p. 8.
79  Ibid.
80  Five years of socialist reform, Nhân Dân, 29 April 1980, p. 1. This article also shows that most 
of the pilot collectives in the Southern Region were in Sông Bé province (152 collectives) and Tiền 
Giang (70 collectives).
81  BCTNNMN (1979), Thông tri về việc kịp thời và ra sức củng cố các tập đoàn sản xuất nông 
nghiệp [Announcement on Doing the Best to Improve Production Units], 1 November, Hồ Chí Minh: 
Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Miền Nam, pp. 1–2.
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A typical example is Minh Hải province in the Mekong Delta, where 
collectivisation accelerated extensively in 1979. Within a year, 
the province had 1,114 production units, involving 45.8 per cent 
of households and 36 per cent of agricultural land (see Table 4.3). 
Only 300 of 1,114 production units were actually farming collectively 
(tập đoàn ăn chia), and only 130 of these 300 units had socialist qualities 
(tập đoàn theo đúng tính chất xã hội chủ nghĩa)—that is, they produced 
collectively and distributed their output according to the work-points 
members earned. The remaining 170 production units only farmed 
semi-collectively. This means that, while some farming was done 
collectively, individual households privately cultivated their own land 
or part of the production unit’s land.82 
Table 4.3 Accelerating collectivisation in Minh Hải province, 1979
Date Tasks No. of 
production units
january 1979 Experimental pilot production units 3 
March 1979 Extending pilot production units 12 
April 1979 Accelerating collectivisation 100 
May 1979 Accelerating collectivisation 500 
june 1979 Accelerating collectivisation 800 
August 1979 Accelerating collectivisation 1,081 
october 1979 Accelerating collectivisation 1,114 
Source: Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Minh Hải (BCTNNMH). (1979). Dự thảo báo cáo: Nhận 
định, đánh giá tình hình cải tạo nông nghiệp thời gian qua ở Minh Hải [A Draft Report: 
Evaluation of Agricultural Transformation in Minh Hải], 13 November. Minh Hải: Ban Cải Tạo 
Nông Nghiệp tỉnh Minh Hải.
In response to the poor results of collectivisation in the Southern 
Region, party leaders in November 1979 instructed everyone to ‘try 
their best to strengthen production unit organisations’.83 The national 
leaders also lowered their expectations and called for the acceleration 
of collectivisation in a ‘positive and firm way’ (phương châm tích cực 
và vững chắc) instead of the ‘urgent way’ (khẩn trương) advocated in 
82  Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp Minh Hải (BCTNNMH). (1979). Dự thảo báo cáo: Nhận định, 
đánh giá tình hình cải tạo nông nghiệp thời gian qua ở Minh Hải [A Draft Report: Evaluation of 
Agricultural Transformation in Minh Hải], 13 November. Minh Hải: Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp 
tỉnh Minh Hải.. 
83  BCTNNMN, Announcement on Doing the Best to Improve Production Units, pp. 1–2.
103
4 . ESTABLISHINg CoLLECTIVE oRgANISATIoNS, 1978–81
previous policies. They also instructed the Southern Region to focus 
on solidifying (củng cố) existing collective organisations rather than 
accelerating the formation of new ones. In particular, the region was to 
put much more emphasis on improving the quality of local cadres and 
creating the ‘necessary conditions’ for them to avoid having to carry 
out collectivisation in a subjective, hasty and coercive way, which was 
perceived to be harming production and living standards.84 
Despite the VCP leaders’ efforts, by early 1980, more than two-thirds 
of the production units in the Southern Region had collapsed. For 
example, of the 2,653 production units established in Hậu Giang 
province in 1979, ‘there were no more than 100’ that could ‘stand 
firm’.85 By the end of 1980, there were only 3,729 production units and 
137 collectives remaining in the Southern Region.86 These collective 
organisations accounted for only 8 per cent of peasant households and 
6 per cent of land.87
VCP leaders often blamed local cadres for the poor results, accusing 
those in the Southern Region of being ‘simpleminded’ and ‘hasty’, 
suggesting they ‘propagandised and mobilised the masses inadequately’ 
(thiếu tuyên truyền và vận động quần chúng), ‘coerced the masses’ and 
had committed ‘shortcomings’ in management.88 The BCTNNMN’s 
report revealed that many local-level cadres in the Southern Region 
did not grasp fully the content of collectivisation policy and had not 
studied it thoroughly. They were therefore unable to explain the policy 
to lower-level cadres and the masses and erred in their instructions, 
making collectivisation even harder to implement.89 In evaluating the 
obstacles to slow collectivisation in the Southern Region, VCP leaders 
complained that: 
84  ĐCSVN (2004), Nghị quyết hội nghị lần thứ 6 Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa IV 
[Resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Fourth Party Central Committee], in ĐCVSN, Văn Kiện 
Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 40, 1979 [Party Document: Volume 40, 1979], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc 
Gia, p. 362.
85  Phan Quang, The Mekong Delta, p. 83.
86  Vũ Oanh (1984), Hoàn thành điều chỉnh ruộng đất, đẩy mạnh cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa đối 
với nông nghiệp các tỉnh Nam Bộ [Completing Land Redistribution and Speeding Up Agricultural 
Transformation in the Southern Region], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 11.
87  Lê Thanh Nghị (1981), Cải tiến công tác khoán sản phẩm để thúc đẩy sản xuất, củng cố HTX 
nông nghiệp [Improving the Product Contract to Solidify Collectives], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 33.
88  Ngo Vinh Long, Some aspects of cooperativization in the Mekong Delta, p. 166; BCTNNMN, 
Announcement on Doing the Best to Improve Production Units, p. 2. 
89  BCTNNMN, Report of Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation, p. 6. 
VIETNAM’S PoST-1975 AgRARIAN REFoRMS
104
Local cadres and party members including key cadres have not yet 
sympathised with the agricultural transformation revolution [chưa 
cảm tình với cách mạng cải tạo nông nghiệp]. They still neglect [thờ 
ơ] and do not support it. They stand outside and leave the task of 
collectivisation to other specialised departments. Besides this, some 
negative cadres who were pursuing their own interests did not want 
to implement collectivisation. When it went smoothly, they were silent 
but when collectivisation went badly, they criticised it by amplifying 
its shortcomings and exacerbating the situation. They tolerated 
‘bad elements’ who harmed the process.90 
An Giang province
After reunification, local authorities in many parts of An Giang province 
faced numerous difficulties in consolidating their power, with a crucial 
problem being a shortage of cadres to fill positions of local authority. 
Additionally, southerners returning from the north seldom worked at 
the local level. So, to find new cadres, local authorities had to recruit 
people who were not familiar and did not have any experience with the 
VCP’s agrarian policies, especially collectivisation.
Despite these difficulties, by the end of 1979, An Giang had established 
308 production units, six pilot collectives and 55 machinery units 
(tập đoàn máy); collective organisations accounted for about 5 per cent 
of agricultural land and 7 per cent of peasant households.91 However, 
the majority of these production units were classified as weak and of 
inadequate quality (chưa đúng tính chất). For example, Phú Tân district 
had established six production units in 1979 but only two were involved 
in collective farming. Likewise, only nine of 94 production units in 
Châu Thành district had ‘socialist characteristics’.92 Some production 
units faced difficulties due to peasants’ resistance and were dismantled 
a few months after being established. In some districts where a majority 
of people were of Khmer ethnicity, such as Tịnh Biên and Tri Tôn, 
no production units had been established.93 
90  Ibid., p. 5. 
91  An Giang vững vàng đi tới [An Giang is doing well], An Giang, 6 January 1980, p. 1. 
The proportions of land and peasant households belonging to collective organisations are based 
on my own calculations. 
92  Collectivisation continues to progress, An Giang, 7 June 1981, p. 2. 
93  Author’s interviews with provincial cadres, 31 May 2005. An Giang’s local archives remained 
almost silent on this matter so I cannot know exactly how many production units were dismantled 
in 1979. 
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Faced with great difficulties in extending the number of production 
units and making them function as collectives, An Giang’s leaders in 
1980–81 put more effort into consolidating existing production units 
rather than rapidly creating more (see more detail in the next section). 
As a result, collectivisation during this period stagnated. At the end 
of 1980, An Giang had 317 production units, six collectives, 1,584 
production solidarity teams and 64 machinery units.94 By the end 
of 1981, An Giang still had only six collectives, while the number of 
production units had risen by 40 to 357. These collective organisations 
occupied about 20,675 hectares of agricultural land, a mere 8.5 per cent 
of the total, and involved 10 per cent of peasant households. 
In Chợ Mới district in An Giang, as well as experimenting with pilot 
production units, authorities cautiously extended their number. By the 
end of 1979, the district had 19 production units; however, most were 
weak and ‘infirm’ (không vững chắc) and the cadres managing them 
were described as ‘confused’ (lúng túng).95 According to a former Chợ 
Mới official, because of difficulties in extending the production units, 
authorities emphasised solidifying existing units, meaning that, in 1980, 
collectivisation stagnated.96 Only a few units were established in  the 
district in 1980.97 Thus, by the end of 1980, Chợ Mới had established 
only 21 production units, which accounted for about 5.7 per cent of 
peasant households and 4.7 per cent of agricultural land.98 By 1981, 
the district had established 19 additional production units. Therefore, 
during 1979–81, Chợ Mới district established 40 production units, 
which accounted for only 10 per cent of the peasant households and 
8.5 per cent of agricultural land.99 
94  Trong tháng 12, 1980 tỉnh phát triển thêm được 14 tập đoàn sản xuất [In December 1980, 
the province established 14 more production units], An Giang, 11 January 1981, p. 2. 
95  Phong trào hợp tác nông nghiệp ở An Giang từng bước được củng cố đi lên [Collectivisation 
in An Giang has progressed], An Giang, 18 November 1981, p. 1; BCHDBHCM, The History of 
Chợ Mới Party Cell, pp. 174–5. 
96  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
97  Report from a conference announcing the completion of collectivisation in Chợ Mới, An Giang, 
15 April 1985, p. 1. 
98  My calculation is based on figures reported in An Giang (ibid.); and in Chi Cục Thống Kê 
huyện Chợ Mới [hereinafter CCTKCM] (1984), Niêm giám thống kê 1976–1984 huyện Chợ Mới 
tỉnh An Giang [Chợ Mới District, An Giang Province Statistical Year Book, 1976–1984], Chợ Mới: 
Chi Cục Thống Kê huyện Chợ Mới, p. 43. 
99  CCTKCM, Chợ Mới District, An Giang Province Statistical Year Book.
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In Long Điền B in 1980, after establishing two pilot production units 
in 1979, and with help from district leaders, authorities established two 
more production units, located near the previous ones. District and 
commune officials strove to make these four production units work 
properly and act as exemplary cases. A former Long Điền B commune 
official claimed that, because of such efforts, commune authorities did 
not extend collectivisation further. Therefore, between 1979 and 1981, 
Long Điền B established only four production units, which accounted 
for a modest proportion of both agricultural land and peasant 
households in the commune. 
In general, collectivisation in An Giang and other provinces in the 
Mekong Delta met with substantial difficulty and proceeded very 
slowly. Regional collectivisation accounted for only a small proportion 
of land and peasants (less than 10 per cent), which fell far short of the 
VCP’s target of completing collectivisation by 1980. The VCP leaders 
attributed the slow collectivisation in the Southern Region to local 
cadres, who, they claimed, were ‘hesitant [do dự], tentative [chần chừ] 
and undetermined [thiếu kiên quyết] in carrying out collectivisation, 
and too relaxed about agricultural transformation [buông lỏng cải 
tạo]’. Some were accused of manipulating the VCP’s ‘positive and firm 
principles’ to delay collectivisation.100 
Similarly, when collectivisation was slow and difficult in An Giang in 
1980 and early 1981, provincial leaders shifted all blame to lower-level 
local cadres. They said the local authorities, especially in the communes, 
lacked ‘determined, integrated and concerted leadership’. ‘Some local 
leaders were lax about agricultural transformation’; local cadres were 
‘inadequate and weak’ (thiếu và yếu), so 
the capacity of local agricultural transformation bodies did not match 
with their function and obligations. 
… [S]ome cadres had not grasped or intentionally misunderstood the 
content of the VCP’s policy on agricultural transformation. 
… They resorted to the VCP’s principle of firm collectivisation and 
voluntary membership to maintain individual farming. 
100  ĐCSVN (2005), Chị thị của Ban bí thư số 93/CT-TW (ngày 30 tháng 6 năm 1980) [Directive 
of the Secretariat No. 93/CT-TW (30 June 1980)], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 41, 
1980 [Party Document: Volume 41, 1980], Hà Nội: NXB Chí Trị Quốc Gia, p. 204. 
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Finally, at the production unit level, 
negativism occurred in some management boards. 
… Some production units achieved poor outcomes so [people’s] living 
conditions had not been improved. 
… [All of which] raised doubts and undermined peasants’ confidence 
in VCP’s agricultural transformation policy.101
A former cadre of An Giang’s Committee for Agricultural 
Transformation (Ban Cải Tạo Nông Nghiệp, or BCTNN) admitted that, 
despite trying to secure their positions, local cadres were less devoted 
to collectivisation because ‘the policy was at odds with peasants’ 
sentiments’ (không hợp lòng dân). Some cadres therefore ‘let the process 
of agricultural transformation drift’.102 
Sharing a similar view, another cadre of An Giang’s BCTNN added: 
Implementing collectivisation in the Mekong Delta seemed less 
harsh than in the Central Coast because local authorities tended to 
use persuasion and less coercion to force peasants to participate in 
collective organisations. Therefore, agricultural transformation in the 
Mekong Delta had not been carried out completely [không triệt để]. 
Collectivisation went slowly because of peasants’ strong reaction and 
cadres’ hesitance.103 
Many villagers in Long Điền B recalled that before collectivisation they 
were relatively well off and had enjoyed sufficient livelihoods (sung túc). 
Even agricultural workers had been able to lead a comfortable life (sống 
thoải mái). This explains why most peasants, even those who were 
poor, did not want to join production units with work-points systems 
in which they would earn only a little (không có ăn). Some said they did 
not like collective farming because it constrained the freedom (bị gò bó) 
they had previously enjoyed under individual farming.104 One man in 
Long Điền B commune commented: 
People in the Central Coast and in the north were used to living in 
poverty [sống kham khổ quen rồi], so they could accept collectives, but 
people in this region had become used to enjoying a sufficient and free 
101  Collectivisation continues to progress, An Giang, 7 June 1982, p. 2. 
102  Author’s interview, 6 June 2005, Long Xuyên.
103  Ibid.
104  Author’s interviews, June–July and 5 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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life. They did not like life in the collectives with little freedom. Peasants 
could not be like factory workers—the bell rings and they march off to 
work. Peasants here wanted more time to enjoy breakfast, coffee or to 
take care of their children and animals. Moreover, peasants here did not 
like joining production units because they did not see any immediate 
and visible benefit in collective farming [không thấy lợi trước mắt].
Some landless and land-poor households in Long Điền B also refused 
to join production units. One landless man in the commune argued 
that earnings from collective farming were less than the income from 
wage labour. In addition, people in production units received their 
produce at the end of the season, while independent labourers received 
wages on a daily basis.105 Another landless man who had previously 
sympathised with the revolution but who refused to undertake collective 
farming recalled production unit cadres inviting him to join the unit in 
his hamlet. If he did not join, the cadre warned, and if later he faced 
hunger, the production unit would not lend him rice, and there would 
be no land on which to bury his body when he died. Regardless of what 
cadres threatened, the man refused to join. He  reasoned that under 
collective farming he would earn much less than from his current 
job raising pigs, gleaning leftover paddy in the fields and labouring 
for wages. He laughed and added, ‘ultimately, not me but members of 
production units came to borrow my rice’.106 
Peasants in the Mekong Delta tended to resist collectivisation more 
strongly than their counterparts in the Central Coast. In some parts 
of the delta peasants boycotted or organised strikes against collective 
farming and even threatened to assassinate—and, in some cases, actually 
did assassinate—officials. According to Vo Nhan Tri, peasants in some 
parts of the Mekong Delta ‘refused to harvest crops in time, abandoned 
large stretches of land, slaughtered livestock, destroyed fruit trees, sold 
machines and farm implements before joining the production units’.107 
Similarly, a report from the BCTNNMN revealed: 
In some locations in Long An province collectivisation was so stressful 
that peasants, incited by the enemy, formed groups to demand their 
departure from production units, protested against collective farming 
and rallied support for individual farming [chống đối làm ăn chung, ủng 
105  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B.
106  Author’s interview, 23 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
107  Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, p. 79. 
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hộ làm ăn riêng lẻ] … [Moreover,] taking advantage of the difficulties of 
collectivisation, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements conducted 
sabotage activities. They carried out psychological warfare such as 
distorting agricultural transformation policy, sabotaging production, 
assassinating local key cadres and inciting the masses to strike against 
the government, destroying production units’ seed stores, beating local 
cadres and harvesting collective rice illegally. Some tried to enter the 
managerial boards of production units and collectives and so on.108 
Conclusion
After the country’s reunification in 1975, VCP leaders put great effort 
into imposing the north’s collective models on the south and aimed 
to complete collectivisation there by 1980. However, the project 
encountered difficulties, especially in the Mekong Delta. Authorities 
in QN-ĐN achieved the central government’s target to collectivise 
farming in that province by 1980, but, in contrast, authorities in 
An Giang and elsewhere in the Mekong Delta did not. Collectivisation 
in the delta accounted for less than 10 per cent of land and peasant 
households in 1980. Only in the mid-1980s was collectivisation deemed 
accomplished, thanks in part to policy modifications to accommodate 
villagers’ concerns. 
There were two major reasons for the differences in the outcome of 
collectivisation between these two places. First, the capacity of local 
authorities was greater in QN-ĐN than in An Giang. Local authorities in 
QN-ĐN had more experience with the VCP’s northern collectivisation 
and were more loyal to its policy of socialist transformation of 
agriculture than their counterparts in An Giang. Provincial authorities 
in QN-ĐN therefore carried out collectivisation more aggressively; they 
used stronger coercive measures—similar to those used in the north in 
the early 1960s—to force villagers into collectives. They collectivised 
all land, draught animals and other peasant means of production 
simultaneously, tightly restricted private farming and handicapped 
non-members. They even used strict preemptive measures to prevent 
peasants from slaughtering animals or restricting villagers’ mobility 
before collectivisation. In contrast, local cadres in An Giang had 
weaker commitment to agricultural transformation. To secure their 
108  BCTNNMN, Report of Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation, p. 4. 
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positions, many had to comply with national policies, but they did 
so unenthusiastically. In general, when faced with strong peasant 
resistance, many local cadres were reluctant to force policy compliance; 
often they modified policies or let the process drift to accommodate 
peasants’ concerns. 
Second, peasants’ noncompliance was stronger in An Giang in the 
Mekong Delta than in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast. The consequences 
of war in QN-ĐN had been so severe they rendered most villagers poor. 
These villagers’ main concerns were to do with subsistence and survival. 
They were living in extremely difficult conditions within corporate 
communities and had few outside employment opportunities.109 
Their behaviour was focused on securing their own safety, subsistence 
and survival. The strong local authorities who were insisting on 
implementing state policies were ready to impose heavy sanctions 
on those who did not comply. To avoid suffering disadvantages, many 
peasants decided to join collectives even though they did not believe in 
the benefits of collective farming. Authorities in QN-ĐN had earned 
a fair degree of legitimacy thanks to ending the war and carrying out 
previous land reforms, which made peasants more inclined to comply 
with official policy. Thus, authorities in QN-ĐN were able to complete 
collectivisation within a year—even faster than collectivisation in the 
north in the early 1960s. In contrast to previous scholars who attributed 
swift collectivisation in the Central Coast region to peasants’ preference 
for collective farming as a means of coping with their difficult lives, 
I found that many villagers in Thanh Yen and Hien Loc initially disliked 
and did not trust such farming methods, but they decided to join 
collectives to avoid the disadvantages of not belonging.110
Meanwhile, peasants in An Giang were better off than those in QN-ĐN 
and lived in diverse socioeconomic structures. Moreover, weaker and less 
legitimate local authorities who were hesitant about and incompetent 
in forcefully carrying out socialist agricultural transformation enlarged 
the scope for villagers to evade the state’s policies. In such conditions, 
An Giang villagers were able to resist or evade agrarian projects that 
109  Scott, J. C. (1977), The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast 
Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
110  See Quang Truong, Agricultural collectivization.
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they considered were unattractive or unprofitable. They had more 
economic power and more options to resist collective farming, which 
they saw as inferior to their previous farming method.
In short, collectivisation in An Giang and the wider Mekong Delta faced 
more difficulties than in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast region because 
of stronger peasant resistance and weaker capacity and commitment 
of local cadres. In other words, the extent of collectivisation depended 




Local politics and the performance 
of collective farming under the 
work-points system, 1978–81
Introduction
Despite Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leaders and local 
authorities putting great effort into establishing and strengthening 
collective organisations, collective farming had failed to show its 
superiority over individual farming in southern Vietnam. Similar 
to what Kerkvliet’s study found for the north, in the south, due to a 
lack of political conditions conducive to durability, collective farming 
also became a site for struggle between peasants and local cadres and 
between local people and higher authorities over the governance of 
collectives, the means of production (land, labour and other resources) 
and distribution of produce.1
Under the work-points system (1978–81), these struggles caused major 
difficulties not only in the Mekong Delta, but also in the Central Coast 
region. Villagers in the Mekong Delta tried their best to evade collective 
farming; it was common for them to join a collective but not actually 
participate in its work. Meanwhile, although villagers in the Central 
Coast seemed to comply with the system, they tried their best to 
maximise their work-points rather than production. In addition, local 
1  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 20.
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cadres in both regions often acted contrary to the expectations of VCP 
leaders and villagers. They often took advantage of their positions to 
embezzle resources and mismanage collectives. Despite the authorities’ 
numerous campaigns to correct and crack down on such ‘bad behaviour’, 
and even attempts to modify national policies to accommodate local 
concerns, these problems did not disappear, but seemed to increase.
This chapter will examine local politics and compare the forms and 
magnitude of peasants’ everyday politics and local cadres’ reactions 
and malpractice in response to collective farming and other national 
agrarian policies. It will also examine the extent to which the 
everyday practices of local cadres and peasants affected the outcome 
of collectivisation in both regions and how they contributed to the 
modifications of the VCP’s agrarian policy.
Local politics in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng 
(QN-ĐN), Central Coast region
Peasants’ everyday politics in QN-ĐN’s collectives
In theory, collectives were established according to the principles of 
voluntary membership, mutual benefit and democratic management. 
According to public pronouncements, peasants were the ‘masters of the 
collective’. During the collectivisation campaigns, local authorities 
in QN-ĐN often asserted that ‘the collective was the home and its 
members were the masters’ (hợp tác xã là nhà, xã viên là chủ).2 However, 
may peasants claimed they did not join collectives voluntarily, but were 
coerced into doing so. Most peasants preferred individual farming 
to pooling their resources. They had doubts about collective farming 
methods and believed the collectives belonged to the state. Many 
worried that the collectives were being managed poorly and that much 
of what the collective produced would be stolen. Therefore, collectives 
became sites of conflict and struggle between peasants, cadres and 
the state, and even among peasants themselves. In struggling for 
their livelihoods, peasants tended to do whatever favoured their own 
immediate interests, which was often at odds with the interests of the 
2  Vai trò của đảng viên trong đội sản xuất [The role of party members in production brigades], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 June 1978, p. 2.
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collective and the state. The next section classifies and examines the 
nature of the peasants’ everyday politics in the collectives in QN-ĐN 
during the period of the work-points system (1978–81). 
Optimising work-points rather than the quality of production 
Peasants in QN-ĐN were relatively poor and few had any economic 
options outside the collective, so earning work-points was important to 
their income. The larger the number of work-points they accrued, the 
more paddy they were supposed to receive. 
Many poor peasants in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên villages claimed they 
had to fight for work-points (tranh giành công điểm), working as fast 
as possible to acquire more points. A widow with four small children 
recalled: 
I took advantage of any opportunity to get more work-points. As soon 
as people harvested, I jumped to hoe the corner of the plot in order to 
take over ploughing it. If I did not do so, others would. As soon as I had 
finished, I changed to another plot. My little girl, aged 13, also pulled up 
rice seedlings to get points. If an adult got 10 points a day, she got five. 
At that time, I did not have time to rest.3 
Similarly, another widow said: 
I had to struggle to get work-points [phấn đấu để lấy điểm]. I was the 
only labourer in my family. We lacked labour because of [the] loss of 
[working-aged] men … due to wars. So, we had to work hard by day 
and night to get work-points.4 
Asked why peasants struggled to get work-points, an elderly man in 
Thanh Yên village responded: 
Today we can seek other jobs in Saigon or Danang city, but at that time, 
if we did not work, we would die of hunger. So, we even had to do a job 
that earned only a very few work-points.5 
The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported in December 1978 that, 
despite 90–95 per cent of peasants participating in collective work, 
many focused only on earning work-points. It called the phenomenon 
‘work-point syndrome’ and ‘the doctrine of work-points’ (chủ nghĩa 
công điểm), which it said had started to ‘encroach on peasants’ awareness 
3  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
4  Ibid.
5  Author’s interview, 31 October 2005, Thanh Yên.
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of collective mastery’. For example, when peasants were requested to 
attend public meetings or do public work, they asked whether such 
things would bring them any work-points. This made peasants very 
choosy, and they refused to do tasks that would earn only a few work-
points, preferring tasks worth more points. ‘They were only concerned 
with the work-points … without caring about what the brigade leaders 
and others did and expected’, the newspaper lamented.6 
Villagers in Thanh Yên village remembered doing their collective work 
carelessly and deceitfully (làm gian làm dối) to earn as many work-
points as possible. For example, when ploughing, they would plough 
one row and skip the next (cày một đàng bỏ đàng). When transplanting, 
they planted densely at the edges of the plot but sparsely in the centre. 
Similarly, when weeding, ‘they did it carefully on the edges but 
carelessly in the centre’ because an inspector could more readily see 
the edges.7 Peasants could earn work-points by selling their manure 
to the collective, so, to increase its volume, they mixed manure with 
other easy-to-find ingredients such as rice stubble, soil and leaves.8 
When they were required to carry manure to distant plots, peasants 
would pour out some of it close to their home or in bushes along the 
way. In this way, plots close to the village received considerable levels 
of manure, while more distant plots received little. People also spread 
the manure unevenly, so that some areas received too much manure 
while others received nothing (chỗ có chỗ không). In some cases, people 
did not spread manure at all before ploughing and raking.9 When 
pulling up seedlings, workers tried to increase the number of seedling 
bundles by making them smaller than normal in order to maximise 
their work-points.10 
A woman in Hiền Lộc village recalled cadres devising a new method 
of transplanting: putting seedlings in lines. People resisted, however, 
because this method was slow. ‘We transplanted only a few rows half 
a day at a time. We complained a lot because transplanting like that 
meant fewer work-points. Finally, they [cadres] gave up the technique’, 
the woman said.11 
6  Nhìn vào đồng ruộng tập thể: Chủ nghĩa công điểm [Looking at collective fields: ‘Work-
pointism’], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 December 1978, p. 2. 
7  Author’s interview, 5 October 2004, Thanh Yên.
8  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên.
9  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
10  Author’s interview, 17 December 2005, Hiền Lộc.
11  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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A newspaper report from December 1978 stated: 
Some peasants only pursue their own interests, so they do collective 
work deceitfully and carelessly [làm gian dối, làm ẩu], never ensured 
work quality, nor did they comply with technical procedures. People 
preferred to do easy jobs and refused to do hard ones … they did not 
harmonise [the] interests of [the] individual, the collective and the 
state.12 
The article also attributed such problems to inadequate education. 
However, when people were asked why they were so careless about 
their collective work, many responded that it was ‘in order to get as 
many work-points as possible’ or, as one person summed it up: ‘work 
honestly, eat gruel; work deceitfully, eat rice [làm thật ăn cháo, làm láo 
ăn cơm].’ People believed that those who tried to do collective work 
properly and honestly would earn fewer work-points than those who 
did things carelessly and deceitfully. Such practices in QN-ĐN—aimed 
at accumulating the maximum number of work-points rather than 
maximising production—were similar to those in the north, studied by 
Kerkvliet. For example, an expression similar to the one cited above—
‘work well, eat gruel; work deceitfully, eat rice’ (làm tốt ăn cháo, làm láo 
ăn cơm)—was also popular in northern collectives in the late 1970s.13
One village woman tried to justify people’s behaviour by arguing that 
everyone had to try and make a living. If you traded, you sought 
a profit; if you worked for the collective, you had to try to get work-
points; so, people did collective work carelessly in order to get as many 
work-points as possible.14 
Lack of incentive and ‘neglect of common property’ 
(cha chung không ai khóc) 
That peasants carried out collective work carelessly and deceitfully 
reflected not only their strategies to maximise work-points, but also 
their disillusionment with the governance of collective farming. A man 
in Hiền Lộc village recalled that people were disappointed because 
12  Tổ chức lại sản xuất, phân công lại lao động nhằm phát triển và mở rộng lại ngành nghề 
sản xuất và kinh tế gia đình trong hợp tác xã nông nghiệp trên địa bàn huyện [Reorganising 
production and labour to facilitate development of handicrafts and household economy in the 
district], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 December 1978, p. 1.
13  See Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 163.
14  Author’s interview, 21 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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they received few rewards for their efforts; therefore, they did collective 
work badly, just going through the motions of working and tried to 
complete the job as soon as possible in order to go home. He said when 
collective work was assigned to a group, ‘they often dragged their feet 
so that, by 7–8 am, they hadn’t even started yet. Those who arrived early 
did not work until the whole group had come.’15 
Some peasants did not want to work hard because they realised that, 
no matter how much effort they put in, they would not get a significant 
extra reward. A man in Thanh Yên explained: 
The collective took all of what we produced; the collective paid us about 
0.5 kilograms a workday [10 work-points] and took all the remainder. 
So, peasants just went through [the] motions of working.16 
An elderly man in the village had a similar comment:
No matter how hard you worked, you could only get 10 points a day 
at maximum. No matter how industriously you worked, the produce 
belonged to the collective. So, there was not much difference between 
industrious workers or lazy workers. We worked without any incentive 
[làm không có động cơ].17 
Some peasants were initially eager to fight for work-points but, when 
they received little reward, they were disappointed and did not want to 
go to work or laboured unenthusiastically.18 A brigade leader in Hiền 
Lộc village commented on the decreased income in the Bình Lãnh 
collective: 
The living conditions of people went down dramatically. At first, people 
received 3 kilograms per workday; that went down to 1.5 kilograms [in 
1978]. When I called the people to transplant, some refused to work; 
they complained that they had previously received 3 kilograms but now 
only 1.5 kilograms per workday and wanted to know why.19 
15  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
16  Author’s interview, 5 October 2004, Thanh Yên. 
17  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Thanh Yên. 
18  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
19  Author’s interview, 14 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. In response to low peasant participation 
in collective work, Bình Lãnh collective started to increase sanctions by setting the number 
of compulsory workdays for peasants and restricting or forbidding peasants from doing non-
collective work (Hợp tác xã Bình Lãnh vượt khó khăn giành thắng lợi bước đầu [Bình Lãnh 
collective overcame difficulties and gained first good results], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 13 May 1978, 
p. 2; Chi bộ Bình Lãnh lãnh đạo xây dựng hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Bình Lãnh party cell leads 
building of the agricultural collective], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 June 1978, p. 2). 
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Another common peasant practice in QN-ĐN collectives was not 
caring  for collective property. The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper 
noted in June 1979 that peasants in Điện Bàn district ‘considered 
the collective belonged to the managerial board and brigade leaders, 
so they were not active in protecting collective properties from loss or 
damage’.20 Likewise, an elderly man in Hiền Lộc village said: 
Working in the collective, Mr Brigade Leader [Ông đội trưởng] was in 
charge of everything while we were only concerned with work-points. 
Today, I have the red book [the certificate of the right to use land] for my 
land, so I have made the edges of my plots straight and have levelled the 
surface because I am the owner of the land. But at that time we did not 
control the land. If I saw edges of the plot broken, at most I might inform 
the brigade leader. If he gave me some work-points to repair it, I did [so]. 
Otherwise, I did not. But if that plot was ours, we would do it.21 
Another man recalled:
Working for the collective, we did not need to think; when finishing 
work, I went to bed without worrying about tomorrow. We let the 
brigade leader worry about matters. When he asked me to plough, 
I ploughed. Only later when I worked for myself did I plan everything.22 
Interest in the family economy and the plundering 
of collective resources 
In addition to collective farming, peasants were allowed to farm 
individually on their garden land—known as the ‘5 per cent land’—
which the collective set aside for the peasant family economy. In the 
lowlands and midlands, households were able to retain about 500 
square metres for this purpose, while in the highlands, it was about 
750–1,000 square metres.23 Farming on garden land became a central 
part of peasants’ family economy because there were few economic 
options outside the collective. Peasants in Bình Định collective no. 2 
and Bình Lãnh collective often grew sweet potatoes, cassava and other 
staple food on their 5 per cent land. Other peasants tried to cultivate 
land that had been abandoned by the collective. 
20  Kết quả và kinh nghiệm phát huy quyền làm chủ tập thể ở HTX sản xuất nông nghiệp 1 
Điện Nam [Result of and experiences from facilitating collective mastery in Điện Nam Collective 
No. 1], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 June 1979, p. 3. 
21  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
22  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
23  Some regulations on establishing collectives, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 26 August 1978, p. 1. 
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Peasants were supposed to harmonise their family economy with the 
collective economy; however, peasants tended to favour the former 
because they could see the direct connection between their efforts 
and the rewards. They therefore devoted as much of their time and 
resources as possible to their family economy to supplement the food 
the collective fell short of supplying. Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh 
Yên recalled that, despite limited individual land, the family economy 
contributed a great part of their livelihoods. A man in Thanh Yên village 
recalled: 
When joining the collective, I retained my garden land as 5 per cent 
land. [The collective granted 5 per cent land to those who did not have 
enough garden land.] The land was a great help. During the period of 
the work-points system, our family received only 90–100 kilograms per 
season from the collective. This amount was enough for my family to 
consume within one month. But thanks to our 5 per cent land, we grew 
sweet potatoes and cassavas, which enabled us to survive.24
Villagers also commented that people made use of any available 
resources—for example, time, land and inputs—and invested them 
in their individual farming. For example, they used quality manure 
for their own sweet potatoes and cassava plots, while they gave the 
collective poor manure in exchange for work-points.25 Some did their 
collective work fast and carelessly to have more time to devote to their 
own work. Some made use of land the collective did not use—for 
example, reclaiming the uncultivated corners of collective land, lake 
edges, the banks of streams and forest. As one elderly woman told me: 
‘At that time, we reclaimed land anywhere; we reclaimed even a small 
piece of land to plant sweet potatoes and cassava.’26 
Because peasants were concerned with their own interests, there were 
conflicts between collective and family work. For example, the Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported in January 1981 that, in Quế 
Sơn collective in Quế Sơn district, ‘after transplanting seedlings, the 
collective leaders were not able to mobilise peasants to weed because 
they were busy growing cassava in their own gardens’. In response, the 
collective leaders had to rely on local authorities and mass organisations 
24  Author’s interview, 9 November 2005, Thanh Yên. 
25  Author’s interview, 21 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
26  Author’s interview, 14 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
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to force people to work.27 Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported in February 
1981 that instances of peasants practising ‘neglect of common property’ 
had become prevalent in collectives. This led to a situation in which 
individual plots were lush, while crops in collective plots were stunted 
and full of weeds.28 
Villagers recalled that people made use of collective resources for their 
own family economy. For example, when fertilising collective fields, 
people often hid some in bushes and took it home later for their own 
plots.29 Similarly, when harvesting, carrying, threshing and drying 
grain, peasants often took some for themselves. Villagers in Thanh 
Yên recalled children following their parents to glean the rice ears 
they intentionally dropped when harvesting. When carrying sheaves 
of grain from the fields to the drying sites, some peasants hid sheaves 
in the bushes and took them home later. Those who brought kettles of 
water to the harvesters often returned home with kettles full of grain. 
When threshing, peasants tried to leave some grain on the stalk so 
they could thresh it again at home.30 A brigade leader in Bình Lãnh 
collective recalled: 
Whenever we did not pay enough attention to watching collective 
grain, peasants stole it. So, at the harvest time, we had to watch day and 
night. When harvesting, if checkers were absent, people hid grain in the 
fields. When threshing, if the checkers were negligent, people often hid 
the grain in the straw they carried home.31 
As early as April 1979, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported that ‘the 
phenomena of [peasants] stealing grain and collective property were 
widespread’.32 Another article reported:
When harvesting, there were too many rice-gleaners. Those who carried 
grain to the drying sites of the brigades often dropped by [to hide grain] 
in collective members’ [relatives’ or friends’] houses. When threshing 
27  Hợp tác xã Quế Tân I: Xây dựng con người, xây dựng hợp tác xã [Quế Tân Collective No. 1: 
Training people and building the collective], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 21 January 1981, p. 2.
28  Nhìn vào đồng ruộng tập thể: Giống lúa [Looking at collective fields: Rice seeds], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 February 1981, p. 2.
29  Chống hao hụt mất mát sản phẩm nông nghiệp khi thu hoạch [Preventing loss of collective 
produce during harvesting], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 1 December 1981, p. 2.
30  Author’s interview, 9 November 2005, Thanh Yên.
31  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
32  Thành lập 32 hợp tác xã trong vụ Hè-Thu toàn tỉnh có 164 hợp tác xã’ [With 32 more 
collectives established, the province has 164 collectives for the summer–autumn crops], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 19 April 1979, p. 1.
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at the brigade’s yards, collective members threshed deceitfully and let 
straw still retain many grains so that after taking the straw home, they 
could get more grain from it.33 
Villagers also said the economic efficiency of secondary crops such as 
peanuts, sugarcane and sweet potatoes was even worse than the rice 
crop because these plants were often stolen at planting and harvest 
times. A collective leader in Bình Lãnh recalled that, when sowing 
peanut seeds, peasants planted the flatter ones and put the full-sized 
ones into their pockets. When harvesting the peanuts, they ate some 
and hid some, which significantly reduced the quantity of the harvest.34 
A woman in Hiền Lộc recalled:
For the peanut crop, the collective leaders did not allow young people to 
harvest because they feared they would eat too many peanuts. Instead, 
they used elderly people who were toothless and could not eat much. 
But they could not keep people from stealing. How can we catch a thief 
living in our own house? It didn’t make sense to keep watching people 
all the time. They certainly needed to absent themselves. Likewise, 
when harvesting cassava and sweet potatoes, peasants often hid good 
ones in the soil and returned to get them later.35 
In short, despite peasants being labelled ‘the masters of the collectives’, 
everyday politics undermined party leaders’ expectations. To secure 
their livelihoods and survive, peasants deployed strategies such as 
optimising work-points and stealing the collective’s resources and 
produce. The main objectives of these practices were to minimise 
the disadvantages of collectivisation and maximise their livelihoods. 
In other words, individually, these actions were merely strategies 
for peasants’ livelihood and survival. However, the aggregate of 
these individual actions had a powerful political effect because they 
effectively derailed collectivisation.36 I will discuss this in more detail 
in the next sections. 
33  Preventing loss of collective produce during harvesting, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 1 December 
1981, p. 2.
34  Author’s interview, 20 October 2004, Bình Lãnh.
35  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
36  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 23. 
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Local cadres’ practices
Despite many cadres being loyal to the VCP’s agrarian policies, some 
in the Central Coast abused their power at the expense of the state’s 
interests. The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported in May 1979: 
Some party members were bad learners. Some were opportunistic, 
corrupt, conservative, and small minded, embezzling and colluding. 
Some displayed bureaucratic, autocratic, and patriarchal behaviours. 
They made decisions without consulting the masses.37  
In June 1979, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng censured its readers: 
Because of inadequate awareness of bad thoughts, some party members 
were corrupt and self-interested; they were not good examples for the 
masses. Cadres embezzling [collective property] either individually 
or collectively were prevalent. Many cadres and party members 
behaved excessively bureaucratically and were autocratic and aloof … 
they falsified the actual crop productivity, underreported the output 
[to the state], poorly managed, stole produce and minimised food 
contributions to the state [tính thiệt hơn với nhà nước].38 
At the brigade level, some leaders took advantage of their power over 
the management of labour, costs, production and produce, assigning 
tasks and giving out work-points to benefit themselves. Villagers in 
Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên thought of brigade leaders as ‘landlords’ who 
had ‘power over life and death’ (quyền sinh sát). A man in Hiền Lộc 
village commented: 
The brigade leader was prejudiced [thành kiến]. If he disliked someone, 
he assigned him difficult work. He also took revenge on those who 
dared to criticise him in public meetings.39 
In an October 1979 article, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported a typical 
case of a brigade leader abusing his power in assigning work and 
giving out work-points. He was accused of stealing the brigade’s inputs, 
‘prolonging work and inflating work-points’: 
37  Để đưa phong trào hợp tác xã nông nghiệp tiến lên mạnh mẽ và vững chắc [To speed up 
collectivisation forcefully and firmly], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 12 May 1979, p. 1.
38  Tăng cường công tác xây dựng đảng trong các hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Intensifying building 
party organisation in the collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 6 June 1979, p. 1.
39  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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Regardless of stipulated work norms and work contracts, he gave work-
points to collective members at his discretion … if someone gave him 
a cup of wine, he could increase their tally by 10–20 work-points. 
He assigned tasks with many work-points to those who were close 
to him. He also granted five–per cent land to collective members at 
his discretion. Therefore, many collective members said: ‘the brigade 
leader comes first and the king of heaven second’ [Nhất đội, nhì Trời].40 
Brigade leaders were also in charge of collective produce after 
harvest, so they had more opportunities than others to pilfer some 
of the produce. A woman in Thanh Yên village claimed that brigade 
leaders took a considerable amount of collective produce because it 
was concentrated in their hands.41 An elderly man said ‘some brigade 
leaders took as much as they liked. They had a party eating chicken 
and ducks [very valuable food] every night. The people knew, but did 
nothing.’42 A former cadre from Bình Định collective no. 2 admitted he 
colluded with brigade leaders to share the benefits during harvesting 
time. For example, they underreported the real crop so they could take 
the difference for themselves.43 
Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên also complained that collective 
leaders were in their positions because of their revolutionary 
credentials, not their education or management skills (không có trình 
độ, hồng hơn chuyên). They did not know how to manage the collective 
well, and many were self-interested and corrupt. This led to the leakage 
(thất  thoát) of considerable amounts of collective property. Some 
villagers claimed such leakage was greater at the collective level than at 
the brigade level. 
A former brigade leader in Thanh Yên said: 
Leakage was greatest at the collective level. The collective took 
60  per  cent of the brigade’s output and left 40 per cent for peasants. 
For example, if the brigade harvested 20 tonnes of paddy, the collective 
took 12 tonnes and left 8 tonnes to distribute among peasants. 
Therefore, peasants received too little paddy, so they had to supplement 
their livelihood with growing sweet potatoes and cassava on their 
40  Xã viên làm chủ phát triển một đối tượng phá hoại hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Members 
discover a pilferer in a collective], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 6 October 1979, p. 2. 
41  Author’s interview, 31 October 2005, Thanh Yên. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Author’s interview, 9 November 2005, Bình Định.
125
5 . LoCAL PoLITICS ANd THE PERFoRMANCE oF CoLLECTIVE FARMINg
gardens. The collective leaders were supposed to use the produce to 
buy machines, tractors, fertilisers and to build infrastructure. But they 
embezzled a great deal through buying these things. For example, 
when buying a threshing machine, they could embezzle a half of the 
value by colluding with sellers to write a fake receipt that doubled the 
actual price. They embezzled ‘legally’, so the people could not sue them. 
People saw collective property leaking, so they became disappointed 
and did not want to work anymore. But they had to work because if 
they did not, they did not have food to eat.44
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported in November 1979 that collectives in 
Thăng Bình had incorrectly recorded income, expenditure, inputs and 
outputs. For example, Bình Nguyên no. 2 and Bình Đào collectives 
had falsified all records of funds, inventories, cash, receipts and 
expenditure.45 
Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc villagers attributed their low income to the 
poor quality and great number of collective cadres. They said that, on 
average, each collective had to feed hundreds of cadres. The salary of 
each cadre was about 200–300 kilograms of paddy per season, which 
was much higher than the annual income of the average collective 
member. Apart from the salary, cadres enjoyed many other benefits, 
such as attending parties and meetings and buying paddy at low 
prices (mua lúa điều hoà).46 At that time, the collective spent too 
much on buying machines and building infrastructure. It subsidised 
all mass organisations, such as women’s unions, peasant associations, 
schools, hospitals, irrigation teams, specialised and industrial teams, 
‘priority’ families such as those of war martyrs and wounded soldiers, 
poor peasants and party cells. Even higher-level cadres came to ask for 
subsidies from the collective.47 
44  Author’s interview, 5 November 2005, Thanh Yên.
45  Huyện Thăng Bình tổng kết 2 năm cải tạo nong nghiệp [Thăng Bình district summing up 
2 years of agricultural transformation], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 November 1979, p. 2.
46  Author’s interview, 5 December 2005, Thanh Yên. According to a former collective cadre in 
Bình Lãnh, the salary of the collective chairman was 140 per cent of the income of the advanced 
labourer in the collective. The salaries of both the vice-chairman and the chief accountant were 
equal to 95 per cent of the chairman’s salary; the salary of other collective cadres was 90 per cent 
of the chairman’s (Author’s interview, 21 October 2004, Bình Lãnh).
47  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên.
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A man in Hiền Lộc commented: 
The collective produced a great deal of produce but ‘leakage’ was high. 
Much of the produce was taken to feed a large number of cadres. So, the 
people often complained: ‘the worn rain-hat [peasants] worked so that 
the pith helmet [cadres] enjoyed’ [cời làm cho cối ăn].48 
An Giang in the Mekong Delta
Peasants’ everyday politics in An Giang’s 
production units
Joining production units, but not participating in work
Unlike many peasants in QN-ĐN, who tended to devote much of their 
time to collective work to get work-points, many peasants in production 
units in Long Điền B commune of Chợ Mới district in An Giang were 
uninterested (thờ ơ) in work-points. Many joined the production units 
but did not do much collective work. Villagers in Long Điền B recalled 
that few production unit members were devoted to collective work ‘full-
time’; most of the full-time workers were poor and landless peasants. 
Meanwhile, a large number of better-off peasants refused to work or 
worked only occasionally for production units because they could 
make a living by doing jobs outside the units or live from their own 
wealth. A former team leader of production unit no. 1 in the commune 
recalled: 
Some people joined the production unit simply as a formality [vào hình 
thức]. They signed up to join but did not go to do collective work, so, 
at the end of the season, they did not have any work-points to receive 
paddy. Some families let one or two subsidiary members participate in 
the production units while the others worked outside [the unit], such 
as working for wages, fishing or farming elsewhere].49 
To persuade peasants to do collective work, production units in Long 
Điền B did not grant household plots (5 per cent land) to peasants as 
officially stipulated; however, this policy did not help persuade peasants 
to undertake collective farming. At first, some landless peasants 
48  Author’s interview, 14 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
49  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B.
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were eager to work collectively, but they were later disappointed and 
dissatisfied with the low rewards and the methods of distribution in the 
production units. A young formerly landless man recalled:
At first we worked enthusiastically, but later we felt discouraged. In fact, 
the production unit produced a considerable amount of paddy but 
production unit cadres took much of it. Therefore, we received almost 
nothing. My wife and I were both full-time labourers but the income we 
received from work-points was not enough for us to survive [không đủ 
sống]. If we worked for wages, we received cash immediately on a daily 
basis. But for the production unit, we only received paddy at the end 
of the season. How could the poor live on this? Therefore, some people 
felt so discouraged that they quit and laboured elsewhere.50 
A man whose family had five labourers recalled that the income 
from collective farming was so small his family received only 4–5 gịa 
(80–100  kg) of paddy for a whole season. Therefore, he decided to 
pull out of the unit and made a living elsewhere. He added that many 
other households had done the same. Because collective farming did 
not supply adequate food, many people had to take extra jobs outside 
the unit. Production unit cadres often neglected these peasant practices 
because they were not able to secure the peasants’ livelihoods with 
collective farming.51 Similarly, a landless widow with four young 
children explained why she worked for a production unit for just one 
month before quitting: 
After reunification, Mr T [the hamlet chief] granted me 4 công of land 
to make a living. Later, at his suggestion, I put all the land into the 
production unit. I followed others working in the production unit for 
almost a month, but I did not receive any cash or paddy. My children 
at home were hungry, so I had to give up doing collective work and 
laboured for others to raise my little children.52 
Asked why the rate of peasant participation in collective work was low, 
many villagers claimed that working collectively was unprofitable and 
lacked flexibility compared with working individually or for wages. Many 
better-off families were coerced to join farming collectives, but  were 
50  Author’s interview, 17 June 2005, Long Điền B. He meant that the value of a collective 
farming workday was less than that of a day of wage labour. Local people mentioned that before 
reunification the value of a day working for wages was about 2 giạ (40 kg) of paddy. Meanwhile, the 
value of a collective farming workday was less than 10 kilograms, and even as low as 2–3 kilograms.
51  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B.
52  Ibid.
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disappointed (chán nản) because they lost their land and the income 
earned from collective farming was small compared with their previous 
earnings. They had previously owned considerable amounts of  land 
and enjoyed a better life. A former chairman of production unit no. 2 
recalled that his unit actually coerced people into joining, but they did 
not trust collective farming. Some joined but did not work collectively 
at all and did not receive any work-points for the whole season; some 
worked for a few days and earned 10–20 points to avoid being labelled 
anti-government by the authorities. Some worked for production units 
for just one or two seasons and then were so disappointed they found 
jobs elsewhere. So, the percentage of peasants who did collective work 
in the fields was low—about 10 to 20 per cent.53 A full-time member 
of  a  production unit whose husband was a production unit cadre 
recalled: 
Others worked only three out of 10 days. We worked 10 out of 10 days. 
Some better-off people joined but rarely went to work. The production 
unit had more than 400 công [40 hectares] of land and 100 labourers 
but only about seven to eight people went to do collective work in the 
field daily. Therefore, we had to work a lot, working to death [làm muốn 
chết].54 
‘The outside foot was longer than the inside foot’
It was common for peasants in the Mekong Delta to try to evade 
collective farming and make a living outside the production unit. 
Even some production unit cadres were focused on jobs outside the 
unit. Those who had boats used them to do trading; those who had 
relatives in places where collective farming had not yet been established 
borrowed land to make a living there. Because many places had not yet 
been collectivised, peasants could easily borrow land to avoid joining 
collective farming.55 A former chairman of production unit no. 1 fits 
this pattern: 
Our production unit was established in 1979. In the first season, the 
value of work-points was really good [more than 10 kilograms per 
workday], but after that the value of work-points deteriorated. At the 
end of 1980, because of the flood, the value of work-points was only 
0.7 kilogram. At that time, many peasants left the production unit to 
53  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B
54  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
55  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
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do outside jobs. But in the following season many of them came back 
to the production unit because of the increased value of work-points. 
The higher the value of work-points peasants received, the larger the 
number of peasants who participated in the production unit.56 
He also admitted that many peasants and cadres, and even his own 
family, had to ‘keep one foot within and another outside the production 
unit’ (giữ chân ngoài chân trong).
This phenomenon was widespread across many collectives in 
An Giang. The An Giang newspaper reported in August 1980 that, when 
authorities in Mỹ Lương commune in Chợ Mới district established 
production unit no. 2, many peasants resisted fiercely; some joined but 
‘kept one foot within and another outside’, and the ‘outside foot was 
longer than the inside one’ (chân ngoài dài hơn chân trong). The number 
of labourers doing collective work in the fields was very low—sometimes 
only 20–30 labourers (out of 113) worked in the fields.57 Similarly, in 
production unit no. 1 in Chau Long 4 hamlet, some peasants did not 
do collective farming properly; they also kept ‘the outside foot longer 
than the inside one’. The rate of peasant participation depended on the 
performance of the production unit. If the unit’s performance was good, 
many engaged in collective work; but, if it was bad, many would leave 
and find jobs elsewhere. In some families, only one member worked for 
the production unit, while the remaining members worked outside it to 
ensure their livelihoods (xoay sở cuộc sống).58 
In short, peasants in Long Điền B and An Giang did not devote the 
majority of their time, energy and resources to collective farming. 
Because they lacked confidence in collective farming, many peasants 
kept ‘one foot within and another outside the production unit’. 
This shows that peasants in An Giang had more options than their 
counterparts in QN-ĐN to avoid or minimise the disadvantages of 
collective farming.
56  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B.
57  Về thăm tập đoàn số 2 Mỹ Lương [A visit to Production Unit No. 2 in Mỹ Lương], An Giang, 
7 December 1980, p. 2.
58  Tập đoàn sản xuất I, khóm Châu Long 4 vững bước tiến lên [Production Unit No. 1, Chau 
Long 4 Subcommune is progressing], An Giang, 9 August 1981, p. 2.
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Careless work and neglect of common property
In addition to low levels of participation in collective work, another 
common problem in Long Điền B production units was the manner 
in which the peasants worked. They were unenthusiastic and sluggish 
(làm không nhiệt tình, làm lê thê); some just went through the motions, 
waiting for day’s end rather than trying to finish their work. They did 
not want to work as hard or as carefully as they worked in their own 
plots.59 A better-off man in Long Điền B described the manner of 
peasants’ collective farming in his production unit: 
Collective farming according to work-points was poor. People just 
went through the motions of working without taking care of collective 
property. When passing by the collective rice plots, if they saw weeds 
they would not stop and pull them up, as they would have done for 
their own plots. They worked with their minds elsewhere. People 
only worked carefully if they worked for themselves. How could the 
production unit be profitable? I felt sad that our land was pooled for 
others to work together. But because they were landless and the land 
was not theirs, they did not love the land at all; they worked for points, 
so they did not take care of the land. Working together was certainly 
impossible. I think that only those like Uncle Hồ and Uncle Tôn Đức 
Thắng could work collectively, but peasants could not. The central 
leaders were kind; they thought peasants were like them, but peasants 
were not; they were selfish and different.60 
Looking back on how peasants resisted collective farming in production 
units under the work-points system, the An Giang newspaper reported, 
in April 1982:
When preparing rice seeds to sow, nobody cared whether they were too 
dry or too soaked. When transporting seeds to the fields, people carried 
the sacks carelessly and dropped many along the road. When the seeds 
reached their destination, people did not have enough baskets to take 
them to the fields. Moreover, people just went through the motions of 
working until the end of day. When the seeds were ready to sow, they 
were left sitting in the fields. When it rained slightly, the people refused 
to work. When it was a bit sunny, many people complained of headaches. 
After weeding for a while, many people grumbled about backache.61 
59  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
60  Ibid. Uncle Hồ is Hồ Chí Minh, the first President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; 
Tôn Đức Thắng, born in An Giang, was Hồ Chí Minh’s successor.
61  Vụ lúa khoán ở tập đoàn 3 Tây Khánh B [The results of contracted rice crops in Production 
Unit No. 3 in Tây Khánh B Commune], An Giang, 18 April 1982, p. 3.
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The fact that peasants refused to work or worked unenthusiastically 
affected the operation of production units. People in Long Điền B 
recalled that the units were not able to mobilise peasants to complete 
tasks on time, so some fields were left uncultivated and rice plots 
remained unweeded. A former chairman of Long Điền B production 
unit no. 1 admitted that his unit was unable to complete weeding in 
time because of low levels of peasant participation in work schedules: 
‘weeds were often more numerous than rice shoots’ (cỏ thường nhiều 
hơn lúa).62 A former chairman of production unit no. 2 said:
For individual farming, peasants prepared the soil and weeded carefully, 
so the fields hardly had any weeds. But under collective farming, the 
rice fields were full of weeds because of carelessness. If weeds were not 
pulled out properly, they would flourish.63 
Villagers admitted that the collective rice fields were so overgrown with 
weeds that they looked like a wilderness during the period of collective 
farming. People in Long Phú hamlet had a popular saying to describe 
the situation: ‘Please come to Long Phú and see weeds that touch the 
sky’ (Ai về Long Phú mà xem, âm u cỏ rác phủ xanh rợp trời).64 A former 
cadre of Chợ Mới district observed: 
Because peasants did not see efficiency in collective farming, they did 
not want to work for production units. They were better off leaving the 
units and finding jobs elsewhere. Therefore, wherever production units 
existed, the weeds thrived [tập đoàn đi tới đâu thì cỏ đi tới đó]. At that 
time, Mr Do Vuong, a northern cadre, criticised us for not allowing 
peasants to join production units voluntarily. But I argued with him 
that no matter how much we propagandised and educated the peasants, 
they never volunteered to join, because they considered collective 
farming as working for the sake of cadres.65 
As well as doing their collective work sloppily and slowly, peasants 
in Long Điền B were accused by local officials of not caring for and 
even sabotaging collective property. A former production team leader 
recalled that floods in 1980 affected the rice fields, so cadres called on 
62  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B.
63  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
64  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B. Long Phú was a hamlet in Long Điền B, Chợ 
Mới district, An Giang.
65  Author’s interview, 22 August 2005, Long Điền B. Châu Thành was one of the districts in 
An Giang with a low population density. Peasants here had greater economic options to evade 
collective farming, so the performance of collective farming here was much worse than in other 
parts of An Giang, such as Chợ Mới district.
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people to harvest the crops as soon as possible. No-one responded. 
People said the rice was not theirs; it belonged to the production unit. 
He added: 
People were so negative that they even ate sugarcane seedlings [during 
transplanting] and said anyone who did not eat them was stupid. That 
was annoying because the production unit had to buy those seedlings. 
Moreover, when people worked in the fields, they saw broken paddy 
walls; they should have fixed them. But they did not. They said: ‘Why 
should we when it was not ours?’ I ask you, how could the rice survive? 
A few people had a good attitude but those who had a bad attitude were 
numerous. Working collectively was certainly impossible.66 
Similarly, a woman in the production unit recalled: ‘We tried to plant 
sugarcane and corn, but when the crops were ready to harvest, people 
snitched or destroyed them all.’ The production unit then gave up 
planting secondary crops.67 A former chairman of production unit 
no. 2 admitted that secondary crops were a financial failure because of 
careless cultivation and peasant sabotage. Therefore, in 1980, he decided 
to give the secondary-crop land to peasants to cultivate individually—
similar to what happened in QN-ĐN. In return, peasants paid tax to the 
state via the production unit.68 
In summary, unlike their counterparts in QN-ĐN, who tried to strike 
a compromise with collective farming and pursue work-points, peasants 
in Long Điền B and An Giang tended to evade collective farming 
altogether. Some joined the production units but worked infrequently; 
some worked sluggishly and unenthusiastically and did not care about 
collective property. These practices significantly affected the performance 
of collective farming, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Local cadres’ practices in An Giang
Party leaders accused local cadres in the Mekong Delta of being 
unenthusiastic about agricultural transformation, having ‘weak, messy 
and slack management of labour, finance, production and distribution 
of produce’ and committing embezzlement. All these factors made 
66  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B.
67  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B.
68  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B. He argued that his production unit granted 
secondary-crop land to peasants without the consent of higher authorities. Each household 
received about 0.5 công (500 sq m) of land to farm individually.
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collectivisation in the region difficult.69 Provincial authorities accused 
local cadres in An Giang of displaying ‘negative practices such as 
stealing collective property, materials, cash and peasants’ work-points, 
appropriating illegally peasants’ land and belongings and bullying the 
masses’ (ức hiếp quần chúng).70 
Peasants in Long Điền B complained that production unit cadres 
behaved badly. One man in the commune recalled: 
At that time, cadres enjoyed a comfortable life. They controlled 
everything such as work-points, materials, cash and paddy; the unit 
members did not know anything about those things. After harvesting, 
they controlled all paddy and only distributed part of it to each person 
according to the amount of work-points. We did not know exactly how 
they used the remaining.71 
Some argued that cadres did not make public (công khai) the production 
unit’s income and expenses. They only released one financial report 
a year, and this was often a ‘ghost’ (fake) report (báo cáo ma).72 
The An Giang newspaper describes many cases of embezzlement in 
production units. For example, 27 inspections in May 1980 found 
40  cadres had been embezzling collective property. Authorities 
received 361 complaints from peasants—most about cadres stealing 
and bullying.73 In 1981, Chợ Mới district inspectors discovered that the 
managerial board of production units in Long Điền B had embezzled 
collective property. As a result, some production unit cadres were 
sentenced to a few months’ imprisonment.74 Informants complained 
that, although some cadres were sacked or imprisoned, authorities were 
not able to entirely eliminate corruption among the cadres. New cadres 
might be better behaved initially, but eventually, they committed the 
same wrongdoings. Some attributed the cadres’ problems to policy 
mechanisms (do cơ chế chính sách) that gave considerable power to 
cadres in terms of controlling and managing production units.75 
69  BCTNNMN, Report of Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation, p. 4.
70  Tăng cường chỉ đạo công tác chống tiêu cực [Intensifying the fight against negativism], 
An Giang, 8 June 1980, p. 2.
71  Author’s interview, 29 June 2005, Long Điền B.
72  Author’s interview, 20 June 2005, Long Điền B.
73  An Giang đẩy mạnh công tác chống tiêu cực [An Giang speeds up the fight against negativism], 
An Giang, 8 June 1980, p. 2.
74  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B.
75  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B.
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A poor man who at first supported the new authorities and worked 
enthusiastically for the production unit shared his story: 
At that time, the authorities told us that, from now on, people had to 
join production units to work collectively because individual farming 
was not allowed. We obeyed and joined to work for the production 
unit. But the authorities cheated people [chính quyền lừa dối dân]. 
We conformed to the policy while many production unit cadres, even 
higher officials, left to work individually … Most cadres were self-
interested; they stole collective property with no conscience pangs. 
It was common that production unit cadres stole collective paddy and 
were caught by members. As far as I remember, Mr Ba Truc at the Hat 
Giang School of Agricultural Transformation said that, if a production 
unit operated according to socialist principles, it was a heaven on 
earth for poor households. But if it went wrong, it was much worse 
and crueller than [life under] previous landlords. He explained that 
the landlords forced peasants to fill their storehouses full of paddy 
but people could borrow it back when they needed some. Meanwhile, 
production unit cadres only focused on [chỉ có biết] stealing, pilfering 
and embezzling collective property without caring about their 
members. All of these certainly made collective farming go to ruin and 
peasants suffer starvation.76 
Some Long Điền B peasants also complained that cadres showed 
favouritism when assigning work tasks and grading work-points. 
A poor man whose family joined a production unit but infrequently 
went to work said production unit cadres showed favouritism to their 
relatives and friends. These people often received many points because 
the unit assigned them light tasks worth numerous points and those 
who were not close to the cadres got less work-points, even though 
they worked harder. Many therefore wanted to quit and rely on outside 
jobs to make a living.77 In other production units, cadres gave the same 
points to everyone, undermining any incentive people might have to 
work well. A team leader of production unit no. 1 recalled: 
At first, I was a production unit member. Because I worked hard, I was 
elected team leader in charge of grading points for the whole team. 
It was impossible to follow the grading regulations because I feared 
hurting others’ feelings [sợ mất lòng]. For example, according to the 
regulation, if someone came to work one hour late, I had to subtract his 
76  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B.
77  Author’s interview, 29 June 2005, Long Điền B.
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work-points. The regulation said so, but in practice, we were afraid of 
hurting others’ feelings so we distributed work-points to people evenly 
[cào bằng]. At first, some peasants worked enthusiastically but later 
lost their incentive because there was no difference between those who 
worked hard and those who worked sloppily.78 
Local cadres too often mismanaged state resources and did not serve 
the people responsibly. During the work-points period, the An Giang 
newspaper reported numerous cases of problem cadres. For example, 
a November 1980 article accused cadres of ‘snitching’ (ăn xén) fertiliser 
from bags sold to peasants in a state trading shop in Châu Phú district. 
A bag of fertiliser should have weighed 50 kilograms, but in this district 
many bags weighed only 46 or 47 kilograms. Peasants also discovered 
salt and other ingredients had been mixed with the fertiliser.79 
Figure 5.1 Rice production unit
A worm says to his wife, ‘do not be afraid of moving here, we’ll be safe because the 
production unit manager has already sold all of the pesticides on the black market!’
Source: Drawn by Văn Thành, published in An Giang, 22 March 1981 . 
78  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B.
79  Chuyên to nhỏ: Ăn xén của dân [Pilfering people’s resources], An Giang, 23 November 1980, 
p. 3.
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Similarly, in the winter–spring of 1980–81, cadres in charge of 
storehouses in Thoại Sơn district embezzled 310 tonnes of paddy, 
which they simply reported as missing. Cadres colluded with private 
merchants buying paddy so that both gained financial benefits at the 
expense of the state and food supplies.80 
Figure 5.2 Food procurement station
At the food procurement station, a man who sells rice bribes the official so he will ignore 
the water and sand mixed into his rice . He ponders: ‘In life, sometimes a word can increase 
the weight!’
Source: Drawn by Văn Thành, published in An Giang, 3 May 1980.
In explaining the increased prices of paddy in An Giang, a local 
newspaper reported that some of the cadres responsible for controlling 
free markets and extending socialist markets were actually corrupt and 
colluded with private rice merchants, creating favourable conditions 
for an illicit rice trade. At the same time, cadres ‘blocked transport and 
prohibited markets’ (ngăn sông cấm chợ) for ordinary labourers.81 A man 
in Long Điền B recalled that he went to harvest rice crops for wages 
(cắt lúa mướn) in Thoại Sơn district and took home a few giạ of paddy, 
80  Vài nét về những kho chứa lúa ở Thoại Sơn [Some problems with rice stores in Thoại Sơn], 
An Giang, 23 August 1981, p. 3.
81  Vì sao giá lúa leo thang [Why rice prices escalate], An Giang, 27 October 1980, p. 2.
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but cadres from a food purchasing station stopped him and told him to 
surrender his paddy to them. Meanwhile, rice merchants who colluded 
with the cadres passed through easily.82 Another man commented: 
Policies said that peasants were not allowed to cultivate and transfer 
paddy across borders. But if you had money to bribe the cadres you 
could do this without any difficulty.83 
Long Điền B peasants and the An Giang newspaper accused local cadres 
of misusing common property. They said cadres frequently organised 
meetings and parties (nhậu nhẹt), wasting time and other resources, 
which made the state’s organisations function poorly and significantly 
affected people’s social and economic activities. The following cartoons 
help us understand these problems (Figures 5.3–5.6). 
Figure 5.3 A farmer and a merchant at a food procurement station
A local officer in charge of preventing private trading points his left hand at a farmer who 
has two chickens and shouts, ‘Hand them over!’ Meanwhile, in his right hand, he receives 
a bribe from a merchant with many bags of rice and beans . She says, ‘Here are my 
permission papers to transport goods .’
Source: drawn by Nhi, published in An Giang, 12 October 1980.
82  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
83  Author’s interview, 30 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
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Figure 5.4 Drinking at work
A farmer comes to a local office at 2 pm, showing a form to an official, and shyly says, 
‘Sir, please consider my form.’ The officer, who is in the middle of a drinking session, shouts 
at him, ‘don’t you see we are busy with our meeting?’
Source: Drawn by Văn Thành, published in An Giang, 16 November 1980.
Figure 5.5 Tet (New Year) gifts
An officer submits a form to a higher official on New Year without including a ‘gift’, and is 
criticised for not behaving properly (like the man on the right). 
Source: Drawn by Văn Thành, published in An Giang, 22 February 1981 .
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Figure 5.6 Smuggling
The ambulance carries a patient surrounded by smuggled MSg, textiles and cigarettes . 
Source: Drawn by Văn Thành, published in An Giang, 4 january 1981 .
The performance of collective organisations 
under the work-points system
QN-ĐN in the Central Coast region
In the first years after reunification, staple food production in QN-ĐN 
reportedly increased rapidly, from 149,062 tonnes in 1975 to 380,000 
tonnes in 1978. Inspired by this achievement, QN-ĐN officials believed 
that, under their close leadership, the province could produce 550,000 
tonnes of staple food by the end of the 1976–80 five-year plan. They 
believed that only collectivisation with ‘three revolutions’ would enable 
agriculture to meet that target.84 
84  29-3-1975 – 29-3-1979: 4 năm lớn mạnh về kinh tế [From 29 March 1975 to 29 March 1979: 
4 years of economic expansion], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 March 1979, p. 1. 
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However, in contrast to their expectations, when collectivisation in the 
province was extended, food production stagnated and did not match 
the increases in the area under cultivation and in agricultural investment. 
A leading article in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng in September 1979, titled 
‘Some urgent measures to increase food production’, reported: ‘The rice 
productivity of the spring–summer of 1979 is low while the coming 
summer–autumn is under the threat of drought and flood. Starvation 
has occurred in some locations.’ The article argued that, in addition 
to bad weather, the poor performance of staple food production was 
because local authorities mismanaged and underutilised agricultural 
land (especially secondary-crop land) and labour. To improve food 
production, the article urged collectives to temporarily lend secondary-
crop land to collective members for three years.85 Similarly, the 
chairman of the provincial Committee for Agricultural Transformation 
admitted that the area and yield of secondary crops had decreased 
compared with pre-collectivisation times, and he urged collectives to 
lend secondary land to their members.86 Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên also 
recalled secondary crops doing badly because of peasants pilfering 
produce. Finally, in 1980, collective leaders decided to temporarily 
redistribute secondary-crop land to households.87 
Accounts in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng showed that the province continued 
to have bad harvests in the winter–spring of 1979–80; average rice 
productivity was about 2.5 tonnes per hectare compared with 2.92 in 
the previous winter–spring, of 1978–79. Thousands of hectares of rice 
yielded no crop (mất trắng). For example, Tam Kỳ district suffered 
failed rice crops across 557 hectares, while Quế Sơn district had 188 
hectares producing no harvest.88 Similarly, of Thăng Bình district’s 
4,500 hectares of rice in the winter–spring of 1979–80, 800 hectares 
yielded no crop and 1,600 hectares returned poor yields. The average 
rice productivity in Thăng Bình district fell to 1.47 tonnes per hectare.89 
85  Các biện pháp cấp bách đẩy mạnh sản xuất lương thực, thực phẩm ổn định đời sống nhân 
dân [Some urgent measures to increase food production], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 September 
1979, p. 1.
86  Nhận thức đúng đắn và thi hành nghiêm chỉnh việc tạm giao đất chuyên trồng màu cho 
xã viên sản xuất [Understanding well and seriously implementing a temporary redistribution of 
secondary land to members], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 19 September 1979, p. 1.
87  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Thanh Yên. 
88  Vụ Đông–Xuân 1980–1981 được mùa cả lúa và màu [Good rice and secondary crops harvested 
in winter–spring of 1980–1981], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 May 1981, p. 1.
89  Huyện Thăng Bình phấn đấu đạt 65000 tấn lương thực năm 1981 [Thăng Bình is striving to 
produce 65,000 tonnes of food], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 9 September 1981, p. 2.
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As a result of the efforts of QN-ĐN authorities to expand irrigation and 
agricultural land, and increase the number of crops per year and the use 
of chemical fertilisers, by 1980, the province’s staple food production 
was expected to reach 460,000 tonnes of paddy.90 However, according 
to a recent report from the Quảng Nam Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (Sở Nông Nghiệp Phát Triển Nông Thôn Quảng 
Nam, or SNNPTNTQN) QN-ĐN’s grain production (including rice 
and corn) in 1980 was just 285,426 tonnes of paddy equivalent—falling 
short of the target.91 
Many other provinces in the Central Coast region faced similar food 
production shortfalls. In assessing the effects of collectivisation on the 
Central Coast’s agriculture, one study found: 
The Central Coast was the region in which collectivization occurred 
most quickly and thoroughly and was most like the northern models. 
In this region, all peasants’ means of production became collective 
property; labor was tightly controlled by centralized leadership; 
household economy is highly restricted and even prohibited (so, they 
generated only a little staple food). Therefore, during the peak period 
[of] collectivization, the region faced a severe problem of staple food 
production. For example, thousands of hectares of secondary crop land 
in Thăng Bình district of QN-DN were abandoned in 1978.92 
Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc villagers recalled their living conditions 
dramatically deteriorating during the work-points period. At the 
beginning of collective farming, the value of a workday in Bình Định 
collective no. 2 was 0.5 kilograms of paddy; later, it fell to 0.3 kilograms. 
Bình Lãnh collective faced a similar situation: the value of a workday 
fell  from 3 kilograms of paddy in 1977 to 2 kilograms in 1978, 
1.5 kilograms in 1979 and 0.5 kilogram in 1980.93 
An elderly man in Thanh Yên village recalled that collective farming 
caused hunger, and the value of a workday—0.3 to 0.5 kilogram 
of paddy—was not enough to ‘feed a rooster’, let alone a person.94 
According to a former brigade leader of Bình Định collective no. 2:
90  Sở Nông Nghiệp Phát Triển Nông Thôn Quảng Nam (2005), Kết quả sản xuất nông nghiệp 
năm 1976–2004 [Agricultural Production 1976–2004], Tam Kỳ: Sở Nông Nghiệp và Phát Triển 
Nông Thôn Quảng Nam. I received this report during fieldwork in Quảng Nam in 2005.
91  CTKQN, Quảng Nam’s Socioeconomic Development.
92  Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam, p. 32.
93  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên.
94  Author’s interview, 31 October 2005, Thanh Yên.
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The value of a workday during the first harvest of the collective [in the 
summer–autumn of 1979] was 0.5 kilogram of paddy. In the following 
season, the winter–spring of 1979–1980, the collective had such a bad 
harvest that collective cadres had to go elsewhere to buy food for their 
families. The value of a workday in that season was less than 0.3 kilogram 
of paddy. In the summer–autumn of 1980 season, the harvest was also 
bad. In the winter–spring of 1980–1981, the collective enjoyed a good 
harvest but the district’s authorities took a large quantity of collective 
paddy, so the value of a workday never reached 0.5 kilogram of paddy 
during the work-points system.95 
Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên villagers often resorted to sarcasm to describe 
their living conditions during the work-points period. For example, 
I recorded statements such as: ‘collective farming produced so little rice 
that, when eating, people had to lick rice clinging to their chopsticks’ 
(lúa điểm là liếm đũa); ‘working for the collective, there were no clothes 
to cover one’s privates’ (hợp tác hợp te không có miếng vải mà che cái 
lồn); ‘in the evening, people had dinner with sweet potatoes to sleep; 
in the morning, people had breakfast with sweet potatoes to work; at 
noon, people opened their mouth to chew sweet potatoes again’ (tối ăn 
khoai đi ngủ, sáng ăn củ đi làm, trưa về hả hàm nhai khoai); and ‘farmers 
work and cadres enjoy’ (cời làm cho cối ăn).96
Villagers recalled people living on sweet potatoes and cassava. 
An elderly man in Hiền Lộc told me his family did not have enough 
rice so they had two meals of cassava a day and one of rice mixed with 
cassava.97 An elderly man in Thanh Yên shared a similar story:
At that time, we substituted sweet potatoes for rice. Sweet potatoes were 
our main staple food. During one season of working for the collective, 
my family received only 20 kilograms of paddy. How could we live? 
The collective took much of what we produced.98 
95  Author’s interviews, 22 and 23 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
96  Lúa điểm là liếm đũa is a kind of backwards slang: lúa điểm is the amount of rice peasants 
received according to their work-points; liếm đũa literally means ‘licking chopsticks’, implying rice 
was so scarce that, after meals, people were still hungry. Hợp tác hợp te không có miếng vải mà che 
cái lồn is a modified version of the government slogan ‘working for collectives, few people went on 
foot; many went by bus’ (hợp tác hợp te đi bộ thì ít đi xe thì nhiều).
97  Author’s interview, 22 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
98  Author’s interview, 31 October 2005, Thanh Yên.
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Villagers believed the poor performance of collective farming (its low 
productivity), high levels of leakage (thất thoát) and the wasting 
of collective resources (lãng phí) were the main reasons for their 
deteriorating living conditions. According to villagers, collective 
farming always produced poor harvests because people did not do 
collective work as carefully as they did private work and merely went 
through the motions of working; they did not take care of collective 
fields, and the ploughing, spreading of manure and weeding were done 
carelessly and unevenly. Some plots produced good harvests while 
neighbouring ones were bad.99 A man in Thanh Yên commented:
If collective farming had continued, land would become unsuitable for 
ploughing and transplanting any more because the soil would become 
harder and suffer degradation. Moreover, for years of collective farming, 
the collective plots would significantly decrease in size because people 
did not plough the soil properly; they did not hoe the corners and clear 
the edges properly.100 
In the opinion of many villagers, the poor productivity of collective 
farming was largely a result of people’s everyday politics and survival 
strategies. They also considered the ‘leakage’ from and waste in 
collectives, caused by cadres, as other major reasons for their low 
income. The leakage, villagers said, resulted not only from peasants’ 
theft and cadres’ embezzlement, but also from extraction by other 
individuals, mass organisations and the state. They argued that, because 
a large amount of collective produce was extracted to support cadres, 
subsidise mass organisations and pay state taxes and obligations, 
collective members received little income. Despite the fact that 
members were supposed to share more than 60 per cent of collective 
produce, leakage and waste meant they received less than half of this.101 
This problem was not confined to Bình Lãnh and Bình Định collectives, 
but was common in many Central Coast collectives. According to 
a report by the Committee for Southern Agricultural Transformation 
in November 1979: 
In some Central Coast locations, the state’s share in collective food 
distribution was about 30 to 40 per cent, together with collective funds 
and supplies for local guerillas, local cadres, party and mass organisations 
which meant that collective members received less than 60 per cent of 
99  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
100  Author’s interviews, 10 October 2004; 5 October 2005, Thanh Yên. 
101  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc. 
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total produce, as regulated. Even in some locations collective members 
received only 40–50 per cent of produce. Meanwhile, peasants’ 
secondary crops produced a bad harvest. So, the living standards of 
collective members were very low; many households faced difficulties 
in earning enough to live. Starvation occurred in some places such as 
Tam Ka district, QN-ĐN.102 
Another problem was poor governance, especially the inefficient 
management of collective resources. Villagers argued that collectives 
were too large and cadres could not control resources (such as 
agricultural inputs, land and labour), production and output. Since 
a collective was unable to utilise all of the available agricultural land 
and labour, some land was left uncultivated or was cultivated too 
late. Moreover, under collective farming, workers were not able to 
weed, care for fields or dry produce as efficiently as under individual 
farming. A Hiền Lộc villager recalled delivering grain to the brigade’s 
house and then to the collective’s storehouse. Even though the grain 
had not dried properly, it was still put into storage. Later much of this 
produce rotted—an example of how collective farming wasted a lot of 
resources.103 Another man argued that ‘the state thought that centralised 
leadership and management made agriculture stronger, but it failed to 
do so. I thought that individual farming was much more efficient than 
collective farming.’104 
An Giang in the Mekong Delta
As discussed in the previous section, peasants from Long Điền B often 
expressed their objections to collective farming by rarely undertaking 
collective work or doing it unenthusiastically. Combined with local 
cadres’ mismanagement, this led to poor performance for collective 
farming. 
Long Điền B peasants said the work-points system was terribly poor 
compared with their individual farming methods. The common reasons 
they gave were that ‘people did collective work unenthusiastically 
and sluggishly’, ‘no-one took care of common property’, ‘production 
unit cadres embezzled collective resources’ and ‘management of the 
102  BCTNNMN, Report of Central Committee for Agricultural Transformation, p. 2.
103  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
104  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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production units was slack’. As a result, peasants’ incomes were even 
worse than those of tenants in the period of landlords. An elderly man 
argued: 
In the French time, the tenants who did not have land could farm 
on the landlord’s; the rent was not too much and tenants could make 
a living. Furthermore, at that time, wild fish were still numerous, which 
enabled people to make a living easily [dễ sinh sống]. When joining 
the production unit, people worked miserably and results were low. 
Because people did not want to work collectively, they did collective 
work sloppily [làm khơi khơi] and weeded carelessly, so weeds overgrew. 
Therefore, at that time, peasants’ income was less than previously.105 
A former chairperson of production unit no. 1 in Long Điền B recalled 
that, initially, a collective workday was valued at more than 10 kilograms, 
but this later decreased. At the end of 1980, after heavy floods, the value 
of a workday was only 0.7 kilogram (the same as in QN-ĐN). Peasants 
were disappointed and wanted to quit collective farming.106 A landless 
man who worked full-time for production units recalled that he and his 
wife received about only 20 giạ of paddy (400 kg) for a whole season—
not enough to feed his family and much less than his previous income 
from wage labour.107 
The low value of a workday was not limited to collective farming in 
Long Điền B, but occurred across many parts of An Giang. Production 
unit no. 3 of Tây Khánh B commune in Long Xuyên faced the same 
situation. A full-time and hardworking member received only 10 gịa 
(200 kg) of paddy per season. Here again, the reason for the low income 
was that people did not participate in collective farming wholeheartedly, 
but tried to make a living outside the production unit.108 A Chợ Mới 
district official who had experience of collectivisation in the period 
1979–81 observed: 
105  Author’s interview, 20 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
106  Author’s interview, 28 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
107  Author’s interview, 23 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
108  The results of contracted rice crops, An Giang, 18 April 1982, p. 2.
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The living conditions of peasants in collective farming production units 
deteriorated. Where local authorities carried out collectivisation exactly 
according to the state policy, peasants faced many more difficulties in 
making a living. But where local authorities loosely applied the policy 
of collectivisation, peasants found it easier to make a living.109 
An Giang provincial Resolution No. 017/NQ-TU (26 November 1981) 
admitted that, ‘in many production units and collectives, production 
had not increased, it had even decreased; the living conditions 
of production unit members have not improved’.110 
In June 1981, the An Giang newspaper reported that rice productivity 
in the Tây Huề collective in the winter–spring of 1979–80 was about 
1.5  tonnes per hectare (compared with the 4–5 tonnes per hectare 
achieved under individual farming). Moreover, leakage (thất thoát) 
and cadre embezzlement accounted for 50 per cent of this produce. 
The living conditions of collective members therefore had worsened.111 
Another example was Phú Quý production unit in Phú An commune 
in Châu Phú district, whose land was assessed as fertile and, before 
collectivisation, had achieved average rice productivity of about 
5–6 tonnes of paddy per hectare. However, after collectivisation, rice 
productivity fell to 1–2 tonnes of paddy per hectare.112
By 1981, collectivisation in An Giang involved less than 10 per 
cent of agricultural land and peasant households, and the effect of 
collectivisation policy on the province’s agricultural production 
was minor compared with that in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast. 
However, the combined effects of agricultural transformation—
including collectivisation, prohibition of non-resident cultivators, land 
redistribution, conversion to double cropping, the low prices paid for 
grain procurement and free market restrictions—significantly hindered 
the development of An Giang’s agricultural sector. For example, the 
low prices paid for grain procurement discouraged peasants from 
increasing production. Instead, they produced only enough grain 
for their own family’s consumption. The prohibition of non-resident 
cultivators limited the productive capacity of peasants who previously 
109  Author’s interview, 23 June 2005, Chợ Mới.
110  Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 33. 
111  Chuyển biến mới ở HTX Tây Huề [Good progress in Tây Huề collective], An Giang, 7 June 
1981, p. 2.
112  Vài nét về một tập đoàn yếu kém [Some portraits of a weak production unit], An Giang, 
6 September 1981, p. 2.
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enjoyed relative freedom in choosing where to live and selecting their 
own businesses. According to Nguyễn Minh Nhị, a former An Giang 
party secretary, from 1976 to 1979, food production in the province 
stagnated at about 500,000 tonnes of paddy equivalent per annum. 
Due to heavy floods in 1978, An Giang’s food production fell to less 
than 400,000 tonnes and starvation occurred in some places.113 From 
1979 to 1980, the collapse of the majority of production units, which 
released peasants and land from collective farming, contributed to 
a  slight increase in food production and productivity in 1980 and 
1981. In general, despite much effort to modernise, food production 
and productivity during 1975–81 did not increase as much as expected 
(see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 An Giang’s cultivated area, food yield and rice productivity, 
1975–81
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Area of annual 
food crops 
(hectares) 









2 .13 2 .25 1 .97 1 .55 2 .27 2 .52 2 .34 
Source: Cục Thống Kê An Giang (CTKAG) (2005), Tổng hợp diện tích, năng suất sản 
lượng cây trồng hàng năm và số lượng gia súc gia cầm gia đoạn 1975–2005 [Area, 
Productivity and Output of Annual Crops in An Giang from 1975–2005], Long Xuyên: Cục 
Thống Kê An Giang.
The stagnation of food production occurred not only in An Giang, but 
also across the whole Mekong Delta region. According to Nguyễn Sinh 
Cúc, before 1975, the Mekong Delta was one of the largest commodity 
rice–producing regions. However, after reunification, in the period 
1976–80, despite peaceful times, the region’s staple food production did 
not increase, but fluctuated. In particular, rice production in the region 
fell between 1976 and 1978 and increased slightly between 1979 and 
113  Nguyễn Minh Nhị, An Giang, p. 1. Some provincial officials explained that, apart from 
collectivisation and other policies, at that time, cheap prices for food discouraged peasants from 
increasing their own food production. They produced only enough for their own consumption 
(Author’s interview, 6 June 2005, Long Xuyên).
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1980 (Tables 5.2–5.4). Nguyễn Sinh Cúc argued that, apart from bad 
weather, the fall in rice production was closely linked to the expansion 
of collectivisation. Moreover, he attributed the slight increase in rice 
production in 1979–80 largely to the collapse of a large number of 
production units, which released peasants and considerable amounts 
of land from collective farming.114
In general, food production in the region fell short of the VCP leaders’ 
expectations, and aggravated the severe food shortage across the 
country in the early 1980s. 
Table 5.2 Rice crop area, paddy production and rice productivity in the 
Mekong Delta, 1976–80
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Area of rice crop 
(thousand hectares) 
2,062 2,099 2,062 2,086 2,096 
Paddy production 
(thousand tonnes) 
4,206 3,478 3,565 4,650 4,835 
Rice productivity 
(tonnes per hectare) 
2.04 1 .66 1 .73 2 .23 2 .3 
Sources: Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991), Thực Trạng Nông Nghiệp, Nông Thôn và Nông Dân Việt 
Nam 1976–1990 [Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam 1976–1990], Hà Nội: NXB 
Thống Kê; and Cục Thống Kê An Giang (CTKAG) (2005), Tổng hợp diện tích, năng suất 
sản lượng cây trồng hàng năm và số lượng gia súc gia cầm gia đoạn 1975–2005 [Area, 
Productivity and Output of Annual Crops in An Giang from 1975–2005], Long Xuyên: Cục 
Thống Kê An Giang.
Performance of Vietnam’s agriculture in 1976–80 and 
modification of the national agrarian policy 
According to Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, from 1976 to 1980, land redistribution 
and collectivisation had a negative effect on the south’s agriculture. 
He  argued that peasants’ negative practices resisting collectivisation 
(such as abandoning their land and neglecting to care for rice fields), 
egalitarian land redistribution and cadres’ corruption contributed 
significantly to the poor performance of agriculture in the south. 
In particular, paddy productivity and yield stagnated during 1976–80 
(see Table 5.3). 
114  Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam, pp. 31, 32.
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Table 5.3 Area, productivity and output of rice crops in southern 
Vietnam, 1976–80
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Area of rice (thousand hectares) 2,909 3,034 3,010 3,011 3,236 
Output (thousand tonnes) 6,346 5,887 5,014 6,431 7,207 
Productivity (tonnes per hectare) 1 .97 1 .94 1 .67 2 .14 2 .23 
Source: Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991), Thực Trạng Nông Nghiệp, Nông Thôn và Nông Dân Việt 
Nam 1976–1990 [Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam 1976–1990], Hà Nội: NXB 
Thống Kê, p. 8.
Ben Kerkvliet’s study of northern Vietnam showed that, due to everyday 
politics regarding land, labour and harvesting, staple food production 
there decreased between 1974 and 1980. In particular, paddy 
production fell by 20 per cent, while staple food per capita decreased 
from 276 kilograms in 1974 to 215 kilograms in 1980. Moreover, the 
performance of collective organisations deteriorated during the period 
1976–80 and many could not meet tax and other obligations to state 
agencies.115 
In general, Vietnam’s agriculture and staple food production stagnated 
in the period 1976–80. The country could not meet many of the targets 
in the government’s 1976–80 five-year plan. Staple food production, 
for example, reached only 68.5 per cent of the target. Food production 
could not meet the needs of consumption and inputs for industry. 
Vietnam had to increase its food imports from 1.2 million tonnes in 
1976 to 2.2 million tonnes in 1979.116 
Table 5.4 Vietnam’s staple food production, 1976–80
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Staple food production 
(thousand tonnes) 
13,400 12,579 12,255 13,986 14,382 
Staple food per capita 
(kilograms per person) 
274 250 237 266 267 
Paddy production 
(thousand tonnes) 
11,828 10,576 9,789 11,362 11,047 
Paddy productivity 
(tonnes per hectare) 
2 .23 1 .95 1 .79 2.07 2 .11 
Source: Nguyễn Sinh Cúc (1991), Thực Trạng Nông Nghiệp, Nông Thôn và Nông Dân Việt 
Nam 1976–1990 [Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam 1976–1990], Hà Nội: NXB 
Thống Kê, p. 8.
115  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, pp. 174–5. 
116  Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam, p. 9. 
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Vietnam in the late 1970s faced persistent food shortages and 
widespread  hunger that alarmed national leaders.117 Other aspects 
of the economy also were in bad shape. The growth rate of gross domestic 
product in industry was –4.7 per cent in 1979 and –10.3 per cent in 
1980. Additionally, from late 1978, Vietnam was at war with Cambodia 
and, from early 1979, it endured armed conflict with China, which 
consumed high levels of the country’s resources.118 
From 1979 to 1981, VCP leaders released a series of directives and 
instructions urging local authorities to strengthen collective farming 
and crack down on local negativism. However, the formation of 
collective farming had not improved and local malpractices had not 
disappeared, but increased over time. For example, in QN-ĐN, despite 
several campaigns to improve collectives and correct cadres’ and 
peasants’ negativism, progress was modest, and some problems were 
only temporarily corrected. The success of these campaigns was uneven 
and, in general, lower than expected.119 Many collectives in QN-ĐN 
were unable to adopt in full the northern model of collectivisation, 
despite the best efforts of the authorities. With inadequate capacity 
and poor governance, collectives tended to allow more room for local 
practices, policy modification such as ‘hidden contracts’ (khoán chui) 
or return of some collective land to peasants. Collectives became sites 
of perennial conflict between cadres, the state and peasants.
In An Giang, despite the government campaigns, the quality and 
performance of most production units did not improve as much as 
provincial leaders had expected. By mid-1981, only 40 per cent of 
production units and collectives in the province farmed collectively 
and the remainder farmed individually or under other illegal 
arrangements.120 By the end of 1981, An Giang had 357 production 
units and six collectives, but only 35 of the units were ‘advanced’. 
The lead article of the An Giang newspaper in September 1981 reported 
that collectivisation in the province had been uneven and was not 
extensive. The number of strong production units and collectives was 
117  Ibid., p. 9; Phạm Văn Chiến, History of the Vietnamese Economy, p. 159. 
118  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, pp. 176–7; Phạm Văn Chiến, History of the 
Vietnamese Economy, pp. 155–6. 
119  Quyết tâm đưa cuộc đấu tranh chống tiêu cực trong năm 1981 lên thành cao trào quần 
chúng, đều khắp vững chắc [Be resolute in fighting ‘negativism’ comprehensively in 1981], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 January 1981, p. 1. 
120  Đẩy mạnh công tác cải tạo nông nghiệp [Speeding up agricultural transformation], An Giang, 
7 June 1981, p. 1.
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small. Some policies—such as those relating to land compensation, the 
family economy and the non-resident cultivator prohibition—had not 
been implemented correctly or seriously.121 Another article reported 
that, despite the efforts of the central and provincial governments, the 
‘phenomenon of negativism’ (hiện tượng tiêu cực) remained severe. 
Negativism included widespread embezzlement and the theft of 
collective property, wages and work-points.122 
In response to the food crisis, the poor performance of collective 
organisations and widespread local use of ‘illegal contracts’ (khoán 
chui) in collectives across Vietnam, the VCP released Directive No. 100 
in January 1981, calling for the expansion of new farming arrangements 
called ‘the product contract to individual workers or groups of workers’ 
(khoán sản phẩm đến nhóm và người lao động). These arrangements 
largely approved local practices and marked a significant modification 
of Vietnam’s agrarian policies.
Under the new system, each peasant household was allocated several 
small fields and a quota (mức khoán) for how much each field should 
produce. Frequently the quota was 10–15 per cent more than the average 
production during the previous three to five years. Collective leaders also 
determined which phases of farmwork should be done collectively and 
which individually. Farmwork was often divided into eight major phases, 
with individuals responsible for the three that most closely affected the 
end product (sản phẩm cuối cùng): planting (trồng), tending (chăm sóc) 
and harvesting (thu hoạch). The remaining phases—considered 
‘technically complicated’—were preparing the land, providing seeds, 
irrigation, fertilisation and preventing and controlling disease. Specialised 
teams and brigades undertook these tasks collectively.123 The income 
of collective members was supposed to come from two main sources: 
work-points earned in collective work and income from the amount each 
household produced beyond their quota.124 
121  Xã luận: Công tác cải tạo nông nghiệp tỉnh An Giang [The editorial: Agricultural 
transformation in An Giang], An Giang, 6 September 1981, p. 1.
122  Intensifying the fight against negativism, An Giang, 8 June 1980, p. 1.
123  Lê Thanh Nghị, Improving the Product Contract, p. 645; Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday 
Politics, p. 193.
124  BCHTU (1993), Chỉ thị cải tiến công tác khoán, mở rộng khoán sản phẩm đến nhóm lao 
động và người lao động trong hợp tác xã nông nghiệp (ngày 13 tháng 1 năm 1981) [Directive on 
improving the contracting of products to labour groups and labourers in agricultural cooperatives 
(13 January 1981)], in Bộ Nông Nghiệp and Công Nghiệp Thực Phẩm (eds), Chủ trương chính sách 
của Đảng, Nhà nước và tiếp tục đổi mới và phát triển nông nghiệp và nông thôn [Vietnam’s Agrarian 
Policies], Hà Nội: NXB Nông Nghiệp; Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 184.
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Conclusion
As in the north, in both QN-ĐN and An Giang provinces, everyday 
peasant politics during 1977–81 significantly affected the performance 
of collective farming.125 It is true that collective organisations in both 
provinces became sites of struggle between peasants, collectives and 
the state over production, distribution and the balancing of different 
interests. Like their counterparts in northern collectives, peasants in 
QN-ĐN tried to maximise the number of work-points they earned 
rather than production. Meanwhile, peasants in An Giang tended 
to evade collective farming and focused more on jobs outside the 
collective to make a living. Local cadres in both provinces also 
committed various wrongdoings and often took advantage of their 
power to benefit themselves rather than collectives and the state. 
While QN-ĐN cadres seemed to strictly control peasants’ economic 
activities and did not allow them to conduct businesses outside the 
collective, their counterparts in An Giang seemed to be slack in their 
management and allowed peasants to ‘put one foot inside and the other 
foot outside’ the collective. The latter were, however, engaged in higher 
levels of embezzlement and other negative practices. For example, they 
frequently organised drinking sessions (nhậu nhẹt), stole collective 
inputs and resources and wasted time. Despite authorities in both 
provinces putting great effort into correcting peasants’ and cadres’ 
‘negative practices’, those behaviours increased over time. As a result, 
collective farming performed poorly in both QN-ĐN and An Giang 
and food production fell short of local and VCP leaders’ expectations. 
At the national level, too, despite several campaigns by the VCP to 
improve collective organisations across the country, performance fell 
short of expectations. Faced with a crisis in staple food production and 
stagnation in the agricultural sector, national leaders finally abandoned 
the work-points system in early 1981 and approved previously ‘illegal’ 
local farming arrangements, called the product contract system. 
The VCP leadership believed that, by using the economic incentive of 
producing beyond quotas, the new system would motivate peasants to 
work enthusiastically and efficiently and increase productivity, thereby 
strengthening and perfecting collective farming. 
125  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 28.
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However, the product contracts merely marked a new phase in 
Vietnam’s  agriculture in which collective farming again gradually 





Adopting the product contract 
system and the continuation of 
land reform and collectivisation, 
1981–88
Introduction
Starting in 1981, product contracts—officially called ‘The Product 
Contract to Groups of Workers and Individual Workers’ (Khoán 
sản phẩm đến nhóm và người lao động)—became the backbone of 
collective organisations in Vietnam.1 According to Đặng Phong, the 
product contract directive was issued by the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) (Ban Bí Thư) 
rather than the Politburo (Bộ Chính Trị) because there were still some 
differences about this issue among members of the Politburo. The VCP 
Secretariat believed the product contract system was not a departure 
from collective farming, but rather an improvement to it. Under 
the VCP’s Directive No. 100 (issued on 13 January 1981), collective 
organisations were asked to continue perfecting the existing system 
by more strictly applying the rules for reward and punishment at the 
brigade level.2 
1  BCHTU, Directive on improving the contracting of products. 
2  Đặng Phong, The Economics of Vietnam, p. 224.
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At the same time, VCP leaders acknowledged the failure of socialist 
transformation in the previous five years. Persistent in their task 
of building socialism in the south, party leaders emphasised the 
continuation of the push for socialist large-scale production and 
considered collectivisation and agricultural development top priorities 
for the next socioeconomic five-year plan, 1981–85.3 The fifth party 
congress in 1982 also officially changed the target for completing 
collectivisation in the Southern Region (which includes the Mekong 
Delta and the South-East Region) from the end of the 1976–80 five-
year plan to the end of the 1981–85 five-year plan.
From 1981, the Southern Region had intensified both collectivisation 
and land redistribution, which encountered weaker resistance 
from peasants under the product contract system. However, policy 
implementation fluctuated periodically and largely depended on the 
VCP’s campaigns and directives. With continuous pressure from the 
VCP, local authorities in the Southern Region were able to complete 
basic collectivisation by the mid-1980s, although many collectives fell 
short of expectations. By February 1985, An Giang province was halfway 
towards completing collectivisation. To achieve full collectivisation in 
time to coincide with the tenth anniversary of Vietnam’s reunification, 
provincial leaders pushed even harder and, by the end of May 1985, 
80  per cent of agricultural land had been collectivised—a minimum 
index for basic collectivisation.4
This chapter will discuss how local authorities in QN-ĐN and An Giang 
adopted and extended the product contract system and how peasants 
and local cadres responded to it. It also examines how and why VCP 
leaders persistently pressed authorities in the Southern Region to 
achieve socialist agricultural transformation and how those local 
authorities, especially in An Giang, coped with obstacles to their efforts 
to complete the VCP’s collectivisation goals. 
3  Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, p. 126. 
4  Đưa phong trào hợp tác hóa của tỉnh nhà lên vững chắc [Advancing collectivisation firmly], 
An Giang, 7 June 1985, p. 1.
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Adopting product contracts
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (QN-ĐN), in the 
Central Coast region
Soon after Directive No. 100 was issued, QN-ĐN leaders held meetings 
to discuss product contracts and prepare their own directive to guide 
local authorities. The directive urged each district in QN-ĐN to 
select one collective in which to experiment with product contracts 
on paddy fields. To avoid any deviation, it warned that the product 
contract policy was not intended to redistribute collective land to be 
farmed individually nor to make a ‘blank or full contract’ (khoán trắng) 
allowing peasants to undertake all phases of farming. The directive also 
outlined five principles with which local authorities had to conform in 
implementing the policy. First, each collective was required to manage 
and control the collectivised means of production (land, farm tools, 
draught animals, fertilisers, and so on); no collective was allowed to 
return the collectivised means of production to members. Second, 
the collective was required to manage and monitor labour. Third, the 
collective had to make a production plan based on the district plan. 
Fourth, the collective had to control the end product and distribute it in 
an equitable and appropriate way. Finally, the collective had to facilitate 
members’ collective mastery of management and production.5 
According to a Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper account, by 
May  1981, 15 collectives had experimented with product contracts. 
The performance of these collectives reportedly improved significantly. 
Collective members’ responsibility for tending paddy fields had been 
enhanced in an ‘unprecedented way’, and ‘everyone was daily and nightly 
concerned about how to exceed the quota’.6 The report said peasants 
usually worked on their contracted rice fields—even on 30 (lunar) 
December, an important day of the Tết holiday (Vietnam’s New Year 
festival) and one day before the New Year. Collectives had cultivated 
their fields fully and on time, prepared the land properly, transplanted 
5  Bàn về công tác khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động trong sản xuất nông nghiệp 
[Discussing the assignment of final products to labourers in agricultural production], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 18 March 1981, p. 1.
6  Qua các hợp tác xã làm thử việc khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động [An evaluation 
of the performance of collectives adopting the product contract], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 May 
1981, p. 1.
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paddy according to the right techniques, weeded assiduously and so 
on. The paper reported that members had improved agricultural 
intensification on contracted fields and had used manure of a higher 
quality than previously. Many bought extra chemical fertilisers to 
supplement their contracted paddy fields, and staple food production, 
labour productivity and yield had increased substantially.7 
Excited with the good performance of collectives in adopting product 
contracts, in early July 1981, QN-ĐN chairman Phạm Đức Nam called 
for an intensification of the contract system. He said the product contract 
was correct policy that met collective members’ aspirations and needs 
and helped enhance further collectives’ economic performance. As well 
as contributing to a 40 per cent increase in paddy productivity, he 
argued, the product contract system had helped strengthen collective 
organisations, especially those that had been close to collapsing. 
In addition, product contracts helped improve collective management 
and the fight against negativism—rather than reviving peasants’ 
consciousness of individual farming, as some critics had worried.8 
On the back of these good results, in August 1981, QN-ĐN leaders 
called for an expansion of the use of contracts to secondary crops. 
They  urged collectives to take back secondary-crop land, which had 
been temporarily lent to peasants.9 
By the end of July 1981, 165 of the 241 collectives in QN-ĐN had 
adopted the product contract system; in Đại Lộc and Hòa Vang districts, 
all collectives implemented the policy. By the end of the winter–spring 
of 1981–82, all collectives in QN-ĐN had completed the adoption 
of product contracts.10 
7  Ibid., p. 1.
8  Phạm Đức Nam: Tích cực thực hiện khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động trong 
nông nghiệp [Phạm Đức Nam: Be positive in implementing the product contract], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 1 July 1981, p. 1. 
9  Khoán sản phẩm trên đất màu để làm vụ Đông–Xuân tốt nhất [Making contracts on 
secondary-crop land for the best winter–spring crop], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 August 1981, p. 1. 
10  Tổng kết 3 năm thực hiện khoán sản phẩm đến người lao động trong nông nghiệp (1981–
1984) [Summary of three years of implementing the product contract (1981–1984)], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 6 July 1985, p. 1.
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In Thăng Bình district, the implementation of product contracts was 
also rapid. By October 1981, all collectives in the district had adopted 
the system.11 Villagers in Hiền Lộc recalled that Bình Lãnh collective 
adopted product contracts in 1981. Under these contracts, peasants 
were in charge of three phrases (ba khâu) of production—ploughing 
and harrowing, planting and tending, and harvesting—which differed 
somewhat from the national policy. The collective teams supplied 
seedlings, applied fertilisers, irrigated the fields, controlled and 
prevented diseases and monitored distribution after the harvest.12 
The implementation of product contracts in many other provinces 
of  the  Central Coast and Central Highlands was also swift. In the 
winter–spring of 1980–81, 341 of 1,101 collectives in the Central Coast 
and 105 of 285 collectives in the Central Highlands began to experiment 
with the system.13 Moreover, by July 1981, 53.8 per cent of collectives 
in these regions had adopted product contracts. At a conference on 
collectives in the Central Coast and Central Highlands in July 1981, party 
researchers claimed the product contract policy met the aspirations of 
people and local cadres and had significantly contributed to increased 
productivity in the collectives. Local ‘negative practices’ had also been 
significantly reduced. At the conference, Nguyễn Ngọc Trìu, a central 
government agriculture minister, also asserted that product contracts 
played an important role in strengthening collectives and facilitating 
agricultural production. He called for the completion of the adoption 
of product contracts in these two regions by the winter–spring of 1981–
82.14 Within one year, almost all collectives in the Central Coast had 
implemented product contracts. 
Product contracts immediately enhanced the performance of 
collective  farming and boosted agricultural output in QN-ĐN.15 
To illustrate these improvements, the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper 
11  Các hợp tác xã ở Tam Kỳ, Thăng Bình, Tiên Phước căn bản hoàn thành khoán sản phẩm vụ 
Đông–Xuân [Collectives in Tam Kỳ, Thăng Bình and Tiên Phước have completed the adoption 
of the product contract in the winter–spring crop], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 October 1981, p. 1.
12  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
13  Ban Quản Lý Hợp Tác Xã Nông Nghiệp Trung Ương [hereinafter Ban Quản Lý HTX NN TU] 
(1982), Khoán sản phẩm trong hợp tác xã và tập đoàn sản xuất nông nghiệp [The Product Contract 
in Collectives and Production Units], Hà Nội: NXB Sự Thật, p. 65. 
14  Hội nghị khoán sản phẩm trong hợp tác xã nông nghiệp ven biển Trung Trung Bộ và các tỉnh 
Tây Nguyên [A conference on the product contract in the Central Coast and Central Highlands 
collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 8 July 1981, p. 1. 
15  Phạm Đức Nam: Phát huy thắng lợi bước đầu mở rộng khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng ở tất cả 
hợp tác xã nông nghiệp cả tỉnh [Phạm Đức Nam: Extending the product contract to the rest of the 
collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 September 1981, p. 11.
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in 1981 printed several articles praising the positive effects of product 
contracts. Among these was a letter from a peasant that criticised old 
farming arrangements and praised the new product contract system in 
his village. He wrote that, previously, under the work-points system, 
villagers merely pretended to work. When ploughing, people did one 
line and skipped another. When carrying manure to the fields, they 
dropped a lot along the road. They did not take care of collective 
production but concentrated on accumulating as many work-points 
as possible. But now, under the product contract system, everyone 
took care of their contracted fields. They ploughed their land properly. 
They transplanted and spread fertilisers and manure according to the 
right techniques, and many had increased their use of fertilisers and 
manure—all of which showed that villagers wanted to produce beyond 
their quota.16 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng also reported several typical cases of collectives 
whose performance was significantly improved thanks to the adoption 
of product contracts, one of which was Tam Ngọc collective in Tam 
Kỳ district. Its performance during the work-points system had been 
very poor; in the spring–summer of 1980, the average productivity of 
paddy was 1.1 tonnes per hectare, meaning the collective was unable 
to fulfil its food obligation to the state, owing 8 tonnes of paddy. In the 
spring–summer of 1981, collective leaders adopted product contracts 
and set a quota of 1.2 tonnes per hectare. Thanks to the contracts, 
paddy productivity increased to 2 tonnes per hectare, exceeding the 
quota by 0.8 tonnes per hectare. As a result, the collective members’ 
income increased, and the collective was able to repay its previous 
debt and also fulfil its state obligation of 42 tonnes of paddy. The main 
reason for the increase in paddy productivity, the article argued, was 
the product contract system, which encouraged members to care for 
their contracted fields more than ever before.17 
In general, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng accounts showed that, under the 
product contract system, the performance of collective farming in 
the province had significantly improved. In 1981, for the first time 
since reunification, the province had produced nearly 500,000 tonnes 
16  Thư xã viên: Cách khóan mới ở quê tôi [Member’s letter: New method of contracts in my 
village], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 July 1981, p. 3.
17  Một vài cách vận dụng khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng về cây lúa ở hợp tác xã Tam Ngọc 
[Application of the product contract for rice fields in Tam Ngọc collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 12 September 1981, p. 2.
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of staple food, which was close to the province’s own consumption.18 
Staple food production in 1982 reached 525,000 tonnes of paddy 
equivalent, while staple food per capita increased from 303 kilograms 
in 1979 to 342 kilograms in 1982.19 Kerkvliet’s study of the northern 
collectives showed similar improvements; thanks to product contracts, 
staple food production in the north in 1981 and 1982 averaged 
a 24 per cent increase over 1980.20 
Table 6.1 Rice production in QN-ĐN, 1979–82
Year Area (hectares) Yield (tonnes) Annual growth 
of yield (%)
1979 124,739 319,917
1980 123,329 310,742 –2 .87
1981 122,734 332,211 6 .91
1982 123,575 347,572 4 .62
Source: Diễn biến sản lượng lúa cả tỉnh qua các năm [Paddy production over the past 
years], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 September 1983, p . 1 .
A few seasons after adopting product contracts, however, collective 
farming in QN-ĐN started to falter. Although the province’s leaders 
made great efforts to strengthen them, collectives became weaker. Staple 
food production in QN-ĐN stagnated, especially during 1985–88, and 
the living conditions of collective members deteriorated. Villagers in 
Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc recalled that the product contracts improved 
the performance of collective farming in the first few seasons, but 
their living conditions then deteriorated because they were unable to 
produce beyond the quota—a serious problem that is discussed in the 
next chapter.21 
18  Mặt trận sản xuất nông nghiệp: Thành tựu của năm 1981 và nhiệm vụ vụ Đông–Xuân 
1981–1982 [Agricultural production: The achievements of 1981 and the ongoing tasks for winter–
spring 1981–1982], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 October 1981, p. 1; Tổng kết sản xuất nông nghiệp 
năm 1981 và phát động thi đua giành vụ Đông–Xuân 1981–1982 thắng lợi toàn diện, vượt bậc 
[Summing up agricultural production in 1981 and calling for high achievements in the winter–
spring of 1981–1982], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 November 1981, p. 1. 
19  Diễn biến sản lượng lúa cả tỉnh qua các năm [Paddy production over the past years], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 September 1983, p. 1. 
20  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 194. 
21  Author’s interviews, October 2004; October–December 2005, Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên. 
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An Giang, in the Mekong Delta
Adopting the product contract system
The Southern Region began to experiment with product contracts in 
the summer–autumn of 1981—a season later than their counterparts in 
the Central Coast.22 In mid-1981, An Giang’s leaders called for trials of 
product contracts in the two production units in Bình Phú commune 
in Châu Thành district.23 However, by the winter–spring of 1981–82, 
180 of 394 production units and five of six collectives in the province 
had adopted the contracts.24 
Like their counterparts in QN-ĐN, production units in An Giang found 
the adoption of product contracts improved their collective farming 
performance. Members of production units and collectives were 
‘enthusiastic’ about the new contract system because of their increased 
income.25 Some members who had previously doubted collective farming 
now had confidence in it and ‘actively worked the contracted fields’. Many 
members ‘spontaneously dug channels to ensure sufficient water for their 
paddy fields and overcame the fertiliser shortage by using manure or 
extra compost bought from the free market’.26 Some collective members 
who had been fed up with the work-points system and had dropped out 
now returned to receive contracted fields. As one man in production unit 
no. 3 in Tây Khánh B hamlet (Long Xuyên) commented: 
I had previously neglected collective farming and left because I saw 
people mistrusting each other on every task [nạnh hẹ nhau]. I, a primary 
labourer, tried to work hard while other households sent their young 
children to work for form’s sake. Now, under product contracts, I will 
not neglect farming any more.27 
22  Ban Quản Lý HTX NN TU, The Product Contract in Collectives and Production Units, p. 65. 
23  Collectivisation in An Giang has progressed, An Giang, 18 November 1981, p. 1; Xã luận: 
Ra sức phấn đấu đưa phong trào cải tạo xã hội chủ nghĩa đối với nông nghiệp ở tỉnh ta tiến lên 
một bước mới [The editorial: Do the best to take collectivisation in An Giang one step forwards], 
An Giang, 18 November 1981, p. 11.
24  Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh Ủy An Giang: Thắng lợi của việc khoán sản phẩm trong nông nghiệp 
ở tỉnh nhà [An Giang Provincial Committee of Agriculture: The victory of the product contract in 
the province], An Giang, 4 July 1982, p. 3; Kết quả tốt đẹp của khoán sản phẩm trong nông nghiệp 
[The product contract brings about good results], An Giang, 23 May 1982, p. 1. 
25  Phấn khởi với cách khoán mới [Enthusiasm with the product contract], An Giang, 14 March 
1982, p. 2.
26  Vụ lúa khoán đầu tiên ở thị xã Long Xuyên [The first contracted rice crop in Long Xuyên 
town], An Giang, 14 March 1982, p. 1.
27  Cited in The results of contracted rice crops, An Giang, 19 April 1982, p. 3. 
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According to An Giang newspaper accounts, product contracts achieved 
the following results: first, food production increased, mainly because 
the new contracts made peasants ‘enthusiastic and eager to work’ 
(tự giác lao động). Paddy productivity in collective farming increased, 
from 2–3 tonnes per hectare in the winter–spring of 1980–81 to 4–4.5 
tonnes per hectare in the winter–spring of 1981–82. For example, in 
Chợ Mới district, paddy productivity increased from 2.5–3 tonnes per 
hectare to 6–8 tonnes in the winter–spring of 1981–82. 
Second, the living conditions and income of collective members 
increased accordingly. The amount of paddy that each hectare of rice 
produced beyond the quota ranged from 300 kilograms to 1.5 tonnes. 
In Chợ Mới district, the amount exceeding the quota per hectare 
increased from 1 tonne to 2 tonnes, and the value of work-points 
increased from 1.2–5 kilograms of paddy to 10 kilograms of paddy in 
the winter–spring of 1981–82.
Finally, product contracts helped improve and strengthen collective 
farming in production units and collectives. Land, inputs and labour 
were better used and incidents of land being abandoned, laziness, 
foot-dragging, dropping out and embezzlement had been significantly 
reduced. Many production units and collectives had fulfilled two-
way exchange contracts (hợp đồng hai chiều) with the state, paying 
irrigation fees and old debts, while food procurement (mobilisation) 
and sales (huy động lương thực) to the state increased to the amount of 
1.2–2 tonnes per hectare.28 
Satisfied with these achievements, provincial leaders urged the 
expansion of the product contract system. By the winter–spring 
of 1982–83, 896 production units (86 per cent of the total) and six 
collectives (100 per cent) in An Giang had adopted product contracts.29 
In Chợ Mới district, the adoption of product contracts was also rapid. 
28  Khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động, một hình thức thích hợp mang lại nhiều 
kết quả to lớn [The product contract is suitable and brings about good results], An Giang, 30 May 
1982, p. 1; The product contract brings about good results, An Giang, 23 May 1982, p. 1; An Giang 
Provincial Committee of Agriculture, An Giang, 4 July 1982, p. 3.
29  Các tập đoàn sản xuất, hợp tác xã tiến vào vụ Đông–Xuân 1982–1983 với nhiều khí thế 
mới [Production units and collectives entered into the winter–spring of 1982–1983 with new 
enthusiasm], An Giang, 2 January 1983, p. 1.
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By the winter–spring of 1981–82, 39 of 40 production units were using 
the system. The four production units in Long Điền B took up product 
contracts in the winter–spring of 1981–82.30 
Villagers there recalled that, in order to take up these contracts, 
collectivised land in the four production units had to be randomly 
(bóc  thăm) divided among each household’s primary worker. Each 
primary worker received 1 công (1,000 sq m) of contracted land and 
a subsidiary worker received 0.5 công (500 sq m).31 In May 1982, 
An Giang newspaper reported that, in the winter–spring of 1981–82, the 
production units in Long Điền B in Chợ Mới district had all produced 
a bumper harvest; the average productivity of paddy was 6 tonnes per 
hectare. Explaining the increased performance, the article quoted one 
peasant, who said: 
Frankly speaking, under product contracts, every member took care of 
the paddy fields, so every member had a bumper harvest. I had never 
seen abundant harvests like these since the beginning of production 
units!32 
A former cadre of production unit no. 1 said product contracts had 
saved some units from collapse and facilitated collectivisation in the 
Southern Region. The main reason was peasants’ resistance to collective 
farming under product contracts was weaker than it had been under 
the work-points system.33 However, like their counterparts in QN-ĐN, 
in An Giang, a few seasons later, collective farming began to flounder 
and became a site of struggle between the state, cadres and peasants 
over land, labour and other resources. 
The second wave of collectivisation under product contracts 
At the fifth party congress in March 1982, VCP leaders acknowledged 
the failure of socialist transformation in the previous five years and 
outlined a new socioeconomic five-year plan for 1981–85.34 After 
this, the Southern Region intensified both collectivisation and land 
redistribution.35
30  Huyện Chợ Mới áp dụng khoán sản phẩm có kết quả [The product contract in Chợ Mới 
brings about good results], An Giang, 9 May 1982, p. 3.
31  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B.
32  Kết quả khoán ở Long Điền B [The results of the product contract in Long Điền B], An Giang, 
2 May 1982, p. 3.
33  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B.
34  Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, p. 126. 
35  Lâm Quang Huyên, The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, p. 193. 
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Like many provinces in the Southern Region, in An Giang, from 
1982 to 1985, collectivisation was more extensive and more rapid 
than in previous periods. For example, from 1979 to 1981, Phú Tân 
district established only 30 production units. However, using product 
contracts, the district established 40 units during the first six months 
of 1982. The main reason for this acceleration was that peasants did 
not resist as strongly as before. In some areas, some peasants even 
mobilised one another to form production units.36 A former cadre of 
An Giang’s Committee for Agricultural Transformation asserted that 
product contracts made it easier to mobilise peasants into collective 
organisations because they were allowed to farm on their own land.37 
An Giang newspaper accounts show that, from the issuance of product 
contracts, collectivisation in the province moved more quickly than 
before. At the end of 1981, An Giang had only 384 production units 
and six collectives, accounting for less than 10 per cent of peasant 
households and agricultural land. A year later, however, An Giang had 
1,044 production units and six collectives, accounting for 34 per cent of 
peasant households and 19.2 per cent of agricultural land. The province 
had established 660 production units in 1982—double the number 
of units set up between 1978 and 1981.38 
Collectivisation in An Giang and many other provinces in the Southern 
Region began to slow during the period 1982–83. During the first 
10 months of 1983, An Giang established only 164 production units.39 
The reasons for this were unclear. It seems a shortage of cadres was 
one important factor. In addition, from 1982 to 1983, authorities 
put greater effort into strengthening the newly established collective 
organisations and training cadres than into expanding the number of 
new production units.40 Explaining the slowing of collectivisation in 
36  Phú Tân tiến nhanh trong phong trào hợp tác xã hóa nong nghiệp [Collectivisation in Phú 
Tân advances fast], An Giang, 8 August 1982, p. 2. 
37  Author’s interview, 6 June 2005, Long Xuyên. 
38  Ban Tuyên Huấn tỉnh Ủy An Giang: Thành tích cải tạo nông nghiệp của tỉnh An Giang 
[An Giang Provincial Committee of Propaganda: The achievements of agricultural transformation 
in An Giang], An Giang, 2 January 1983, p. 1. 
39  Đẩy mạnh cải tạo quan hệ sản xuất nông nghiệp [Speeding up agricultural transformation], 
An Giang, 25 September 1983, p. 2.
40  An Giang reports in 1983 often called for the strengthening of production units and collectives. 
See, for example: Toàn tỉnh đẩy mạnh củng cố và phát triển tập đoàn [The province intensifies the 
solidification and extension of production units], An Giang, 12 June 1983, p. 1; Các địa phương tập 
trung công tác củng cố, nâng chất và phát triển tập đoàn sản xuất [Local authorities must focus on 
solidifying, improving and extending production units], An Giang, 7 August 1983, p. 2.
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the province in 1983, a former Chợ Mới district official argued that, 
after seeing collective farming’s unpleasant outcomes, the provincial 
party leaders wanted to halt its progress. Moreover, in the early 1980s, 
many northern cadres who came to provide support for agricultural 
transformation returned home on expiry of their official duty or after 
conflict with local cadres.41 
Unhappy with the slow progress of collectivisation and land 
redistribution in the Southern Region, the central party secretariat 
issued Directive No. 19/CT-TW on 3 May 1983, urging the Southern 
Region to accelerate the socialist transformation of agriculture and 
setting 1983 as the target for completion of land redistribution and 
1985 for collectivisation.42 However, neither land redistribution nor 
collectivisation accelerated.
In September 1983, An Giang newspaper reported that collectivisation 
in the province had been extended ‘slowly and not widely in all 
districts. There were still 28 communes where no production unit 
had been established.’ Provincial leaders therefore again called for an 
intensification of agricultural transformation and urged the completion 
of collectivisation by 1985 as a national target.43 In October 1983, the 
provincial party committee released an urgent action plan (chương 
trình hành động), pushing each district to determine the main causes of 
slow collectivisation and to set about reversing them. Provincial leaders 
also insisted that some key districts, such as Long Xuyên, Chợ Mới and 
Châu Đốc, achieve complete collectivisation by 1984.44 
According to one study, from 1984 to 1985, collectivisation in 
An  Giang was ‘extended hurriedly’.45 The share of collectivised land 
in total agricultural land jumped from 20.6 per cent in October 1983 to 
30 per cent in June 1984 and to 47.6 per cent in February 1985.
41  Author’s interview, 18 June 2005, Chợ Mới. 
42  ĐCSVN (2005), Chỉ thị của Ban Bí Thư số 19/CT-TW (ngày 3 tháng 5 năm 1983) [Directive 
of the Secretariat No. 19/CT-TW (3 May 1983)], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 44, 
1983 [Party Document: Volume 44, 1983], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 190. 
43  Speeding up agricultural transformation, An Giang, 25 September 1983, p. 2. 
44  Hội nghị tỉnh ủy đề ra chương trình hành động từ nay đến năm 1984 [Provincial party 
committee meeting to make a plan of action from now to 1984], An Giang, 23 October 1983, p. 1.
45  Tô Thành Tâm (1990), Vấn đề ruộng đât và hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp ở An Giang [Land and 
collectivisation issues in An Giang], Thông Tin Lý Luận, 8 August, p. 8.
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Table 6.2 Extending collectivisation in An Giang, 1982–85


















384 0 6 7.00 n .a . 
december 
1982 
1,044 2 6 19 .16 34.00 
october 
1983 
1,216 57 6 20.61 42.08 
june 1984 1,633 106 7 29.70 56.80 
February 
1985 
1,957 116 7 47.60 n .a . 
May 1985 2,326 121 7 80.00 77 .13 
November 
1985 
2,607 132 7 93.00 86.00 
n .a . = not available
Sources: Ban Tuyên Huấn tỉnh Ủy An Giang: Thành tích cải tạo nông nghiệp của tỉnh An 
giang [An giang Provincial Committee of Propaganda: The achievements of agricultural 
transformation in An giang], An Giang, 2 January 1983, p. 1; Toàn tỉnh hiện có 1216 tập 
đoàn sản xuất, 57 liên tập đoàn, 70 tập đoàn máy nông nghiệp [An Giang now has 1,216 
production units, 57 interproduction units and 70 machinery units], An Giang, 23 october 
1983, p. 2; Khắp nơi trong tỉnh [News around the province], An Giang, 12 july 1984, p . 4; 
Toàn tỉnh thành lập được 1957 tập đoàn sản xuất, tập thể hóa 106,798 ha [An Giang has 
1,957 production units, collectivising 106,798 hectares], An Giang, 28 February 1985, p . 1; 
Đưa phong trào hợp tác hóa của tỉnh nhà lên vững chắc [Advancing collectivisation firmly], 
An Giang, 7 June 1985, p. 1; An Giang hoàn thành cơ bản công tác cải tạo nông nghiệp 
[An giang has completed agricultural transformation], An Giang, 22 November 1985, p . 1 .
By February 1985, the province was halfway towards completing 
collectivisation. To achieve full collectivisation in time to coincide with 
the tenth anniversary of Vietnam’s reunification, provincial leaders 
pushed even harder towards completion. As a result, by the end of 
May 1985, collectivisation accounted for 80 per cent of agricultural 
land—a minimum index for basic collectivisation.46 Unsatisfied 
with this achievement, however, the provincial Communist Party 
committee issued Directive No. 17-CT on 23 July 1985, urging an even 
more rapid take-up of collectivisation. By November 1985, An Giang 
46  Advancing collectivisation firmly, An Giang, 7 June 1985, p. 1. 
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had established 2,607 production units, 132 interproduction units 
and seven collectives, accounting for 93 per cent of agricultural land 
and 86 per cent of peasant households.47 
Collectivisation in many other provinces in the Mekong Delta was 
also extensive during the period 1984–85. For example, by early 1984, 
Tiền Giang province had established 2,515 production units and 27 
collectives, which collectivised 85,953 hectares of land (77.7 per cent 
of the total agricultural land) and 143,158 peasant households (78.2 per 
cent of the total).48 By May 1985, Cửu Long province had established 
17 collectives and 4,721 production units, which accounted for 76 per 
cent of agricultural land and peasant households. At the same time, 
however, there were still many communes in which no production units, 
and even no production solidarity teams, had been established. Even so, 
by 20 October 1985, Cửu Long province announced the completion of 
collectivisation. The province had established 18 collectives and 5,337 
production units, accounting for 97 per cent of peasant households and 
94 per cent of its agricultural land.49 Similarly, by June 1985, Hậu Giang 
province had established 6,983 production units and 36 collectives, 
accounting for 86 per cent of agricultural land and 85 per cent of 
peasant households. By 30 September 1985, Hậu Giang announced 
the completion of collectivisation in most of the province, with the 
establishment of 7,420 production units, 219 interproduction units and 
36 collectives, accounting for 93 per cent of land and 94 per cent of 
peasant households.50 
By early 1984, the whole Southern Region had established 20,341 
production units and 296 collectives, which accounted for 38 per cent 
of agricultural land and 45 per cent of peasant households.51 By late 
1985, the Southern Region, including the Mekong Delta, had largely 
completed collectivisation. However, a former cadre of the Committee 
for Southern Agricultural Transformation recalled the hasty way in 
47  An Giang has completed agricultural transformation, An Giang, 22 November 1985, p. 1; 
Tô Thành Tâm, Land and collectivisation issues in An Giang, p. 18. 
48  Lâm Quang Huyên, The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, p. 197. 
49  Nguyễn Thành Nam (2000), Việc giải quyết vấn đề ruộng đất trong quá trình đi lên sản xuất 
lớn ở Đồng bằng Sông Cửu Long 1975–1993 [Resolving land issues in the process of large-scale 
production in the Mekong Delta, 1975–1993], PhD thesis, Đại Học Khoa Học Xã Hội & Nhân 
Văn, Hồ Chí Minh, p. 78. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Lâm Quang Huyên, The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, p. 196. 
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which provinces in the region collectivised by ‘just signing the names’ 
(đánh trống ghi tên) in order to complete collectivisation by 1985. 
Therefore, the quality of collective organisations was poor.52 
A former production unit leader in Long Điền B recalled how, in 1983, 
authorities decided to build unit no. 10 in his hamlet. The authorities 
came to mark its boundaries (đóng khung) and then invited peasant 
households to join. Local cadres had to visit each household to persuade 
them to participate. The authorities declared those households who 
had land within the boundary had to join the unit or they would lose 
their land. About 70 per cent of the invited households decided to 
join.53 In September 1984, An Giang newspaper revealed that some 
local cadres had commanded peasants to ‘join the production units 
or lose their land’. The article said coercion was an effective tool for 
extending collectivisation, but it failed to make the collectives strong.54 
A former cadre from Long Điền B commune recalled authorities 
announcing the completion of collectivisation in late 1984, while many 
collective organisations had not even started operating. For example, 
28 production units and four interproduction units in Long Điền B had 
been formed, but their quality varied and was generally poor (không 
đúng tính chất). Likewise, many production units in Chợ Mới were not 
functioning well despite the district being hailed as the first to complete 
collectivisation.55 
Asked why they decided to join production units, many villagers in 
Long Điền B claimed it was so they could keep their land or to receive 
contracted land under the product contract system. Even some upper–
middle peasants joined production units.56 Asked why he decided 
to join a production unit with product contracts, an upper–middle 
peasant who had lost some of his land to redistribution in 1983 said: 
I was discontented with the policy but could not avoid joining the 
production unit. Because bureaucratic and subsidised policies were 
imposed on us, we citizens had to obey the state.57 
52  Author’s interview, 6 July 2005, Hồ Chí Minh. Đánh trống ghi tên literally means ‘banging 
drums to get signatures’. 
53  Author’s interview, 15 August 2005, Long Điền B.
54  Chuyện to nhỏ: Khẩn trương nhưng vững chắc [Some issues: Hurry up and be firm in 
collectivisation], An Giang, 20 September 1984, p. 4.
55  Author’s interview, 20 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
56  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B. 
57  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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A middle peasant explained: 
We could not help joining the production unit because it managed 
agricultural materials such as fuel, diesel, fertilisers and pesticides. If we 
did not join, we could not buy these things and were disadvantaged 
[chịu nhiều thiệt thòi]. We could not even buy toothpaste [from the 
state].58 
In short, from 1982 to 1985, collectivisation in An Giang spread more 
widely and more rapidly than in earlier periods. This was partly because 
of the pressure from national leaders to complete collectivisation by 
1985. Local cadres in the province and the wider Mekong Delta exerted 
themselves to achieve this goal.59 They even used coercive measures 
like their Central Coast counterparts to force peasants to join the 
production units, regardless of the peasants’ aspirations or the quality 
of these organisations. Because of the product contracts and allowing 
peasants to farm on their own land, collectivisation did not face as 
much resistance as it had previously.
The second wave of land redistribution
Accompanying collectivisation was a continuous process of land 
redistribution in the Southern Region from 1981 to 1985. On 30 April 
1981, the VCP released Circular No. 14/TB-TW, which called for the 
resolute and rapid implementation of the policy of land redistribution 
in rural areas of the Southern Region. VCP leaders complained that 
the landless and land-poor still made up a large proportion of the rural 
population in the region despite land redistribution.60 An investigation 
into 80 rural areas in the region in May 1981 showed that 25 per cent 
of peasant households were landless or land-poor, occupying only 10 
per cent of available land. While rich peasants accounted for just 2.42 per 
cent of peasant households, they occupied 7.1 per cent of agricultural 
58  Author’s interview, 20 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
59  By examining a series of VCP policies from 1981 to 1985, such as Directive No. 93 (June 1980), 
two circulars (no. 14, April 1981; and no. 138, November 1981), Directive No. 19 (May 1983) and 
so on, one can see that the party put great emphasis on completing collectivisation in the Southern 
Region. 
60  ĐCSVN (2005), Thông báo 14/TB-TW, ngày 20 tháng 4 năm 1981: Kết luận của Ban bí thư 
tại Hội nghị bàn việc xúc tiến công tác cải tạo nông nghiệp ở các tỉnh Nam Bộ [Circular No. 14/
TB-TW, 20 April 1981: On facilitating agricultural transformation in the Southern Region], in 
ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập: Tập 42, 1981 [Party Document: Volume 42, 1981], Hà Nội: NXB 
Chính Trị Quốc Gia, pp. 198–9.
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land.61 It was therefore essential, party leaders argued, to continue with 
the land redistribution policy, the main contents of which had already 
been provided in the previous directive, No. 57/CT-TW (November 
1978).62 Party leaders released Circular No. 138/TT-TW (11 November 
1981) to guide the implementation of product contracts by strictly 
controlling land and redistributing it among households in order to 
make contracts with collective members.63 
According to a report by the Committee for Southern Agricultural 
Transformation, many provinces in the Southern Region now intensified 
their land redistribution efforts, which had been all but neglected 
in 1980 and early 1981. This was in response to circular numbers 14 
and 138 and Directive No. 100 (on product contracts). During 1982, 
13 provinces in the Southern Region redistributed 54,934.5 hectares of 
land. Together with the 247,963 hectares reallocated during 1975–81, 
this brought the total area redistributed in the Southern Region during 
1975–82 to 302,896 hectares.64 
On 3 May 1983, the VCP issued Directive No. 19/CT-TW, which stressed 
the completion of land redistribution by 1983 and the intensification 
of collectivisation in the region. It reasserted the point that socialist 
agricultural transformation was designed to eliminate class warfare 
and deal with ‘who triumphed over whom in the clash between 
capitalism and socialism’. Therefore, each province had to carry out 
land redistribution ‘positively and completely’ by appropriating land 
that was beyond the work capacity of each rural capitalist, landlord, 
rich peasant and upper–middle peasant household and sharing it with 
landless and land-poor households in the commune.65 Despite the 
similarity of this directive to no. 57 (in November 1978), the language 
here was urgent and emphatic. 
61  Nguyễn Thành Nam, Resolving land issues, p. 88; Đào Duy Huấn, Solidifying and perfecting 
socialist production relations, p. 36; Lâm Quang Huyên, The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, 
p. 181.
62  ĐCSVN, Circular No. 14/TB-TW, pp. 198–9. 
63  ĐCSVN (2005), Thông tri của Ban bí thư số 138/TT-TW ngày 11 tháng 11 năm 1981 
[Secretariat Circular No. 138/TT-TW of 11 November 1981], in ĐCSVN, Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn 
Tập: Tập 42, 1981 [Party Document: Volume 42, 1981], Hà Nội: NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia, p. 443.
64  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, pp. 12, 18.
65  ĐCSVN, Directive of the Secretariat No. 19/CT-TW, p. 192.
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According to the Committee for Southern Agricultural Transformation’s 
report, after the release of Directive No. 19, every province in the 
Southern Region stepped up implementation of land redistribution: 
[They] were resolute to complete land redistribution by 1983 to meet 
the target of the central leaders’ policy. In 1983 the Southern Region 
had readjusted 72,779.8 hectares of land … [which was] equal to the 
total amount of land redistribution from 1979–1981. So, by the end of 
1983 the whole region had readjusted about 375,677.24 hectares.66 
According to Đào Duy Huấn, from 1983 to 1985, the whole Southern 
Region had redistributed 186,286 hectares. By late 1985, it had largely 
completed the process. In total, in the period 1975–85, some 489,183 
hectares of land had been reallocated.67 
In assessing land redistribution, the Committee for Southern 
Agricultural Transformation’s 1984 report admitted some mistakes 
had been made despite great achievements in eliminating rural 
exploitation, strengthening the revolutionary authorities and boosting 
collectivisation. First, land redistribution had been uneven across 
different parts of the Southern Region. For example, some local 
authorities had carried out land redistribution completely, while others 
had not. In many mountainous and single-crop areas, local authorities 
had not implemented land redistribution at all. 
Second, many local authorities had implemented land redistribution 
hastily without distinguishing between different types of land recipients 
and land-givers. They often appropriated land and redistributed 
it equally (cào bằng) among each worker in the commune. Such 
distribution harmed ‘the interests of a large number of middle peasants 
and caused disunity among peasants and conflicts in rural areas, 
manifest in peasants’ complaints and petitions [thưa kiện]’: 
[Finally], due to the low level of socialist consciousness, some cadres 
and party members were not able to distinguish between labourers and 
exploiters. Some wanted to retain individual farming and exploitative 
economic activities. Some took advantage of their positions to capture 
public and readjusted land, good and fertile land, for themselves and to 
exploit peasants.68 
66  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, p.18. 
67  Đào Duy Huấn, Solidifying and perfecting socialist production relations, p. 37. 
68  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, pp. 22–3. 
173
6 . AdoPTINg THE PRoduCT CoNTRACT SySTEM
The amount of land redistributed in the Southern Region in 1975–85 
was less than the 564,547 hectares the Việt Minh had reallocated there 
between 1945 and 1954.69 It was much more than the 245,851 hectares 
Ngô Đình Diệm’s government redistributed during the period 1955–
63, but less than half of the approximately 1 million hectares the land 
reforms of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s government brought to tenants during 
1968–74.70 
These previous land reforms boosted commercial agricultural 
production, whereas the 1975–85 redistribution weakened it, by 
reducing the productive capacity of households classified as middle, 
upper–middle and rich peasants. In the late 1980s, when facing severe 
food shortages, production stagnation and emerging conflicts over land 
in the Southern Region, the VCP recognised there were shortcomings in 
existing land policies, especially Directive No. 19 (3 May 1983), which 
equalised (cào bằng) the distribution of landholdings among rural 
households without taking into account the capacity and occupation 
of each household. ‘Therefore, commercial agriculture in the Southern 
Region had been set back one step.’71 In addition, the land redistributed 
in 1975–85 was then farmed collectively—a method that was usually 
less productive than individual household farming. 
The following section discusses in more detail how the second phase 
of land redistribution took place in An Giang province. 
In An Giang
On 5 June 1982, An Giang’s leaders released Directive No. 44, calling for 
the acceleration of land redistribution, which had been largely neglected 
in 1981 and early 1982, and which they planned to complete by 1983.72 
As a result of this directive, according to newspaper accounts, many 
districts in the province intensified land redistribution. For example, 
by June 1982, Châu Thành and Châu Phú districts had redistributed 
69  Lâm Quang Huyên, The Land Revolution in South Vietnam, p. 25. 
70  The figures for the governments of Ngô Đình Diệm and Nguyễn Văn Thiệu include a small 
but unknown amount of redistributed land in the Central Coast (Prosterman and Riedinger, Land 
Reform and Democratic Development, p. 139). 
71  Ban Tuyên Huấn Trung Ương (1988), Đảng trả lời nông dân một số vấn đề cấp bách về ruộng 
đất [The Party’s Response to Urgent Land Problems], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB Tuyên Huấn, pp. 6–7. 
72  Land redistribution in rural areas, An Giang, 6 September 1982, p. 4.
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2,557 hectares of land. Of these, only 500 hectares were granted to land-
poor and landless households; the remainder was used by the state and 
district farms or was ‘borrowed’ by local cadres to produce food.73 
From reunification until September 1982, An Giang had reallocated 
39,157 hectares of land to 51,818 land-poor and landless households. 
Nevertheless, a large number of land-poor and landless households 
remained. In areas where land growing one rice crop per year had not 
been converted to double cropping, the percentage of land-poor and 
landless households was particularly high—about 21.6 per cent.74 
In response to Directive No. 19 from the central government, authorities 
in An Giang again agitated for speedy land redistribution. In October 
1983, realising that 18 per cent of households were still land-poor or 
landless, the provincial party committee repeated its call to meet the 
deadline set for the end of 1983.75 
Despite many districts implementing land redistribution, the results 
fell short of expectations and, by late 1983, the province had not yet 
completed the task. On 12 December 1983, An Giang’s provincial 
standing party committee released Resolution No. 05, calling for the 
equitable redistribution of land among members in each commune 
(điều chỉnh theo định xuất đất toàn xã). That policy seemed to be at odds 
with the VCP’s policy, which referred only to reallocating appropriated 
land equally among poor peasants.76 
The reallocation of land equally among commune members was carried 
out not only in An Giang, but also in several Southern Region provinces, 
such as Tiền Giang, Cửu Long and Kiên Giang. Here, land redistribution 
was implemented at the same time as the establishment of production 
units; land within the boundaries of production units was distributed 
equally among members regardless of their work capacity. Authorities 
73  Trong tháng 6 phát triển 39 tập đoàn sản xuấ: Tỉnh hiện có 474 tập đoàn [In June, 39 
production units were established: The province now has 474 units], An Giang, 11 July 1982, p. 1.
74  Land redistribution in rural areas, An Giang, 6 September 1982, p. 4.
75  Văn Phòng Tỉnh Ủy An Giang: Tiếp tục điều chỉnh ruộng đất củng cố và phát triển tập 
đoàn sản xuất [An Giang Provincial Committee Office: Continuing land redistribution, and the 
solidification and extension of production units], An Giang, 9 October 1983, p. 1.
76  Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh Ủy: Tình hình điều chỉnh và qui hoạch ruộng đất ở xã Vĩnh Phú 
[Provincial Agriculture Board: Land redistribution in Vĩnh Phú commune], An Giang, 9 August 
1984, p. 3.
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allowed landed households to retain part of their land according to the 
number of people in their households, but appropriated the excess for 
reallocation to land-poor and landless families.77 
In 1984 authorities in An Giang executed land redistribution 
extensively, to the tune of about 10,000 hectares.78 From 1975 to 
July 1984, the province had appropriated 57,594.8 hectares and 
redistributed 56,778.9  hectares to 71,756 landless and land-short 
households.79 By 30 April 1985, the province had largely completed land 
redistribution, having redistributed 60,225 hectares to 75,558 landless 
and land-poor households since 1975. Therefore, redistribution in 
An Giang had affected about 27 per cent of the total agricultural land 
(224,357 hectares) and benefited 32 per cent of the province’s 233,612 
peasant households.80 According to provincial documents, in 1975, 
40 per cent of peasant households in An Giang were landless or land-
poor. Land reform from 1975 to 1985 therefore brought land to 81.05 
per cent of the targeted beneficiaries. 
However, it was later discovered that a large amount of redistributed 
land did not go to poor peasants but fell into the hands of local cadres. 
This angered peasants, and several sent petitions to authorities at all 
levels. For example, in July 1987, a local newspaper reported that 
authorities in Thạnh Mỹ Tây commune had implemented the land 
policy incorrectly and redistributed land irrationally (bất hợp lý): 
Most of the people in Thạnh Mỹ Tây were discontented with the 
results of land redistribution because they considered it [was] based on 
individual sentiment and injustice and because it favoured commune 
and district cadres’ families.81 
77  BCTNNMN, Report on Land Redistribution, p. 17.
78  Toàn tỉnh thành lập được 1957 tập đoàn sản xuất, tập thể hóa 106,798 ha [An Giang has 1,957 
production units, collectivising 106,798 hectares], An Giang, 28 February 1985, p. 1.
79  Khắp nơi trong tỉnh [News around the province], An Giang, 12 July 1984, p. 4; Xã luận: 
Đẩy mạnh cải tạo quan hệ sản xuất nông nghiệp [The editorial: Intensifying agricultural 
transformation], An Giang, 9 August 1984, p. 1.
80  Toàn tỉnh đã xây dựng được 2570 tập đoàn sản xuất, 7 hợp tác xã và 21 liên tập đoàn sản 
xuất [The province has established 2,570 production units, 7 collectives, and 21 interproduction 
units], An Giang, 2 August 1985; An Giang has completed agricultural transformation An Giang, 
22 November 1985, p. 1.
81  Còn thắc mắc về việc điều chỉnh ruộng đất ở xã Thạnh Mỹ Tây [Some concerns about land 
redistribution in Thạnh Mỹ Tây commune], An Giang, 31 July 1987, p. 6.
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People claimed that cadres rather than average people were the 
beneficiaries, and that cadres accumulated large amounts of land for 
themselves and then lent it to others. Meanwhile, many poor households 
received low-quality or inadequate amounts of land, while some did 
not receive any at all.82 
In retrospect, the An Giang newspaper concluded, in 1987: 
In past years, the implementation of land redistribution has not been 
correct. Some cadres, especially local cadres, took advantage of their 
power [lạm dụng chức vụ] and gave themselves, their relatives and 
families good land. Some local cadres did not directly cultivate but tried 
to accumulate land. Many state agencies at provincial and district levels 
also made use of their collective names to misappropriate land. On the 
other hand, due to the constraints of administrative mechanisms [such 
as prohibiting non-resident cultivators], a large amount of land was 
abandoned … This led to many peasant households not having land or 
enough land for their production.83 
Villagers in Long Điền B commune recalled two types of land 
redistribution between 1975 and mid-1986. The first was done 
according to the ‘sharing one’s clothes and rice’ policy, which took 
place from 1975 to 1981 (before the adoption of product contracts). 
The second was allocating an equal amount of land to each labourer in 
the commune (chia theo định suất), which began after the adoption of 
product contracts and continued until 1986.84 
Under the product contract system, land in four collective farming 
production units in Long Điền B was initially divided equally among 
collective members. In addition to four production units, commune 
authorities often combined the implementation of directive numbers 
100 and 19 with the establishment of new production units. For 
example, when establishing a production unit, land within its boundary 
was supposed to be distributed equally among its members. In practice, 
land-surplus households had the right to retain any part of their 
82  Ibid., p. 6.
83  Ý kiến: Không nên ngộ nhận giữa việc phân bố chia cấp đất đai cho hợp lý với việc trả lại 
ruộng đất cho chủ cũ [The opinion piece: Don’t mistake rational reallocation of land for returning 
land to previous landowners], An Giang, 29 May 1987, p. 1.
84  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B.
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land equal to the amount allocated to everyone else. The surplus was 
distributed to land-poor and landless households. One middle peasant 
recalled: 
I had 15 công of land. After readjusting according to land rations, I only 
had a few công left. My household had five workers, so I only retained 
5 công. We selected some of our land according to our land ration and 
surrendered the remaining land for others.85 
An elderly couple who retained only 1 công of land recalled: 
We had 12 công but almost all of our holdings were destroyed [phá tan 
hết]. At that time [about 1983–84], the state made all decisions without 
listening to us. Anyone was granted land; the poor and the rich had 
the same amount of land. A woman aged above 55 years old and a man 
above 60 each received only 0.5 công of land. The children received 
the same.86 
To please landowners, local cadres in Long Điền B often allowed land-
surplus households to redistribute some of their land to their relatives 
and acquaintances. A former cadre of interproduction unit no. 3 (liên tập 
đoàn 3) remembered that, by allowing landowners to redistribute their 
land to relatives, there was less resistance to the redistribution. He only 
readjusted whatever land remained beyond what each household had 
been able to disperse.87 A former leader of production unit no. 16 said 
he was able to complete land redistribution in his unit in just two days 
(in 1984). He organised a meeting and told landowners with substantial 
holdings to distribute their land to relatives but not to anyone else. They 
all agreed and the redistribution was rapid.88 Similarly, a former leader 
of production unit no. 13 said: 
At the time of production solidarity teams [1978–84], the amount of 
land owned still varied among households. But at the peak time 
of production units [1984 and 1985], land was divided equally among 
members according to land per capita in the commune. My method 
was to let the land-surplus households redistribute their land to their 
family members and relatives. They had the right to retain the best 
85  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B.
86  Ibid. 
87  Author’s interview, 20 June 2005, Long Điền B. 
88  Author’s interview, 11 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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land. Then the production unit readjusted the remaining surplus land. 
We conducted redistribution in this way in order to avoid hurting 
[people’s] feelings [tránh khỏi mất long].89 
In general, from 1982 to 1985, land redistribution in Long Điền B 
achieved better results and faced less resistance than during previous 
periods—for several reasons. First, many years after reunification, local 
authorities were strengthened significantly because the number of local 
cadres had increased and they had been better trained. Moreover, under 
strong pressure from higher-level authorities to complete agricultural 
transformation by 1985, local cadres resorted both to using harsh 
measures to coerce peasants and to modifying state policies to ease 
their resistance. For example, peasants in Long Điền B remembered 
that, when implementing land redistribution, authorities often sent 
to the fields armed cadres who were ready to arrest anyone who dared to 
openly resist the policy.90 A local newspaper in 1985 printed a peasant’s 
letter complaining that authorities in Long Kiến commune in Chợ Mới 
district had taken advantage of their power to redistribute peasants’ 
rice fields, which were under cultivation, and had handcuffed people 
who tried to prevent cadres from redistributing land.91 
Second, after several campaigns of socialist transformation in rural 
areas—including agricultural, trade and industrial transformation—
in the mid-1980s, the economic power of large landowners had been 
weakened significantly. In addition, the state forced the adoption of 
high-yielding rice, the production of which depended heavily on state 
inputs. Realising they were not able to farm all their land on their own, 
many land-surplus households gave some of their land to others.92 
Finally, despite some poor households refusing to receive others’ land, 
local authorities faced fewer problems redistributing the appropriated 
land thanks to a large number of land recipients. Land recipients were 
not only landless or land-poor peasant households, but also included 
non-farming people who had previously made their living as small 
89  Author’s interview, 20 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
90  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Điền B.
91  Trả lời bạn đọc: Về việc điều chỉnh ruộng đất ở xã Long Kiến [Reply to reader’s letter: On land 
redistribution in Long Kiến Commune], An Giang, 27 September 1985, p. 3.
92  Author’s interview, 7 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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merchants, in transport, as handicraft-makers and so on. Due to the 
socialist transformation of trade and industry, these people returned to 
their hamlets to receive land. One woman land recipient recalled:
At the time of land redistribution, many people wanted to receive land 
because they feared that, if they did not have land, they would be sent 
to the new economic zones. So, we accepted the land although we knew 
that a few công was not enough for us to make a living. We thought we 
could combine farming with working for wages [làm mướn].93 
Another woman in the same commune also asserted that some non-
farming households had accepted land because they feared being 
taken to the new economic zones.94 An official of Chợ Mới district’s 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development who was familiar 
with post-1975 land redistribution commented: 
An Giang was one of the provinces in the Mekong Delta which 
implemented forceful socialist agricultural transformation. Under the 
Directive No. 100, An Giang had peasantised all the rural population 
[nông dân hóa mma ngưưm]. Bike-taxi riders [xe thồ], pedicab riders 
[xe xích lô] and small merchants in Chợ Mới town were put into 
production units to receive land. So, landholdings became fragmented. 
This led to the poor performance of agriculture.95 
However, some peasants—especially those who had lost large amounts 
of land due to the prohibition on non-resident cultivators—refused to 
accept other people’s land. A well-off man in Long Điền B recalled that 
he had 60 công in Thoại Sơn district but lost it due to the state prohibiting 
non-resident cultivators. The production unit there asked him to accept 
a few công, but he refused, considering it inappropriate to take others’ 
land when the owners were unhappy and crying. He decided to work 
for wages instead.96 Similarly, a woman who had lost 130 công in the 
late 1970s due to the non-resident prohibition also refused to accept 
redistributed land. She said: 
93  Author’s interview, 3 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
94  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B.
95  Author’s interview, 23 June 2005, Chợ Mới.
96  Author’s interview, 7 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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I did not receive readjusted land because I was afraid of making the 
landowners unhappy. Like us, they had suffered a lot to accumulate 
land. It was not right to take others’ land. Rather, we worked for wages. 
Later I borrowed 10 công of my sister’s land to make a living.97 
Despite the theory that land redistribution in Long Điền B meant 
equal distribution among households, this was not how it occurred 
in practice. One peasant commented that local authorities did not 
appropriate surplus land from their relatives or from powerful cadres 
(người có chức có quyền), but they redistributed every bit of land of those 
who were powerless.98 Land recipients were forced to accept poor and 
unproductive land, while local cadres took good-quality, productive 
land for themselves and their relatives (a practice detailed in the next 
chapter).99 
In short, the second round of land reform in Long Điền B and An Giang 
fulfilled the targets of weakening large landowners and ‘peasantising’ 
rural people; however, due to misuse of their position, local-level cadres 
redistributed land in unexpected ways, meaning their relatives were the 
beneficiaries rather than landless and land-poor households. 
Conclusion
In the first few years after the adoption of the product contract system, 
the performance of collective farming improved significantly, not only 
in QN-ĐN in the Central Coast, but also in An Giang in the Mekong 
Delta. As a result, the contract system was welcomed by the members 
of collective organisations and adopted extensively in both provinces. 
In An Giang, the use of product contracts and allowing households 
to retain some of their land meant authorities were able to accelerate 
collectivisation and land redistribution. However, with strong pressure 
from central party leaders to complete collectivisation by 1985, 
authorities in An Giang and elsewhere extended collectivisation and 
land redistribution too hastily, while modifying the content of the 
national policy to speed up the process, especially during 1984–85. 
97  Author’s interview, 10 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
98  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
99  Author’s interview, 12 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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By  late 1985, those provinces had largely ‘completed’ collectivisation, 
but many collective organisations were unstable or existed only on 
paper. 
The completion of collectivisation, egalitarian land redistribution and 
other policies from 1981 to 1985 changed major features of An Giang’s 
agriculture, from commercial farming to subsistence-oriented 
farming, as they did in the Central Coast. They eventually destroyed 
the diverse rural economy of An Giang and many other areas of the 
Southern Region. From that time—especially from mid-1985 to the 
late 1980s—agricultural production in the Southern Region stagnated 
and then declined, peasants’ living standards dropped alarmingly and 
a new class of exploiters started to emerge—in contrast with the VCP’s 
original vision. In other words, from 1985 to the late 1980s, collective 
farming in both An Giang and QN-ĐN was in crisis, with similar 
serious problems and local politics in both places, which led not only 
local authorities, but also the VCP leadership to rethink the direction 





Local politics and the withering 
of collective farming, 1981–88
Introduction
When the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) released Directive No. 
100 to officially endorse the product contract system, it hoped the new 
farming arrangements would create an incentive for the members of 
collective organisations to produce beyond their contracted quota, 
which would increase productivity and yields. VCP leaders also 
expected the product contracts would reduce peasants’ resistance and 
local cadres’ negativism and strengthen collective organisations.
The product contracts did in fact immediately improve the performance 
of collectives and boosted agricultural production in both Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng (QN-ĐN) and An Giang for the first few years. After that, 
however, they lost their momentum and failed to sustain collectives’ 
performance and deal with local malpractices. The product contracts 
solved some of the peasants’ concerns, but not the inherent governance 
challenges of collective farming and the struggle and conflicts of interest 
between households, collectives and the state. 
In QN-ĐN, peasants and many collective leaders did not conform to the 
product contract guidelines and instead adopted ‘blank contracts’ and 
other improper variations (nhiều lệch lạc). The number of collectives 
adopting blank contracts increased, and the collectives’ debts to the 
state and households’ debts to the collective increased annually. Fed up 
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with their growing debt, some collective members decided to return all 
or part of their contracted land to the collectives so they could find off-
farm jobs. Despite provincial leaders putting great effort into solidifying 
collective organisations during the period 1981–88, collective farming 
increasingly weakened in terms of collective ownership, management 
and production and tended to collapse, leading to a return to individual 
farming.
In An Giang, the product contracts aided the completion of 
collectivisation and land redistribution, but could not improve or 
strengthen collective farming. Despite several campaigns by the 
provincial authorities to solidify and upgrade the quality of production 
units and collectives, many units remained weak and did not operate 
according to collective principles. The adoption of blank contracts 
became widespread, and production unit cadres allowed peasants to 
undertake all phases of farming (buông trắng cho dân). In addition, 
collective cadres often took advantage of their position to embezzle 
or steal collective resources and oppress the masses. As a result, food 
production in some production units did not increase; the living 
conditions of their members were poor and food contributions to the 
state decreased. In early 1988, An Giang’s leaders began to question 
the direction of their agrarian policy and shifted to a preference for 
household farming, which contributed to a major change in provincial 
policy in 1988.
This chapter will continue to examine local politics, especially the forms 
and magnitude of QN-ĐN and An Giang peasants’ and local cadres’ 
everyday practices during the product contract period (1981–88), and 
reveals how and why collective farming faced similar problems and 
comparable practices in both locations. It will show how that behaviour 
adversely affected collective farming under the product contract system. 
The chapter also discusses how local politics and ‘illegal’ arrangements 
contributed to derailing and shifting the Communist Party’s agricultural 
policy from collective farming to individual farming. 
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Local politics during 1981–88 in QN-ĐN, 
Central Coast region
Peasants’ everyday politics
Household economy versus collective economy
Soon after the experiments with product contracts began, the Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper mentioned ‘a tough struggle over bad 
thoughts’ (cuộc đấu tranh tư tưởng phức tạp) in the countryside, as 
peasants tried to harmonise their interests with those of the state and 
the collectives. Local authorities still insisted that, under the product 
contract system, collective members’ earnings would come mainly 
from the value of their collective workdays (giá trị ngày công tập thể) 
and partly from the amount each household produced beyond their 
quota. In reality, many peasants were dubious about this and expected 
the opposite. Therefore, many wanted collective organisations to lower 
the quotas on their contracted fields to increase the income coming 
from their individual farming efforts.1 
Despite being encouraged by the authorities to care for collective 
interests, many peasants mainly looked after their own household 
economy (kinh tế gia đình), where they saw a direct link between their 
efforts and the rewards. For example, according to the Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng newspaper, in the summer–autumn of 1981, when ripe paddy 
fields in some collectives in northern parts of the province were suddenly 
flooded, many collective members took advantage of the situation and 
asked managerial boards to lower their quota. Otherwise, they would 
refuse to harvest. As a result, many paddy fields were not harvested 
in time and collectives suffered huge losses.2 Likewise, according to 
a former brigade leader of Bình Lãnh collective, during the product 
contract period, collective members and cadres continually argued 
1  Các hợp tác xã khẩn trương thực hiện thử khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng cho người lao động 
[Collectives must hurry in implementing the product contract], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 22 April 
1981, p. 1; Qua các hợp tác xã nông nghiệp làm thử việc khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người 
lao động [Results of experimenting with the product contract], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 12 May 
1981, p. 2; Nhìn vào đồng ruộng tập thể: Lại chuyện chung và riêng [Looking at collective fields: 
Collective interest versus individual interest], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 May, p. 2.
2  Nân cao chất lượng khoán sản phẩm trong sản xuất Đông–Xuân [Improving the product 
contract in the winter–spring crop], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 November 1981, p. 1. 
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about categorising contracted land and determining quotas. Peasants 
wanted to have fields with modest quotas and refused to accept fields 
on which they were not able to produce more than the quota.3 
Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên recalled that, a few seasons after 
the implementation of product contracts, many of them lost their 
enthusiasm for collective farming because they could not produce more 
than the quota and because the value of collective work-points was low.4 
Explaining the poor earnings villagers received from collective farming 
under product contracts, a former chairman of Bình Lãnh collective 
admitted: 
At that time, the quota was set too high. For example, the quota for 
1 sào [500 sq m] of the best soil land was about 200 kilograms of paddy 
[equal to 4 tonnes per hectare] and the quota of work was five workdays 
per sào. These quotas were stipulated by the district’s authorities and 
readjusted within five years. In general, collective members received 
less than 50 per cent of what they produced.5 
The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper in March 1983 evaluated 
the  performance of Duy Phước, one of the leading collectives in 
the province, and revealed that, although paddy production in the 
collective had increased from 2,981 tonnes in 1978 to 3,577 tonnes in 
1982, the living conditions of collective members had not improved 
much; the  value of a workday was still about 2–2.1 kilograms and 
2  Vietnamese dong (VND), which was similar to that under the 
previous system. The  reason was the costs of production were huge, 
accounting for 75–80 per cent of the total product. Only 43.7 per cent 
of production went to members; therefore, income from the collective 
sector was far less than peasants’ expectations.6 
Fed up with the low rewards from collective farming, peasants started 
to devise their own arrangements. A man in Hiền Lộc village recalled 
that, after the implementation of contracts, everyone had to do other 
3  Author’s interview, 24 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
4  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên. 
5  Author’s interview, 24 October 2005, Bình Lãnh.
6  Hợp tác xã Duy Phước chặng đường 5 năm của phong trào hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp [Duy 
Phước collective over the past 5 years], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 5 March 1983, p. 2. 
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work (làm thêm) outside the collective sector. Some went to collect 
firewood and rattan to sell, while others reclaimed and worked land 
abandoned by the collectives.7 One poor elderly woman remembered: 
At that time, we tried to reclaim any abandoned land on the banks of 
streams, small ponds, corners of contracted fields, and every little bit 
of land. In addition, we increased the number of crops on contracted 
fields. For example, on one-crop-a-year land, we grew two crops; on 
two-crops-a-year land, we grew three crops.8 
Many peasants claimed they often stole some of the collective’s 
resources, such as chemical fertilisers and pesticides, to use in their 
own household farming (on gardens, 5 per cent land and reclaimed 
land) rather than on their contracted collective fields. The Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng newspaper reported in December 1983 that, in many parts 
of the province: 
[C]ollective members appropriated collective land for their own 
farming … they reclaimed new land, cleared the forest for cultivation, 
evaded paying taxes to the state and disobeyed the management of the 
collective.9 
Meanwhile, ‘collective land was cultivated poorly or abandoned’. These 
problems were severe in some places, especially in midland areas. 
The article warned that, if collective ownership was not well established 
soon, the increased expansion of the household economy would 
significantly harm the collective economy.10 
Generally speaking, under the product contract system, the household 
economy expanded rapidly at the expense of collective farming. 
Although the household economy was officially recognised in late 
1979 as an integral part of the collective economy, QN-ĐN leaders in 
1984 expressed their concern about the ‘transgression’ of putting the 
household economy before the collective economy, especially in weak 
collectives whose managerial boards were not able to control land, 
7  Author’s interview, 24 October 2004, Hiền Lộc. 
8  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
9  Củng cố và xác lập chế độ sở hữu tập thế trong hợp tác xã [Solidifying collective ownership], 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 December 1983, p. 1.
10  Ibid., p. 1. 
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draught animals and labour.11 For example, Tam Ngọc was among the 
weak collectives in Tam Kỳ district in which ‘the struggle between two 
paths’—the collective (tập thể) and individuals (cá thể)—was severe. 
By early 1984, the Tam Ngọc collective controlled and managed only 
30 per cent of collectivised land, and all draught animals had been 
returned to individual households. The collective was unable to control 
and manage labour, so each worker contributed an average of only 
80–90 days of labour per year; they spent the rest of their time on 
their household economies. Members’ income from the collective was 
minor, accounting for only 13 per cent of the total. Therefore, ‘they did 
not care much about the collective economy’.12 
According to a report from the Agricultural Department of the QN-
ĐN Communist Party’s Committee (Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh Ủy), by 
November 1984, the household economy accounted for 70 per cent of 
the average farming family’s income, while earnings from their collective 
work made up only 30 per cent. In large parts of paddy-growing lowland 
areas of the province where collectives were able to manage and control 
almost all of the land, the shares of household earnings and collective 
earnings in a household’s total income were approximately equal. 
However, in the midlands, where the area of secondary-crop land was 
large, about 80–95 per cent of peasants’ total income came from the 
household economy.13 In assessing the development of the household 
economy during 1981–84, a provincial leader raised his concern: 
Since 1981 thanks to adopting product contracts, the potential of 
the household economies has been exploited well, in the form of 
merging [the] collective economy with the household economy. So 
far, the household economy has been recognised but has been loosely 
managed [buông lỏng]. So, in many locations the household economy 
has developed in a spontaneous, unstable and incorrect way and relied 
largely on free markets; in some areas where the collective economy was 
weak, the household economy even clashed with and encroached upon 
the collective economy in terms of land, labour, fertilisers and so on.14 
11  The VCP had recognised and encouraged the development of the household economy since 
the sixth plenum of its fourth congress in 1979, and particularly after its fifth plenum in 1982 
(see Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, pp. 130–1).
12  Cuộc đấu tranh giữa hai con đường đang diễn ra ở một hợp tác xã [The struggle between two 
paths: Cooperative and individual farming in a collective], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 January 1984, 
p. 4.
13  Trần Ngọc Cư-Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh QN-ĐN (1984), Kinh tế gia đình ở tỉnh ta [The household 
economy in our province], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 29 November. 
14  Ibid. 
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In response to the uncontrolled expansion of the household economy, 
QN-ĐN’s leaders in December 1984 issued Directive No. 53/CT-
TV, which, on the one hand, stressed continuing to encourage the 
development of the household economy, while, on the other, emphasised 
controlling and guiding the activities of the household economy to 
bring them in line with the collective economy.15 
Despite inadequate support from local authorities, the household 
economy in QN-ĐN continued to rise, especially after the VCP 
launched the ‘Đổi Mới’ economic reforms of 1986, which officially 
recognised the existence of non-socialist economic sectors, liberalised 
trading and allowed freer flows of capital and labour that created more 
job opportunities outside the collectives. A former brigade leader in 
Thanh Yên village recalled: 
In the late 1980s, especially after Đổi Mới, the many young peasants 
abandoned or returned part of their contracted land to the collective 
so that they could earn a living outside the collective. Some went gold 
digging and some went trading. These people often got higher income 
than those clinging to the land. Therefore, many wanted to leave 
collective farming [muốn bỏ chạy ra ngoài].16 
Similarly, a former brigade leader in Hiền Lộc village remarked that, 
when the country’s economy was opened (mở cửa), young people left 
the village to earn a living elsewhere. Some worked for state enterprises, 
while some went to Dak Lak province in the Central highlands, where 
the coffee industry was booming.17 
A former building worker (thợ hồ) in a specialised team in Bình Lãnh 
collective recalled that, during the later stages of the product contract 
system, he did not want to work for the collective simply because the 
value of a workday there was about 1 kilogram of paddy. Meanwhile, 
working for individuals, he received 3 ang (12–15 kg) of paddy per day.18 
A July article from Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper also revealed: 
15  Ban Thường Vụ Tỉnh Ủy QN-ĐN (1984), Nghị quyết 53/CT-TV về việc tiếp tục khuyến khích 
phát triển kinh tế gia đình [Provincial Resolution No. 53/CT-TV on Continually Facilitating the 
Household Economy], 20 December, Tam Kỳ: Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng.
16  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên. 
17  Author’s interview, 23 October 2004, Hiền Lộc. 
18  Author’s interview, 20 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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The biggest problem [the collective faced] was that peasants in Bình 
Lãnh wanted to escape collective farming [thoát ly hợp tác xã]. By June 
1987, at least 160 young people refused to accept contracted land or join 
specialist teams; this figure was on the rise … The reason was that the 
value of [a] collective workday in Bình Lãnh collective was about 1.35 
kilograms of paddy; the share of the collective economy in [a] collective 
household’s total income was nearly 30 per cent. The excess beyond 
the quota was small … [therefore,] there were two trends in peasants’ 
behaviour. First, peasants wanted to receive less land so that they were 
able to intensify farming to exceed the quota. This gave them more time 
to care for their household economies. Second, some people, especially 
young people, wanted to earn a living in towns and cities because they 
thought collective farming could not benefit them.19 
In short, product contracts reduced the practice of workers simply 
going through the motions of collective farming to accumulate work-
points. They were unable, however, to motivate peasants to maximise 
their efforts to enhance the performance of collective farming. Rather, 
peasants were mainly concerned with their own household economies. 
Therefore, collective farming under the product contract system became 
a site of struggle between peasants’ and collectives’ interests. Peasants 
always tried to take advantage of any opportunity or available resources 
to increase their household economies, which severely harmed the 
collective economy. 
Debt
In the first few years after the implementation of product contracts, the 
living conditions of collective members and food production in QN-ĐN 
had improved somewhat. However, at later stages of the system, collective 
members’ living conditions stagnated or, even worse, some peasants fell 
into debt to the collective and the state, which they refused to pay. 
According to the Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper, by 1985, most 
collectives in Thăng Bình district owed the state because members 
continually postponed paying (dây dưa) or refused to pay what they 
owed to collectives. Households in the district owed about 800 tonnes 
of paddy. One reason was that cadres only loosely managed harvests 
and produce—for example, in 1985, in Ha Lam collective no. 1, each 
household was allowed to harvest individually. After harvesting, some 
19  Suy nghĩ về Bình Lãnh: Sự giàu có còn ở phía trước [Think of Bình Lãnh: Prosperity is still 
ahead], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 July 1987, p. 3. 
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households used the produce for their own consumption or sold some 
to meet their other daily needs rather than paying their quota and other 
obligations to the collective. As a result, 250 of 580 households had 
debts totalling 130 tonnes of paddy, accounting for 12 per cent of the 
total collective yield.20 
A 1987 investigation (điều tra) found that, despite authorities’ increasing 
investment in agricultural inputs, staple food production and food 
procurement had not grown accordingly. Meanwhile, members’ debts 
to collectives and the collectives’ debts to the state had increased. For 
example, in the period 1984–86, collectives in QN-ĐN owed the state 
25,792 tonnes of paddy equivalent. The total debt in 1986 alone was 
11,903 tonnes—equal to about 4.1 per cent of the grain production in 
the province that year.21 
According to accounts in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, there were several 
reasons for the increased debt. First, cadres classified land and 
determined quotas irrationally, inaccurately and unfairly. Second, 
collectives did not fully service some farming phases, such as irrigation, 
the supply of fertilisers and the application of pesticides. Instead, they 
made ‘straight contracts’ (khoán thẳng) or ‘package contracts’ (khoán 
gọn) with collective households. Third, collectives were not able to 
provide resources and services to members on time, in the right quantity 
or of adequate quality. Therefore, many households, especially those in 
areas where irrigation was unreliable, suffered losses that led to them 
accumulating debts to the collective. Fourth, the supply of state inputs 
to collectives was hampered by bureaucratic red tape—for example, 
the level of input for a collective was calculated according to the area 
of land rather than actual needs. Fifth, the state set the terms of trade 
between agricultural inputs and agricultural produce to favour the 
former. Finally, authorities levied dozens of different payments from 
collective households, such as public bonds in paddy (công trái thóc), 
savings in paddy (tiết kiệm thóc), funds to help people being affected by 
storms and floods, paddy for training soldiers (thóc luyện tập quân sự), 
and so on.22 
20  Tại sao tiến độ huy động lương thực ở Thăng Bình chậm? [Why is food procurement in 
Thăng Bình slow?], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 December 1985, p. 3. 
21  Điều tra nợ lương thực: Vấn đề giải quyết lương thực hiện nay [Investigation of food debt: 
How to deal with food problems], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 29 October 1987, p. 2. 
22  Củng cố và hoàn thiện công tác khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động trong nông 
nghiệp [Improving and perfecting the product contract], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 October 1986, 
p. 1. 
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Villagers in Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc villages recalled that product 
contracts did not make their lives much better. Most households 
owed paddy to the collective. They argued that the quota was often 
set inaccurately—for example, in areas where production conditions 
were unfavourable, collective cadres still made contracts with relatively 
high quotas. On land unsuitable for growing rice, cadres still forced 
households to grow rice. Therefore, many suffered losses and fell into 
debt. A former chairman of Bình Lãnh collective asserted that, by the 
end of the product contract system (mid-1988), households owed 500 
tonnes of paddy to the collective and more than 70 per cent of peasant 
households were in debt to the collective.23 A man in Hiền Lộc village 
told of his sad experience with product contracts: 
My family received 1 mẫu and 5 thước of land [5,166 sq m]. The 
collective coerced us to accept a large tract. My family had only three 
people: my mother, my elder sister and me. At that time I was 17 years 
old. Among the contracted plots was 4 sào of land without irrigation 
(one crop per year). For this 4-sào land, I could produce only 30 ang 
[150 kg] of paddy, but had to pay the collective 480 kilograms. I ask 
you, how could I pay? I had to owe the collective. At that time I often 
went to do collective work and accumulated a large number of work-
points. So, the collective used my work-points to reduce my debts but 
the remainder was still large. I had to plant sweet potatoes and cassavas 
to pay the remaining debt. We had a difficult life and always owed the 
collective. Some households owed tonnes of paddy. I did not understand 
why the collective set the quota so high. A sào of land without irrigation 
had a quota of 120 kilograms. How could we produce that amount? 
We knew that they had suppressed us but we did not know what to do. 
Some people cried a lot and begged the collective to take back the land 
but that hardly succeeded.24 
Like their counterparts in Hiền Lộc village, about 90 per cent of the 
households in Thanh Yên village owed the Bình Định collective. By the 
late 1980s, the whole village (60 households) owed the collective about 
22 tonnes of paddy. Some households owed more than 1 tonne of paddy 
each.25 Villagers commented that, under contract number 100, paddy 
productivity was low due to inadequate levels of fertiliser. Collectives 
set unfair quotas and charged many fees and funds that were converted 
into paddy, so many households ended up owing tonnes of paddy 
23  Author’s interview, 24 October 2004, Bình Lãnh.
24  Author’s interview, 21 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
25  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên. 
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to the collective.26 An elderly man in the village recalled that, under 
the product contract system, people did not want to receive much 
contracted land for fear of falling below the quota and because they 
had to contribute more than 70 per cent of their yield to the collective. 
The payment for fertilisers (received from the collective) alone was half 
the yield.27 Similarly, a woman whose family owed 2 tonnes of paddy to 
the collective—the largest single debt in the village—explained: 
Under product contracts, the collective forced us to accept large amounts 
of land. My family did not have cattle so we did not use manure to 
fertilise the fields. We did not have money to buy chemical fertilisers as 
others did. Moreover, my husband was fed up with collective farming 
and refused to work. I worked the fields alone. Therefore, we always 
had bad harvests and were not able to pay our debts.28 
In response to the increased debts in the late 1980s, Bình Lãnh and Bình 
Định hardened their collection procedures. According to a former Bình 
Định collective cadre, initially, cadres relied on commune police to 
confiscate debtors’ property (such as cattle and bicycles), but the results 
of such hardline property seizure were unpleasant. Later, collectives 
hired district court cadres and police to collect debts by paying them 
20 per cent of the value of the debt reclaimed. However, results were 
unsatisfactory because many debtors had nothing to confiscate. Finally, 
authorities gave up collecting peasants’ debts.29 A former brigade leader 
of Bình Lãnh collective lamented: 
Many people owed the collective; they said they did not have enough 
food to eat so they could not pay. They said that they would pay their 
debts when human flesh was allowed to sell in the markets [they meant 
selling their own flesh to pay off debt]. They also watched each other to 
see if others paid or not; if not, neither did they. They copied each other 
[nạnh với nhau].30 
26  Author’s interview, 12 October 2004, Thanh Yên. Ví is a large bamboo basket that villagers 
often use to store paddy. 
27  Author’s interview, 17 December 2005, Thanh Yên.
28  Author’s interview, 9 November 2005, Thanh Yên. 
29  Author’s interview, 9 December 2005, Thanh Yên. 
30  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
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A 70-year-old man said that, under product contracts, 
many people were in debt to the collective. If people were poor, the 
state failed. It was impossible for the state to kill people if they were not 
able to pay their debts.31 
Abandoning or accepting less contracted land 
The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reported in late 1984 that many 
collectives in the province were using agricultural land wastefully and 
ineffectively. For example, collectives had abandoned large amounts of 
agricultural land or irrationally converted some of it into non-farming 
land. As a result, in 1984 alone, QN-ĐN had lost 5,000 to 10,000 
hectares of cultivated land.32 
A further investigation in 1985 found that another reason for the 
decrease in agricultural land was that some peasants had abandoned 
collective fields. For example, in 1984, peasants in 11 districts of 
the province had abandoned 13,000 hectares; in some collectives, 
the abandoned area amounted to hundreds of hectares.33 Peasants 
abandoned collective fields largely because the costs of cultivating were 
too high. In November 1986, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported that, after 
adopting product contracts: 
Some collectives did not provide collective households with agricultural 
inputs or services sufficiently or on time, leaving them alone to take 
care of their crops. If collective households invested more in their 
contracted fields, the excess beyond the quota would not cover their 
expenditure … It was worrying that collective members did not want to 
accept contracted land. Instead they wanted to return it to the collective 
in order to do outside work, which brought them higher incomes.34 
31  Author’s interview, 14 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
32  Chung quanh vấn đề sử dụng đất nông nghiệp [The problem of using agricultural land], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 August 1984, p. 2; Hội nghị tổng kết sản xuất nông nghiệp, phát động chiến 
dịch sản xuất vụ Đông–Xuân [A conference summing up five years of agricultural production and 
campaigning for the winter–spring crop], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 30 October 1984, p. 1. 
33  Hội nghị quản lý ruộng đất của tỉnh sử dụng tài nguyên đất với hiệu quả kinh tế cao nhất, 
chấm dứt việc cấp đất trái phép, xử lý nghiêm khắc những vụ lấn chiếm đất trái phép của nhà nước 
và tập thể [Provincial land management conference promotes land resources with the highest 
economic efficiency, terminates illegal land allocation, strictly handles illegal encroachment on 
state and collective land], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 April 1985, p. 1; Cần quản lý và sử dụng đất 
nông nghiệp một cách hợp lý [The need to use agricultural land rationally], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
25 April 1985, p. 2.
34  Thực sự coi nông nghiệp là mặt trận hàng đầu [Agricultural sector needs to be regarded as 
top national priority], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 27 November 1986, p. 1; Improving and perfecting 
the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 October 1986, p. 1.
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An example of the problem was Duy Thành collective, one of the 
successful collectives in Duy Xuyên district during the work-points 
system. A few years after adopting product contracts, however, the 
number of households here producing beyond their quotas significantly 
decreased. And the more peasants invested in collective fields, the 
greater the losses they suffered. Therefore, ‘many returned the land or 
kept some contracted land just as a formality [lấy lệ] so that they could 
set aside time to do other jobs to earn a living’. This led to a paradoxical 
situation in which the collective had a high population density but 
its land was abandoned.35 Similarly, in the winter–spring of 1985–86, 
30 per cent of peasant households in Điện Nam collective no. 2 in Điện 
Bàn district decided to return their collective land.36 In mid-1986, for 
the same reason, 20 per cent of households in Bình Triều collective in 
Thăng Bình district returned their contracted land.37 
Bình Lãnh and Bình Định collectives in Thăng Bình district faced 
problems similar to those in other districts of QN-ĐN. The number of 
peasants who abandoned or returned their contracted land increased 
annually. For example, according to Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, in 1984, 
hundreds of households in Bình Lãnh collective decided to accept less 
contracted land or return some of their poorer land to the collective. 
As a result, villagers were unwilling to accept contracts on 30 hectares 
(không có người nhận khoán).38 According to a former chairman of 
Bình Lãnh collective, after the Đổi Mới reforms began, the number 
of households returning land to the collective increased by an average of 
40–50 households per year. Some households returned land that was 
unfavourable for production; others returned it in order to earn a living 
in the Central Highlands or elsewhere. Some tried to farm on land not 
controlled by the collective.39 
35  Hợp tác xã Duy Thành từng bước hoàn thiện khoán sản phẩm đối với cây lúa [Duy Thành 
collective gradually perfected the product contract], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 17 December 1987, 
p. 3. The collective set a quota of 8.6 tonnes per hectare per year (in the winter–spring season, 
3 tonnes per hectare; the spring–summer season, 3.2 tonnes; and the third season, 2.4 tonnes). 
36  Hợp tác xã Điện Nam 2 khoán mới động lực mới [New farming arrangements created new 
incentives in Điện Nam Collective No. 2], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 24 December 1987, p. 2. 
37  Bình Triều 2 qua vụ Đông–Xuân 1987–1988 [Performance of Bình Triều Collective No. 2 in 
the winter–spring of 1987–1988], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 10 May 1988, p. 4. 
38  Khoán sản phẩm cuối cùng đến người lao động những vướng mắc và cách giải quyết 
[The product contract: Problems and solutions], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 8 November 1984, p. 1. 
39  Author’s interview, 21 October 2004, Bình Lãnh. 
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Villagers in Hiền Lộc complained that, under product contracts, the 
collective established many new specialised teams (chuyên khâu) and 
other non-cultivating industries (chuyên ngành), which recruited many 
labourers. Therefore, each cultivating labourer in the collective was 
assigned more land than others.40 A woman with a disabled husband 
and young children shared her story: 
When authorities distributed land [by drawing lots] to make contracts, 
I drew a lot [bóc thăm] of 1 mẫu and 7 thước [5,233 sq m]. That was too 
big for me! My husband was disabled and my children were too young; 
how could I manage it? I tried my best to work but contributed almost 
all of the produce to the collective. Thanks go to Mr Linh [Nguyễn Văn 
Linh],41 who saw our problems. If collective farming had continued, 
I guessed that the land would be completely exhausted [because people 
overexploited land]. If product contracts continued for a few more 
years, all the people here would refuse to do collective farming.42 
Similarly, a former brigade leader in Thanh Yên village commented 
that, after Nguyễn Văn Linh’s ascension to power as general secretary 
of the Communist Party, people were freed from collective farming. 
He said if this had not happened, people in his village would have run 
away from the collective because they worked hard but received little.43 
A former chairman of Bình Định collective said: 
Under product contract no. 100, many people wanted to return their 
contracted land. This would raise a big question to the top leaders of 
why under the product contracts many people were not able to produce 
more than the quota; and why they wanted to abandon their collective 
land. In the past, landlords were thought to exploit peasants, but 
nobody abandoned their rented land; rather peasants often competed 
with each other to rent land from landlords. But now why did peasants 
want to abandon land?44 
40  Author’s interviews, October–December 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
41  Ordinary people in Vietnam often attributed the Đổi Mới policy to former general secretary 
of the Communist Party Nguyễn Văn Linh. Recently, some authors have argued that Trường 
Chinh was the author of Đổi Mới (see Huy Đức, The Winning Side).
42  Author’s interview, 15 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
43  Author’s interview, 5 October 2005, Thanh Yên.
44  Author’s interview, 5 October 2005, Bình Định. 
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In short, everyday peasant practices such as pursuing their own 
household economic activities, abandoning land and accepting less 
collective land reflected not only their low confidence in collective 
farming, but also their discontent with local cadres’ poor practices and 
mismanagement of collectives. 
Local cadres’ practices in QN-ĐN
In theory, product contracts diminished cadres’ power and increased 
peasants’ responsibility over the management of collective farming. 
Villagers were permitted to do three phases of farmwork on their 
own and were supposed to work collectively on the remaining five 
phases. However, the contract system created new opportunities 
for cadres to benefit at the expense of ordinary collective members. 
For example, managers were still given considerable power to direct 
collective farming, but they were not responsible for its performance. 
They therefore tended to shift their responsibilities on to villagers and 
embezzled major collective resources over which they had control, such 
as agricultural inputs, collective property and produce. 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper warned in November 1981 that it was 
erroneous to think the adoption of product contracts had solved all the 
problems of collectives. In reality, cadres in many of the collectives and 
brigades ‘were not positive about improving management’; they did 
not look after the land, production tools or farmwork. Many offloaded 
the tasks of preparing seedlings and fertilising land to collective 
members without properly monitoring their performance.45 Villagers 
in Thanh Yên and Hiền Lộc also recalled that cadres often failed to 
fulfil their duties, such as spraying to prevent insects or watering the 
fields on time. Therefore, seeing their paddy fields attacked by insects 
or short of water, villagers often tried to save their fields first rather than 
wait for a collective response. A former brigade leader of Bình Định 
collective said: 
From the outset of product contracts, the collective had nearly made 
‘blank contracts’ with peasants; soon after implementing contract no. 
100, the collective returned collective draught animals to households. 
In fact, the collective was only in charge of delivering fertilisers, 
spraying insecticides and supplying water. Meanwhile, peasants did 
45  Improving the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 November 1981, p. 1. 
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everything else, but they were obliged to the collective, paying tax, 
agricultural input fees [for fertiliser and insecticide] and irrigation fees 
and contributing to collective funds.46 
According to Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, a few years after the implementation 
of product contracts, many collectives increased their quotas but did 
not increase their investment accordingly. Some even tried to reduce 
production costs by lowering the price paid for manure bought from 
collective members and the value of a collective workday.47 In some 
collectives, where cadres were allowed to farm contracted land, cadres 
lowered the quota to ensure they made a profit at the expense of 
collective earnings.48 
When authorities ordered loans of secondary-crop land to households, 
collective cadres in some locations saw it as an opportunity to 
appropriate land for themselves and their families. When authorities 
wanted these fields farmed collectively again, these cadres tended to 
delay its return.49 QN-ĐN’s leaders considered the poor management of 
collectives was a result of local cadres’ weaknesses. Due to inadequate 
training, local cadres were often incompetent and lacked discipline; 
some even did things at odds with state and party policies.50 
In the period 1983–86, provincial authorities launched several 
campaigns to improve collectives and train local cadres, but results 
were below expectations. Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reported in October 
1986 that  collective cadres were still incorrectly implementing ‘the 
five-farming-phase-contracts signed with collective members’ by 
leaving households alone to do almost all the phases of farmwork; 
they did not conform to the requirements for managing production, 
inputs and outputs, which significantly affected the performance of 
collective farming and diminished the value of the collective workday.51 
46  Author’s interview, 5 November 2005, Thanh Yên.
47  Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh QN-ĐN, The household economy in our province.
48  Summary of three years of implementing the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 6 July 
1985, p. 1. 
49  Solidifying collective ownership, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 December 1983, p. 1.
50  Phạm Đức Nam: Công tác trước mắt để củng cố và phát triển quan hệ sản xuất mới ở nông 
thôn [Phạm Đức Nam: Ongoing tasks for solidifying and improving new production relations in 
rural areas], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 18 June 1983, p. 1. 
51  Improving and perfecting the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 25 October 1986, p. 1. 
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In  addition, in their direction of agricultural production, collective 
cadres emphasised ‘controlling the end-products but paid scant 
attention to supplying inputs, credits and technology’.52 
After the VCP launched the Đổi Mới policy in 1986, the press was given 
more power to tackle ‘social evils’. Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng began to report 
on several problems with local cadres, including leaders of collectives. 
For example, an investigation in Điện Phước collective no. 2 in Điện 
Bàn district found 16,602 tonnes of stored paddy had disappeared 
during the period 1983–86; however, collective managers had not taken 
responsibility for this loss. Instead, they claimed ‘the paddy vanished 
naturally [tự nhiên biến mất] rather than being pocketed by anyone’. 
They asked collective members for their understanding (thông cảm), 
and also intimidated and chastised any member who disagreed or 
dared to protest.53 
Investigations also found cadres had used incorrect weight standards, 
thereby cheating ordinary people. Inspecting 74 scales belonging 
to several food-related organisations in eight of the largest paddy-
producing districts in 1986, authorities discovered that only five 
met proper standards. The Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng article said that, 
by weighing incorrectly, staple food officials (ngành lương thực) had 
embezzled large amounts of food in the province.54 
Cadres in Thăng Bình district also embezzled inputs and outputs. 
Explaining the reasons for poor paddy productivity in the winter–
spring of 1986–87 (1.6 tonnes per hectare on average, the lowest since 
1976), an article in Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng revealed that 
a large amount of chemical fertilisers [supplied by the state] did not 
go directly to collective paddy fields but passed through the hands of 
private merchants and then to the fields [or peasant households]. 
52  Agricultural sector needs to be regarded as top national priority, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
27 November 1986, p. 1. 
53  Nhìn vào đồng ruộng tập thể: Hai bàn cân ở hợp tác xã Điện Phước 2 [Looking at collective 
fields: Two different weighing scales at Điện Phước Collective No. 2], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
8 August 1987, p. 2.
54  Trách nhiệm của ngành lương thực trong việc để hao hụt một số khối lượng rất lớn lương 
thực [State food agencies need to take responsibility for considerable loss of staple food], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 16 August 1986, p. 2. 
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In addition, many collectives merely ‘fertilised on paper’ (bón phân trên 
giấy). For example, investigations in five collectives in Bình Tú, Bình Sa 
and Bình Hải communes found that, in 1986 alone, 120 tonnes of urea 
fertilisers had ‘flown’ to the free market (bay ra thị trường).55 
In 1987 authorities in QN-ĐN carried out several inspections and 
retrieved VND599.4 million and goods worth VND50 million that 
cadres had embezzled. In agricultural collectives, inspectors found 
‘many cases of embezzlement and theft’. For example, ‘a storehouse 
keeper of Đại Quang collective [Đại Lộc district] embezzled 19 tonnes 
of paddy … [and] an interbrigades accountant of Điện Thoại No. 1 
[Điện Bàn district] embezzled 35 tonnes’.56 
In response to local cadres’ negativism, the lead article in Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng in September 1987 called for the widespread and full 
implementation of socialist democracy. It also complained: 
Local cadres and party cadres have already forgotten the lesson of 
‘taking people as the foundation’ [lấy dân làm gốc] because they now 
lacked democratic spirit and were not close to the masses in order 
to hear their voices. Therefore, there were too many heart-breaking 
incidents such as violating the master rights of people, embezzlement 
and bribes which took place widely in many locations, even in some 
executive committees of local party organisations.57 
Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên also complained that, under the 
product contract system, collective cadres set high quotas and raised 
numerous funds but used the income in ambiguous ways. Most funds 
went into the pockets of key collective cadres. A man in Thanh Yên village 
commented that ‘people contributed a lot to collective funds but the 
collective did not do anything to benefit the people. Cadres took it all.’58 
A former brigade leader revealed that, particularly in later stages of the 
55  Vì sao năng suất Đông-Xuân ở Thăng Bình giảm sút? [Why did rice productivity in Thăng 
Bình go down?], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 28 April 1987, p. 2; Vụ Đông–Xuân 1983–1984 Thăng 
Bình củng cố hợp tác xã gắn liền với tập trung chỉ đạo vùng lúa có sản lượng cao [Thăng Bình will 
solidify the collective and extend high-yielding rice in the winter–spring of 1983–1984], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 9 November 1983, p. 2; Why is food procurement in Thang Binh slow?, Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 7 December 1985, p. 3. 
56  Tổ chức thanh tra các cấp tăng cường công tác thanh tra , kiểm tra nhanh chóng phát hiện 
những vụ tiêu cực [Intensifying investigations of negativism], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 November 
1987, p. 1. 
57  Xã luận: Thực hiện rộng rãi và đầy đủ nền dân chủ xã hội chủ nghĩa [The editorial: Fully 
implementing the socialist democracy], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 1 September 1987, p. 1.
58  Author’s interview, 1 October 2005, Thanh Yên. 
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product contract system, ‘collective cadres knew that the organisation 
would sooner or later be dismantled so they gradually turned collective 
property into their own’.59 Another former brigade leader confirmed 
that, after the implementation of product contracts, collective property 
such as tractors, waterpumps and rice-husking machines gradually 
disappeared, falling into the hands of collective cadres. People saw the 
collective property being spirited away (hao  mòn) so they no longer 
wanted to contribute to the collective.60 
The excessive number of local cadres combined with the levels of 
embezzlement consumed large amounts of villagers’ produce. Villagers 
often complained that ‘peasants worked, the cadres enjoyed’ (cời làm cho 
cối ăn). The apparatus of collective administration consisted of so many 
cadres they shared among themselves much of the collective’s income. 
For example, many collectives opened up non-farming industries, 
which required even more cadres to manage them—animal husbandry, 
brick kilns, forestry, building, carpentry and so on. All collective cadres 
and workers in these specialised teams had to be paid in paddy, while 
the non-farming income went to collective funds. Therefore, collective 
members’ income was reduced. The collective also had to subsidise 
many mass organisations, which meant the collective’s income was 
constantly being drained.61 A former chairman of Bình Lãnh collective 
asserted that, under the product contract system, 
a collective was like a small state. The collective was in charge of all 
kinds of subsidies for local education, health care and cadre welfare. For 
example, when having a meeting, the district’s party committee came to 
ask for a cow to slaughter. We had to give them one. Individual cadres 
from district offices also asked for help. Because the district authorities 
directly monitored us, when they asked for something, we had to give 
it to them. Commune authorities did the same. The Commune People’s 
Committee still owes the collective about VND30 million.62 
59  Author’s interviews, October 2005, Thanh Yên. In November 1983, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng also 
reported that the privatisation of collective property through forms of ‘illegal liquidation’ (thanh lý 
trái phép) had begun to take place in some collectives in the province (Xã luận: Cũng cố hợp tác xã 
vấn đề cấp bách đưa sản xuất nông nghiệp lên một bước [The editorial: Solidifying collectives is an 
urgent task to advance agriculture], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 14 November 1983, p. 1). 
60  Author’s interview, 5 November 2005, Thanh Yên. 
61  Author’s interview, 19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc. 
62  Author’s interview, 8 December 2005, Bình Lãnh. 
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In short, local cadres’ malpractice and mismanagement contributed 
significantly to the poor performance of collective farming and the 
failure of the product contract system in QN-ĐN. 
Local politics in An Giang, 1981–88
Peasants’ everyday politics 
Farming poorly and owing debts to production units 
In An Giang province, product contracts had a brief positive effect on 
production units that had performed poorly under the work-points 
system. Product contracts also helped boost socialist agricultural 
transformation and bring more land and peasants into collective 
organisations. However, despite this and earlier land redistribution, 
peasants’ living conditions and agricultural productivity did not 
improve for long. The reasons have to do with peasants’ responses to 
collective farming. 
Villagers in Long Điền B commune in Chợ Mới district recalled 
that land redistribution and the product contract system provided 
landless and land-poor households with fields to farm; however, many 
farmed unprofitably and ended up deeply in debt to production units. 
Meanwhile, some landowners who had lost land to redistribution gave 
up farming or grew only enough for their own consumption. A former 
cadre of production unit no. 9 in Long Điền B argued: 
Some guys who did not know how to farm were put into the production 
units to receive land. The production unit was supposed to teach 
them how to farm. Despite the production unit delivering fertilisers 
to them in advance, they did not know how to spread it properly. As 
you know, although the state was concerned about agricultural output, 
performance was low because many people did not know how to farm, 
while professional cultivators had lost much of their land.63 
He also mentioned that non-farmers accounted for more than half of all 
land recipients in Long Điền B; most had been small traders, labourers 
or ran other businesses. Some lived in Cho Moi town, the capital of 
Chợ Mới district, and Mỹ Lương, another town in Chợ Mới. During 
63  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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collectivisation, these people received land, but they did not know how 
to farm well or were unenthusiastic about farming. Therefore, after 
a few seasons, they often transferred, mortgaged or sold their fields to 
others and resumed their non-farming work. A man whose family had 
been river traders (nghề ghe) for generations recalled: 
My family had long been trading on boats so we were not good at 
farming. My parents previously had 3 công [3,000 sq m] of land but 
they lent it to others. At the time [about 1984], we found it difficult to 
continue trading on the boat because it was extremely difficult to buy 
fuel. Besides, it was rumoured that anyone who did not have land would 
be sent to the new economic zones. Therefore, I returned to farming. 
Because I had 3 công of land from my parents, I did not receive any 
land from others. But we farmed unproductively. My first three, four 
harvests were bad. I was not able to pay the fees of the B contracts [hợp 
đồng B for agricultural inputs].64 [Consequently,] because I was not 
able to pay to the production unit, I was put into custody [bị bắt nhốt] 
by commune police [in 1986]. At that time, many others also owed to 
production units because they did not know how to farm. In addition, 
the production unit provided us with insufficient fertilisers, pesticides 
and irrigation while we contributed so much to the production units. 
The contribution accounted for more than half of our harvest.65 
As well as a lack of knowhow, insufficient supplies of agricultural 
inputs and poorly functioning production units, many poor peasants 
complained they could not farm well because they were destitute and 
lacked capital to invest in their fields. For example, unlike the better-
off peasants, poor peasants were unable to buy extra fertilisers and 
pesticides on the free market; they did not have enough money to hire 
labourers or machinery from production units to level the land, which 
was necessary for growing high-yielding rice.66 Some poor villagers 
complained that the land redistributed to them was infertile, undulating 
or located in unfavourable areas. Many suffered losses and fell deeply 
into debt. Ultimately, some had to transfer or abandon collective land 
after a few seasons of farming.67 
64  In the years 1979–86, at the beginning of each season, authorities (through production 
units) supplied peasants with agricultural inputs (fertilisers and pesticides) in return for peasants’ 
paddy after harvest, according to the stipulated exchange rate. This arrangement was called the 
‘B contract’.
65  Author’s interview, 12 August 2005, Long Điền B.
66  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B.
67  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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An investigation in Chợ Mới district in December 1985 found that 
70 per cent of peasants lacked capital to invest in their farming and 
had begun to return land to production units.68 This problem was 
widespread in An Giang. In particular, after Đổi Mới, when An Giang 
abolished some agricultural subsidies and B contracts, poor peasants 
faced increased difficulties in attaining agricultural inputs to invest in 
their farms. According to the An Giang newspaper in July 1987, when 
Châu Phú and Phú Tân districts abolished B contracts, some peasants 
began to abandon their contracted land because they could not buy 
fertiliser.69 
Looking back, some poor villagers in Long Điền B argued that with the 
few công of land redistributed to them, their families could not live on 
farming alone. The income from their farming was often less than that 
from their previous jobs, so they had to supplement their income by 
doing wage work or small trading. The more time they spent working 
for wages, the less time they had for their own farming. Moreover, 
producing high-yielding rice required capital. Most poor households 
did not have enough capital, and production units supplied inadequate 
agricultural inputs. Their farming was therefore unprofitable and they 
ended up in debt. A former chairman of Long Điền B Commune 
Peasant Association shared his view: 
At first, some poor peasants were happy to receive readjusted land but 
later they felt dissatisfied because their farming had poor results. A poor 
family with five to seven people received only a few công of land; if all 
their members clung to farming, they could not survive because they 
could not do other business. So, they had to rely on doing wage work 
to supplement their livelihood. As a result, their farming was bad; their 
paddy productivity was about 10 giạ per công [2 tonnes per hectare; 
while that of better-off farmers was 4–5 tonnes per hectare]. Because 
they farmed inefficiently, they transferred and mortgaged [cầm cố] 
their land to others despite authorities not allowing this.70 
68  Chợ Mới vào vụ mới [Chợ Mới begins to cultivate a new crop], An Giang, 20 December 1985, 
p. 2.
69  Xung quanh chuyện đầu tư cho sản xuất nông nghiệp [The problem of agricultural 
investment], An Giang, 17 July 1987, p. 2.
70  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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He also revealed that, despite the commune authorities encouraging 
peasants to exchange labour with each other, those in the Southern 
Region refused to do so, wanting instead to hire labourers rather than 
exchange labour.71 This is why the rice fields of poor households often 
had more weeds and were unprofitable. 
Similar to their counterparts in QN-ĐN, many poor peasants in 
An Giang could not afford the cost of agricultural inputs, taxes and 
other obligations to the production units and ended up in debt. Most 
commonly, they owed paddy for agricultural inputs (nợ vật tư) or 
B contract debts (nợ hợp đồng B). According to the An Giang newspaper, 
some poor peasants, after receiving inputs from production units, sold 
them on the free market to meet their daily needs rather than using 
them in their fields. They ended up with poor harvests and were unable 
to pay their costs. Others adopted the tactic of putting ‘one foot inside 
and the other foot outside’ the production unit so they could buy state 
agricultural inputs at low prices to sell on the free market at higher 
prices.72 Many poor peasants were unable to pay their debts because 
they farmed unproductively but still had to pay production units a large 
amount of paddy. One poor man recalled that, during the product 
contract system, he always had poor harvests. If he paid fees for inputs, 
irrigation and his contribution to the production unit’s funds, he had 
almost nothing left for his family. He therefore delayed his payments 
and was in debt to the production unit. He said: ‘The authorities often 
came to force us to pay debts but when they saw that we were really 
poor, [they] finally they gave up.’73 A former cadre of production unit 
no. 15 argued: 
In the time of Mr Lê Duẩn [then Communist Party secretary], it was 
compulsory to carry out land redistribution. But after redistributing 
land, because they were poor, many people farmed unproductively. 
They refused to pay [in paddy] fees for irrigation, fuel, fertiliser and 
pesticides. It was trouble. The production unit was not able to collect 
fees from people who had nothing. The better-off households were 
able to invest in their farming while the poor households just farmed. 
Farming like that, paddy productivity went down rapidly. The number 
of households who were not able to pay debts was so numerous that 
71  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
72  Người nông dân đang cần phương thức đầu tư hợp lý phát triển sản xuất nông nghiệp 
[Peasants need a rational method of agricultural investment], An Giang, 23 October 1987, p. 2; 
Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B. 
73  Author’s interview, 6 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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I could not count them all. Some did not pay a thing for four successive 
seasons. Most debtors were land recipients who previously had not had 
any land [không có cục đất chọi chim]. After receiving land, they did 
not transform or level out the land. They did not know how to farm. So 
when they grew rice on land that was soaked here but dry there, some 
of their rice died, some survived. The results of such farming were bad, 
so they owed the production unit. Meanwhile, professional cultivators 
knew how to farm and had capital to invest. They levelled out land 
properly so their crops grew better.74 
A former cadre of Long Điền B commune observed that, among 
debtors, the ‘priority’ families (gia đình chính sách)—such as those 
with wounded veterans or who had members killed fighting in the war 
(thương binh liệt sỹ), former soldiers and local poor cadres—had the 
largest debts. Apart from farming unproductively, these households 
often took advantage of their position to evade paying the production 
units.75 To collect arrears and make peasants pay their debts, production 
unit cadres in Long Điền B threshed peasants’ paddy, especially those 
who were in debt or had poor harvests. A leader of production unit no. 
15 recalled: 
The production unit had to control produce. After harvesting and 
threshing paddy in the fields, each household had to pay [fees, taxes 
and funds] before carrying paddy home. If a production unit allowed 
individual households to harvest freely, they would refuse to pay their 
debts fully. It was common that households with low paddy productivity 
came to reap and hide paddy at night. So, during the harvest time, 
production unit cadres had to patrol the fields at night.76 
Villagers in Long Điền B recalled that, apart from collecting fees in the 
fields, production unit cadres and commune police frequently searched 
debtors’ houses and confiscated their paddy and/or belongings; they 
even arrested some and held them in custody. However, the results 
were insignificant. Many debtors continued to refuse to pay their 
debts, justifying their behaviour by saying they had no means to pay.77 
The An Giang newspaper was critical, reporting in July 1988:
74  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B.
75  Author’s interview, 29 July 2005, Long Điền B. The households of martyrs and wounded soldiers 
included those who had family members killed or wounded in the line of duty during the country’s 
wars. In An Giang, most of these were related to conflicts with Cambodia (1978 to mid-1980) and 
China (late 1970). 
76  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
77  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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Over the past years, peasants have not had the right to manage and 
control their own land and produce. Their fate was determined by 
others [cadres]. The only right that they had was to labour … It was 
common that local authorities came to search for peasants’ paddy, 
confiscated their belongings and took back the land to reduce their 
debts. It was a daily phenomenon that peasants in debt were arrested 
and remained behind bars for so-called ‘education’. Many peasants did 
not have enough food; how could they pay?78 
After Đổi Mới started, villagers tended to refuse to fulfil obligations 
such as contributing collective funds to production units. A former 
cadre of production unit no. 16 recalled that, in the late 1980s, the 
number of peasant households which refused to pay production unit 
funds increased in Chợ Mới district. These households were fed up 
with unprofitable farming in production units and discontent with 
cadres’ embezzlement and incompetence. In response, local authorities 
used harsh measures, such as sending soldiers to search for paddy and 
belongings in their homes. They even arrested debtors. However, these 
tactics did not result in significant changes, and dismayed peasants. 
The cadre concluded, ‘when peasants refused to contribute to funds, 
the only option was to dismantle the production units’.79 
Abandoning, transferring, mortgaging and disputing 
ownership of land 
Instead of cultivating redistributed land, some poor peasants in 
An Giang transferred and mortgaged it to others because they did not 
farm or did not have enough capital.80 A former chairman of the farmers’ 
association in Long Điền B commune said that, after a few seasons of 
farming, some peasants abandoned, transferred or mortgaged their 
land so they could take up non-farming work.81 Another man in Long 
Điền B said it was common for land recipients to transfer or sell their 
land to others. Some fields had been transferred several times between 
different landholders.82 
78  Ý kiến: Làm chủ [The opinion piece: Being a master], An Giang, 29 July 1988, p. 1. 
79  Author’s interview, 11 July 2005, Long Điền B. 
80  Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 35. 
81  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
82  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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Villagers and former cadres in Long Điền B argued that transferring 
land made those who had previously had their land redistributed 
discontent with the redistribution policy. Moreover, land-givers 
became more discontented when they saw that some of the local cadres 
took advantage of their positions and misappropriated the land for 
themselves and their relatives.83 However, before the Đổi Mới policy, 
many landowners did not express their views publicly. 
In the spirit of Đổi Mới and in response to the poor performance of 
agriculture, on 19 February 1987, An Giang people’s committee issued 
Decision No. 93-UBND, which corrected the mistakes of previous 
land redistribution efforts. It also allowed households to farm fields 
in communes other than their own.84 It advocated retrieving land 
that had been previously appropriated ‘irrationally and illegally’ by 
local cadres and state organisations and giving it back to the former 
landowners according to their capacity to farm or to those who were 
currently landless or land-poor. The policy triggered a host of claims 
from households for their former land and led to widespread conflict 
among peasants and local cadres in rural areas of An Giang.85 
According to the An Giang newspaper, within the first three months 
of 1987, authorities in the province had received 2,000 letters from 
peasants and met 5,000 people who submitted petitions. Most letters 
complained about land, houses, belongings and agricultural and other 
machines being appropriated or transformed (cải tạo) in ways that 
violated people’s mastery rights. Some letters accused local cadres of 
embezzling collective resources.86 Further, in May 1987, An Giang 
reported that, during the implementation of provincial Decision No. 93, 
a complicated problem had emerged when many former landowners 
claimed back their land from the new owners. This problem occurred 
almost everywhere. Regardless of the local authority’s decision, some 
83  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
84  Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 43; Hội nghị cán bộ quán triệt nghị 
quyết 1987 [Officials’ meeting thoroughly resolves 1987 resolution], An Giang, 22 December 1986, 
p. 1.
85  Cần hiểu rõ và chấp hành tinh thần quyết định 93 của Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh [The need to 
fully understand and abide by the Provincial People’s Committee’s Directive No. 93], An Giang, 
22 May 1987, p. 6; Don’t mistake rational reallocation, An Giang, 29 May 1987, p. 1.
86  Phỏng vấn phó bí thư tỉnh ủy An Giang: Nhiệm kỳ tới sẽ cố gắng làm thế nào để góp phần 
vận dụng nghị quyết VI vào thực tế tỉnh nhà đạt kết quả cụ thể hơn nữa [Interview with Vice-
Chairman of An Giang’s Party Committee: The next term will try to contribute to the application 
of Resolution VI in the province to achieve more concrete results], An Giang, 17 March 1987, p. 1.
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peasants claimed their former land by illegally sowing seeds on it or 
by other means.87 For example, in 1985, the production unit cadres in 
Đức Bình ward, Long Xuyên town, redistributed 28 công of surplus 
land from a Mrs Kiem to seven other households to establish product 
contracts. In April 1987, however, Mrs Kiem planted seeds on these 
28 công, in defiance of previous arrangements. In the end, authorities 
had to force her to return the land to the seven new land users (chủ 
mới). Mrs Kiem was not alone; 14 other landowners tried to take back 
their old land in this area.88 
To tackle these problems—of previous landowners (chủ cũ) trying 
to reclaim their redistributed land—authorities issued several 
announcements stressing ‘the need to understand clearly and conform 
to the spirit of Decision No. 93’ and accusing former landowners of 
mistaking (ngộ nhận) the policy of ‘reallocating land rationally’ for one 
of ‘returning land to previous owners’.89 
Land disputes were widespread not only in An Giang, but also across 
the Southern Region. According to researcher Huỳnh Thị Gấm, by 
August 1988, 59,505 peasants had lodged complaints about land across 
the whole Southern Region. In many areas, peasants took back their 
former land or fought against each other, state enterprises and military 
organisations. There were physical clashes and incidents in which 
people were wounded and some were killed. For example, seven people 
died in An Giang and Cửu Long in 1988. Peasants also organised 
demonstrations. They gathered together, carrying national flags, 
slogans and pictures of former national chairman Hồ Chí Minh. They 
marched through government offices at all levels, from the commune, 
district and provincial to the central, demanding resolution of their 
land claims.90 
87  Mỗi tuần một chuyện: Nhanh chóng giải quyết vấn đề ruộng đất hợp lý [A story each week: 
Be quick to solve land disputes], An Giang, 22 May 1987, p. 3. 
88  Mỗi tuần một chuyện: Hiểu lầm hay cố ý? [A story each week: Misunderstood or intended?], 
An Giang, 29 May 1987, p. 7.
89  The need to fully understand and abide by the Provincial People’s Committee’s Directive 
No. 93, An Giang, 22 May 1987, p. 6; Don’t mistake rational reallocation of land, An Giang, 29 May 
1987, p. 1. 
90  Huỳnh Thị Gấm, Socioeconomic changes in the Mekong Delta, p. 89. According to Huỳnh 
Thị Gấm, by the end of 1988, authorities in An Giang had received 41,000 petition letters from 
peasants, Đồng Tháp had received 20,000, Minh Hải 18,000 and Cửu Long 10,000. 
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In response to these disputes, the VCP issued Directive No. 47/CT-TW 
(31 August 1988), which recognised the shortcomings of previous land 
redistributions. First, land redistribution, especially under Directive 
No. 19 (3 May 1983), had equalised (cào bằng) landholdings among 
households and interrupted and rearranged previous farming systems 
(xáo canh) in rural areas, which negatively affected agricultural 
production. Second, it distributed land to non-farming households such 
as small traders and other non-farm workers who did not know how 
to farm. Finally, local cadres and state agencies had taken advantage of 
the policy to use land inappropriately. Now peasants wanted their old 
land back.91 
To boost commodity production, the directive advocated the 
elimination of the prohibition on non-resident cultivators and the 
retrieval of land that was farmed poorly or illegally. Retrieved land was 
to be redistributed to productive landowners or to those who currently 
had insufficient land. However, the directive called for land disputes to 
be dealt with cautiously, case by case. It also stipulated that landlords, 
reactionaries, rich peasants and rural capitalists whose land had been 
confiscated under the policy to eliminate exploitation did not have the 
right to reclaim their land.92 
To clarify the central government’s Directive No. 47, leaders in An Giang 
issued Directive No. 303-QD-UB (4 October 1988)—which contained 
a feature not mentioned in the central directive. It encouraged former 
landowners and the new users of land to negotiate with each other 
to determine who should own the land and to decide on the level of 
any compensation. For example, if a new land user wanted to keep 
the land, they would have to compensate the former landholders for the 
cost of land reclamation and transformation (công khai phá và cải tạo 
ruộng đất), although this would be applicable only to middle peasant 
households. Otherwise, the former landowner must compensate the 
new land user for the cost of rehabilitating and transforming the land 
and the value of the crop on it.93 
91  Ban Tuyên Huấn Trung Ương, The Party’s Response to Urgent Land Problems, p. 9. 
92  Ibid., pp. 9–14. 
93  UBNDTAG (1989), Quyết định 303/QĐ-UB [An Giang People’s Committee Directive No. 303], 
4 October, Long Xuyên: An Giang.
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Directive No. 303 triggered a second wave of land disputes in An 
Giang. One popular rumour was that authorities would return land to 
its former landowners. Excited by this news, many former landowners 
in Long Điền B rushed to claim their land. Some met new land users to 
negotiate the return of their land; some simply brought seeds to sow on 
their old land regardless of what the authorities said; and some gathered 
at commune and district offices to strike and demand resolution of 
their land claims. All of this caused what villagers in Long Điền B 
called ‘great turmoil’ (đảo lộn) in Chợ Mới district and elsewhere in 
An  Giang during the late 1980s.94 A former vice-chairman of Long 
Điền B commune shared a story of how one former landowner whose 
family had two ploughing machines responded to Directive No. 303: 
Hearing news of Directive No. 303, before anyone was ready to work the 
fields, he and his brothers carried long knives and machines to plough 
his family’s old land. They threatened to kill anyone who dared to block 
them. So, the new land users did not dare to. Finally, the commune 
police had to arrest them. At the office, they argued that authorities had 
redistributed their land to others to do collective farming in production 
units, but now collective farming in production units did not really 
exist any more so the authorities had to return the land to them.95 
A Long Điền B resident who had lost 6 hectares of land in Long Điền A 
commune due to the non-resident cultivator prohibition, and who later 
took that land back, recalled: 
Before the reunification, I had 6 hectares of land [in Long Điền A]. After 
reunification, revolutionary authorities took all my land to redistribute 
to others. They took my land right out of my hands. The hamlet chief 
in Long Điền A appropriated much of my land. However, after Mr 
Linh came to power, I had a chance to take it back. I also sent many 
letters to claim my land, but authorities rejected them all. So, I decided 
to break the law. My two brothers and I brought machetes to the field to 
work; I said that if he [the hamlet chief] came to the field, we would kill 
him. I said that it was right for the authorities to take abandoned land, 
but not right to steal land from people. Thanks to the party secretary of 
Long Điền A commune, who asked the hamlet chief to return the land 
to me, I was able to get the land back.96 
94  Author’s interviews, June–August 2005, Long Điền B.
95  Author’s interview, 29 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
96  Author’s interview, 9 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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A former cadre of production unit no. 1 who was aware of land conflicts 
after Directive No. 303 recalled:
Directive No. 303 did not tell the new users of land to return land to the 
old landowners. It just mentioned that both needed to negotiate with 
each other in the spirit of mutual concession. But it seemed that the 
authorities favoured the interests of the old landowners. I did not know 
what provincial leaders’ opinions were, but I knew that some district 
and commune cadres implicitly supported returning land to the old 
landowners [to boost commodity production]. As far as I remember, 
at the meeting to deal with land disputes in 1988, Mr Chau, a district 
leader, said that people could not get rich with 2 and 3 công of land. 
With a few of công of land, people could not produce commodity 
paddy. So,  people should return land to old landowners and find 
other businesses. Therefore, in land disputes, old landowners had the 
advantage over new land users. Eventually, most new land users in 
Long Điền B decided to return land to old landowners.97 
As discussed in previous chapters, during land redistribution, 
authorities in Long Điền B allowed landowners to ‘lend’ (cho mượn) 
much of their surplus land to their land-poor relatives. Moreover, Long 
Điền B villagers highly respected the rights of individual landownership 
and values of justice and religious morality. Therefore, new land users 
tended to return land to its former owners. A man who lost his land 
in Đồng Lớn later received 3 công of land from his relative, but, after 
Directive No. 303, he felt emotional about his relative (tình cảm bà 
con) so he decided to return the land. He did not want to fight over it 
because it would bring him a bad reputation (mang tiếng).98 Similarly, a 
landless man who received a few công from an acquaintance decided to 
return it to its previous owner. He felt it was odd for him to take another 
person’s land, and he would rather be poor than steal someone else’s 
land (giựt đất người khác).99 
Some landowners in Long Điền B still complained they were unable to 
reclaim their land, especially land located in other communes, districts 
or provinces. Notably, peasants who had land in Đồng Tháp said they 
could not get it back as the authorities there favoured their own residents. 
However, landowners who had lost fields in Thoại Sơn and Châu Thành 
districts in An Giang province were able to take back much of their 
97  Author’s interview, 17 August 2005, Long Điền B.
98  Author’s interview, 3 August 2005, Long Điền B.
99  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B.
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land during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In general, from 1988 to the 
early 1990s, many upper–middle and middle peasants retrieved much 
of their previous landholdings. An upper–middle peasant who had lost 
200 công of land in Thoại Sơn recalled: ‘Thanks to Mr Linh, I could 
retrieve half of my land and a ploughing machine. I was very happy 
when I took it back. People should worship Mr Linh!’100 
According to one report, from 1988 to 1990, An Giang had dealt with 
more than 30,000 peasant complaints about land, which reduced 
tensions in rural areas.101 However, the legacy of collectivisation and 
land disputes in An Giang was not solved yet. Still today land disputes 
are a hot issue in rural areas of An Giang and elsewhere in the Southern 
Region. 
Local cadres’ practices in An Giang 
Under the product contract system, collectivisation in An Giang 
accelerated. This required additional local cadres and increased efforts 
to supervise them. Yet, despite the efforts of An Giang’s leaders to 
improve the quality of local cadres during the period 1981–88, problems 
remained and even seemed to worsen. The most common malpractices 
among local cadres were misappropriation of land and embezzlement 
of state agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, fuel and so on). 
Misappropriating collective inputs and funds
An Giang newspaper accounts highlighted numerous cases of local 
cadres who exploited their positions to misappropriate and embezzle 
agricultural inputs. For example, a report on 27 June 1982 said that, 
after receiving state provisions of fertiliser and fuel, a commune cadre 
in Châu Thành district sold them on the ‘black market’ for a quick profit 
rather than giving them to peasants, according to the requirements of 
the B contracts. The commune cadre used his ill-gotten gains to upgrade 
his house and pigpen and reported to the higher-level authorities that 
peasants had refused to pay their input debts.102 
100  Author’s interview, 18 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
101  UBNDTAG, An Giang Province, p. 400. 
102  Chuyện to nhỏ: Ông cán bộ xã T [Some issues: Commune cadre], An Giang, 27 June 1982, p. 4. 
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In March 1983, An Giang reported: 
Recently, some peasants complained that local cadres were stealing 
production unit inputs to sell on the black market for a quick profit or 
to raise [black] funds. Some cadres even misappropriated inputs worth 
15 tonnes of paddy … This made agricultural production in An Giang 
difficult.103 
In 1984, An Giang put several local cadres on trial for embezzling 
agricultural inputs, collective paddy and other goods. In July 1984, 
Tran Van Ba, a Long Xuyên agricultural input station accountant, 
was put on trial for colluding with leaders of production units and 
production solidarity teams and misappropriating a large quantity of 
inputs to sell on the black market.104 In September, an accountant from 
Bình Long commune’s food station was taken to court for writing fake 
invoices and embezzling 3,027 kilograms of state paddy to sell on the 
black market.105 In December, the An Giang people’s court tried 26 
cadres who were staff of the provincial food department. They were 
accused of increasing the price of cement, which the Ministry of Food 
used to exchange for paddy with peasants. In addition, they created 
fake receipts for millions of dong, embezzled, took bribes and stole 
state inputs. In the end, the court sentenced one of them to death; the 
head of the provincial Ministry of Food was sentenced to 17 years’ 
imprisonment and others were sentenced to many years in jail.106 
Despite continuous efforts by the An Giang authorities to tackle cadres’ 
misbehaviour, problems persisted. On 16 May 1986, An Giang reported 
that two-thirds of provincial goods used to exchange for peasants’ paddy 
had fallen into the hands of individual merchants, most of whom were 
relatives of local cadres.107 Local cadres unilaterally increased the prices 
of goods and agricultural inputs that peasants had to purchase from 
state agencies. The cadres then sold considerable amounts of these goods 
and inputs on the black market, making quick profits. This contributed 
103  Chuyện to nhỏ: Nên chấm dứt [Some issues: Stop it], An Giang, 13 March 1983, p. 4.
104  Tóa án nhân dân tỉnh xét xử đầu cơ và hối lộ [Provincial People’s Court adjudication on 
speculation and bribery], An Giang, 12 July 1984, p. 3. 
105  Huyện Châu Phú xét xử bọn tham ô lương thực [Châu Thành District Court tries food 
thieves], An Giang, 27 September 1984, p. 3. 
106  Phạm nhiều tội, 26 bị cáo ra tòa án nhân dân An Giang [26 defendants sentenced for many 
crimes in An Giang People’s Court], An Giang, 27 December 1984, p. 2.
107  Hàng đổi hàng đến tay ai? [Who benefits from goods exchanged for paddy?], An Giang, 
16 May 1986, pp. 3–4.
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to inflation in the province and aided the survival of black markets and 
individual merchants—something the VCP leadership was trying to 
control and eliminate.108 
At the local level, production unit cadres played an intermediary role in 
economic transactions between the state and peasants, so they had even 
more opportunities to capture resources. It was common for villagers to 
send letters to newspapers or the state to accuse cadres of embezzling 
agricultural inputs and collective property. For example, in 1984, 
peasants in production unit no. 12 in Kiến Thành commune (Chợ Mới 
district) sent a letter accusing their production unit cadres of buying 
things without receipts. They also accused them of stealing agricultural 
inputs and overcharging members for the costs of production (such as 
fuel, fertilisers and collective funds).109 
Likewise, according to the An Giang newspaper in August 1984, 
peasants in one production unit were surprised to see the paddy 
fields of production unit cadres were more luxuriant and had higher 
productivity than those of ordinary peasants, when all were supposed 
to be operating under the same conditions. An inspection found that 
production unit cadres had taken scarce agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilisers, pesticides and fuels, for themselves, rather than distributing 
them among households. They also sold some of these products on the 
black market. This explained why, after a few years of working as cadres, 
all had newly renovated houses and expensive belongings.110 
Villagers in Long Điền B asserted that production unit cadres 
embezzled a considerable sum of agricultural inputs and collective 
funds. From 1982 to 1987, inspections discovered many production 
unit cadres embezzling agricultural inputs and collective paddy. Some 
were imprisoned—for example, a former production unit head was 
sentenced to several months in prison in 1986 for embezzling 75 giạ 
of paddy (according to him), but 16 tonnes of paddy according to his 
successor.111 A man in production unit no. 9 recalled: 
108  Chuyện to nhỏ: Xé rào [Some issues: Fence breaking], An Giang, 31 October 1982, p. 4; Xã 
luận: Tăng cường quản lý thị trường và ổn định giá cả [The editorial: Strengthening control of 
markets and stabilising prices], An Giang, 22 May 1983, p. 1; Who benefits from goods exchanged 
for paddy?, An Giang, 16 May 1986, pp. 3–4.
109  Chuyện to nhỏ: Đề nghị giải quyết thỏa đáng [Some issues: The need to solve the problem 
satisfactorily], An Giang, 28 August 1983, p. 4.
110  Chuyện to nhỏ: Chuyện các ngài trong ban quản lý tập đoàn [Some issues: The problems 
caused by production unit managerial cadres], An Giang, 8 October 1984, p. 4.
111  Author’s interviews, 9 and 11 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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The production unit cadres served people very poorly, but embezzled 
very well. Their pockets were full from embezzlement. For example, 
when pumping water to peasant fields, it cost one container of fuel, but 
they reported three. When raising funds to buy farm machines, instead 
of charging each production unit member 30 kilograms of paddy per 
1 công of their land, they charged 34 kilograms. So, how much would 
they get for about 1,000 công of land?112 
The inspections in Chợ Mới during the second quarter of 1986 also 
showed violations in several managerial boards of production units. For 
example, in Bình Hòa commune, a storekeeper for production unit no. 
17 embezzled 3,235 kilograms of paddy; a storekeeper for production 
unit no. 15 embezzled 6,051 kilograms; and a leader of production unit 
no. 7 misappropriated 6,244 kilograms of collective grain.113 A former 
cadre of the Chợ Mới Committee for Agricultural Transformation 
recalled: 
Most production units were not low in quality; they were production 
units on paper and ghost units [tập đoàn giấy, tập đoàn ma]. When 
inspecting, we discovered violations in many of them. Because the 
inspection was to strengthen production units, we did not take them to 
court [đưa ra pháp luật]. For example, in 1986, the provincial inspection 
in Mỹ Hội Đông and Mỹ Lương communes uncovered many cases of 
cadre embezzlement, but they were settled internally [xử lý nội bộ], not 
in public.114 
In explaining why so many local cadres embezzled, a primary 
schoolteacher from Long Điền B commented that production unit 
leaders were selected from revolutionary and pro-revolutionary 
families; most were poorly educated but were recruited because they 
readily accepted the posts (while better educated people were reluctant 
to take on such positions). They had also not been well trained, so they 
managed the units ambiguously and poorly. The teacher concluded: 
‘All cadres in production units and interproduction units embezzled 
collective resources.’115 
112  Author’s interview, 10 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
113  Huyện Chợ Mới tiến hành kiểm tra một số tập đoàn nông nghiệp [Chợ Mới district carried 
out investigations into some production units], An Giang, 13 June 1986, p. 1.
114  Author’s interview, 17 June 2005, Chợ Mới.
115  Author’s interview, 15 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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Cadres’ debts
An Giang newspaper accounts suggest cadres’ improper behaviour 
continued and even worsened. In November 1984, the provincial 
food department found that peasants’ debt was small compared 
with that of local cadres. For example, four communes in Châu Phú 
district each owed 400 to 500 tonnes of paddy; most debtors were 
local cadres.116 In May 1985, many areas of Châu Thành district still 
had huge debts; some  communes owed 600 tonnes of paddy each, 
according to a  provincial Inspection Commission report. And most 
of the large debtors were cadres. For example, in A. H. commune, 
the chairman owed 80 tonnes of paddy; the chief and the storekeeper 
of the  commune’s Department of Agricultural Inputs owed 14 and 
16 tonnes of paddy, respectively.117 In Bình Hòa commune, 30 of 36 
production units were in debt, much of it due to cadres’ theft. Fearing 
punishment, some production unit cadres ran away (bỏ trốn). 
Commune and district cadres in Châu Thành also had large debts. For 
example, Duong Van Minh, a district irrigation agent, owed 4 tonnes 
of paddy, while Vo Van Rang, a district inspection agent, owed 806 
kilograms. Such officials, according to a 1987 report, ‘took advantage of 
their positions and the weakness of loose management to collude and 
steal state agricultural inputs. Some cadres owed 50–70 tonnes, even 
more.’118 
Similar to Châu Thành district was Thoại Sơn. From 1983 to the winter–
spring of 1986–87, that district had 21,500 tonnes of paddy debt, of 
which input (B contract) debt was 15,000 tonnes and unpaid taxes were 
6,500 tonnes. According to a manager of the district’s food company, 
the debts of production unit, commune and district cadres accounted 
for 70 per cent of the total; ordinary peasants’ debt was only 30 per cent. 
Moreover, despite commune and district cadres’ families owing large 
debts, production unit cadres did not dare collect because they ‘feared 
higher officials’ (tâm lý sợ cấp trên).119 
116  Chuyện to nhỏ: Nợ không chụi trả [Some issues: Refusing to pay outstanding debt], An Giang, 
16 November 1984, p. 4. 
117  Cited from Chuyện to nhỏ [Some big and small issues], An Giang, 24 May 1985, p. 4.
118  Tại sao Châu Thành chưa giải quyết được tình trạng nợ trầm trọng? [Why haven’t Châu 
Thành district authorities dealt with their huge outstanding debt?], An Giang, 31 May 1985, p. 3. 
119  Tình hình thanh lý nợ hợp đồng trong sản xuất nông nghiệp ở Thoại Sơn [Contract debt 
liquidation in agricultural production in Thoại Sơn district], An Giang, 4 September 1987, p. 3. 
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Phú Tân district experienced similar circumstances. From the winter–
spring of 1986–87 to June 1987, the total debt of 20 party members 
and 50 production unit cadres reached thousands of tonnes of paddy. 
Some owed 40–50 tonnes of paddy each.120 In Hòa Lạc commune (Phú 
Tân), 24 of 27 commune party cell members owed more than 1 tonne 
of paddy each.121 
Local cadres’ debts were large and common in many parts of An Giang. 
The provincial newspaper in July 1987 said commune, hamlet and 
production unit cadres in the province owed about 70 per cent of the 
total B contract debt.122 
In late 1987, provincial leaders decided to revise the policy on 
agricultural inputs. Local cadres’ poor management and embezzlement 
hindered the accurate and timely delivery of inputs, causing difficulties 
for production and peasants’ livelihoods. From the winter–spring 
of 1987–88 onwards, An Giang decided to end the delivery of state 
agricultural inputs to peasants through production units. Instead, 
state inputs would be sold to peasants directly in exchange for cash or 
paddy.123 
Misappropriating peasants’ land
Cadres in many parts of An Giang were accused of misappropriating 
(chiếm dụng) peasants’ land, accounts of which emerged after Đổi 
Mới, and especially after the provincial people’s committee issued 
its Decision No. 93 (19 February 1987). In May 1987, the An Giang 
newspaper pointed out: 
Over the past years, the redistribution of provincial land was irrational. 
Some cadres have taken advantage of their position to gain good land 
for themselves and their families. Others did not cultivate the land 
but took a considerable portion of it. Many state organisations at 
district and provincial levels took advantage of their collective status to 
misappropriate land.124 
120  Cai hợp đồng B [Boss of the B contracts], An Giang, 28 August 1987, p. 7. 
121  The problem of agricultural investment, An Giang, 17 July 1987, p. 2. 
122  Ibid.
123  Peasants need a rational method of agricultural investment, An Giang, 23 October 1987, p. 2. 
124  Don’t mistake rational reallocation, An Giang, 29 May 1987, p. 1. 
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In July 1988, the An Giang newspaper listed the names of several cadres 
who had used the prohibition against non-resident cultivators to take 
land for themselves. For example, Cao Hồng Dinh, Tân Lập commune 
police chief, whose family already had 2 hectares of land, took another 
6 hectares; Ba Hương, the commune’s Department of Agriculture 
head, appropriated over 10 hectares; and Tứ Dũng, the vice-commune 
chairman, took more than 12 hectares. Some peasants whose fields 
had been usurped ‘lost their temper’ (loạn trí) and went to commune 
offices, shouting and demanding their land back.125 
Several government offices and mass organisations took land for illicit 
purposes. In Định Mỹ commune in Thoại Sơn district, for instance, such 
organisations took more than 160 hectares. They tried to justify this by 
calling the areas ‘self-sufficient land’ (đất tự túc) to serve the benefit of 
the entire organisation. Although annoyed, villagers initially tolerated 
this behaviour, but certain officials ended up using the land as their own. 
For example, the commune’s party secretary took 6  hectares of land 
for himself; the party’s vice-secretary took 12 hectares; the commune’s 
vice-chairman took 12 hectares; and the chief of the commune police 
took 6 hectares. One group of cadres claimed a vast 167 hectares, 
which they classified as unclaimed land (đất hở). A Mr Cop, a cadre 
of the commune’s Department of Agricultural Tax, took (bao chiếm) 
26 hectares for himself, an act he hid by using the names of seven 
different landholders. Lê Văn Dũng, the chief of the same department, 
appropriated 14 hectares and hid the theft under four different names. 
Mr Tân, the chief of communal police, stole 31 hectares, while Út Hên, 
the commune vice-chairman, took 31 hectares, using the names of 
different landholders.126 
Land misuse was also severe in Phú Tân district. In 1982, district 
authorities prohibited non-residents from farming there. Taking 
advantage of the situation, many local cadres took fields for themselves. 
For example, Trần Văn Phát, the leader of production unit no. 17 in 
Long Phú commune, took more than 2.7 hectares; Nguyễn Văn Hảo, 
the leader of production unit no. 15, took 5.4 hectares; Tô Văn Ba, the 
chairman of Long Phú commune’s Father Front (a social organisation), 
took 1 hectare; Út Bình, the former commune chairman, appropriated 
125  Nỗi oan trái của bà con nông dân Tân Lập [The grievances of peasants in Tân Lập], An Giang, 
1 July and 8 July 1988, p. 3. 
126  Những người bao chiếm đất [Land misusers], An Giang, 5 August and 19 August 1988, p. 2. 
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5 hectares; Chau Ngoc Chao, the commune chairman, appropriated 
5 hectares; and Nguyễn Văn Thái, the commune’s party secretary, 
appropriated 4.5 hectares. By August 1988, hamlet and production unit 
cadres had taken 78 hectares from non-resident farmers.127 
Cadres also misused land in Chợ Mới. A man in Long Điền B admitted 
that local cadres misappropriated land everywhere, and it was common 
for cadres to have more land than ordinary people.128 Another man 
said compared with land appropriation elsewhere, in Chợ Mới it was 
less severe.129 However, in some Chợ Mới communes, according to 
accounts in the An Giang newspaper, land appropriation was just as bad 
as elsewhere. For example, in Tân Mỹ commune in Chợ Mới district, 
many cadres took peasant land, concealing their action under different 
names. Some even resold the land to make a quick profit. Cadres 
delayed or, in the worst cases, avoided implementing state policy on 
returning land to the previous landowners. So, nearly two years after 
Decision No. 93 (19 February 1987) had been issued, authorities in Tân 
Mỹ commune had not settled any peasants’ land claims.130 
Other bad practices
An Giang villagers often accused cadres of monopolising and 
overcharging for farming services to production units. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, households in most production units in 
An Giang did almost all phases of farmwork themselves.131 Production 
unit cadres, however, controlled certain farming resources and services, 
such as irrigation and equipment for ploughing, raking and threshing. 
Often cadres and the specialised teams responsible for providing or 
using these resources were inefficient or unfair in how they provided 
services. A man in Long Điền B recalled how irrigation was done in 
his fields: 
127  Phú Long: Cán bộ xã còn bao chiếm đất [Phú Long: Cadres still misappropriate land], 
An Giang, 9 December 1988, p. 4.
128  Author’s interview, 29 August 2005, Long Điền B.
129  Author’s interview, 27 July 2005, Long Điền B.
130  Đất: Tiếng kêu từ phía nông dân [Land problem: A cry from peasants], An Giang, 
18 November 1988, p. 3.
131  Chuyện to nhỏ: Ông tập đoàn trưởng [Some issues: Production unit leader], An Giang, 
13 June 1982, p. 4.
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Production unit, my goodness! Production unit members had to 
compete with each other to have their land watered. We had to draw 
lots to determine who was served first. If we were first, we had to spend 
days and nights guarding the water. Within two days, if we hadn’t 
finished watering, we had to give the water to others and waited for 
another turn.132 
A woman from Long Điền B added: ‘The production unit teams irrigated 
for some people and not for others. When irrigating fields, some places 
got too much water, others nothing.’133 A man in production unit no. 9 
in Long Điền B remembered problems getting his fields ploughed: 
We contributed paddy to the production unit to buy ploughing and 
threshing machines but we still had to pay for ploughing and threshing. 
They were not free of charge. Moreover, the guys controlling the 
machinery served their relatives first rather than the rest of us. In order 
to have our land ploughed, we had to entreat [năn nỉ] them five or 
10 times and always carry cash to pay them right away. Otherwise, they 
would not plough our land.134 
In April 1983, the An Giang newspaper reported that, in a certain 
district, only a few collective ploughing machines operated even at 
peak times of land preparation. Moreover, their ploughing capacity was 
extremely low. The reason, according to the article, was that operators 
of the collective machines were waiting for ‘special fuel’ (bribes) from 
peasants, which was ‘necessary for machines to run fast’.135 
In July 1986, the newspaper reported that peasants in one 
interproduction unit had criticised cadres for poor ploughing services: 
When ploughing, equipment operators just ploughed around the 
plot, leaving the centre untouched … [and] often the tractors ran like 
a racehorse [chạy như ngựa đua] and raked like a mouse scratching the 
land [xới như chuột cào].136 
132  Author’s interview, 2 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
133  Author’s interview, 12 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
134  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
135  Lệ Làng [Village customs], An Giang, 24 April 1983, p. 4. 
136  Tự phê bình và phê bình: Ý kiến từ một cuộc họp [Criticism and self-criticism: Opinion from 
a meeting], An Giang, 4 July 1986, p. 3.
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As a result, the fields were poorly prepared. In addition, the 
interproduction unit cadres often rented out tractors to other areas 
instead of fulfilling their obligations to members of their own 
interproduction unit.137 
A former cadre of Long Điền B commune complained about the 
performance of disease prevention teams (đội bảo vệ thực vật): 
During that time [of production units], peasants complained a lot 
about these teams because they performed very poorly. They called 
the crop protection team đội bảo vệ thịt vịt [the ‘duck meat protection 
team’] because only by giving the teams duck meat did they work well. 
Otherwise, they worked badly. In the end, we let peasants receive 
pesticides and spray their own crops.138 
One of the most annoying things for villagers in Long Điền B was that 
production unit cadres monopolised the threshing service for peasants’ 
paddy. One man recalled: 
The production unit took over threshing our paddy without allowing 
others [other production units or individuals] to do the job, regardless 
of whether it was raining or not. They also overcharged us.139 
Similarly, another man recalled the way his interproduction unit 
threshed: 
The interproduction unit [including four production units] had four 
threshing machines, so each production unit had one machine. How 
could they thresh people’s paddy in time? They did not allow people to 
hire outside threshing services. When it rained, people’s paddy got wet 
and rotted. Seeing their paddy going to ruin, some people got so angry 
that they lay down on the road where cadres passed their threshing 
machines and shouted, ‘Thresh my paddy or kill me!’140 
Local cadres’ malpractice contributed to the derailment of national and 
provincial agrarian policies. By capturing such a large proportion of 
state and collective resources and serving farmers poorly, local cadres 
exacerbated the poor performance of collective organisations, and of 
agriculture in the south as a whole. While one of the original aims 
137  Ibid., p. 3. 
138  Author’s interview, 29 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
139  Author’s interview, 27 July 2005, Long Điền B.
140  Author’s interview, 16 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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of  the VCP’s agrarian reforms was to eliminate exploiting classes, in 
many areas, rural cadres became a new class of exploiters. The An Giang 
newspaper reflected critically that, 12 years after the country’s 
reunification, peasants should have escaped poverty and backwardness. 
However, having just escaped from the darkness of landlordism, 
peasants were exploited by ‘new landlords’ (địa chủ mới) masked in the 
name of production units.141 The following cartoons (Figures 7.1–7.4) 
from the An Giang newspaper depict cadres’ other misdemeanours in 
An Giang during the period of product contracts. 
Figure 7.1 Internal funds
Behind the accountant of a production unit were several types of ‘internal funds’ [quỹ nội 
bộ] used only by cadres themselves .
Source: drawn by Nguyen Ngo, published in An Giang, 2 August 1983, p . 4 . 
141  Những điều nghe thấy từ thực tế [Some issues learned from reality], An Giang, 4 March 1988, 
p. 3. 
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Figure 7.2 Red tape
A peasant who submits his petition to the boss in a state office must go through several 
gates. The first gatekeeper asks, ‘Do you have permission papers?’ The second gatekeeper 
asks, ‘do you want to meet the boss? wait here .’ After considering the form, the secretary 
replies: ‘Approved, come and pick up the results in a few days .’ But the cadre behind the 
secretary says: ‘Finished, come and pick up the result in a few months .’ Flooded with piles 
of petition letters, the boss shouts: ‘go back home! I will sign later after studying it .’ Finally, 
the peasant wonders: ‘But we are told that red tape has been eliminated!’
Source: drawn by T . Q . Vu, published in An Giang, 2 october 1987, p . 7 . 
Figure 7.3 Prohibiting the use of cameras
While preparing a lavish party, the boss orders a staff member to post a big sign prohibiting 
the use of cameras so that, the boss says, ‘we need not fear being photographed by 
journalists!’
Source: drawn by T . Q . Vu, published in An Giang, 2 September 1987, p . 7 .
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Figure 7.4 Heart problem
After examining a cadre who has benefited from bureaucratic red tape and embezzlement, 
the doctor says: ‘you have a heart problem!’ The cadre ponders: ‘Probably I have had this 
problem since the appearance of NVL .’142
Source: drawn by Van Thanh, published in An Giang, 4 September 1987, p . 7 . 
142  NVL is the abbreviation of the name of the Communist Party General Secretary, Nguyễn 
Văn Linh, who initiated the Đổi Mới policy and cracked down on corruption. ‘NVL’ was often also 
interpreted as ‘Nói và Làm’ (‘speaking and doing’). 
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A return to household farming
QN-ĐN in the Central Coast 
According to QN-ĐN government statistics, in the first few years of 
the product contract system, staple food production in the province 
increased from 460,000 tonnes in 1980 to 500,000 tonnes in 1981 and 
525,000 tonnes in 1982.143 However, from 1983 to 1985, staple food 
production stagnated, and then decreased to 510,000 tonnes in 1983.144 
It increased slightly in 1984 (to 522,000 tonnes) and in 1985 (to 540,000 
tonnes), but fell short of the expected targets for those years—535,000 
tonnes for 1984 and 545,000 tonnes for 1985.145 Therefore, from 1981 
to 1985, the annual growth rate of the food yield in QN-ĐN was about 
only 1.4 per cent. 
Despite a slight increase in QN-ĐN’s staple food production from 
1981 to 1985, collective members’ incomes from the collective sector 
deteriorated because many households could not produce more than 
the quota and the value of their collective workdays was low.146 For 
example, in Bình Lãnh collective (Thăng Bình district), staple food 
production increased slightly, from 2,300 tonnes in 1982 to 2,400 tonnes 
in 1983 and 2,600 tonnes in 1984, but the value of a workday decreased, 
from 2 kilograms of paddy in 1982 to 1.3 kilograms in 1983 and about 
1.4 kilograms in 1984. Similarly, in Duy An collective no. 1 (Duy Xuyên 
district), staple food production increased 20 per cent during 1982–
84, but the value of a workday deceased from 2.7 kilograms in 1982 to 
2.2 kilograms in 1984.147 
143  Vietnamese statistics are often flattering for political and propaganda purposes; however, the 
numbers can be useful for comparison (Paddy production over the past years, Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng, 14 September 1983, p. 1).
144  Phạm Đức Nam: Kết quả năm 1983 và phương hướng phấn đấu năm 1984 trên mặt trận sản 
xuất nông nghiệp của tỉnh nhà [Phạm Đức Nam: The results of agricultural production in 1983 
and plans for 1984], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 15 October 1983, p. 1. 
145  Tổng kết sản xuất nông nghiệp năm 1985, chuẩn bị cho vụ Đông–Xuân tới [Summary of 
agricultural production in 1985 and preparing for the winter–spring crop], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
21 September 1985, p. 1.
146  The product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 8 November 1984, p. 1.
147  Ibid. 
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According to Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper accounts, one reason 
for the decreased value of a workday in the period 1981–85 was an 
increase in the state’s staple food procurement from the collective sector 
and unfair terms of trade between agricultural inputs and agricultural 
outputs, which favoured the former.148 For example, in QN-ĐN, state 
food procurement increased from 61,227 tonnes in 1980 to 110,000 
tonnes in 1984 and to 120,877 tonnes in 1985, accounting for about 
22 per cent of total yield.149 Another report showed that collective staple 
food obligations had increased 2.41 times between 1980 and 1984.150 
Meanwhile, the price of paddy was low but the prices of agricultural 
inputs and other industrial goods were high during 1982–85. Many 
households therefore could not farm profitably and ‘were afraid to 
invest and expand their production’.151 
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng reports in late 1983 revealed several cases of 
weak collectives across various districts of the province. For example, 
an investigation in June 1983 discovered that many collectives in Tam 
Kỳ district were weak and had veered from party directives. In these 
collectives, ‘blank contracts’ were popular at both the collective and 
the brigade levels. Draught animals had not been fully collectivised, so 
collectives could not use them. Land and labour were loosely managed, 
so collective members’ earnings from the sector made up only a minor 
proportion of their total income.152 A close investigation of Tam Phước 
collective, one of the weak collectives in Tam Kỳ district, showed that, 
after adopting product contracts, its collective relations of production 
weakened. The collective had 1,257 hectares of rice land and 563 
hectares of secondary-crop land; however, only half the rice land was 
used for collective farming. The remainder, especially the secondary-
148  Ibid.
149  Quán triệt nghị quyết hội nghị lần thứ 7 Ban chấp hành trung ương đảng: Ban chấp hành 
đảng bộ tỉnh quy định phương hướng nhiệm vụ năm 1985 [Full resolution of the 7th Plenum of 
the Provincial Party Committee: Plans for the year 1985], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 2 February 1985, 
p. 1; Năm năm phát triển sản xuất nông nghiệp [Five years of agricultural production], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 1 February 1986, p. 2.
150  Summary of three years of implementing the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 6 July 
1985, p. 1; Ban Kinh Tế Tỉnh Ủy QN-ĐN (1985), Tốc độ khôi phục kinh tế và phát triển xã hội của 
tỉnh gần 10 năm giải phóng, [QN-ĐN’s Economic Performance over the Past 10 Years], 16 February, 
Tam Kỳ: Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng. 
151  Summary of three years of implementing the product contract, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 6 July 
1985, p. 1. The price ratio of urea fertiliser to paddy in 1983–84 was about 1:2.
152  Củng cố và đưa các hợp tác xã nông nghiệp của huyện Tam Kỳ tiếp tục tiến lên [Solidifying 
and advancing collectives in Tam Kỳ district], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 4 June 1983, p. 3.
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crop land, was used by landowners for their household economy. 
Therefore, a large proportion of collective members’ income came from 
their own household economic activities.153
Collective organisations also suffered losses. According to An Giang’s 
Provincial Committee of Agriculture (Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh Ủy), the 
economic efficiency of collective activities during 1982–84 was so low 
that many could not even cover their costs. (For example, in 1984, 
24 of 40 collectives in Thăng Bình district suffered a loss.) To reduce 
such losses, collectives in QN-ĐN increased their quotas and the price 
of agricultural inputs sold to peasants. They also reduced household 
investment and lowered the value of a collective workday, which is why 
collectives in the province paid their members low rates for a workday—
less than 1 kilogram of paddy.154 
In November 1984, an investigation into eight collectives in different 
areas of QN-ĐN found that members in Bình Nguyên’s collectives in 
Thăng Bình district suffered an average loss of 200 kilograms of paddy 
per hectare. Those in Đại Phước collective in Đại Lộc district lost 
400 kilograms per hectare. Members in Tam Nghia collective in Tam 
Kỳ district lost 123 kilograms per hectare, while Tam Thái collective 
no. 1 in Tam Kỳ district lost 123 kilograms; Đại Hiệp collective no. 2 
in Đại Lộc district lost 148 kilograms; and Bình Lãnh collective in 
Thăng Bình district lost 210 kilograms. Only in Đại Phước collective 
no. 1 in Đại Lộc district did collective members show an average profit, 
of 54 kilograms of paddy per hectare.155 
After Đổi Mới officially began in 1986, the performance of agriculture 
and collective farming in QN-ĐN dropped alarmingly. The province’s 
staple food production fell from 540,000 tonnes in 1985 to 463,000 
tonnes in 1987.156 For paddy and corn, in particular, production 
dropped between 1985 and 1988 (see Table 7.1). At a meeting about 
‘solidifying and strengthening agricultural production relations’ in 
153  Tam Phước củng cố hợp tác xã nông nghiệp [Tam Phuoc solidifies collectives], Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 9 July 1983, p. 3. The article did not mention how the other half of rice land had been 
used. It seems this land was largely under the control of landowners.
154  Ban Nông Nghiệp Tỉnh Ủy QN-ĐN (1984), Những vấn đề cần giải quyết để phát huy động lực 
của chế độ khoán mới trong hợp tác xã sản xuất nông nghiệp [Some Ideas to Facilitate the Incentives 
for Product Contracts], 24 November, Tam Kỳ: Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng.
155  Ibid.
156  Sơ kết sản xuất nông nghiệp năm 1987, chuẩn bị vụ sản xuất Đông–Xuân tới [Preliminary 
summing up of 1987 agricultural production and preparing for the winter–spring crop], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 17 September 1987, p. 1.
229
7 . LoCAL PoLITICS ANd THE wITHERINg oF CoLLECTIVE FARMINg, 1981–88
June 1987—and in the spirit of ‘looking the truth straight in the eye’ 
(nhìn thẳng sự thật), inspired by the Đổi Mới policy—provincial leaders 
recognised ‘some problems and weaknesses’ with the product contract 
system. They admitted that weak collectives were still numerous. 
Of 270 collectives in the province, 78 were weak (28.9 per cent), 103 were 
average (38.1 per cent) and 89 were good or advanced (33 per cent). 
In the midland area, weak collectives accounted for 45.2 per cent of the 
total.157 Collectivisation in Thăng Bình district was in an even worse 
situation: 36 per cent of its collectives were classified as weak, while 
only 19 per cent were considered good.158
Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng newspaper reports noted several reasons for 
the decrease in collective farming’s performance and peasants’ living 
conditions between 1986 and 1987. First, unfavourable weather affected 
crop yields. Second was the negative effect of the central government’s 
‘price–wage–currency’ reforms in September 1985. In particular, from 
late 1985, prices across the board in QN-ĐN increased sharply. The 
price of agricultural inputs increased faster than that of agricultural 
produce, leading to agricultural produce being sold below cost.159 
Third, the quantity, quality and variety of agricultural inputs were 
inadequate. In the two price systems (state and free market prices), 
enterprises serving state farms often sold agricultural inputs on the free 
market to make a quick profit at the expense of collectives. Meanwhile, 
collective organisations still lacked economic autonomy.160 Finally, 
cadres embezzled, stole collective resources and ‘prolonged work and 
inflated work-points’ for non-farming activities.161
157  Hội nghị củng cố và tăng cường quan hệ sản xuất trong nông nghiệp kết thúc tốt đẹp 
[The conference on solidifying agricultural production relations produced good results], Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 16 June 1987, p. 1. 
158  Thăng Bình mở rộng hội nghị củng cố phong trào hợp tác hóa [Thang Binh held a conference 
on solidifying collectives], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 18 August 1987, p. 3.
159  Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng (1987), Nghị quyết của Tỉnh ủy tiếp tục củng cố và tăng cường 
quan hệ sản xuất, hoàn thiện cơ chế khoán sản phẩm [Provincial Party Committee’s resolution on 
continuing to solidify production relations and perfect the product contract], Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam-
Đà Nẵng, 9 July. According to Nguyễn Khắc Viện, policies relating to the exchange of banknotes 
and readjustment of prices and wages in 1985 caused the country’s hyperinflation. Overall, prices 
increased 200 per cent in 1985, 550 per cent in 1986 and 400 per cent in 1987. See Nguyễn Khắc Viện 
(1990), 15 năm ấy: 1975–1990 [15 Years: 1975–1990], Hồ Chí Minh: NXB TP, p. 96. 
160  Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, Provincial Party Committee’s resolution on continuing to 
solidify production relations; Preliminary summing up of 1987 agricultural production, Quảng 
Nam-Đà Nẵng, 17 September 1987, p. 1.
161  Hoàn thiện cơ chế khoán sản phẩm trong nong nghiệp [Perfecting the product contract 
system], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 1 March 1988, p. 1.
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Table 7.1 Grain production (including paddy and corn) in QN-ĐN, 1976–88














Source: Cục Thống Kê tỉnh Quảng Nam (CTKQN) (2005), Quảng Nam 30 Năm Xây Dựng 
và Phát triển [Quang Nam’s Socioeconomic Development over the Past 30 Years], Tam Kỳ: 
Cục Thống Kê tỉnh Quảng Nam, p. 95.
Villagers in Hiền Lộc and Thanh Yên gave several reasons for the low 
performance of collective farming under the product contract system. 
One was a decrease in state investment in collective farming, which meant 
households did not have adequate chemical fertilisers and pesticides. 
Peasants’ inadequate care of fields led to low paddy productivity and, 
due to a lack of ownership rights, land was overexploited and degraded 
over time. In addition, the rice seeds were of poor quality—coming 
from stock people had planted again and again.162
Return to household farming 
In response to peasants’ resistance and the poor performance of 
collective farming, from late 1986 to 1987, some collectives in QN-ĐN 
began to experiment with new farming arrangements. For example, 
when a large number of households returned their contracted land, the 
managerial board of Bình Tú collective no. 1 in Thăng Bình district 
decided to implement ‘package contracts’ (khoán gọn) for peasants 
in the winter–spring of 1986–87. Under this arrangement, the work-
162  Author’s interviews, 4–19 October 2005, Hiền Lộc.
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points system was eliminated and the board announced in advance the 
cost of inputs, taxes and other fees. After paying these items, peasants 
were allowed to keep whatever was left. The board faced criticism 
from higher-level authorities about derailing and destroying socialist 
production relations; however, the new contracts resulted in peasants 
who had returned land asking for it back.163 
Similarly, in Điện Nam collective no. 2 in Điện Bàn district, after falling 
117 tonnes below its paddy production quota and 30 per cent of peasant 
households returning their land, leaders searched for a better farming 
arrangement in the winter–spring of 1986–87. To encourage peasants 
to retain their contracted land, the board decided to reward each 
household by lending it 1.3 sào of land for its own use if it also continued 
farming on its contracted land. Moreover, the collective cadres decided 
to implement contract no. 100 for only two farming seasons per year 
and to use ‘straight contracts’ (khoán thẳng) for the third season. Under 
the straight contracts, peasants knew in advance what they would have 
to pay the collective. The remainder of their harvest belonged to them, 
which produced an ‘enthusiastic’ (phấn khởi) response.164 
Other collectives, such as Hòa Sơn collective in Hòa Vang district and 
Điện Phước collective no. 1 in Điện Bàn district, also brought in new 
farming arrangements. A former chairman of Bình Lãnh collective 
admitted that his collective in the mid-1980s made ‘package contracts’ 
with peasants for infertile land they had returned or refused to farm 
under product contracts.165 The names of the new arrangements differed 
from one collective to another, but included ‘household contracts’ 
(khoán hộ), ‘package contracts’ (khoán gọn) and ‘agreement contracts’ 
(khoán hợp đồng).166 
In general, collectives experimenting with new farming arrangements 
achieved improved results, which came to the attention of provincial 
authorities. In June 1987, QN-ĐN’s leaders held a conference 
163  Sự thật về cách khoán mới ở Bình Tú 1 [The true story of new contract arrangements in Binh 
Tu Collective No. 1], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 23 June 1988, p. 4; Chuyện đồng ruộng cuối năm 
[Collective farming at the end of the year], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 31 December 1987, p. 3.
164  New farming arrangements created new incentives, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 24 December 
1987, p. 2. 
165  Author’s interview, 24 October 2004, Bình Lãnh.
166  Qua một năm cải tiến công tác khoán sản phẩm trong sản xuất nông nghiệp [An evaluation 
after one year of improving the product contract system], Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 30 August 1988, 
p. 2.
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‘on  solidifying and strengthening agricultural production relations’167 
at which they authorised new farming arrangements by releasing 
Directive No. 03 (22 June 1987), stressing ‘solidifying and strengthening 
production relations and perfecting the product contract in agriculture’. 
The directive called for an increase in the economic autonomy of 
collectives and advocated new farming arrangements in them called the 
‘agreement contract according to price unit’ (khoán hợp đồng theo đơn 
giá). Under these new contracts, collectives had to inform members 
of their obligations and benefits up front and eliminate widespread 
subsidies. In addition, under the terms of the new contract, collective 
members were allowed and even encouraged to buy their own means 
of production, such as draught animals and small farm machines.168 
The new contracts spread to many collectives in QN-ĐN and, by the 
winter–spring of 1987, they had been officially adopted by 34 collectives 
in the province.169 
Kerkvliet’s study on northern Vietnam showed that farming 
arrangements other than product contracts also prevailed there in 
many collectives in 1986 and 1987, and some northern provinces, such 
as Hà Sơn Bình and Vĩnh Phú, approved new farming arrangements in 
1987.170 
An Giang in the Mekong Delta 
Like their counterparts in QN-ĐN, many production units in An Giang 
saw their farming performance improve in the first few seasons of the 
product contract system. An Giang’s staple food production grew 
from 691,561 tonnes in 1981 to 835,000 tonnes in 1982.171 However, 
from 1983 to 1985, when An Giang’s authorities pushed the process 
of ‘socialist transformation’, the province’s staple food production 
stagnated, and then declined. Table 7.2 shows how paddy production 
and the amount of cultivated land increased in the early 1980s, but 
then dropped considerably in 1983 and 1984. Due to a large amount of 
167  The conference on solidifying agricultural production relations, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 
16 June 1987, p. 1.
168  Nghị quyết số 03/NQ-TU: Tiếp tục củng cố và tăng cường quan hệ sản xuất, hòa thiện cơ chế 
sản phẩm trong nông nghiệp [Resolution No. 03/NQ-TU: Continue to improve and perfect the 
product contract], Tỉnh Ủy Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 22 June 1987.
169  Collective farming at the end of the year, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng, 31 December 1987, p. 3.
170  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, p. 224.
171  Con số niềm tin [The figures and faith], An Giang, 20 March 1983, p. 2. 
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abandoned land and flooding, An Giang’s paddy production fell from 
820,952 tonnes in 1982 to 792,486 tonnes in 1983 and 725,392 tonnes 
in 1984.172 
Table 7.2 Cultivated area of crops and paddy production in An Giang, 
1975–88
Year Cultivated 
area of annual 
crops (ha)
Cultivated 







1975 236,594 217,629 2 .157 469,426 
1976 255,743 220,670 2 .249 496,287 
1977 278,559 241,593 1 .972 476,421 
1978 275,980 233,513 1 .555 363,113 
1979 263,389 231,568 2 .271 525,891 
1980 329,321 292,374 2 .524 737,952 
1981 335,092 296,016 2 .336 691,493 
1982 324,064 283,772 2 .893 820,952 
1983 325,303 278,652 2 .844 792,486 
1984 308,153 257,963 2 .812 725,392 
1985 300,705 263,214 3 .451 908,352 
1986 312,389 258,805 3 .277 848,104 
1987 317,139 261,090 3 .389 884,834 
1988 324,148 262,930 3 .729 980,466 
Source: Cục Thống Kê An Giang (CTKAG) (2000), Niên giám thống kê tỉnh An Giang [An 
Giang Statistical Year Book], Long Xuyên: Cục Thống Kế An Giang, pp. 61–75.
According to An Giang’s Department of Agriculture, the province’s 
staple food production increased to 923,000 tonnes in 1985; however, 
this was still short of the target. This increase resulted mainly from an 
increase in the number of crops per year and the extensive adoption of 
high-yielding rice. In particular, An Giang expanded the area of land 
planting two crops per year with high-yielding rice from 34,000 hectares 
172  Cục Thống Kê An Giang [hereinafter CTKAG] (2000), Niên giám thống kê tỉnh An Giang [An 
Giang Statistical Year Book], Long Xuyên: Cục Thống Kế An Giang, pp. 61–75. An Giang’s staple 
food yield in 1984 reached about 755,732 tonnes and met only 84 per cent of the target (Ngành 
nông nghiệp tổng kết công tác năm 1984: Vượt qua khó khăn, toàn tỉnh gieo trồng 300,842 ha 
[Summing up 1984 agricultural production: Overcoming difficulties to cultivate 300,842 hectares], 
An Giang, 21 February 1985, p. 1). 
VIETNAM’S PoST-1975 AgRARIAN REFoRMS
234
in 1976 to 180,000 hectares in 1985.173 Therefore, despite the decrease 
in An Giang’s cultivated area of more than 20,000 hectares from 1982 
to 1985, better paddy productivity increased production from 820,952 
tonnes in 1982 to 908,352 tonnes in 1985. Therefore, the average growth 
rate of paddy production in An Giang from 1982 to 1985 was about 
3.5  per cent.174 In assessing agricultural conditions, a 1986 report by 
An Giang’s party executive committee revealed widespread problems: 
In general, agricultural production developed slowly and unevenly. 
Investment in agriculture did not meet requirements; the price of 
agricultural produce was still fixed low [gò ép] and was not attractive 
[to peasants]. Due to agrarian policy shortcomings, some cultivated 
land was used inefficiently or abandoned. Furthermore, the number of 
new agricultural machines could not compensate for the damage and 
loss of old machines.175 
As in QN-ĐN, despite food production in An Giang increasing slightly 
during 1982–85 (staple food per person increased from 515 kilograms 
per year in 1982 to 530 kilograms in 1985), peasants’ living conditions 
did not improve.176 There were at least three reasons for this. First, the 
terms of trade between agricultural produce and industrial products 
(including agricultural inputs) had deteriorated at the expense of the 
latter. For example, in 1975, 1 kilogram of paddy was worth 1 kilogram 
of urea or 1.5 litres of fuel. In 1985, 4 kilograms of paddy could buy only 
1 kilogram of urea or 1 litre of fuel. Second, the state’s food procurement 
increased considerably between 1982 and 1985. During the period 
1983–85 alone, An Giang authorities took 851,000 tonnes of grain 
(nearly the entire annual output), 30,000 tonnes of beans and sesame, 
18,400 tonnes of pork and 21,200 tonnes of fish. Food procurement 
in 1982–85 increased 28.1 per cent compared with the previous 
period, 1980–82.177 Finally, local cadres’ embezzlement, theft and poor 
management (discussed above) and high payments to production units 
negatively affected peasants’ incomes. 
173  Nguyễn Vũ: Tiếp tục đưa nhịp độ phát triển nông nghiệp lên nhanh hơn [Nguyễn Vũ: 
Continue to speed up agricultural production], An Giang, 24 October 1986, p. 1. Nguyễn Vũ was 
manager of An Giang’s Department of Agriculture.
174  CTKAG, An Giang Statistical Year Book, pp. 61–75. 
175  Báo cáo chính trị của Ban chấp hành đảng bộ tỉnh An Giang [The political report of Executive 
Committee of An Giang Provincial Party Committee], An Giang, 24 October 1988, p. 3. 
176  CTKAG (1986), Tình hình kinh tế xã hội tỉnh An Giang 1983–1985 [An Giang’s Socioeconomic 
Situation from 1983–1985], Long Xuyên: Cục Thống Kê An Giang, p. 7. 
177  Ibid., p. 10.
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After the completion of collectivisation in 1985, agricultural 
production in An Giang did not improve. In assessing the province’s 
economic performance in 1986, provincial resolution No. 1/NQ-TU 
(29 November 1986) revealed: 
The provincial socioeconomic situation was more difficult and 
complicated than in 1985 due to price–wage–currency adjustments. 
Some targets were not met; food production fell compared to 1985; 
more than 10,000 hectares of land were abandoned; farm machines 
were seriously damaged and lost … economic and social evils, 
violations of labourers’ mastery rights and oppression of the masses 
become widespread. Especially at the local level, managerial boards of 
production units committed many serious wrongdoings.178 
A chairman of An Giang province reflected: 
From 1980 to 1986, due to the consequences of socialist agricultural 
transformation, forced collectivisation and bureaucratic red tape, food 
production [in An Giang] stagnated, increasing only slightly, from 
741,000 tonnes in 1980 to 855,000 tonnes in 1986. In general, over 
10 years after reunification, despite the party organisation and people 
concentrating on staple food production, it increased only 400,000 
tonnes. So, the average annual increase in staple food production was 
about 40,000 tonnes … In addition, during that time, more than 30,000 
hectares of land was abandoned.179 
A former cadre of An Giang’s Committee for Agricultural 
Transformation  listed three reasons for the poor performance of 
agriculture in the mid-1980s. First, the prices paid for food procurement 
were low, which discouraged peasants from increasing their production. 
Second, the state’s supply of inputs was inadequate and delivered late, 
so peasants often ‘sowed seeds only’ (sạ chay), without using fertilisers, 
irrigation and other inputs. Finally, the combination of these and other 
factors meant peasants were not interested in farming (không thiết tha 
với ruộng đất).180 
From late 1986 onwards, in the new political atmosphere inspired by the 
VCP’s Đổi Mới policies, moves to strengthen collective organisations in 
An Giang faced even more challenges. Many peasants took advantage 
of the spirit of Đổi Mới, which gave the people more freedom to speak, 
178  Cited in Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 40. 
179  Nguyễn Minh Nhị, An Giang, p. 1. 
180  Author’s interview, 27 June 2005, Long Xuyên.
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and sent petitions to ask for return of their former land and machinery 
and to complain about cadres’ embezzlement of collective resources, 
theft of land and oppression of the masses. Also in the spirit of Đổi 
Mới, An Giang’s journalists were given more power to fight ‘social 
evils’. During 1987, journalists exposed many cases of local cadres’ 
misbehaviour, such as embezzling resources, misappropriating peasant 
land, mismanaging collective funds and oppressing the masses (ức hiếp 
quần chúng). Many production units were also criticised for their 
poor performance and large debts. By the end of 1987, the total debt 
of collective organisations in An Giang had reached 10,000 tonnes of 
paddy.181 
Assessing collective organisations in September 1987, the chairman of 
An Giang’s agriculture department concluded that weak production 
units and cadres’ malpractices were still widespread. This hindered 
agricultural production and made peasants feel insecure and discontent. 
He attributed these problems to hasty collectivisation and a lack of 
well-trained cadres. He also considered bureaucratic red tape and 
subsidy mechanisms (cơ chế quan liêu bao cấp) harmful to agriculture 
and especially to collective farming.182 
The performance of production units continued to deteriorate in the late 
1980s along with peasants’ living conditions. The An Giang newspaper 
reported in August 1987 that 50 per cent of peasant households had 
to rely on buying paddy on credit and could pay for it only after the 
harvest. The article listed three reasons for the fall in peasants’ living 
conditions: first, much of what peasants produced was extracted by 
state agencies, while agricultural inputs (such as fuel, fertilisers and 
pesticides) arrived late, were inadequate or were not what was needed. 
For example, even months after planting paddy, some peasants had 
not received their agricultural inputs. Second, paddy productivity 
was severely reduced due to insufficient supplies of agricultural inputs 
and irrigation. However, peasants were still required to pay for these 
provisions and to contribute to collective funds. In addition, they had 
to pay the debts of local cadres and party members. Finally, prices paid 
181  Peasants need a rational method of agricultural investment, An Giang, 23 October 1987, p. 2.
182  Phỏng vấn Nguyễn Vũ: Nhất định khắc phục những yếu kém đưa tập đoàn sản xuất tiến 
lên một bước [Interview with Nguyễn Vũ: Be certain in correcting shortcomings to advance 
production units], An Giang, 18 September 1987, p. 2. Nguyễn Vũ was the chairman of An Giang’s 
agriculture department. 
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for paddy were set much lower than those in the free market while the 
prices of state goods sold to peasants were relatively high. In addition, 
agricultural taxes were disadvantageous for peasants.183 
An investigation into peasants’ earnings in August 1987 showed that 
production unit members received an average of 2 gịa (40 kg) of paddy 
per hectare. Peasants complained their costs were illogical. They had 
to pay input costs (the B contract), quotas, transport costs for inputs, 
support for invalid and martyr families and for irrigation, threshing of 
paddy, ink and paper and so on.184 Table 7.3 shows that, because of this 
cost burden, what remained for each production unit member at the 
end of a harvest was only 30.2 kilograms of paddy.185 
Table 7.3 Results and distribution in the average production unit 
in An Giang in the summer–autumn of 1987
1 . Total number of households 115 
2 . Total number of people 856 
3 . Total number of workers 459 
4. Area of land (hectares) 49 .4 
5. Output of paddy (kilograms) 123,500 
6. Expenditure (kilograms of paddy) 
     Land preparation 9,580 
     Irrigation 2,559 
     Urea 33,509 
     Fuel 2,500 
     Lubricating oil 400 
     Pesticide 6,420 
     Paddy seeds 14,820 
     Fee for pumping water 8,860 
     NPK fertiliser 8,401 
     Diesel 4,762 
     Threshing of paddy 1,880 
     Managerial fees 617 
183  Giá cả thu mua, chính sách thuế nông nghiệp ảnh hưởng đến đời sống của nông dân 
[Procurement prices and agricultural taxes affect peasants’ living standards], An Giang, 28 August 
1987, p. 3. 
184  Mỗi tuần một chuyện: Chuyện ở tập đoàn sản xuất [A story each week: Production unit 
story], An Giang, 28 August 1987, p. 7. 
185  Ibid. 
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     Fee for indirect labour 517 
     Other 2,785 
7. Total expenditure (kilograms of paddy) 97,610 
8. Remainder for production unit’s members (kilograms of paddy) 25,890 
9. Paddy income per công (0.1 hectare) of land (kilograms of paddy) 52 .4 
10. Income per person (kilograms of paddy) 30.2 
Source: Mỗi tuần một chuyện: Chuyện ở tập đoàn sản xuất [A story each week: Production 
unit story], An Giang, 28 August 1987, p . 7 .
According to villagers in Long Điền B, during the time of production 
units, farming achieved poor results and generated low incomes. 
A formerly landless man in the village recalled: 
In the past [before 1975], a wage earner could get 2–3 kilograms of 
paddy per day, but farming under the production unit, we got less than 
1 kilogram of paddy per day. Before reunification, it was easy to make a 
living, but after reunification [and until decollectivisation], we worked 
hard but did not have any surplus; our lives were difficult. The state 
forced us to accept land but we did not feel happy because farming did 
not give us good earnings.186 
Similarly, a former production unit leader in the commune commented: 
After collectivisation, all households here became poor; no-one was 
able to get rich. Before reunification, people in the Southern Region 
lived in a market economy so they had comfortable lives. When 
implementing land redistribution, some households who traded 
and engaged in non-farming work also accepted land because they 
feared going to new economic zones … The state saw the failure of 
collectivisation and changed their policy because they saw that, nine 
to 10 years after reunification, living conditions of people had been set 
back [đi thụt lùi].187 
The return to household farming 
After An Giang completed its socialist agricultural transformation, 
agricultural production faced even more difficulties. Paradoxically, some 
agrarian policies resulted in outcomes in An Giang that differed from 
what the VCP and provincial leaders wanted. Land redistribution was 
aimed at giving land to landless and land-poor households and boosting 
collectivisation and agricultural production, but, in reality, it benefited 
186  Author’s interview, 3 August 2005, Long Điền B.
187  Author’s interview, 5 August 2005, Long Điền B. 
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local cadres’ families and relatives, angered former landowners and 
caused agricultural stagnation. The non-resident cultivator prohibition 
and collectivisation had similar consequences. As a result, a large amount 
of land was abandoned, misused or misappropriated by cadres and 
government organisations; collectivised farm machines were damaged; 
and, more importantly, food production deteriorated alarmingly. 
In late 1986, An Giang’s leaders started to acknowledge and tried 
to correct these shortcomings of the agrarian policies. To utilise 
abandoned land and boost agricultural production, provincial 
leaders decided to cancel the non-resident cultivator prohibition 
and to grant more land to households who had greater farming 
capacity.188 On 19 February 1987, provincial leaders issued Decision 
No. 93-NQUB, aimed at correcting the shortcomings of previous 
land redistributions. To protect agricultural machines from further 
damage, they discontinued the collectivisation of peasants’ machines 
and urged collective organisations to return machines to their previous 
owners (peasants).189 These policies were mainly aimed at improving 
agricultural performance, but they triggered peasants’ moves to reclaim 
their land and machines. 
Despite land conflicts disrupting agricultural production in rural areas, 
in 1987, production recovered thanks to the corrective measures.190 
Inspired by these positive effects and finding that most production units 
in the province were, in fact, problematic, in early 1988, An Giang’s 
leaders started to question the direction of collective organisations. 
In January 1988, Võ Quang Liêm, the vice-secretary of An Giang’s party 
committee, admitted: 
Collective organisations are now unsuitable because they are inefficient 
in terms of production and their managerial bodies are bulky and 
unnecessary. Collective organisations manage poorly and commit 
numerous wrongdoings, which hinder agricultural production and 
negatively affect the living conditions of peasants.191 
188  Officials’ meeting thoroughly resolves 1987 resolution, An Giang, 22 December 1986, p. 1. 
189  In collectivising peasants’ farm machines, production units paid the owners in instalments 
the remaining value of the machines; however, production units often delayed or evaded 
these payments (Củng cố và cải tạo máy nông nghiệp, xay xát [Improving and renovating the 
management of agricultural machines], An Giang, 22 December 1986, p. 2). 
190  Võ Tòng Xuân and Chu Hữu Quý, KX Account 08-11, p. 47. 
191  Võ Quang Liêm: Vấn đề củng cố, nâng chất các tập đoàn sản xuất [Võ Quang Liêm: The matter 
of solidifying and upgrading production units], An Giang, 15 January 1988, p. 1. Võ Quang Liêm 
was the vice-secretary of An Giang’s party committee.
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He also argued that, given current production conditions in which 
farming required a lot of manual work, it was necessary to consider 
households as basic units. Authorities should grant long-term land use 
for households and reduce staff on managerial boards to only one or 
two cadres. Peasants should be allowed to select freely the best farming 
services available.192 The provincial resolution of March 1988 called for 
a redefinition of the objectives of agricultural transformation. It argued 
that the main objective of the transformation was to facilitate production; 
however, in the past, An Giang’s authorities had misunderstood this 
objective and ‘coerced peasants into joining collective organisations 
even though it was supposed to be voluntary’. As a result, ‘production 
stagnated; living conditions of peasants were difficult … [and a] new 
class of oppressors and exploiters had appeared’—local cadres, mainly 
of collective organisations.193 
It is worth noting that the debate about the shift in agrarian policy in 
An Giang took place before the VCP released Resolution No. 10 (5 April 
1988), which officially endorsed the reallocation of land to peasant 
households to use for 15 years and fixing the quota for five years.194 
The shift in national policy and the return 
to household farming 
Under the product contract system, especially in the later stages, the 
deterioration in agricultural production and the performance of 
collective organisations occurred in almost all provinces of Vietnam. 
According to a VCP report, product contracts only slightly boosted 
agricultural production in the period 1981–85, while after 1986, 
contracts lost their positive effect and food production stagnated 
(see Table 7.4).195 
192  Ibid.
193  Xác định lại mục đích cải tạo nông nghiệp [Redefining the objectives of agricultural 
transformation], An Giang, 4 March 1988, p. 1. 
194  Ban Tuyên Huấn Trung Ương, The Party’s Response to Urgent Land Problems, pp. 99–100. 
195  Bộ Nông Nghiệp (1990), Dự thảo tổng kết 3 năm thực hiện nghị quyết 10 10 của Bộ chính trị 
về đổi mới quản lý kinh tế nông nghiệp [A Draft Summing Up of the Three-Year Implementation 
of Resolution No. 10], 10 December, Hà Nội: Bộ Nông Nghiệp, p. 1. 
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Table 7.4 Vietnam’s staple food production, 1981–87
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Staple food production 
(millions of tonnes, paddy 
equivalent) 
15.0 16 .8 16 .9 17 .8 18 .2 18 .3 17 .5 
Source: Bộ Nông Nghiệp (1990), Dự thảo tổng kết 3 năm thực hiện nghị quyết 10 của Bộ 
chính trị về đổi mới quản lý kinh tế nông nghiệp [A Draft Summing Up of the Three-Year 
Implementation of Resolution No. 10], 10 December, Hà Nội: Bộ Nông Nghiệp, p. 2.
According to researcher Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, a decrease of 0.8 million 
tonnes of food in 1987 compared with 1986, accompanied by 
a  population increase of 1.5 million, caused a sharp decrease in 
staple food per capita, from 300.8 kilograms per year in 1986 to 280 
kilograms per year in 1987—the lowest figure since 1981. In collective 
organisations, peasants’ income accounted for about 20 per cent of 
the quota. In 21 Vietnamese provinces (from Bình Trị Thiên province 
northward), 39.7 per cent of rural people suffered severe hunger 
between harvests (nạn đói giáp hạt).196 
Faced with falling living conditions like their counterparts in QN-ĐN 
and An Giang, peasants elsewhere in Vietnam were fed up with collective 
farming. Even in ‘good’ collectives, peasants began to return contracted 
land. As a result, land in widespread locations was abandoned and 
peasants’ debts increased over time. In response to the situation, some 
collectives tried to experiment with ‘package contracts’, which some 
local authorities authorised.197 Despite criticism by party officials and 
analysts, ‘package contracts’ or ‘household contracts’ gradually gained 
the approval of authorities. According to Ben Kerkvliet, by September 
1987, farming arrangements other than product contracts prevailed 
in more than 70 per cent of the collectives in Vietnam. Finally, in 
April 1988, the party’s political bureau released Resolution No. 10, 
stressing ‘the renovation of agricultural economic management’, which 
implicitly endorsed previous practices and marked the beginning of 
decollectivisation in Vietnam.198 
Resolution No. 10 was aimed at unleashing the production capacity 
of agriculture and shifting it to commodity production, by giving 
collective organisations and peasant households more autonomy in 
196  Nguyễn Sinh Cúc, Agricultural and Rural Development in Vietnam, p. 47. 
197  Bộ Nông Nghiệp, A Draft Summing Up, p. 1.
198  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics, pp. 224, 227.
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production. To encourage peasant households to increase production, 
land was allocated to them for longer-term use (15 years) and quotas 
were fixed for five years.199 
VCP leaders did not intend to dismantle collective organisations; 
however, in the context of a market-oriented economy, after 
implementation of Resolution No. 10, peasants gradually became 
independent of collective organisations and they gradually lost their 
purpose and were dismantled or were changed to farming-service 
organisations in the early 1990s. The peasant household finally became 
the basic production unit in rural areas of Vietnam. 
Conclusion 
In an effort to save collective organisations and improve their 
performance, in 1981, the VCP released Directive No. 100. The hope 
was to reduce peasants’ and local cadres’ problems and to strengthen 
collective organisations. Even though product contracts immediately 
improved the performance of collectives and boosted agricultural 
production, they did not solve the long-term struggle between peasants 
and local cadres over land, labour and other resources. 
Although there were many campaigns to correct cadres’ problems, 
both in QN-ĐN and in An Giang, performance did not improve. Local 
cadres often took advantage of their position to steal state, collective 
and peasant resources. Land redistribution, the non-resident cultivator 
prohibition and collectivisation in An Giang were all aimed at 
eliminating the old exploitative class, but, in reality, the policies created 
a new exploitative class—namely, local cadres. 
During the product contract system, collective farming essentially 
replaced commercial farming and the diverse rural economy of 
An Giang. This is why villagers in An Giang displayed behaviour 
comparable with their counterparts in QN-ĐN. Villagers in both 
places tried their best to minimise the disadvantages of collective 
farming to enhance their own survival and livelihoods. For example, 
while villagers in QN-ĐN tried their best to enlarge their household 
economies by capturing collective resources, land and labour, villagers 
199  Ban Tuyên Huấn Trung Ương, The Party’s Response to Urgent Land Problems, pp. 81–123.
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in An Giang tried their best to ensure their livelihoods by doing wage 
work and using collective resources for their daily needs. Both tried to 
avoid paying debts and fulfilling their obligations to the collective; they 
returned land or abandoned it when they saw that collective farming 
was unprofitable. All of these behaviours had a huge adverse effect on 
the survival of collective organisations. 
The combined effect of the peasants’ and local cadres’ practices 
significantly contributed to the poor performance of collective farming 
and the failure of the product contract system, which the VCP had 
expected to improve collective farming. The output of staple food 
decreased alarmingly after mid-1985 and, in response, local cadres and 
authorities in QN-ĐN, An Giang and elsewhere experimented with new 
farming arrangements. When Vietnam faced a food crisis in the late 
1980s, the VCP finally gave up on the official system and endorsed new 
local arrangements, which marked the beginning of decollectivisation 





This book has investigated why socialist collectivisation failed in south 
Vietnam after 1975. After the country was reunified, the Vietnamese 
state attempted to implement collectivisation policies similar to those 
that had been applied in the north of the country during the Vietnam 
War. Despite the strong will of the new regime to implement this central 
pillar of socialist ideology, collectivisation was not realised uniformly; 
it was misapplied and subverted; and, after only 10 years, it was annulled 
as policy. This set of failings is somewhat of a puzzle for it occurred 
well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, when socialist ideology 
in Vietnam was at its peak and was manifest in many aspects of social 
policy. It also took place when the state was at its most confident and 
resolute after the successful reunification of the country. Focusing on 
two case studies (Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng province in the Central Coast 
region and An Giang province in the Mekong Delta) and based on an 
extensive review of the evidence, this study suggests that the reasons 
for variations in policy implementation, and the failure and reversal of 
policy, were twofold: regional differences and local politics.
The book shows that, at the time of the reunification in 1975, there 
were significant differences between the Central Coast and the Mekong 
Delta in terms of the consequences of the country’s wars, the impacts of 
previous agrarian reforms, the natural and socioeconomic conditions 
and the social structure of rural communities. In Quảng Nam-Đà 
Nẵng  (QN-ĐN) in the Central Coast, prolonged war had disrupted 
or destroyed any positive effects of previous land reforms and 
development carried out by either Saigon’s government or the National 
VIETNAM’S PoST-1975 AgRARIAN REFoRMS
246
Liberation Front (NLF). It was the war rather than previous land reforms 
that had transformed the local land tenure system, by causing landlords 
and a large proportion of the rural people to abandon their houses and 
land and live in enclosed camps. After the war, many landlords did not 
return, while others returned but could not reclaim or restore all of their 
land. Large areas were overgrown with weeds and seemed to have come 
under a kind of communal ownership. People restored any plot they 
liked as if it were their own. Thus, the war had changed the land tenure 
system and flattened the structure of rural communities, leaving the 
society relatively homogeneous. In addition, after the war, the peasant 
economy was mainly subsistence-focused. Most peasants were rendered 
poor and were mainly concerned with producing enough food for their 
families. As in the north, peasant communities in QN-ĐN continued 
to practise labour exchange and possessed a strong collective sense 
in accordance with traditional thinking about reciprocity and mutual 
assistance, especially during difficult times. 
Meanwhile, soon after reunification, the agricultural sector in An Giang 
in the Mekong Delta had reached a higher level of economic development 
than that in the Central Coast and in the north in the 1950s. The social 
structure and rural economy in the Mekong Delta were more diverse. 
Previous agrarian reforms carried out by the Việt Minh, various South 
Vietnamese governments or the NLF had significantly changed the 
land tenure system and boosted commercial agriculture. By 1975 in 
the Mekong Delta, 70 per cent of the rural population were middle 
peasants who owned 80 per cent of the cultivated land, 60 per cent of 
the total farm equipment and 90 per cent of draught animals. Market 
relations and individual land tenure had been well established. The 
landless and land-poor could make a decent living by working as 
agricultural labourers, engaging in small trading or pursuing other off-
farm economic opportunities. Many middle peasant farmers owned 
their own machinery, cultivated land beyond their residential area and, 
unlike those in the Central Coast, engaged in commercial rather than 
subsistence farming. Therefore, concepts of mutual aid, labour exchange 
and reciprocity were unpopular and occurred only among members of 
an extended family. In general, unlike the agrarian sector in the Central 
Coast and in northern Vietnam in the 1950s, the agrarian sector in the 
Mekong Delta was dominated by middle peasants who engaged largely 
in commercial agriculture and who wanted to continue to farm their 
own land and sell their own crops.
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Differences in revolutionary influence also contributed to the disparities 
between the two regions. Large parts of the rural areas of QN-ĐN and 
the wider Central Coast region were under the influence of the Việt 
Minh during the war with France (1945–54) and then under the NLF 
during the war with America (1954–75). Therefore, peasants in these 
regions had a stronger relationship with the Việt Minh and the NLF 
and were more familiar with their respective political and economic 
policies. During the American war, the NLF was able to recruit a large 
number of revolutionaries who operated locally or were sent to the north 
for training. After the war, thanks to the considerable number of local 
revolutionaries who survived or returned from northern Vietnam, the 
Central Coast did not face a huge problem filling local government and 
party positions. These cadres were familiar with, enthusiastic about and 
committed to the post-1975 socialist transformation policies, at least 
in the first few years. Meanwhile, in An Giang during the American 
war, the area and therefore the population under the influence of the 
revolutionaries was reduced, local networks of revolutionaries were 
destroyed and many revolutionaries were killed or deserted. In many 
locations, no Communist Party cells operated until after reunification 
and, even then, they were few in number and relatively weak. The new 
local-level authorities had to recruit new cadres, a majority of whom 
were not ex-revolutionaries and were therefore not familiar with 
socialism and were unenthusiastic about the socialist transformation of 
agriculture and collectivisation. 
Despite these regional disparities and the high level of commercial 
agriculture in the Mekong Delta, Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
leaders decided to impose on the south the northern model of socialist 
agricultural transformation, which was considered a central pillar of 
socialist construction. As in the north and in other socialist countries, 
this agrarian reform consisted of two key components: land reform 
and collectivisation, with the former an essential step to prepare for 
the latter. Regardless of the existing shortcomings and disappointments 
of collective farming in the north, the VCP believed that collectivising 
agriculture in the south was the only way to modernise it, eliminate 
exploitation, support industrialisation and improve peasants’ living 
standards. VCP leaders were apparently propelled by a commitment 
to building socialism and socialist large-scale production and a strong 
belief in their own capacities. 
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The VCP strongly believed the socialist transformation of agriculture 
in southern Vietnam could be completed by 1980. The socialist project, 
however, was not driven solely by the strong will and high ideology 
of top-level leaders; it also greatly depended on local-level conditions 
and politics, the main actors of which were ordinary peasants and local 
cadres. As it happened, the results of the post-1975 agrarian reforms 
varied from region to region. The implementation of postwar economic 
restoration measures, land reform and collectivisation was rapid in 
QN-ĐN and other provinces in the Central Coast. From 1975 to 1978, 
authorities in QN-ĐN were able to accomplish most of the preparatory 
measures for collectivisation, such as land redistribution, irrigation, 
field transformation and the establishment of simple collective 
organisations and pilot collectives. Authorities in QN-ĐN also met the 
central government’s target to collectivise farming by 1980.
In contrast, authorities in An Giang and elsewhere in the Mekong 
Delta encountered major difficulties, and to the extent that socialist 
transformation occurred, it took many years and much effort to 
complete. Many policies—such as land redistribution and the building 
of interim collective organisations and pilot collectives—failed to 
reach the central government’s targets and expectations due to strong 
peasant resistance and the inadequate commitment of local cadres. 
Local authorities failed to fully establish northern-style collective farms 
and had to modify and reduce the scale and socialist characteristics 
of their collectives to ease local resistance. Despite these compromises, 
collectivisation in the region accounted for less than 10 per cent of 
agricultural land and peasant households in 1980. 
In the period 1981–85, having failed to achieve their targets, the VCP 
continued to press local authorities in the Mekong Delta to complete 
socialist transformation. Central Directive No. 100 (January 1981)—
which called for the replacement of the work-points system with the 
product contract system, in which each household farmed separately 
on their contracted land—collectivisation in the region faced weaker 
peasant resistance and moved faster than before. Under pressure from 
the central government, authorities in An Giang and elsewhere in the 
delta rushed to carry out agricultural transformation, especially from 
1984 to 1985. Many collective organisations were hastily established 
by ‘just signing names’, and land redistribution divided a commune’s 
land equally between members. By February 1985, the province was 
declared halfway towards completing collectivisation. By April 1985, 
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An Giang announced completion of basic collectivisation, accounting 
for 80 per cent of the province’s agricultural land—a minimum index 
for success. Thus, although the VCP announced the completion of 
socialist agricultural transformation in the Mekong Delta in the mid-
1980s, many collective organisations essentially existed only on paper 
and fell short of expectations. 
Despite encountering great difficulties, VCP leaders were resolute 
and persisted with the attempt to carry out socialist agricultural 
transformation and build socialism in the rural south. Only by 
modifying their policies to ease local resistance were VCP leaders 
able to establish collective organisations, but still they failed to realise 
their policy objectives. Collectives became sites of constant struggle 
between peasants, local cadres and state agencies over land, production 
and distribution. While VCP leaders were able to force villagers into 
collective structures, they could not direct peasants and local cadres to 
behave according to their expectations. This is why collective farming 
performed very poorly in the Mekong Delta and in the Central Coast 
region. 
During the work-points system (1978–81), villagers in the Central 
Coast merely went through the motions, trying their best to optimise 
their work-points rather than the quality of production. In other words, 
they ended up doing collective work carelessly and deceitfully. Many 
tried to plunder collective resources and invested most of their energy 
in their own household economy. Few took care of collective property 
or worked as enthusiastically as authorities wanted. Meanwhile, the 
better-off villagers in An Giang tried their best to evade collective 
farming altogether. To avoid any political disadvantage, some joined 
production units but did not seriously undertake collective work. Some 
‘kept one foot within and the other foot outside’ the production unit 
to make a living. Some sent their children or auxiliary labourers to do 
collective work while they, as their household’s main labourers, worked 
for themselves. Many did collective work carelessly and sluggishly and 
did not care much about collective property. Although the behaviour 
of peasants in QN-ĐN and An Giang was quite different, in both 
places, the main objectives were to minimise the disadvantages of the 
system and maximise the benefits to themselves. The aggregate of these 
individual actions contributed significantly to the poor performance of 
collective farming. 
VIETNAM’S PoST-1975 AgRARIAN REFoRMS
250
Other key factors contributing to the poor performance of collective 
farming were local cadres. Despite being loyal to the VCP’s agrarian 
policies, several local-level cadres in QN-ĐN took advantage of 
their position for personal gain, at the expense of the collective 
and the overall purpose of the reform. They strictly controlled 
peasants’ economic activities while managing collectives poorly; they 
embezzled a considerable amount of agricultural inputs and produce. 
Some assigned tasks and gave work-points to members at their own 
discretion or prolonged tasks and inflated work-points to favour 
their fellow villagers or relatives at the expense of others. Some were 
prejudiced, bureaucratic, autocratic and patriarchal towards members; 
their behaviour contradicted the authorities’ dictum that ‘the collective 
is home and its members are the masters’. 
Meanwhile, local cadres in An Giang were unenthusiastic about 
agricultural transformation and collective farming policies. Faced with 
peasant resistance, they were reluctant to carry out policies forcefully 
according to the official blueprint and instead modified policies to 
accommodate local concerns. Some used specific parts of the national 
policies, such as the ‘positive and firm principle’ of collectivisation, to 
delay the process or let it drift. Compared with their counterparts in the 
Central Coast, cadres in An Giang allowed peasants more freedom in 
selecting whether or not they joined collective farming or participated 
in collective work; however, they managed collective property poorly. 
An Giang newspaper accounts revealed numerous cases of local cadres’ 
sloppy management of production, theft of collective inputs, cash and 
peasants’ work-points, misappropriation of peasant land and property 
and bullying of the masses. Cadres colluded with merchants, most of 
whom were their relatives, which contributed to inflation and aided the 
survival and expansion of the black market. These were the very things 
the VCP leaders were trying to control and eliminate. 
As in north Vietnam, everyday peasant politics and local cadres’ 
malpractices in both QN-ĐN and An Giang provinces during 1979–81 
significantly affected the performance of collective farming. Collective 
farming in both provinces, as elsewhere in Vietnam, performed poorly 
and food production deteriorated, falling short of official expectations. 
Despite authorities in both regions putting great effort into correcting 
peasants’ and cadres’ negative practices, these behaviours increased 
over time. In response to the deteriorating performance of collective 
farming and the steady fall in the country’s food production, the VCP 
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decided to abandon the work-points system and introduced a new 
farming arrangement, the product contract system, which was intended 
to reduce poor practices and motivate villagers to work enthusiastically 
and responsibly. The product contract system helped improve the 
performance of collective farming in both provinces for a few years 
only, and failed to solve the long-term struggles between peasants and 
local cadres about land, labour and other resources. 
During the product contract period (1981–88), villagers in QN-ĐN 
tried their best to enlarge their household economies by encroaching 
on collective resources such as land, labour and agricultural inputs at 
the expense of the collective economy. Despite authorities expecting 
them to put collective and state interests first, villagers prioritised their 
own interests. When they failed to produce more than their quota 
or faced subsistence shortages, many refused to pay their debts to 
collectives or fulfil their obligations to the state. In the later stages of the 
product contract system, when it became clear collective farming was 
less profitable than outside opportunities, many peasants in QN-ĐN 
decided to accept less contracted land or even abandoned collective land 
to make a living elsewhere. This had a huge impact on the performance 
of collective farming in that province. 
By contrast, in An Giang, collectivisation during the product contract 
period transformed the Mekong Delta’s commercial agriculture into 
subsistence farming. Some landowners who lost their land during 
land redistribution were disappointed and gave up farming or did just 
enough to subsist. Many land recipients farmed poorly because they 
did not know how to farm, lacked incentives or had inadequate capital 
and were not provided enough help by production units; many put 
a considerable amount of time and effort into working for wages to 
supplement their livelihoods. Some sold state agricultural inputs to 
meet their daily needs rather than investing them in the contracted 
fields. Like their counterparts in QN-ĐN, in the later stages of the 
product contract system, many An Giang villagers were in debt to 
production units, and many refused to repay these debts. Some decided 
to abandon, transfer or even sell their redistributed land to others. 
VCP leaders believed product contracts would reduce the number 
of problems associated with cadres’ malpractice by increasing their 
responsibility for managing certain phases of collective farming. 
However, despite numerous campaigns during 1981–88 by the 
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authorities in QN-ĐN and An Giang, aimed at improving the quality of 
local cadres and correcting and cracking down on their poor behaviour, 
these problems did not disappear, and in fact increased over time. Local 
cadres in QN-ĐN tended to shift their responsibility on to villagers 
by using ‘blank contracts’ that required villagers to do most phases 
of farming. Cadres often failed to fulfil their duties, such as spraying 
pesticides or watering fields on time. They also embezzled scarce 
collective resources over which they had control, such as agricultural 
inputs and collective property. From the mid-1980s, when Vietnam 
adopted a multisectoral market economy, cadres tended to relax their 
management of collectives and take advantage of opportunities in the 
free market. For instance, they sold scarce fertilisers on the free market 
for personal gain—to such a degree that many collectives in Thăng Bình 
and Quảng Nam did not have enough for their own members in 1987. 
Meanwhile, in An Giang, local cadres were guilty of numerous 
malpractices from 1981 to the late 1980s. Many exploited their 
positions to steal collective agricultural inputs and funds, and most 
owed large debts to the state and collectives. Many cadres owed tonnes 
of paddy and accounted for a majority of the total debt in the province. 
Although authorities in both places put great effort into correcting and 
punishing such activities, this sort of behaviour became more prevalent. 
In addition, local cadres misappropriated a considerable amount of 
peasants’ land, which was supposed to be redistributed to landless and 
land-poor households. Most production units in An  Giang did not 
operate according to the official product contract system. Rather, they 
divided land among households to be farmed individually but retained 
control over household production, distribution and marketing. 
Production unit cadres monopolised farming services and served 
members poorly while overcharging them for the cost of these services. 
In general, the widespread malpractices of peasants and local officials 
were at odds with VCP leaders’ requirements and contributed to the 
poor performance of collective farming and the eventual derailment of 
many national agrarian policies. Collective farming failed to increase 
productivity or improve peasants’ living standards. Collectivisation 
also aimed to eliminate exploitation but, in reality, it merely created 
a new class of exploiters in rural areas: collective and production unit 
cadres. Land redistribution was supposed to benefit the landless and 
land-poor, but failed to do so. Rather, it largely benefited local cadres 
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and their relatives. The non-resident cultivator prohibition enabled 
collectivisation but, in turn, significantly hindered peasants’ production 
capacity and commercial agriculture in An Giang. 
The failure of collective farming in Vietnam was manifest well before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and before Vietnam’s withdrawal 
from Cambodia. Staple food production in QN-ĐN, An Giang and 
elsewhere in Vietnam declined alarmingly between 1985 and 1987. 
The living conditions of villagers also deteriorated over time. Fed up 
with collective farming, many villagers decided to abandon or return 
land to collectives, especially when Vietnam adopted a market 
economy under the Đổi Mới policy in 1986. To encourage peasants 
to farm their collective fields, some local authorities in QN-ĐN tried 
new farming arrangements as an alternative to the product contract 
system. Authorities in An Giang also recognised that most production 
units were inadequate in quality and that collective farming had failed 
to improve peasants’ living conditions. To increase food production, 
they tried to correct the shortcomings of socialist transformation by 
allowing peasants to farm outside their villages and returning some land 
to productive landowners. These practices happened before national 
leaders launched a major change to their agrarian policy in 1988. 
The poor performance of collective farming and the deteriorating 
living conditions were not confined to QN-ĐN and An Giang, but 
occurred in most parts of Vietnam during 1985–87. Villagers were 
hungry in many locations; they accepted less contracted land and some 
even abandoned land; and their debts increased over time. In response, 
many locations tried new farming arrangements to deal with their 
problems. By September 1987, more than 70 per cent of collectives 
in Vietnam were using farming arrangements other than the product 
contract. Realising they would not be able to reverse the situation, 
the VCP in April 1988 released Resolution No. 10, which endorsed the 
new local arrangements. The resolution marked a new era in Vietnam’s 
agricultural development: the return to household farming. 
In summary, central to the failure and then modification of national 
agrarian policies in southern Vietnam post 1975 were the widespread 
practices of peasants and local officials that were often at odds the 
VCP’s expectations of ‘the new socialist’. Peasants tried their best to 
pursue their own household economic interests rather than collective 
ones. Local cadres often took advantage of their position to benefit 
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themselves rather than to serve the people, the collectives and the state. 
Despite numerous official campaigns to correct and crack down on 
such bad behaviour and even change national policies to accommodate 
local concerns, these problems did not disappear, but in fact increased. 
The ultimate consequences were the inefficiency of collective farming, 
severe food shortages and an economic crisis that eventually forced the 
VCP to accept and endorse the farming arrangements that villagers and 
cadres had initiated to deal with their own local problems. 
My findings on collective farming in QN-ĐN and An Giang in southern 
Vietnam reinforce Ben Kerkvliet’s proposition about the power of 
everyday politics.1 Despite differences in the form and degree of peasant 
action, their everyday politics had a huge impact on the performance of 
collective farming and contributed to the failure and change of national 
agrarian policies. Moreover, it is clear that socialist agrarian reform 
faced stronger resistance from peasants in the Mekong Delta than in 
the Central Coast and the north of the country. Resistance came not 
only from many landowners, but also through a lack of collaboration 
from landless households. Peasant resistance in the Mekong Delta 
took various forms, from subtle everyday politics to open and 
confrontational resistance. However, like ordinary people, many land-
rich and upper–middle peasants resisted state policies individually, 
rather than mobilising others around them to exercise social control 
together. Only in favourable conditions were these peasants able to use 
kinship, informal social networks, local institutions and various other 
measures to evade or make use of state policies for their own gain. 
For example, after An Giang authorities’ Decision No. 303/QD-UB to 
correct the shortcomings of land policies, from 1988 to the early 1990s, 
many upper–middle and middle peasants were able to take advantage 
of this favourable policy to retrieve their previous landholdings.
One might have expected religious factors to be significant in 
understanding the course of collectivisation in southern Vietnam. 
Followers of the Hòa Hảo religion, who were prominent in many parts 
of An Giang province, might have been obstacles for the VCP’s agrarian 
policies. However, I found that the policies encountered major resistance 
in the Southern Region regardless of people’s religious affiliation. 
The  VCP’s plans faced even more problems in NLF-influenced areas 
1  Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics. 
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such as Tân Hội commune (Cai Lậy, Tiền Giang province) and some 
parts of Đồng Tháp province. In Long Điền B, Chợ Mới in An Giang, 
land redistribution and collective farming encountered the same levels 
of resistance in areas where Hòa Hảo predominated as in areas where 
the majority of people were Catholic. When interviewing villagers 
there, I found that Hòa Hảo and non–Hòa Hảo followers had similar 
views and experiences of the post-1975 agrarian reforms and similar 
justifications for their behaviour. I found barely any villagers who used 
their religion to justify their resistance to collective farming. Chợ Mới 
district was a Hòa Hảo stronghold, but also the first district in An Giang 
to complete collectivisation. In general, collective farming encountered 
problems regardless of whether or not the population was Hòa Hảo. 
In QN-ĐN, villagers in many locations were not particularly religious, 
but collective farming ran into trouble there, too. It is therefore likely 
that religion is not an important factor in understanding the course 
of collectivisation in An Giang and QN-ĐN. 
One might wonder whether struggles between villagers and state 
agencies over land and other agrarian issues have abated since the 
reestablishment of household farming. It seems such struggles are 
not over. Land redistribution, which VCP leaders initially considered 
a temporary measure towards collectivisation, turned out to be a source 
of long-term tension and struggle between the party and southern 
society. Land reform and struggles over it occurred from 1975 to the 
late 1980s, continued to be a hot issue in the early 1990s and remain so 
today. For example, despite authorities in An Giang dealing with more 
than 30,000 peasant complaints in 1988–90, a large number of land 
conflicts have still not been resolved. Unable to settle persistent and 
widespread land disputes, An Giang authorities decided in the early 
1990s to stop dealing with such matters—a decision that angered many 
villagers who had not yet regained their lost land. Meanwhile, new 
land conflicts have emerged since the reestablishment of household 
farming, especially since the late 1990s, as Vietnam’s urbanisation and 
industrialisation have intensified. State agencies have often taken over 
villagers’ fields without proper compensation. Local cadres across all 
regions of Vietnam continue to abuse their power to misappropriate 
villagers’ land for their personal benefit. These phenomena have 
exacerbated rural land conflicts. 
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In recent years, hundreds of villagers from different regions of Vietnam, 
disillusioned with local government, have gathered in Hà Nội and Hồ 
Chí Minh City to demand the central government resolve their land 
disputes.2 Some of these disputes have their origins in the post-1975 
land redistribution, while others have resulted from the recent process 
of urbanisation. Villagers’ demonstrations have become a hot issue in 
Vietnam today. In other words, land will likely continue to be a source of 
rural conflict and political discontent in Vietnam in the coming years. 
2  BBC Vietnamese (2016), Dân nhiều vùng lên Hà Nội biểu tình đòi đất [Many people in Hanoi 
protest about land], BBC Vietnamese, 21 January, available from: www.bbc.com/vietnamese/
forum/2016/01/160120_quynhchau_land_protests (accessed 4 October 2017).
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